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Abstract 
German listed firms have been allowed by law some choice of a set of Generally 
Accepted Accounting Standards (GAAP) in the preparation of their consolidated 
accounts since 1998. This thesis examines the relationship between non-financial 
German firms' specific characteristics and their choice of GAAP in the financial year 
ending 2001 using data obtained from Hoppenstedt's Aktienführer. The study is 
conducted on firms from two divisions of the Frankfurt Stock Market. The section 
on the Main Market analyses the GAAP choice of 295 firms between internationally 
recognized accounting standards (IRAS, which includes International Accounting 
Standards (IAS or IFRS) and U. S. GAAP) and German GAAP (GGAAP). The 
analysis of 244 Neuer Markt firms reviews the choice between IAS and U. S. GAAP, 
as such firms must choose one of the two internationally recognised approaches. 
Statistical analysis was undertaken at three different levels: univariable, bivariable 
and multivariable analysis. However, conclusions are based on the results of the 
multivariable analysis, namely multivariable logistic regression models. Results 
show that the choice of IRAS by Main Market companies is statistically positively 
associated with their size, being in a quality segment, having a Big-5 auditor and 
having foreign managers, but is statistically negatively associated with managers' 
holding equity. In the Neuer Markt, on the other hand, the choice of U. S. GAAP 
rather than JAS is statistically positively associated with having a subsidiary in the 
USA, having a Big-5 auditor, and the presence of U. S. investors, but is significantly 
negatively associated with leverage and profitability. Furthermore, the choice of U. S. 
GAAP in the Neuer Markt is also a function of being in specific industry sectors. 
The choice of U. S. GAAP in the Main Market, on the other hand, is significantly 
positively associated with having a U. S. listing and marginally positively associated 
with free float. 
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I Chapter 1: Introduction and purpose of the study 
1.1 Introduction 
Over the last few decades, there has been significant growth in the movement of 
capital across international borders. There has been an increasing need for companies 
to raise capital abroad, and for investors to invest their money in companies abroad. 
financial information produced in different countries lacks international 
comparability because of the impact of political, legal, cultural, and business 
environment on reporting frameworks in these countries (Tarca 2004). Given the 
many advantages comparability can offer for international investing, there has been 
growing attention to the harmonisation of accounting practices of firms across the 
different stock markets. The International Accounting Standards Committee (IAS(', 
IASB now) is known as one of the international organizations which has played a 
vital role in accounting harmonisation. This role started in the year 1973 with the 
establishment of this organisation. IAS (currently IFRS) are widely seen as common 
accounting language or an international accounting language. Another 
internationally widely recognised set of accounting standards is U. S. Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP), which is associated with stringent 
practices and increased disclosure (see Chapter 4). Yet, one should note that US 
CGAAP does not solely consist of accounting standards. In fact it is a vast corpus, 
which includes FASB statements and interpretations, APB Opinions and AICPA 
Accounting Research Bulletins, Rules and interpretative releases of the SEC 
(Gordon, Roberts and Weetman, 1998). 
The history of German firms using internationally recognised accounting practices 
goes back to the early nineties, when some German firms started to use IAS and US 
(ºAAP for their group accounts, either in a supplementary form or as reconciliation. 
Hovvýcver, since 1998 an amendment to the Commercial Code (§ 292a HGB). has 
allowed companies listed on the German Stock Market to adopt internationally 
recognised accounting standards (specifically IAS and US GAAP) for the 
preparation of their consolidated accounts. These developments coincide with 
German companies starting to look to raise capital abroad to a much larger extent. 
This is thought to be a result of the reunification of West and East Germany in 1990. 
which made such heavýyy demands on state borrowing. that companies were forced to 
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look abroad to raise capital (Leuz and Wüstemann. 2004. p-455). In addition the 
privatisation of state owned business also gave an impetus, as the German capital 
markets were deemed too small to absorb major share issues such as arose on the 
privatisation of Deutsche Telekom (November 1996 ' ). The Capital Raising 
Facilitation Act of 1998 (KapAEG2) was presented as a concession for companies 
needing to raise capital abroad. As explained by Leuz and Wüstemann (ibid). this 
regulation was a reflection of demands for reliable public information required to 
attract foreign capital. Ordelheide and KPMG (2001, p. 1360) describe this reform as 
a response to the internationalization of financial reporting. In general terms, one can 
say that both IAS and US GAAP are offered as more sophisticated accounting 
approaches which can be substitutes for local GAAP in Germany. 
By the end of 2001, nearly 28 % of German companies listed on the Frankfurt 
Exchange (other than the Neuer Markt) complied with either IAS or US GAAP. 
Furthermore, the Neuer Markt, which was launched in 1997 as a junior stock market 
for smaller firms, required its companies to prepare their financial statements in 
accordance with either IAS or US GAAP. By the end of 2001. companies in this 
market were nearly equally split between IAS and US GAAP. 
Following this, in May 2002, the Council of the European Union issued a regulation 
on the application of IAS requiring listed companies, including those in the financial 
sector, to prepare their consolidated accounts in accordance with IAS from 2005 
onwards. However, this application is deferred for those companies that were using 
US GAAP at time of this regulation until 2007 (European Parliament, 2004). 
"I, he free choice of a particular set of accounting standards raises the interesting 
question of what factors explain this choice. If one set of accounting standards is 
superior to the other standards, why do not all German firms comply with this set? 
Tlic current research attempts to explain why German listed companies decide on 
using a specific GAAP - US GAAP, IAS or German GAAP 
1.2 Reasons for choosing Germany 
(Berman companies and their accounting practices fain their importance from the 
Biet that Germany is the third largest economy in the world and consequently is of 
Date of IPO (Flippo, 200) 
2 Kap \1 G stands for Kapitalaufnahmeerleichterun`gs`gesetz. It is also translated as La\w for 
simplification of raising capital (Roberts, \Veetman and Gordon. 2002, p. 293) 
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considerable interest (Elston and Goldberg, 2003). Furthermore, as an important 
leading member state in the EU. it has been the focus of several studies on 
international accounting harmonisation. Therefore, although this study belongs to a 
different type of literature, it complements the knowledge provided by studies of 
harmonisation. 
The German model of accounting is very different from the Anglo-Saxon model. 
which is reflected in IAS and US GAAP. Therefore, a voluntary switch from this 
model to the Anglo-Saxon one should be an interesting event and one worth 
examining. German companies are familiar with earnings management (Ball 2004) 
and by following IAS and US GAAP, they might be sacrificing the chance to 
manage earnings (Weißenberger, Stahl and Vorstius, 2004). This research answers 
the question of which specific factors influence this decision. 
1.3 Extant literature 
Literature on the choice of accounting standards is still limited. The first direct study 
on the choice of a particular set of accounting standards is that by Dumontier and 
Raffournier (1998) 3. The authors investigate voluntary compliance with IAS by 
Swiss companies. Their study examines the relationship between specific-firm 
characteristics and the choice of IAS. El-Gazzar and Jacob (1999) do similar work 
on an international sample of multinational firms, but with only a very few 
hypotheses. Ashbaugh (2001), on the other hand, explains voluntary compliance 
with IAS using an international sample at different levels of use (supplementary use 
and total adoption). Furthermore, it is the first study to investigate the factors 
associated with the choice between IAS and US GAAP, although only a limited 
number of factors were studied. 
Leuz (2003), on the other hand, studies information asymmetry across IAS and US 
(ºAAP in the Neuer Markt. He tests whether ask-bid spreads and share turnover (as 
proxies for information asymmetry) of Neuer Markt companies using IAS and US 
GAAP differ significantly across the two groups of firms. Additionally he explores 
the choice between the two GAAPs and the link with a few - firm characteristics. 
"[area (2004) does similar work to Ashbaugh (ibid). but through testing a wider range 
of variables. All the studies above rely on information provided by companies' 
1'his is according to the authors' acknowledgement. 
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annual reports and financial databases. A very recent work by \Veißenberger. Stahl 
and Vorstius (2004) 4, however, studies the switch from German accounting rules to 
IFRS or US GAAP using a different type of data. They survey companies on their 
objectives in choosing either IFRS or US GAAP. They also survey them on whether 
or not they have satisfied their objectives. 
It should be mentioned here that the work in this research is not only based on the 
literature viewed above. A substantial part of the hypotheses tested in this work are 
developed from another branch of the literature. This is the disclosure literature 
which is much larger than the literature on the choice of GAAP. The point in using 
literature on this different topic is the assumption that German companies adopting 
IRAS are voluntarily committing themselves to higher levels of disclosure and more 
stringent practices than those implemented by G GAAP. Therefore, the factors that 
are suggested by researchers as explaining voluntary disclosure may also explain the 
voluntary adoption of a relatively rigorous set of accounting standards such as IAS 
or US GAAP. The same idea is also applied to explain the adoption of US GAAP 
rather than IAS, where US GAAP is assumed to be more stringent and requiring 
more disclosure. A discussion of the logic of this assumption is presented in 
Chapter-5. 
1.4 Differences between the current study and previous work 
Although two of the studies above are mainly conducted on German data' data, the 
present research investigates the topic from a different perspective. Whereas Leuz 
(2003) focuses only on the Neuer Markt, this study includes both the Neuer Markt 
and the Main Market. Furthermore, Leuz mainly concentrates on the subject of 
differences in information asymmetry between IAS and US GAAP. Therefore, his 
vvorl: on the choice between IAS and USGAAP is not the main focus of the study. 
and in turn, he ignores different important features such as internationality and any 
U. S element6 in these companies. Weißenberger et al (ibid), on the other hand, 
consider these factors, but in a survey based study. This is different from the present 
stud, which is based on an annually published database of German listed companies 
' Published at the final stages of finishing the present research 
Tarca (ibid) also included Germany but only as a subsample. Others, such as El-Gazzar and Jacob 
(ibid) and Ashbaugh (ibid) included German firms within international sample containing companies 
from different countries (see Chapter 5. 
It is intended to be any factors related with U. S.. such as having direct in\ e, ýtnients in the U. S. 
4 
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which draws on annual reports and stock market data (Hoppenstedt). Furthermore. 
although their sample included all the companies in the Neuer Markt. it included 
only the DAXI00 companies from the Main Market and excluded a substantial part 
of this market which includes SMAX and other unclassified companies. The present 
research, conversely, includes all the non-financial Main Market companies. One 
fundamental difference between their study and the current work is that their work 
attempts to establish a direct relationship between the companies' choice of GAAP 
and the motives that led to this choice, whereas the present work attempts to 
establish the relationship between the choice of GAAP and different firm 
characteristics. Finally, the two pieces of work have been carried out over nearly the 
same period; nevertheless Weißenberger et al's work happened to be published first7. 
Whatever the methodological differences between the current research and previous 
research, this study covers a wider range of variables and provides the chance for an 
interesting comparison of the analysis of two different choices: between German 
GAAP (GGAAP hereafter) and internationally recognised accounting standards 
(IRAS hereafter) and between IAS and USGAAP in the Neuer Markt and amongst 
Main Market companies using IRAS. 
Moreover, the hypotheses tested in this empirical work are developed within a 
thorough review of two main streams of accounting literature: disclosure literature 
and accounting choices literature. The comprehensive discussions provided to 
develop each hypothesis gather numerous arguments borrowed from both streams of 
literature to form together a substantial body of theory. 
1.5 Research questions: 
This research attempts to answer four main questions: 
" Is the tendency of German companies listed in the Main Market to comply 
with IRAS associated with firm-specific characteristics, namely: size, being 
in quality segments, ownership structure. leverage, listing status, 
internationality of business, internationality of investors. auditor and industry 
sector? 
September 2004. in which this work ww as at the final stages. 
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" Is the tendency of German companies listed in the Main Market (and using 
IRAS) or the Neuer Markt to comply with US GAAP rather than LAS 
associated with firm-specific characteristics, namely size. ownership 
structure, leverage, listing status, having business interests in the U. S.. having 
U. S. investors, listing in the U. S., auditor and industry sector'? 
" Are the factors associated with the choice between GGAAP and IRAN 
different from those associated with the choice between IAS and US GAAP'l 
" Are the factors associated with the choice between IAS and US GAAP in the 
Main Market different from those associated with choice between IAS and 
US GAAP in the Neuer Markt? 
A group of null hypotheses are stated to answer each question. For each firm-specific 
characteristic, at least one or more null hypotheses are tested. To test the influence of 
ownership structure, for example, three null hypotheses are suggested for testing, 
although only two are empirically tested. 
1.6 Scope of the study 
"This study is concerned with non-financial German companies listed on the 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange, which is the main German exchange for equity shares. 
However, this market will not be examined as one unit. Two main divisions of this 
market are the Main Market and the Neuer Markt, which have significant differences 
from each other. The financial year ending in 2001 is chosen as a sample year. This 
'car is the most suitable choice for this work for two reasons. One is that the annual 
reports for this year were the latest available reports at the time this work started 
(further details are discussed in Chapter 6). The second reason is that two years had 
passed after the amendment of the Commercial Law, which would allow enough 
time for companies willing to switch to IRAS to do so. 
1.7 Organisation of the study 
An overview, of the remaining 8 chapters is provided below: 
1.7.1 Chapter 2: German Stock Market 
In order to provide essential background for the following chapters, this chapter aims 
to provide basic background material on the German Stock Market, to which the 
6 
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sample firms belong. Furthermore, it provides a simple overv'ic\v- of the German 
linancial system in which the Stock Market is just one element. Detailed discussion 
is provided on important developments in this market. Special attention in this 
chapter is given to the Frankfurt Stock Exchange including the Neuer Markt. which 
used to be a significant part of the Frankfurt Exchange. 
In fact, information in this chapter is a key to understanding many of the arguments 
used in developing research hypotheses in Chapter 5. 
1.7.2 Chapter 3: German Accounting 
This Chapter is structured so as to study the environment of German accounting 
from five different angles. The importance of this chapter is evident in the need to 
know about the accounting rules which are still the main choice in the German 
market. 
First, it provides an overview on the position of Germany in the classification of 
international accounting models. Second, it uses an approach suggested by Nobes 
(2000) to look at the environment of German accounting by identifying direct 
influences. Third, it provides an explanation of the different sources of German 
accounting regulation. Fourth, it discusses the key features of German accounting in 
accordance with Gray's model (1988). Finally, it gives a brief overview of the 
German auditing market. Given the purpose of this chapter, it is intended to be 
predominantly descriptive rather than analytical. 
1.7.3 Chapter 4: an Analytical Overview on the use of GGAAP, IAS and 
USGAAP 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an explanation of the relationship between 
GGAAP, IAS (IFRS) and US GAAP. It is structured into six main sections: First, it 
describes the general attitude of German interested parties towards IAS (IFRS) and 
US GAAP prior to incorporating them into German Law. Second, the case of 
Daimler Benz is used to illustrate different important points. Third is a discussion 
about income smoothing. Fourth, the main differences between the three models of 
accounting (or maybe twos) are explored. Fifth follows a discussion of the value 
lt \\ C considered that LAS and US GAAP belong to one model (Anglo-Saxon) 
7 
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relevance of GGAAP compared with IAS and US GAAP. The final section is a brief 
overview of the prospective use of IAS in EU member states. 
1.7.4 Chapter 5: Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
The aim of this chapter is twofold: first is to provide a rev ie«w of the literature which 
focuses on the main topic of this research. The second is to develop through this 
review a set of hypotheses that will be tested in this research. These aims are 
achieved by supporting each hypothesis with arguments that are borrowed from two 
main streams of literature: literature on the choice of accounting standards and 
literature on voluntary disclosure. Ten hypotheses are developed to explain the 
choice between GGAAP and USGAAP. Furthermore, eleven hypotheses are 
developed to explain the choice between IAS and USGAAP. 
1.7.5 Chapter 6: Research Design 
This chapter is intended to give a detailed view of several methodological issues 
related to the analysis of this research. This will include an introduction to the data 
resource used, the study sample, the process of data collection, and an introduction to 
the different statistical methods used. This chapter provides an essential introduction 
['Or the following two chapters, 7 and 8. 
1.7.6 Chapter 7: Analysis on the choice between IRAS and GGAAP 
This chapter contains two main parts: statistical analysis on the choice of GGAAP or 
IRAS and a discussion on the different results. The statistical analysis takes three 
different lines: univariable, bivariable and multivariable analysis. The first type 
Iýrovides a summary of some important descriptive statistics of all the variables 
tested. Furthermore, the t-test and its non-parametric equivalent, Mann-Whitney, are 
included under univariable analysis. Bivariable analysis includes chi-square tests and 
the use of crosstabulation. Finally, the multivariable analysis covers the construction 
of a multivariable model, which tests the different hypotheses in a multivariable 
scttirig. 
It should also be mentioned that ANOVA and its non-parametric equivalent Kruskal- 
Wallis arc used to analyse the choice between GGAAP. I: AS or I ISGAAP (as three 
(1n)ups). 
8 
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The second main part of this chapter is devoted to a discussion of the different 
results. 
1.7.7 Chapter 8: Analysis on the Choice between JAS and USGAAP 
The choice between IAS and USGAAP takes place both in the Main Market and the 
Neuer Markt, but in different contexts as explained above. Hence, Chapter 8 presents 
the results of the analysis of the two markets. The design of this chapter is very 
similar to that in Chapter 7, although this chapter does not include the use of 
ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis (which are designed for the analysis of three groups). 
1' urthermore, the presentation of the different results is followed by a section which 
provides a detailed discussion of the different results and compares them with those 
of Chapter 7. 
1.7.8 Chapter 9: Summary, Conclusions and Suggestions for Further research 
This Chapter is designed to present a summary of the whole study and to provide the 
main conclusions. It also ends with brief suggestions for further research in related 
areas. 
9 
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2 Chapter 2: German Financial system and German Stock Market 
2.1 Introduction: 
In order to provide essential background for the following chapters, this chapter aims 
to provide basic background material on the German Stock Market, to which the 
sample firms belong. However, it is necessary to provide a simple overview of the 
German financial system in which the Stock Market is just one element. Schmidt and 
Tyrell (2004) evaluate the German financial system across four headings: banks, 
non-bank financial intermediaries, financial markets and the regulatory environment 
in which these institutions work. This structure is used as an approach to describe the 
German financial system, but, non-bank financial intermediaries and the regulatory 
framework will be dealt with very briefly9. 
2.2 Banks: 
The German banking system can be characterized as "a universal banking system" as 
it is dominated by universal banks (Hackethal 2004, p. 72). In such a system banks 
are engaged in all types of financial business. This important role of universal banks 
in Germany dates back to the nineteenth century. German universal banks can be 
' divided into three groups: commercial banks, savings banks and cooperative banks °. 
Schmidt and Tyrell (2004, p31) state: "In terms of the numbers of banks and 
banking offices, German was and still is, one of the most heavily `banked 
economies in the world". Furthermore, they report that the ratio of banking assets to 
GDP is relatively high compared to other industrialized countries. 
Elsas and Krahnen (2004, p. 227) summarize the `close ties' between universal 
banks and German firms in terms of four ways in which banks can influence 
management decisions of firms: "debt provision, direct equity stakes, proxy voting 
rights and supervisory board representation"". Furthermore the so-called Hausbank 
is a prime example of the aforementioned `close ties". 
`' Banks are given more attention because of their significance importance in the German firms as one 
could see below. 
"' In terms of business volume. the market shares of these banks are (3 %, 40 % and 10 % 
reshcctiv c Iv); whereas specialised banks comprise the remainder (15 ° o) (Deutsche Bundesbank, 
Yet, one should know. that the importance of debt provision is `-greater in the case of non-listed 
Grins, tor which debt is the onl\ external finance resource. 
10 
Chapter 2: German Financial s1 vstem and German Stock . 
llui"kct 
The Huu, vhunk is based on the principle of a long-term stable relationship betvv een 
German banks and firms. as opposed to the principle of deal-based banking in the 
UK and US (Schneider-Lenne, 1994). According to Elsas and Krahnen (ibid. p.? 11). 
a German bank can be described as a Hausbank; if it "(i) has a high share in debt 
financing, (ii) a high share in payment transactions, (iii), (iv) has a high share in the 
long-term or short-term financing, (v), (vi), (vii) undertakes special, exclusive, or 
intense business with the firm, (viii) the period of the bank-borrower relationship is 
long, or (ix) has influence on the firm's management". 
Overall, despite the recent developments in the German financial and economic 
system, it is not very clear whether this system should be classified as a bank-based 
system or a market-based system. Schneider-Leine (ibid, p. 287) emphasises that 
although the relationship between German banks and firms is more than being a 
borrower-lender relationship, observers outside Germany tend to "grossly 
overestimate" the influence banks have on the German economy. However, 
conclusion on the classification of the German financial system may be found in a 
report by Deutsche Bundesbank (2003, p. 4) stating that: "the German financial 
system can be considered a "hybrid" system lying somewhere between a purely 
bank-based and a purely market-based system". 
2.3 Non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFIs): 
There are two main groups of non-bank financial intermediaries in Germany: 
insurance companies and investment funds. In terms of gross direct premiums 
written in 2003, the German insurance industry is the fourth largest insurance market 
in the world after the US, Japan and the UK (Insurance Information Institute, 2004). 
The investments of insurance funds are mainly in loans and bonds. Furthermore. 
they indicate that insurance funds invest in domestic equities with virtually nothing 
iwcsted in foreign equities (Schmidt and Tyrell, ibid)'2. 
The second main group of NBFIs is the Investment Funds. It is necessary to 
distinguish between the investment companies, and the funds themselves. The major 
shareholders of the investment companies are mainly banks 
3 (it can be a single bank 
or a banking group). These banks usually work as `marketing channels' for shares in 
: Although their stud\ is published 
in 2004. the statistics used in this part were from the \ear 1999. 
13 Insurance companies are another type of possible shareholders (Maurer 2004) 
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the funds administered by their investment funds. As in the insurance sector. the 
majority of these funds are invested in loans and government bonds (ibid). 
In terms of both assets under management and market share by 2000. the German 
mutual funds industry was the fifth largest behind the US, Japan, France and Italy. 
Still the German investment industry accounts for a low percentage (9 %)! 4 of GDP 
(ibid). 
2.4 Regulatory environment: 
Schmidt and Tyrell (ibid, p. 39) provide a brief overview of German financial 
regulation and supervision, which distinguishes three fields: banking, capital markets 
and insurance. In short, although banking regulations are well developed, the 
insurance industry was much more heavily regulated". On the other hand, until the 
mid 1990s, the stock market was "rather neglected". However, as explained below'. 
the reforms of 1998 and 2002 indicate an increasing orientation towards the German 
Stock Market. Furthermore, in 2002 the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority 
was established as an integrated financial services supervisor, which integrated 
supervisory offices for banking, insurance and securities trading (Fischer and Pfeil, 
1004). 
Accounting regulations which may be considered as a part of the regulatory 
environment of the financial system are dealt with in Chapter 3. 
2.5 Financial Markets: 
German financial markets include the primary markets and the secondary markets 
br securities and financial instruments, and also the money markets. The remainder 
of this section is devoted to a detailed explanation of the German Stock Market, as it 
is closely related to the subject of this research. 
?. 5.1 German Stock Market: 
The German Stock Exchange is known to be both Vertically and horizontally 
segmented (Hunger 2003). In the horizontal dimension it comprises eight regional 
lthou`gh the references used are up to date, statistics available through them are not the latest. 
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stock exchanges (merged in six groups currently Berlin, Bremen, Düsseldorf. 
rankfurt, Hamburg. Hanover, Munich and Stuttgart. The vertical dimension, on the 
other hand, consists of the three statutory segments described below. All the German 
stock markets have been unified by the Stock Exchange Act (' Börsengesetz") of 
1896, which has been revised several times (Deutsche Börse AG, 2003a). Although 
Germany in terms of GDP has the third strongest economy in the \\ orld after the 
USA and Japan (Economist. com, 2004), the German stock market is not as strong 
and is relatively small. Furthermore, the German stock market is occasionally 
characterised as an "emerging market" (Rosen, 1999). Theissen (2004) investigates 
whether Germany's "organized capital markets are, in some sense, under-developed" 
(Theissen, 2004, p. 139). He based this hypothesis on the fact that the German 
financial system is typically "a bank-dominated system". The following provides 
some important statistics which may highlight the position and importance of the 
German Stock Market in international terms. Moreover, it discusses some of the 
f-acts about German equity culture. 
2.5.1.1 Number of listed companies: 
As can be seen from Table 2.2, in terms of the number of listed shares, Frankfurt 16 
(FWB) 17 was the eleventh stock market in the world. However, in terms of foreign 
companies, it was the fourth one after NASDAQ, NYSE and LSE. 
I'<<ble 2.1: Numbers of Companies Listed on International Stock Markets 
stock Market Domestic Foreign Total 
NASDAQ 3618 445 4063 
Canadian. V. E 2688 0 2688 
NYSE 1939 461 2400 
London 1923 409 2332 
Tokyo 2103 38 2141 
Madrid 1458 22 1480 
Australian 1334 76 1410 
Osaka 1335 0 1335 
Toronto 1261 38 1299 
Euronext ` 1132 NA 1 132 
Deutsche Börse 748 235 983 
source: World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) (2001) 
In 1003, Berlin and Bremen merged to-ether to form one Exchange: whereas Hannover and 
Hamburg \\ ere merged in one group operated by Börsen AG (but still regional for small and medium 
cap firms) 
6 This includes the Official Market, Regulated Market and the Neuer Markt 
I'his abbreviation stands for "Frankfurter V1'ertpapierborse" (Deutsche Börse ; 1G). 
This exchange co\ crs four markets Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon and Paris 
\\\\\\. IIh\. COnl 
ý 1 
Chapter 2: German Financial s vstem and German , 5'toc k . 
harket 
The number of listed German companies has fluctuated during the twentieth century 
as a result of political, economic and legal changes. In Germany. there are about 3 
million businesses of which 600,000 are organised as corporations and some 6500 in 
the legal form of "Aktiengesellschaft" (Stock Corporation). Of these 6500 stock 
corporations, approximately, 750 are listed on the stock exchange (German Business 
Trends, July 2001). These numbers cast light on the great potential for growth in the 
German stock market. One important thing is that the number of foreign equities 
traded on the unofficial regulated market (Freiverkehr) in the German exchanges 
other than FWB is very large. For example, on the Berlin Stock Exchange, it is 
possible to trade all NASDAQ shares. Furthermore, the number of foreign equities 
traded on the Freiverkehr market of Berlin in 2001 totalled 9373 (9421 in 2000) from 
60 countries (Berliner Wertpapier Börse, 2001). 
2.5.1.2 Market Capitalisation 
According to statistics provided by the World Federation of Stock Exchanges for the 
year 2001 which are shown in Table 2.3, Deutsche Börse was the 6th stock market in 
terms of market capitalisation of listed domestic companies. 
Table 2.2: The World's Largest Stock Markets 
Market (2001) Capitalisation (US$) 
NYSE 11,026,586.5 
NASDAQ 2,739,674.7 
Tokyo 2,264,527.9 
London 2,164,716.2 
Euronext 1,843,528.6 
Deutsche Börse 1,071,748.7 
Toronto 611,492.8 
Italy 527,467.3 
SNviss Exchange 527,374.6 
long Kong 506,072.9 
source: WFE (2004) 
2.5.1.3 Market Capitalisation and Gross Domestic Product (GDP): 
The ratio of market capitalization to GDP can be an important economic indicator. 
'Fable 2.4 shows this ratio across the strongest economies in the world. 
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Table 2.3: Market Capitalization to GDP% in larger industrial countries 
1990 1995 2001 
UK 88.2 121.6 152.0 
US 48.7 95.2 136.3 
¬ countries 27.4 28.8 70.7 
Germany 25.0 23.9 58.1 
Japan 98.6 71.4 55.4 
Source: Theissen (2004) 
It can be seen from Table 2.4 that the capitalisation of the German Stock Market as a 
percentage of German GDP is small compared with the UK, US and the average of 
the Euro countries but still higher than that in Japan. The statistics above may not be 
very meaningful without considering the absolute numbers. It is known, for example, 
that the US stock market is the largest in the world by market capitalisation (see 
Table 2.3); nevertheless the US ratio comes third after the UK (and France22). This 
can be explained by the fact that GDP is exceptionally large in the case of USA. 
However, the US ratio is still much higher than the ratio in Japan and Germany, 
which are the second and third strongest economies in the world respectively and 
that is what might show the small relative size of the stock markets of these countries 
compared with the US. On the other hand, the UK was first because it has lower 
GDP, whereas it has the third largest stock market. From the numbers shown above, 
it is clear that German Stock Market has less economic importance than its 
counterparts in the UK and US. Using older data, a similar conclusion to this was 
made by Schneider-Lenne (ibid). 
2.5.1.4 Dramatic Changes during the decade (1991-2000) 23 
The German Stock Market witnessed significant changes during the decade (1991- 
2000). These changes were in part reflected in market capitalization and the average 
number of Initial Public Offers (IPOs). The average between 1949 and 1982 was 3.3, 
\vhcreas this average increased to reach an annual average of 19.5 between 1984 and 
1996 (Franzke, Grobs and Laux, 2004). As can be seen in Table 2.5 and Figure 2.1 
he lo\ty, there was dramatic increase in the number of IPOs in the last three years of 
the decade. This dramatic increase can be explained by the introduction of the Neuer 
1" The av craze for the Euro countries 
21 The original reference for this is DAI Factbook (2002) 
22 ; Accordino to statistics taken from WFE, this percentage for France is I1 1 °, (') for 2000 (144 % for 
200 I as calculated by the researcher based on figures taken from \\ \V \\ finanzplatz. de 
Source: \v \v-\v . tinanzplatz. 
de 
Iý 
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Markt in 1997 (ibid). Furthermore, this dramatic increase in IPOs was combined 
with an increase in market capitalization. Conversely, in the year 2000, the 
substantial increase of 152 new companies combined with a decrease in market 
capitalization. It can be seen from Table 2.5, that the market capitalization decreased 
in the years 2000,2001,2002 (4 %, 12 % and 46 % respectively) in spite of the 
increase in the number of listed companies. This was simply due to the general fall in 
stock prices. 
Table 2.4: Market Capitalization and IPOs in German Stock Market 
Year Market cap 
E Mio 
`%, change IPOs `%, change 
1991 304,973 - 19 19 
1992 287,292 -6 9 9 
1993 409,084 42 11 11 
1994 395,679 -3 15 15 
1995 422,523 7 20 20 
1996 528,713 25 14 14 
1997 758,681 43 36 36 
1998 931,629 23 79 79 
1999 1,428,873 53 175 175 
2000 1,371,271 -4 142 142 
2001 1,203,681 -12 26 26 
2002 647,492 -46 7 7 
Source: based on information taken from WFE and Franzke et al 
(2004) 
Bars show Means 
150- 
100- 
50- 
0- 
up* 
me-po 
go "our 
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Fi,, ure 2.1: Initial Public Offers (IPOs) 1991-2002 
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2.5.1.5 Equity Culture in Germany: 
One of factors which might affect the growth of the stock market may be the lack of 
an equity culture within German society (Rosen, ibid). One argument is that German 
firms are commonly said to be more highly-geared than firms in the UK and US. 
Consequently, this has had a negative impact on the growth of the German Stock 
Market (Murray, 2001). However, this argument may not be entirely true. Edwards 
and Fischer (1994), for example, criticise the fact that international comparisons 
always show that equity debt ratio in Germany is higher than that in the UK. They, 
indicate that accounting rules may be behind these differences. They also report that 
some researchers such as Perlitz et al (1985) proved that after adjusting for 
accounting differences, there are no substantial differences in the debt-equity ratios 
of German and British enterprises. 
Furthermore, Rajan and Zingales (1995) who compare the leverage in the G7 to 
provide surprising results by showing Germany and UK were less levered than other 
countries24. The differences between the two countries did not seem to be significant 
at all. 
Figure 2.2 below shows the percentages of shareholdings in the German equity 
market. The largest shareholding group is non-financial firms with a percentage of 
32.5 %. The percentage held by households, on the other hand, is relatively small 
(compared with 39.1% in the US). This seems to be consistent with the fact that 
ºerman households tend to invest in bank deposits and government or bank-issued 
bonds (as mentioned earlier, Germans, in general, have propensity to acquire bonds 
rather than shares) Based on these observations, Theissen (ibid) concluded that the 
German capital market is underdeveloped in terms of volume. Furthermore, he states 
that the German capital market is also underdeveloped in the legal dimension. But it 
should be noted that his conclusion is based on a comparison with US standards. 
McMillan (2004) reports the results of studies by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
S111eifer and Vishay (2002) and Leahy. Schich. Wehinger. Pelgrin. and Thorgiersson 
(2001) which rate investor protection in different industrial countries including 
(icrmanv. While La Porta et al (ibid) give a score of 5 for the UK compared to I for 
Gcrmanv; Leahy et al (ibid. ) give a score of 0.86 for the UK compared to 0.23 for 
11 Theisscn (2004, p. 140) for some reason report the wron`g results of this stud\ b\ sa\ ink that Rajan 
; ind Zingalcs found that the book equity to capital is the lowest in German. 
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Germany. It is clear that Germany has been rated significantly lower than the UK. 
This raises an interesting question about the relationship between the lack of a strong 
equity culture in Germany and weak investor protection. Is weak investor protection 
the result of the lack of a strong equity culture, or is it the other way round'? 
According to recent reforms in the German market. one can argue that. at least now, 
German legislators are trying to improve the legal environment for investors to 
create a stronger equity culture. 
Nowak (2004) presents a chronology of formal legal changes in the German Capital 
Market. Examples of these changes are: First, Second, Third, Fourth Financial 
Market Promotion Act (1990,1994,1998 and 2002 respectively): changing Rules 
and Regulations of the German Stock Market (1997); Raising of Equity Relief Act 
(1998) and Tax Reduction Act (2000). These reforms, in general, have increased the 
scope of investor protection in the German regulatory environment. Hence, these 
legal changes are, in fact, milestone events which may lead to the convergence of the 
German capital market towards the Anglo-American model (a market-based model) 
(Nowak, ibid; Theissen, ibid). Finally, the latest restructuring of FWB (described in 
a later section) can be viewed as a positive step taken by Deutsche Börse to sustain 
Germany's equity culture. 
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Figure 2.2: Shareholdings in the German Stock Market 
Source: Theissen (2004) 
2.5.2 Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FWB) is the largest of the eight German Exchanges. The 
vast majority of German equities (approximately 83 %25) are listed on FWB. 
Moreover, in the year 2000, about 87 % of the total German stock exchange turnover 
from equities was realised in FWB. The role of Frankfurt in international financial 
services has been examined in different studies, such as a survey carried out by 
CEER (Centre for European Economic Research) and a survey carried out by Bristol 
University in 1996 (Bindemann, 1999), Results proved the competitive position of 
this market among its European rivals, the Paris and London Exchanges, although 
I , ondoii 
is still the leader in many respects. For different international organisations 
which are concerned with international economic statistics such as the World Bank 
and the World Federation of Exchanges. Frankfurt has become a synonym for the 
This percentage is calculated according to the information in Hoppenstedt. The number of domestic 
firms which are traded on German Stock exchanges but not on FWB is approximately 150 (78 on the 
Official and 72 on the Regulated). In general these firms are small and local (operate in the cities 
vv-here the other exchanges belong). 
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German Stock Exchange26. For this reason Frankfurt has been chosen to represent 
the German Stock Exchange in this research. Frankfurt is operated by Deutsche 
Börse AG. 
2.5.2.1 Historical Overview of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
In fact, the following is a very brief overview of the history FWB which developed 
through a sequence of historical events. Frankfurt as a city has been an important 
place for commercial transactions since medieval times. In 1605 the name Börse was 
given to the annual meetings of merchants to regulate financial transactions. In 1896, 
the Stock Exchange Act was enacted to gather the German Stock Exchanges into a 
uniform organisation. By the end of World War I, the FWB had lost its position as 
an international market with the disappearance of all foreign securities from its lists 
and damage to its historic building. The Nazi regime also hampered the development 
of the free market and stock exchange trading. In 196, the trading of foreign 
securities started again on the FWB (Deutsche Börse, 2003a). 
2.5.2.2 Contemporary FWB: 
The contemporary FWB can be characterized by several events in the last few 
decades, which will be discussed below. First central transactions via computer were 
introduced in Frankfurt in 1969; in 1988 the DAX share index was launched to 
become one of the world's most important indices, the establishment of Deutsche 
Börse AG in 1993 to be the operating body of FWB; foundation of the Neuer Markt 
in 1997, and finally in the same year Xetra, the new electronic trading system, was 
introduced for German and cross-border securities trading in Frankfurt (explained 
he low). 
2' This is clear from the fact that data on Frankfurt is used in international databases Without 
considering any of other stock markets 
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2.5.2.3 Number of firms listed on FWB: 
Table 2.6 below shows the numbers of companies listed on FWB for the years 1995 
to 2001. 
Table 2.5: Numbers of Domestic Listed Companies 
Year Official 
Trading 
Regulated 
Market 
Unofficial Reg. 
Market 
Neuer 
Market 
Total 
1995 297 68.9 77 17.9 57 13.2 0 0 431 
1996 303 70.0 73 16.9 57 13.2 0 0 433 
1997 305 67.8 75 16.7 57 12.7 13 2.9 450 
1998 323 59.8 75 13.9 88 16.3 54 10 540 
1999 354 50.4 88 12.5 92 13.1 168 23.9 702 
2000 366 40.4 95 10.5 161 17.8 283 31.3 905 
2001 359 39.4 118 12.9 163 17.9 272 29.8 912 
Source: Hunger (2003) 
2.5.2.4 Market segmentation in FWB 
FWB is structured according to two types of segmentation: statutory segmentation 
and quality segmentation. 
2.5.2.4.1 Statutory segmentation: 
According to this type of segmentation, FWB is divided into three market segments: 
Official Market (Amtlicher Markt), Regulated Market (Geregelter Markt). and 
Unofficial Regulated Market (Freiverkehr: over the counter). These segments are 
defined by the German Stock Exchange Law and Listing Application Regulation. 
Since this segmentation is defined in German Law, it is applied to all German 
Exchanges. 
Official Market (Amtlicher Markt): Official Market is the segment that posts the 
highest turnover on the FWB. Furthermore, it is the oldest market segment in the 
German stock exchanges (Hunger. 2003). Companies on the official list must go 
through an approval process under public-sector legal provisions with strict 
admission criteria. Provisions regulating the official listing are supplied by the Stock 
Exchange Act, the Stock Exchange Listing Directive and the Offering Prospectus 
Law. The minimum age for companies on the Official Market is three years with 
re Stilar published financial statements during this period. The minimum expected 
issuing value is EUR 1.25. -hile the total par value must be at least EUR 250.000. 
Furthermore. companies are required to have a minimum free float of 25 %. Stocks 
-) 1 
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listed on this segment currently27 are 555 shares including the 30 standard stocks 
making up the DAX. 4,300 Bonds are listed in this segment (Deutsche Börse AG. 
2003b). 
Regulated Market (Geregelter Markt): although the legal provisions regulating 
the admission to this segment are the same as the Official Market, admission criteria 
are less strict. This segment was founded ninety years later than the Official Market 
to lower the market-entry-barriers for small companies to facilitate the raising of 
capital (Hunger 2003). There is no minimum age for the companies listed on this 
segment, but the minimum capital required is of total par value of EUR 250,000 with 
a minimum of 10,000 shares. This segment is usually used by medium-sized 
companies when going public. Some 200 shares and about 1,200 bonds are in this 
segment (Deutsch Börse AG, 2003b). 
Regulated Unofficial Market (Freiverkehr): 
This segment is for trading unlisted securities (over the counter, OTC). The OTC 
market had existed even before the Stock Exchange Act in 1897 (in unregulated 
form). However, it has been developed into a regular and an "unregular" OTC 
market (Hunger, 2003). In 1987, as a result of legal reforms, the OTC market took 
the form of Regulated Unofficial Market and Non-Regulated Unofficial Market. This 
segment is not an organized market within the meaning of the German Securities 
I'rade Act (§ 2 para. 5WpHG) (Deutsche Börse AG, 2003b). This market is regulated 
by the private rules of Deutsche Börse AG. As explained later in Chapter 6, this 
market is not within the scope of this research which is only concerned with listed 
firms. 
2.5.2.4.2 Quality Segments 
While the statutory segments described above are defined by law, the quality 
segmentation in FWB is set up by Deutsche Börse AG under private law and high 
transparency requirements. One important thing is that the current quality 
segmentation in FWB is different from that during the sample period. While this 
section explains the segmentation during the period of the current study (2001). 
another section below describes the recent developments in the structure of FWB. 
'[he FWB \\'as segmented into DAX. MDAX. sMAX and the Neuer Market. The 
- 
27 Jan '003 
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criteria which govern the choice of companies for DAX or MDAX are different from 
the ones for SMAX and the Neuer Market. 
DAX: this abbreviation stands for Deutscher Aktienindex (a registered trademark). 
This segment comprises Germany's top 30 blue chips. The main criteria considered 
for companies to be included in this segment are28: turnover, market capitalisation. 
quarterly reporting duty, holding analysts' conferences, and block ownership versus 
free float. However, one should remember that only firms in the Official market are 
required to have minimum free float; and that DAX is open for companies from both 
Official and Regulated markets. The composition of this segment is checked 
annually and adjusted in September. However, all the companies currently in this 
segment are from the Official List. One should notice that after the reorganisation of 
Deutsche Börse's segments in 2003, firms cannot be listed on DAX unless they are 
listed on the Prime Standard. 
DAX is the index associated with this segment and is considered to be a major mood 
barometer for the German economy. Shares related to this index account for 80 
percent of FWB's turnover and 70 percent of the whole German stock market. This 
last piece of information proves the significant role of DAX companies in the 
German economy. 
MDAX: This segment comprised the 70 largest German companies (currently 50)29 
which are not included in the DAX. This segment is described by Deutsche Börse as 
the springboard for companies to the DAX. Like DAX, this segment has its index 
which is MDAX containing all 70 companies. The composition of this index is 
checked semi annually and adjusted in March or September. Listing in this segment 
is based on the same criteria used in DAX. 
Changes in DAX and MDAX are decided by the Executive Board of the Deutsche 
Börse. 
SMAX: Companies in SMAX are not classified accordinIg to their turnover or 
capitalisation as in DAX and MDAX. Companies in SMAX are of small and 
medium size and they have voluntarily chosen to adhere to strict transparency and 
liquidity standards. Decision on admission to SNIAX is taken hY Deutsche Börse. 
Details of this criteria can be found on the Deutsche Börse's wvebsite 
Recent changes in Market segmentation are discussed below. 
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while eligibility of companies to be in SNIAX is conditional on being listed in 
Official Market or Regulated Market on FWB. with a minimum free float of at least 
20 percent. In addition. it must meet stringent disclosure standards and to organise a 
yearly informational event for analysts. Companies on SMAX were supposed to 
comply with either IFRS or US GAAP from 2002 onwards30 (Deloitte and IAS Plus. 
2001). This gives these companies the chance to go above the second-tier stocks in 
order to attract investors and analysts. The number of firms currently in SMAX is 
6331 
, whereas at the end of 
2001 it was 127. Unlike DAX and MDAX, foreign 
companies are allowed to inter SMAX. The Index related to this segment was 
SMAX All Shares which comprises all shares in the SMAX segment. This segment 
was closed at the end of 2002 within the reorganisation of FWB (see below). 
Neuer Markt: This market was launched in March 1997. It is a customised segment 
for companies in sectors such as telecommunications, media and entertainment, 
technology, software, internet, IT services, biotechnology, industrial services, 
medical technology, and financial services. 
2.5.3 Overview of the Neuer Markt: 
The Neuer Markt is considered as `a growth market' because it contains young 
companies which belong to the sectors mentioned above. This market and some 
other European markets are NASDAQ look-alikes produced for smaller companies. 
Examples of these markets are the UK AIM and the French Nouveau Marche. 
Although the Neuer Markt is separate from the Regulated Unofficial Market, the 
private law of the Neuer Markt implemented stricter requirements for the admission 
of securities and ongoing disclosure obligations than those in the official market and 
the regulated market. Furthermore, these requirements may be in some areas even 
stricter than those of NASDAQ (Shearman and Sterling 2001, Hunger 2003). For 
admission to the Neuer Markt, companies are required to have an equity capital of at 
least ¬ 1.5 Mio (Official market: ¬ 1.25 Mio). The aggregated market price of the 
issue had to amount to at least ¬5 Mio (Official market: ¬ 2.5 Mio). Additional 
requirements concern the minimum nominal value of the issue (¬ 250,000) and the 
minimum number of shares (100,000). The issuer should have had a track record of. 
This of course comes after the sample period. 
;ý Jan 200 
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at least. three years, and the free-float of the issue had to be at least 2% of the 
aggregate nominal volume. After going public, firms were required to publish 
quarterly reports, financial statements and management reports according to LAS or 
US-GAAP in both German and English. Furthermore. the issuers were required to 
hold an analysts' meeting at least once a year (Burghof and Hunger, 2003). 
In a few years the Neuer Markt has attracted European shares from all over Europe 
and has become a strong competitor. For flying starts the Neuer Markt stands 
unrivalled" (The Economist 1999). It can be seen from Table 2.7 that the Neuer 
Markt had the largest share of new issues for the four years, although other markets 
such as NASDAQ Europe (EASDAQ previously) and Nouveau Marche are pioneers 
in the growth markets. Figure 2.3, on the other hand, shows how large the proportion 
of the Neuer Markt in the total market capitalization of the European `growth 
market'32 was, as at July 2001. 
Table 2.6: Number of IPOs and Issuing Volume in European Growth Market 
Year IPOs Neuer SWX Nuovo NASDAQ Nouveau AIM 
Europe Markt Mercato Europe Marche 
1996 Number 19 0% 0% 0% 21 % 79% 0% 
Volume ¬ Mio 451 0% 0% 0% 50% 50% 0% 
1997 Number 45 29% 0% 0% 33 % 38 % 0% 
Volume ¬Mio 1411 56% 0% 0% 32% 12% 0% 
1998 Number 101 43 % 0% 0% 16% 42% 0% 
Volume ¬ Mio 3181 51 % 0% 0% 32 % 16% 0% 
1999 Number 261 51 % 2% 3% 6% 12% 25 % 
Volume ¬ Mio 9479 70 % 5% 3% 12% 5% 4% 
2000 Number 436 32% 3% 7% 1% 12% 45 % 
Volume ¬ Mio 22067 59 % 5% 16% 2% 7% 10% 
2001 Number 79 9% 0% 6% 0% 13 % 72% 
Volume ¬ Mio 5765 11 % 0% 2% 0% 13 % 74 % 
source: Deutsche Börse AG, Neuer Markt Report (2001) 
explained abo\ c that it is for \ oung innovative firms 
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8.0% 
Figure 2.3: Market Capital Distribution in the European Growth Market, as at July 2001 
Source: Deutsche Börse AG 
Among its European rivals, the Neuer Markt benefited the most from the high-tech 
bubble in the late nineties. Consequently, it suffered the most from the bursting of 
this bubble in 2000 (Audley, 2004). Furthermore, in 2001 the Neuer Markt 
continued to lose its dominant position with a series of scandals and legal disputes 
involving misleading disclosure practices, insider trading and obvious fraud (Nowak 
2004). Deutsche Börse AG tried to maintain the continuity of the Neuer Markt by 
tightening the disclosure rules and implementing contractual penalties. This led to 
large number of delistings and many companies left this market for less regulated 
market (ibid). By October 2002, the Neuer Markt's index had lost more than 95 per 
cent of its value. In contrast to what is quoted from the Economist (US) (1999) 
above, the following is quoted from the Economist (US) (2002): "Deutsche Börse 
which runs the Neuer Market, would have shown the door to more such "penny 
stocks" had it not been stopped in court". 
'I'hc issues of inadequate reporting were raised earlier than 2001. In 2000 alone, 102 were officiall\ 
criticized for inadequate quarterly reporting (Nowak 2004). 
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In June 2003 Deutsche Börse decided to close the Neuer Markt in December 2003 
within the framework of the reorganisation explained below. 
Burghof and Hunger (ibid) suggest some causes for the failure of this market: first, a 
large number of firms had to be brought to the market in a very short period of time, 
in order to exploit the push of the primary market in the late nineties and to compete 
with other European markets; second, many firms in the Neuer Markt did not satisfy 
some of the listing requirements such as the minimum free float and the three 'cars 
track record; third, some other factors affected the Neuer as well as other stock 
markets, such as, the failure of auditors to protect investors from manipulation in 
accounts and the irresponsible behaviour of some investment consultants or financial 
analysts. 
2.5.4 Xetra: 
A brief overview of Xetra is necessary as it has a significant role in the performance 
cif' FWB. Xetra was introduced by Deutsche Börse AG in 1997 as an electronic order 
system to replace IBIS34. However, the implementation of Xetra was made on a 
"step by step" basis in several releases between 1997 and 1998 (DeMarchi and 
Foucault, 2000). Shares are traded simultaneously on the floors of the eight 
exchanges and on the electronic trading system, Xetra, nevertheless there is no price 
link enforced between Xetra and the floors 35. Trading on this system is based on a 
strict price and time priority 36 . 
This means a better price is the dominant priority. Yet, 
in the case of price equality, the early price input has the priority (Hau, 2001). While 
floor trading is organized as an auction system, trading on Xetra is described as "a 
hybrid of an auction and a market maker system" (Leuz, 2003, p. 452). Figure 2.4 
below shows Xetra's increasing market share of the German equity trading volume. 
It can be seen that this proportion reached its highest share of 71.4 % in the year 
200 3. 
34 An older electronic system built in 1991 to trade the most liquid stocks. 
As a result of this price discrepancies between Xetra and trading floors \\ hich can be up to I% 
(DeNlarchi and Foucault, 2000) 
Price is the first priority in the buy orders. However, with se\ eral orders take place with the same 
secondar,, priority rule is the time of the order so that orders are executed according to their 
arri\ al time (ibid). 
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Figure 2.4: Xetra Market Share of Total German Equity Sales (order book volume, in percent %) 
Source: Deutsche Börse AG, Annual Report 2003 
2.5.5 Reorganization of FWB: 
In September 2002, Deutsche Börse AG announced its intention to reshape the 
trading segments of FWB. Through this announcement the Management Board 
stated that these changes were a response to the implementation of the Fourth 
Financial Markets Promotion Act in July 2002. 
By the end of March 2003 the restructuring of FWB was imposed. This process 
entailed dividing the market into two main segments: Prime standard and General 
standard. The Prime standard is designed to contain companies with international 
focus and aiming at international visibility. Firms on the Prime standard comprise 
tour different indices: DAX, MDAX, SDAX, and TecDAX. The listing requirements 
ofthe Prime Standard include a number of important disclosure obligations: 
" Compliance with IFRSs or US GAAP 
" Accounts audited in accordance with International Standards of Auditing 
(ISA). 
" Publication of quarterly reports in accordance with IFRS or US GAAP. 
0 Publication in both German and English 
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" Issuers should publish a corporate action timetable showing all important 
events such as annual shareholders" meeting and the meetings of analysts. 
" Staging of at least one analyst conference per year" 
As a result of the integration of all important elements of existing private rules and 
regulations governing the Neuer Markt and SMAX into a new legislation (into the 
Prime Standard), "their continued operation will become redundant" (Deutsche 
Börse AG, 2002, p. 3). 
The General standard, on the contrary, is tailored for smaller firms with a domestic 
focus. To be listed on the General Standard, companies need to satisfy the minimum 
legal requirements of the Official market and the Regulated market (Deutsche Börse 
AG, 2004). These are lower than those of the Prime standard and not customized to 
the needs of international investors (Theissen 2004). 
According to the new reforms, the number of MDAX companies has been reduced to 
50 companies belonging to the classic sectors38. SDAX, on the other hand, contains 
an additional fifty firms from the "classic" sector. These are the next 50 issues from 
the Prime Standard ranked below the MDAX39. Furthermore, TecDAX index was 
launched to track the largest and most liquid issues from the different technology 
sectors ranked below the DAX (Deutsch Börse AG, 2004). 
2.6 German Corporate Governance System: 
The German corporate governance system has attracted the attention of researchers 
in the financial field. This can be explained by the fact that this system is different 
from those of other Western European countries, let alone those of the UK and US 
(Peck and Ruigrok, 2000). In fact it is a very wide subject because it has different 
facets and interacts with different elements in the financial system. Therefore, this 
section will be confined to describing the German model of corporate governance, its 
key aspects, and its relationship with German accounting. 
German corporate governance, in general, is organised by the Stock Corporation Act 
(Aktiengesetz), the German Co-determination Act (, l litbe. s timrrrungsge. s ei) and the 
In -, cneral, changes are 
in line with best practice of many German companies and also a formal 
recognition towards a more Anglo-American style. 
Gilled M Theissen "Old economy this description is to distinguish them from the high tech firms. 
'`' 11ooww ever, until March 20033 this index represented the largest 50 companies in SMAX. 
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German Corporate Governance Code revised in May 2003 (German Corporate 
Governance Code, 2004). 
German firms are governed by a two-tiered board structure, comprising a 
supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) and a board of management (Aufstand). However. 
only listed firms (AGs) and large GmbHs are required to have supervisory boards 
(Edwards and Fischer. 1994). This system is different from the UK and US system 
which has a single tier board (Board of Directors) that comprises two types of 
directors: executive and non-executive. 
The separation of power and responsibility between the three organs is largely 
defined by law which gives limited power to shareholders" general meetings 
(Rieckers and Spindler (2004). Schmidt and Tyrell (ibid) report that the Stock 
Corporation Act gives "little power" to the shareholders' meeting, "moderate power" 
to the supervisory board and "considerable power" to the executive board. Different 
rights are granted to the shareholders by the Stock Corporation Act, which can be 
exercised though the general meeting. Examples of such rights are: the discharge of 
the executive committee and the supervisory board and the election of the 
shareholders' representatives to the supervisory board. The management board, on 
the other hand, is concerned with managing the day-to-day business of the company 
and representing it to third parties. Furthermore, its members share joint 
responsibility for all management decisions. The supervisory board supervise the 
management board and appoints its members and fixes their remuneration. 
Fundamental matters, such as decisions which may have important impact on the 
financial position of the firm and (or) its results should be approved by this board. 
Furthermore, the management board should provide regular reports to the 
supervisory board (Schmidt, 2004). 
Although it is not in the scope of this research to present a full comparison between 
German corporate governance and Anglo-American model, it may be useful to report 
a few differences between the two systems. While, the management board in 
German` may be an equivalent to the executive directors in the Board of Directors of 
the UK and US (Franks and Mayer. 2001). it is not right to think that the supervisory 
board in Cºermam' is similar to the non-executive directors in the Anglo-American 
model. While non-executive directors "should be free from any business or financial 
connections with the coinpam- apart from their fees and shareholdings (Watts, 1996. 
1O 
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p. 207). members of the supervisory board have stronger relationships where the 
workers and banks have significant representation (more below). The supervisory 
board has a significant role in determining the remuneration of the board of 
management, whereas in the Anglo-American model the non-executive directors do 
not determine the remuneration of the executive directors (ibid). One of the 
peculiarities of the German model is the significant influence of the codetermination 
concept, which requires the representation of employees on the supervisory board. 
Employees in the Anglo-American model, conversely. do not have a similar 
opportunity to have direct influence on their companies' decisions. Although 
German companies use performance-based compensation payments such as stock- 
options (Government Commission of the German Corporate Governance Code, 
2003), this type of compensation is less important than that in the Anglo-American 
model, in which it is considered as one of the principal mechanisms for managerial 
remuneration (Watts, ibid). One simple explanation for this is the fact that the 
importance of the stock market in Germany is less than that in the UK and US. 
Finally, a vital corporate control mechanism which can give the Anglo-American 
model an advantage over the German one is an active market for corporate control. 
Apart from the Mannesmann-Vodafone takeover in 2000, this market discipline is 
not common in Germany. Although the market for corporate control provides a way 
of dealing with underperforming managers, it may have undesirable side-effects. The 
two tier board tries to keep the disciplinary function in house. However, the adoption 
of a German Takeover Law in 2002 may be considered as an improvement in 
towards a shareholder perspective, although it keeps this balanced with the interests 
of other parties (ibid) 
It may be useful to extract some main features of German corporate governance as 
presented in the following points: 
1. An insider controlled and stakeholder oriented system against the market 
controlled and shareholder oriented corporate governance system of the 
Anglo-Saxon countries (Franks and Mayer, 1994). In simple words this 
reflects the importance of different stakeholders for information producers in 
a company rather than concentration one single party as in the UK and US. 
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2. Influential groups use their influence through the supervisory board. This is 
achieved on the basis of detailed information. but '`much too detailed to be 
presented to the general investing public" (Schmidt. ibid. p. 397) 
3. The law of codetermination gives the employees rights on the supervisory 
board through a number of seats, which can be one third or 50 % of all seats 
in firms with more than 500 or 2000 employees respectively (Elsas and 
Krahnen, ibid). 
4. The majority of votes are delegated to banks through proxy voting rights40. 
Consequently, small shareholders and institutional investors who are not 
affiliated with banks have a minor role (Hackethal, Schmidt and Tyrell, 
2003). 
5. Apart from labour representatives, banks and block holders, influential 
groups in the supervisory board "governing coalition" include former top 
managers of the respective companies or managers from other large 
companies (ibid, p. 2). 
Becht and Böhmer (2003) report that approximately 82% of officially listed AGs4' 
have a large block-holder (controlling more than 25% of the votes), while 65% are 
majority controlled. They also report that the largest number of voting blocks 
(greater than 5%) is held by families and individuals. However, they indicate that 
banks and industrial firms hold substantially larger blocks and account for a larger 
fraction of total shares held by block-holders. Schmidt and Tyrell (ibid. ) explain that 
these block-holders have the right to veto important decisions at shareholders' 
meetings. This seems to be very different from the ownership structure in the US and 
I JK, where family ownership is not a common feature and shares tend to be more 
dispersed. Furthermore, UK/US shares are largely owned by financial institutions 
vv, hich invest on a portfolio basis (Vitols 2003). This difference in the pattern of 
ovv'nership also has an implication for the long-term relationship between German 
shareholders and the firm compared with a more short-term perspective in the 
: Anglo-American model. 
One main reason underlying this difference is the motives 
shareholders have. Whereas in Germany some industrial and commercial companies 
tend to buN, large block holdings in other companies for industrial and strategic 
"' Recall that the dominant type of shares in Germany is bearer shares \\ Bich are deposited in banks. 
'' Listed in the Official Market 
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reasons. financial institutions in the UK and US are motivated by the need to 
maximise the return on their portfolios and tend therefore to feel less loyalty and to 
be much readier to buy and sell. 
It should be also mentioned here that this type off relationship between firms and 
shareholders has implications for accounting practices. Ball (2004, p. 137) argues 
that relative to the shareholder model, the stakeholder model concentrates on 
dividing the profits (the pie) rather than maximising them. Therefore. this may lead 
the managers, representatives of labour and capital "to hide behind poor public 
disclosure and avoid accountability for bad strategic decisions". Furthermore, as 
mentioned several times above, the German system is an insider system with a 
stakeholder orientation. This simply means that stakeholders who are represented in 
governance are privately informed. In other words, this implies that they have inside 
access to information. Ball (ibid, p. 117) argues these are characteristics in Code-law 
systems, which have "a lower standard of financial reporting and disclosure". There 
is clearly less need for disclosure, whereas a market-based system requires good 
disclosure to allow investors who are outsiders to make their investment decisions. 
Another important link with accounting is the role that corporate governance can 
play in the enforcement of accounting rules. Leuz and Wüstemann (ibid, p. 467) 
explain that this role is reflected in three different respects. First, management is 
responsible for "proper application of accounting standards". Second, the 
supervisory board is concerned with examining the financial statements after they 
have been audited. Finally, the reform of 1998 required the supervisory board to be 
in charge of hiring the external auditor (as it used to be a duty of the management 
board). This change can be considered as a step of strengthening the role of the 
supervisory board, which is in turn, may be a sign of a transitional stage of German 
corporate governance towards a market-based model (see Hackethal et al, ibid): 
Riccl: ers and Spindler, ibid). Hackethal et al notice that big German banks such as 
Deutsche Bank are reducing their traditional corporate governance role because they 
do not benefit much any more from this role. This change in the role of banks and 
the increase in the top management compensation are seen by the authors as key 
elements in the move towards the Anglo-Saxon model. 
ýý ý, 
, -rt"I-ltcr 2: German Financial system and 
German Stock Alarkei 
2.7 Important implications of this chapter for the current research: 
Many of the hypotheses discussed in Chapter 5 are to some extent related to agency 
theory (hypotheses on size, free float and leverage). Issues about ownership structure. 
corporate governance and the nature of the relationship between German banks and 
firms are largely linked to this theory, and therefore, important in understanding 
some of the logic of the arguments presented in Chapter >. Furthermore, the peculiar 
characteristics of these issues in Germany might lead one to expect different results 
from those of previous research that examined similar hypotheses in other countries. 
Furthermore, the quality segments in FWB are also peculiar to the German Stock 
Market. Thus, understanding of the nature of these segments is necessary to 
understand the hypotheses on quality segments postulated in Chapter -5. 
;ý 
Chapter 3. - Accounting in Ger»lan1'' 
3 Chapter 3: Accounting in Germany: 
3.1 Introduction: 
In order to provide a complete picture, this chapter aims to present the background to 
German accounting. This Chapter is structured so as to study environment of 
German accounting from five different angles. First, it provides an overview on the 
position of Germany in the classifications of international accounting models. 
Second, it uses an approach suggested by Nobes (2000) to look at the environment of 
German accounting by identifying a few direct influences. Third, it provides an 
explanation of the different sources of German accounting regulation. Fourth. it 
discusses the key features of German accounting in accordance with Gray's model 
(1988). Finally, it gives a brief overview of the German auditing market. 
Furthermore, because of the purpose of this chapter, it is intended to be 
predominantly descriptive rather than analytical. 
3.2 German accounting model in the classification studies: 
According to several famous classification studies of international accounting 
systems, Germany has always had a distinctive accounting model. Table 3.1 shows 
the position of the German accounting system in the results of some of these 
different studies compared with those of both the US and UK which represent the 
Anglo-American model. It can be clearly seen that German accounting system has 
Always been classified differently from those of the UK and US. This also gives a 
clear indication of the different bases of German GAAP from those of US GAAP 
and IAS (IFRSs) which belong to the Anglo-American model. The high influence of 
the Anglo-American model on IAS is debated in Chapter 4. The characteristics of 
German accounting suggested by these classifications are discussed below. 
Jý 
Chapter 3: Accounling in German1: 
Fable 3.1: Germany in Classification Studies 
Study Criteria Classifications 
Choi and Muller Economic and Germany: Macroeconomic - and Uniform 
(1992) political factors Anglo-American: Independent discipline 
Seidler (1967) Zones of Germany: German-Dutch zone 
influence Anglo-American: British zone- US zone'' 
Gray (1988) Cultural Germany: moderate professionalism, marginal 
influences uniformity, marginal conservatism and strong secrecy 
Anglo-American: strong professionalism- strong 
flexibility- strong optimism, strong transparency 
Puxty, Willmott, Source of German regulations: legalism predominant 
Cooper and Regulation The UK: principally associationist 
Lowe (1987) The US: element of legalism and association ism. 
Nobes (1980) Different Germany: Macro-uniform, government driven, tax 
economic and dominated, statue-based 
political factors Anglo-American: Micro-fair-judgemental, 
commercially-driven, business practice, profession 
rules, British origin44 
Source: based on information in Nobes and Parker (2000), Gordon, Roberts and Weetman and 
Gordon (1998) 
3.3 Nobes' influential factors: 
Nobes (ibid. ) suggests that there is a group of factors which have a direct influence 
on the financial reporting environment and cause international differences. Four of 
these factors seem to be relevant to the German accounting environment: legal 
system, providers of finance, taxation and the profession 45 . 
This section, will explain 
this very briefly with the intention of contrasting the impact of these factors on 
German accounting with that in the UK and US. Furthermore, this may be to a large 
extent consistent with four key sources of authoritative regulation on German 
accounting, suggested by Macharzina and Langer (2000): commercial law; tax law 
and rules; accounting practice; and the profession. 
42 The terns `Macro' is used to indicate the role of the government in the process of standard-setting. 
criticized for putting these two s\ stem in different zones (Nobel and Parker, 2000) 
: fit this point, each of them go 
in a different cluster: while the UK falls in the UK influence with 
Protcssional regulation group, the US falls in the US influence with SEC enforcement group 
The rest of the influence factors are: Inflation, Theory and Accidents of histor\ . 
According to the 
explanation provided bN Parker and Nobes (ibid), the role of these factors in German\ is not 
significant. 
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3.3.1 Legal systems: 
Nobes (]bid, p. 19) distinguishes between two types of legal system: common law 
and codified law. Germany has a code law system which is based on Roman law. 
whereas the UK and U. S. have a common law system. In a codified system 
"company law or commercial codes need to establish rules for accounting and 
financial reporting". Germany was the example used by the authors for such system. 
Gordon et al (1998, p. 275), for example, state that German accounting practice is 
`strongly contained in law". The common law, conversely. does not set clown 
detailed rules to guide companies in the preparation of financial statements. Section 
(3.5) about Commercial Law shows clearly how German accounting is extensively 
regulated by law. 
3.3.2 Taxation: 
In countries such as the UK, and US, tax laws do not have any significant influence 
on accounting practice. In Germany, on the other hand, the link between taxation and 
accounting is very close (Gordon et al, 1998). This close link between taxation and 
commercial accounting in Germany is represented by a principle called the 
"Massgeblichkeitsprinzip". A later section below explains in detail different aspects 
of'this complex relationship. 
3.3.3 Profession: 
It is clear from the classification of Gray and from the explanation presented in a 
later section below that the German profession has a smaller role than that in the UK 
and US. Still, the strength of this role is debatable. 
3.3.4 Providers of finance: 
It is explained in Chapter 2 that the size of German stock market is relatively small 
compared with the UK and US. This was reflected in terms of the number of listed 
share, market capitalization and market capitalization as a percentage of GDP. 
It \v ais also explained that Germany has a bank-dominated economy. However. the 
dominance of banks is not the direct result of extensive bank lending. Chapter 
explained that bank lending in Germany is not as large as one would expect. 
although it may be important for small and medium sized firms (Edwards and 
Fischer, 1994). Apart from bank lending, German banks can dominate firms through 
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proxy voting and shareholding (see Chapter 2). Because of this. Gordon et al. (1998. 
p. 279) indicate that "it would not be unusual for the banks collectively to control 
more than half of the votes cast at an annual general meeting of a major German 
company". Another important characteristic of the pattern of shareholding in 
Germany is that the largest proportion is held by non-financial institutions (see 
Chapter 2). Roberts et al (ibid) explain that in such situation cross holdings are often 
found, where firms own stakes in each other. Furthermore, they argue that, although 
this makes companies secure against takeover. it elevates `secrecy (see Chapter 5). 
Nobes (ibid), on the other hand, classifies Germany amongst credit-insider systems, 
as opposed to the UK and US, which are classified as equity-outsider systems. They 
argue that being a credit-insider system implies that there is no important market 
demand for audited and published accounts. They further argue that in such a system, 
the demand for accounts is largely for tax purposes. 
In short, one can say the traditional German corporate financing has encouraged a 
creditor-protection orientation (conservatism) and a lack of transparency (secrecy), 
although this has changed and is changing (further discussion provided in Section 
-, ) 
In fact, by having a closer look at the developments of German regulations since 
1998, it can be clearly seen that the importance of the German stock market, and 
consequently related accounting regulations and practices, has increased. This is 
demonstrated in several sections either in this chapter or the previous one. 
3.4 German accounting Regulation: 
Although German law is highly codified and prescriptive, German accounting 
rcgulations have other sources other than Commercial Law and Tax Law. Other 
potential sources are: German accounting standards (GASs), Interpretations of the 
IdW and firm-specific rules. In addition, there is the important concept of GoB 
(discussed below) and the impact of the European Directives. Although this section 
presents detailed explanations of the role of commercial la\\ and taxation, its scope is 
also extended to cover other sources. 
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3.4.1 Hierarchy of the German regulations of financial reporting: 
It can be seen that German regulations for financial reporting are different from each 
other with respect to factors such as their authoritativeness and their level of detail. 
Ordelheide (1999) presents a useful diagram to cast light on the hierarchy of the 
German accounting regulation, which is reproduced below in Figure 3.1: 
text 
of law 
Complemented 
by court 
decisions 
DSR standards 
complemented by recommendations b\ 
private organisations e. g. IdW, commentaries, 
handbooks and interpretive articles 
Firm-specific rules 
Figure 3.1: The pyramid structure underlying the system of accounting regulation in Germany Source: 
Ordelheide (1999) 
According to Ordelheide (ibid. p. 107), there are three features of this pyramid: 
1. Rules become more detailed and specific as one descends through the 
different levels. Short and unclear rules established at a specific level are 
developed in the following levels. 
2. The rules from the second level downwards gain their authority from the law, 
so that they may be considered as interpretations. However, the rules at the 
second level have legal authoritativeness. Apart from the accounting 
standards GASs. all rules issued at the lower levels "have expert authority 
on1v ". 
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ý. Responsiveness to change lessens at the upper levels. Example of this is 
when a new accounting issue arises or --if a change in the established rules is 
strongly advocated", the firm-specific solution has to be found immediately 
and to be consistent with the law. 
3.5 Commercial Law 
The fact that Germany has a codified and prescriptive law has a predominant 
influence on accounting in Germany (Gray and Radebaugh, 2002). Furthermore. one 
important characteristic of German accounting regulation is "the legalistic system of 
rules" (Pfaff and Schröer, 1996, p. 973), which means that accounting rules are 
mandated by law or the courts. 
Since they were first established in 1794, German accounting regulations have been 
reformed and changed several times over the last two centuries influenced by 
historical economic and political developments. Table 3.2 shows a summary 
chronology of the establishment and developments of the accounting legislations: 
Table 3.2: Development of German Accounting Regulations 
Year Law 
1794 Prussian Civil Code 
1861 General German Commercial Code (ADHGB) 
1870 Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz, AktG) 
1874 Formal recognition of commercial accounts as the basis of tax accounting 
1884 Amendment of Stock Corporation Act (AktG 1884) 
1892 Limited Liability Companies Act (GmbHG) 
1896 Stock Exchange Act (Börsengesetz, BörsG 
1896 Stock Exchange Listing Act (BörsZulG) 
1897 Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch, HGB) 
1899 Co-operatives Act (GenG) 
1931 Stock Corporation Emergency Decrees (Aktienrechtsnotverordnung) 
19 37 Stock Corporation Act amended (AktG 1937) 
1965 Stock Corporation Act amended (AktG 1965) 
1969 Disclosure Act (Publi. -itätsgeset. PublG) 
1985 Commercial Code amended (HGB 1985) 
1987 Stock Exchange Act amended (BörsG) 
1998 Commercial Code Reform Act (KapAEG) 
002 Fourth Financial Market Reform Act (2002) 
source, Ordelheide and KPMG (2001), except for the last point4 
'° Added from Leuz and \Vüstemann (2004) 
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historically the accounting regulations in Germany have been influenced by the 
French Ordonnance de Commerce (1673) and Code de Commerce (1807) (Haller. 
1998). 
The Prussian Civil Code of 1794 was the first law to include comprehensive 
accounting requirements. These requirements were mainly concerned with the 
valuation of inventory and the balance sheet in the event of bankruptcy (Ordelheide 
and KPMG 2001). Moreover, it is the root of the conservative interpretation of 
principles of realization and of lower of cost or market in Germany (Haller 1998). 
The General German Commercial Code (ADHGB) (1861) described by Ordelheide 
(1999, p. 101) as "a part of the process of political integration of the German states 
which resulted in a unified Germany in 1871". This law required each business in 
Germany to draw up a balance sheet. In addition to that, it includes some valuation 
rules for current assets and fixed assets. The Stock Corporation Act (1870), on the 
ether hand, introduced the first disclosure rules for financial statements. Furthermore, 
the reform of 1884 set down the foundation of a valuation system based on prudence 
emphasising the concept of capital maintenance, and introducing some prudent 
provisions such as historical cost for all assets. In 1892, the limited liability company 
was established by the Stock Corporation Act, which also required the application of 
the historical cost principle to fixed assets. The Commercial Code of 1897 obliged 
non-corporations47 to follow the principles of proper bookkeeping (GoB), and to 
provide a balance sheet (Ordelheide, 1999). 
As a result of the worldwide crises of the late 1920s when a large number of 
companies went bankrupt, a major reform in the Stock Corporations Act took place 
in 193 7 which was preceded by an emergency decree in 1931. By these two pieces of 
legislation, the historical cost system of accounting was further developed. Moreover, 
the capitalisation of formation expenses, capital issue costs and self produced 
goodwill became illegal (Ordelheide and Pfaff, 1994, p. 85). These last developments 
are very prudent measures which reinforce the conservatism of German accounting 
(sec below). 
The first obligation to prepare, audit and publish group accounts was established by 
the extensive reform of the Stock Corporation Act in 1965. One of the important 
4T Corporations include: Joint Stock Corporations (AGs). Limited Partnership \ ith shares (KGaAs) 
and Limited Liabilit\ companies (GmbHs). 
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aims of this reform was to limit managements opportunities to create hidden 
reserves. This was accomplished by "specifying the values to which assets should be 
depreciated (compared with acquisition and production costs" and by restricting the 
use of provisions (Ordelheide and KPMG, 2001, p. 1226). Beside that it set down 
new formats for the balance sheet and the profit and loss account. This law was the 
sole codified source of detailed accounting regulations in Germany until the 
amendment of the Commercial Law in 1985 (Haller. 1998). The Disclosure Act 
(Pub1G) 1969 required the preparation of financial statements by large sole 
proprietors, commercial partnerships and GmbHs (of any legal form other than AGs 
and KGaAs 48 (Ordelheide and KPMG, ibid)) 49 . 
Moreover, this requirement was 
accompanied with accounting rules broadly similar to those upon AGs (Ordelheide 
and Pfaff, 1994). 
3.5.1 Introduction of the European Directives: 
in response to the European efforts to harmonise accounting practices between the 
member states, the 2nd, 4tß' 7tß' and 8tß' European Directives were incorporated into 
German Commercial Law in one go in 1985. Table 3.3 is presented simply to show 
the main matters dealt with by these directives and their relevance to accounting 
practices: 
Table 3.3: Main matters dealt with by the European Directives: 2', 4"', 7tß' and 8"' 
Directive Main matters 
? "` Naming of companies, the minimum capital requirements of public 
companies, and the definition of distributable profit 
4"' Defining annual accounts, true and fair view, consistency, details of formats 
for financial statements, detailed valuation and disclosure requirements5' 
Financial firms are included in special versions of this Directive 
7"' Consolidation of financial statements and related valuation and 
disclosure rules, as will as, treatment of goodwill 
8`h Qualification and work of auditors 
Source: produced by the researcher using data from different resources' . 
48 See Glossary for definitions of legal forms of German firms. 
Until the \ear 1969, the only companies required to publish financial statements are AGs and 
kGa; As. 
, ý0 1 \amples are articles 4 to 46 which require large number of disclosures required in the notes to 
the accounts. 
The reference cited in the test below 
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lt can be seen from Table 3.3 above that the 4tß' and 7tß' Directives are of particular 
importance to accounting. Although the main aim behind issuing European 
Directives such as the 4"' and 7tß' is European accounting harmonisation. German 
legislators. when implementing these directives, allowed national choices and 
discretion in the transformation (Leuz and Wüstemann, 2004), although this is also 
true for other member states. Consequently, this discretion in the implementation of 
the European Directives left significant differences in accounting measurement 
between European countries (Joos and Lang, 1994). Van Hulle (2004) indicates that 
Germany, in particular, has encountered serious difficulties in applying the 
Directives, because small and medium firms were against making their financial 
statements public. Furthermore the impact of taxation on German accounting led to a 
very conservative transformation of the 0' Directive (Haller, 1992). It is also 
important to note the incorporation of the true and fair view in the 0' Directive was 
one of the significant issues strongly related to the introduction of this Directive into 
German Commercial Law. (Section 3.5.6 below is devoted to discussing this issue). 
3.5.2 Reforms of 1998: 
As described by Ordelheide and KPMG (2001, p. 1360), the reform of 1998 
Kapitalaufilahineerleichterungsgesetz (KapAEG) was "a reaction to the 
internationalization of financial reporting and the critics of the German corporate 
governance'. Furthermore, Leuz and Wüstemann (ibid) indicate that German firms 
have become capital importers and as a result of that they had to respond to the 
international need for reliable public information. This reform introduced three 
important changes in the German accounting environment. First, it allowed German 
listed corporations to adopt US GAAP and IAS in preparing their consolidated 
accounts. Nowak (2004) indicates that this law relieves firms listed on US exchanges 
of the obligation to prepare two sets of financial statements. Second, according to 
this reform, German firms were for the first time required to prepare a Cash Flow 
Statement. Finally, the 1998 reform has passed another significant milestone in the 
history of the German accounting legislation which is the establishment of the 
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German Accounting Standards Board (GASB)'2. Detailed explanation about the 
introduction of IAS and US GAAP and related issues is provided in Chapter 4. 
3.5.3 Principles of proper bookkeeping (Grundsätze ordnungsäßiger 
Buchführung- GoB): 
It is important at this stage of discussion to try to define the so called GoB. The 
Commercial Code (HGB) states that financial statements should be prepared 
according to principles of proper bookkeeping (Grundsäge ordnungsmäf3 gcr 
Buchführung-GoB). The code of 1897 was the first to make reference of the GoB 
(Ordelheide 1999). 
As there is no legal definition of GoB, there is a debate on what this concept 
embraces. Bonthrone (2000) indicates that it is misleading to refer to GoB as 
"German GAAP"; nevertheless he states that it is the nearest thing Germany has to 
GAAP'3. Leuz and Wüstemann (ibid), on the other hand, define it as "German 
GAAP". They suggest that German GAAP comprises the legal rules, principles and 
the standards employed by a firm in preparing its financial statements. According to 
Baetge et al (1995, p. 93), the GoB used in financial reporting have been developed 
over time as a consequence of "teachings, practice and administration of justice". 
Furthermore, they also indicate that although "they may supplement the law, they do 
not replace it". Finally, Haller (1998) thinks that it is a misunderstanding to interpret 
GoB similarly to US GAAP. He argues that the German GoB comprises only non- 
codified rules produced through accounting practice, whereas the US GAAP 
comprises the entire set of accounting rules and principles. Ordelheide and KPMG 
(ibid, p. 1244) provide a list of accounting conventions calling them "narrowly 
defined" GoB: Revisability 54 , 
Completeness, Materiality, Accuracy, Continuity, 
Clarity,, and Pagatoric values (accruals) (see also Ordelheide and Pfaff, ibid). 
Furthermore, McLeay, Ordelheide and Young (2000) state that legally authoritative 
interpretations of Commercial law combined with non- authoritative legal 
interpretations form GoB. They explain that the legally authoritative interpretations 
'' lt is also referred to as German Accounting Standards Committee (GASC), while the German name 
is Deutsches Rechnungslegungs Standards Committee (DRSC). 
,' For the purposes of this study. the researcher has chosen to use the term "German GAAP" with a 
similar scope to that explained above. 
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, \uditabilit\ which means 
that the books should allow experts to Lain an insight into the business 
transactions and financial position 
ý` Income and expenses of the financial y ear must be taken in the financial statements regardless of 
the date of the pa\ merits to which they relate 
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are produced by tax courts, especially in areas on which Commercial Law is not 
exhaustive, such as foreign currency translation. This may seem to be another narrow 
definition of Goß. 
The researcher will use the definition given by Leuz and Wüstemann (ibid). as the 
term German GAAP is used in this study to mean all the accounting principles used 
in preparing financial statements regardless of whether they are codified or not. To 
argue for this, one may say that the legislators require financial reporting in 
accordance with GoB, while they know that the majority of German accounting 
principles are codified. One important point about GoB is its relationship with the 
true and fair view principle which is discussed in a later section. However, it may be 
useful here to indicate that one common thing between the two concepts is the 
vagueness of their definitions. 
3.5.4 Taxation: 
It is widely known that the tax laws in Germany have had significant impact on the 
development of the German accounting principles. It may also be important to 
indicate that the influence of these laws on accounting practice has been stronger that 
of the accounting profession (Watts, 1996). 
The link though which the tax laws affect German accounting is the so called 
"Massgeblichkeitsprinzip" or the `authoritative principle' 56 . Although the 
authoritative principle can be traced back to the 19tß' century, it was first established 
in the Tax Code in 1934 (Haller, 1992). In accordance with this concept, asset 
comparison and computation of income for tax purposes has to be according to the 
generally accepted commercial accounting principles (GoB) (ibid). 
Pfaff and Schröer (1996) explain that the authoritative principle has two implications: 
`material' and `formal' authoritativeness. The `material' side implies that the 
commercial law is authoritative for the tax accounts as long as it is consistent with 
(ioB and is not against any particular tax rules. The 'formal side', on the other hand, 
implies that it is not only the Commercial Code and GoB'7 which are binding but 
also the actual accounts. In other words, the substantive basis for calculating taxable 
income is the actual balance sheet. 
S( 
, \,, translated by Pfaff and 
Schröer (1996), and Nobes and Parker (2000): whereas Haller (1992) 
uses the "principle of congruency" 
ý1 This would include the commercial accounting law as defined later. 
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In a few particular cases, the tax laws require different treatments from those 
required by the commercial law and GoB. This is mainly in the area of recognition 
and depreciation. To avoid treating these differences in a separate set of accounts. a 
large percentage German firms (90 % of limited liability companies) prepare the 
same accounts for both financial and tax purposes. However, listed firms. in general. 
prepare two sets of accounts (Pfaff and Schröer, ibid). 
3.5.4.1 The reverse authoritativeness principle: 
It is explained above that commercial accounting has its impact on tax accounting. 
However, tax accounting can have its influence in the opposite direction though the 
reverse authoritativeness principle (Umkehrmaßgeblichk(_, it) (Ordelheide and KPMG, 
2001). According to this principle, options in tax law which give tax advantages can 
only be used if they are also used in the commercial accounts. Examples of such 
options are the accelerated depreciation and tax-exempt reserves. 
The relationship between German accounting and taxation can be summarized into 
three main points: 
" Commercial accounting is accepted by tax authorities when accounting 
options used are not against any specific rules. 
" Using accounting options which are not consistent with tax accounting rules 
leads to the production of two different sets of financial statements (the case 
of listed firms). 
" Using options from the tax code which give tax advantages is conditional 
upon incorporating them in the commercial accounts. 
3.5.4.1.1 Effects of the authoritative principles: 
lt is widely known the authoritative and reverse authoritative principles have had 
significant impact on the financial reporting. Haller (1992) classifies this impact into 
t\\ ,o main streams: direct and indirect effects. Below is a diagram which summarises 
thcsc effects followed by short explanation of each of them: 
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Authoritative Principle) 
Indirect Effects on II Direct Effects on 
International Investors 
International F(arnmonisation 
orms 
Accountini Practice 
Figure 32: Direct and indirect effects of the Authoritative Principle 
Source: Based on a diagram by Haller (1992) with a few adjustments 
3.5.4.1.1.1 Direct effects: 
Impact on Tax Law: with the exception of the area of depreciation and write-offs, 
the Tax Code does not include major accounting regulations and it is tied to 
commercial accounting. According to Haller (ibid. ), this causes judicial rulings to 
play a principal role in establishing tax accounting rules by interpreting GoB in 
deciding doubtful cases. This may indicate that guides to German accounting are 
largely based on the law and on tax cases, whereas Anglo-Saxon guides are largely 
based on accounting standards. 
Intl et on Commercial Law: One important impact of this principle is the very 
conservative transformation of the 4tß' Directive in Germany. Haller (ibid) explains 
this by the contradiction between the implications of the authoritativeness principle 
and those of the true and fair view (see below). Söderblom (2001) also supports the 
point of view that the significant tax influence had a negative effect on the 
incorporation of the true and fair view into German law. Furthermore. Pfaff and 
Schröer (ibid) indicate that after WWII, the reverse authoritativeness principle led to 
the increasing introduction of tax-driven procedures in commercial accounts. This, in 
turn, had an influence on the reform of the Stock Corporation Act in 1965. where the 
some of these procedures have been embodied into the law. 
47 
Chapter 3:. 1ccoiinting in Gertnanv: 
Principles of Proper Bookkeeping (GoB): it suggested that the impact on GoB is 
dual. The interpretation of GoB made the tax courts decide whether certain 
accounting treatments practiced can be accepted as proper accounting. On the other 
hand many tax accounting practices became generally accepted commercial 
accounting (Ordelheide 1999). 
Impact on Accounting practice (Accounting Policy): according to Haller (ibid., p. 
321), German companies have to deal with two conflicting aims "a desired high 
income in the commercial accounts leads to higher tax payments and the realization 
of the aim to minimize taxable income, on the other hand, decreases commercial 
income". As a result of this, the latter aim of minimizing taxable income, in general, 
outweighs the first aim in many German firms. Another is that in order to prepare 
one set of financial statements, firms ignore any recognition and valuation policies 
which are not permitted by the tax law (Ordelheide, ibid. ). 
3.5.4.1.1.2 Indirect effects: 
Decisions of international investors: the authoritativeness principle is considered to 
be a major cause of undervaluation and the very conservative computation of income 
in German accounting, resulting in lower numbers for distributable earnings. This 
affects investors in two negative ways: first, it makes it difficult for them to interpret 
the actual financial position of a company and its financial position. On the other 
hand, low earnings do not promise high dividends. Haller (ibid) thinks that this is a 
main reason that international investors are reluctant to invest in Germany and a 
main reason for high gearing. 
Increasing Importance of Consolidated Accounts: according to Haller (ibid), 
consolidated financial statements are not the basis for taxes or dividend payments. 
They can be drawn up on a pure commercial accounting basis. Therefore German 
consolidated accounts are considered to be much more informative than individual 
accounts. However. Ordelheide (1999) refers to the fact that according to HGB 
( X00 and § 308), valuation and recognition of assets and liabilities in the group 
accounts must be based on the same rules used by the parent company in its 
individual accounts. On the other hand, one should notice that the reverse 
authoritativeness principle does not apply to the group accounts when there is 
conflict between the rules of tax accounting and those of financial accounts. Yet, if a 
company made use of tax rules in preparing its group accounts. it is required to give 
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additional information in the notes to the accounts in order to make it possible to 
reconcile them with those which would have been produced in accordance with the 
Commercial Code only (Ordelheide and KPMG, 2001) 
International Harmonisation of Accounting: Haller (ibid, p. 321) explains that 
Germany was reluctant and resisted the incorporation of the true and fair view in the 
4"' Directive, simply because of the conflict between this principle and the influence 
of tax accounting rules on financial reporting. However, Germany succeeded in 
including regulations in the 4tß' Directive which recognise the interaction between the 
two types of accounting and to make the directive, "as far as possible, tax neutral". 
Furthermore, he argues that the strong influence of the authoritativeness principle led 
to breaching of the rules of the 4th Directive (such as the prohibition of valuation 
with present values and prohibition of capitalization of R&D). The influence of tax 
on German accounting has certainly been a barrier to harmonisation and it should be 
noted that all current harmonisation efforts are based on group accounts. which have 
no tax consequences. (See below for true and fair view, see also Chapter 4 for more 
about the position of Germany in international accounting harmonisation) 
3.5.4.2 The role of the BFH: 
I'he Federal Fiscal Court (Bundesfinanzhof-BFH), which is the highest tax court, has 
an important role in passing judgements in accounting matters raised in lawsuits 
between legal persons under civil law, where commercial accounting law is rarely 
relevant (Pfaff and Schröer, ibid). The explanation of this is that the BFH plays a 
supportive role for the authoritativeness principle. This court plays a crucial role in 
interpreting the GoB in relation to the concept of the true and fair view. As explained 
aho\'c, the vast majority of small and medium sized firms prepare only one set of 
financial accounts for both purposes (commercial and taxation). The tax court has 
therefore a vital role in deciding whether these statements are in accordance with 
soB or not. 
3.5.5 Standards of the German Accounting Standards Board (Deutscher 
Standardisierungsrat, DSR): 
In order to establish a framework for bringing German accounting and financial 
reporting in line with international principles, The German Government in 1998 
requested the establishment of a privately organised institution (GASC, 2004). As a 
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result of this, the German Accounting Standards Board (GASB) was established, 
modelled on FASB as a private-sector standard-setting body made up of seven 
independent accounting experts in the areas of auditing, financial analysis. academia 
and industry (Ordelheide, 1999). In September 1998, the GASB was recognised by a 
contract with the Federal Ministry of Justice (FMJ) as a private accounting body 
within the meaning of §342 of the HGB. The operating body of GASB is the 
German Accounting Standards Committee (GASC, DRSC38) 
The following is a summary of the main aims of the GASB as stated by Nowak 
(2004): 
1. Introducing and financing the process of standard-setting by an independent 
body of experts and along Anglo-American and International models. 
2. Developing accounting standards to meet needs in the area of consolidated 
financial reporting (group accounts). 
3. Participating in the international harmonization of accounting in cooperation 
with all the international and intergovernmental organizations concerned with 
this process. 
4. Consultation on the development of German accounting regulations. 
5. Representing Germany on international standardization committees. 
6. Promotion of academic accounting research. 
"[he standards are published by the Ministry of Justice and once they are published, 
"the standards will conjectured to have the standing of principles of proper 
bookkeeping for group accounting (GoB) '9" (Ordelheide, 1999, p. Ill). The auditors, 
on the other hand, should testify to proper application of GAS. Deviation from a 
IAS can be only justified by a statement that this deviation is required to comply 
vv-ith GoB (Ordelheide and KPMG, 2001). 
By July 2004, the GASB had issued 14 German Accounting Standard (DSR; GAS"'' 
l'able 3.4 presents a summary of these standards: 
5S Deutsches Rechnungslegungs Standards Committee 
this means that tliC\ are given legal status, unlike UK standards 
`'° the equivalent abbreviation in English (German Accounting Standard) 
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I able 3.4: A list published German Accounting Standards as at date 
GAS Subject Published"' 
GAS I Exempting Consolidated Financial Statements July 2000 
GAS '2 Cash Flow Statement May 2000 
GAS 3 Segment Reporting May 2000 
GAS 4 Acquisition Accounting in Consolidated Financial Statements Dec 2000 
GAS 5 Risk Reporting (by different types of financial entities) May 2001 
GAS 6 Interim Financial Reporting Feb 2001 
GAS 7 Group Equity and Total Recognized Results April 2001 
GAS 8 Accounting for investments in Associates in C. F. S" May 2001 
GAS 9 Accounting for investment in joint Ventures in C. F. S Dec 2001 
GAS 10 Deferred Taxes in Consolidated Financial Statements Apr 2002 
GAS 11 Related Party Disclosure Apr 2002 
GAS 12 Non-current Intangible Assets Oct 2002 
GAS 13 Consistency Principle and Correction of Errors Oct 2002 
GAS 14 Currency Translation N P`" 
Source: prepared by the researcher based on information in DRSC (2004) 
The majority of these standards have different versions published specially for 
financial institutions. This casts light on the importance of these sectors in the 
German stock market. 
Given the fact that the GASB is still relatively new, the number of standards issued 
so far seems to be reasonable. In addition to those published, there are few drafts 
which are still under discussion64. Leuz and Wüstemann (2004) indicate that the 
GASs are mainly concerned with disclosure issues or questions of recognition. They 
also indicate that it is still early to pass judgments on these issues. Furthermore, Leuz 
and Wüstemann (ibid) raise the question of whether it will still be necessary to have 
this body after the incorporation of IAS into European accounting law. This question 
does not consider the needs of unlisted firms. In fact, the question about the 
prospective role of DRSC after the year 2005 may also apply to standard-setters in 
all member states of the EU. 
German standards and related issues are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 when 
compared with IAS and US GAAP. 
`'I The publication of the first version by the Federal Ministry of Justice (FMJ) 
`'' Stands for consolidated financial statements 
submitted to the FMJ in Aug ? 003 but it had not been published until Mar 2003 
\ccording to N\ \\ \\ . 
drsc. c e 
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3.5.5.1 Enforcement of the accounting standards: 
Although the German standard-setting body was established in 1998, a legal 
mechanism to enforce its standards came into being only in 2004 with the 
establishment of the Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel (FREP). Although it 
does not have authority to impose any sanctions. it is there to discover any violations 
of financial reporting requirements by listed firms including IFRSs (Deloitte and IAS 
Plus, n. d. ). 
However, apart from the expected role of FREP, Leuz and Wüstemann (ibid) 
indicate that corporate governance has an important role in the enforcement of 
accounting rules (explained below). They also indicate that pressures of enforcement 
can result also from different parties such as tax authorities (especially in issues of 
valuation and recognition) and the registration department of stock exchanges (such 
as that of FWB). 
3.5.6 The True and Fair View in German Accounting: 
One of the most important issues related to the implementation of the European 
Directives in continental Europe is the introduction of the `true and fair view 
principle' (hereafter TFV). Although a substantial body of literature has been 
produced during the last decades about TFV (Nobes, 1994), only its relationship 
with German accounting will be considered here. As discussed below, this issue is of 
particular importance to Germany. This is simply because of the fact that prior to the 
integration of the 4tß' Directive, Germany had had no experience at all with the TFV 
(Ordelheide, 1993). This concept was introduced through article 2(3) of the 4tß' 
Directive which states that: "The annual accounts shall give a true and fair view of 
the company's assets, liabilities and financial position and profit or loss. " 
Although it is not within the scope of this discussion to define the concept of TFV, 
one should point out that one of the issues raised around the introduction of TFV in 
Europe is that there is no universal agreement on the definition of TFV and its 
interpretation (Söderblom 2001). However, this concept can be argued to be the 
strongest influence that British accounting had on the EEC Directives. Ordelheide 
(199,, p. 81) distinguishes between two different concepts of TFV: the TFV 
principle and the European TFV. He states that the TFV principle is "what British 
accountants declare it to be"', whereas the contents of European TFV at that 
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moment are the accounting principles and valuation rules included in the 4"' 
Directive. 
The way Germany responded to TFV is by increasing disclosure rather than moving 
away from the uniformity required by both the commercial and tax laws (Watts, 
1996). As previously explained, the influence of the Commercial Code and the Tax 
Law is shown in detailed legal rules and the narrow scope for flexibility or 
judgement caused by the authoritativeness principle. According to Alexander (1993), 
for example, published accounts in Germany prepared on tax bases (under the 
influence of the authoritativeness principle) would not be considered by UK 
accountants as presenting a TFV. Ordelheide (ibid, p. 84), explains in line with the so 
called `separation thesis': 
"Accounting according to the TFV principle can be different from accounting 
according to GoB, and that in case of differences additional information in the notes 
is sufficient in order to establish a TFV". 
Yet, Haller (1992) indicates that the notes cannot totally cure the information 
distortion caused by the authoritativeness principle. Haller (ibid) relates this to two 
reasons: first, because the information provided by these notes has no material 
impact on the results of the commercial accounts; second, experience of the past 
years shows that companies do not interpret these disclosure rules in their proper 
sense. Furthermore, the information usually provided on the effect of the 
authoritativeness principle is often very brief and incomprehensible, especially for 
those who do not have knowledge of German tax laws. 
One important issue about absorbing the true and fair view into German legislation is 
the omission of the true and fair override. This is, in fact, an important concept in the 
British TFV, which requires companies to break the law and accounting standards in 
order to give a TFV, based on professional judgment. In conclusion, German TFV is 
more about compliance with rules and some additional disclosures than it is an 
ov, crriding principle of German accounting, N\-hich remains firmly attached to 
prudence. 
3.6 The role of the Profession: 
Despite some recent developments, the role of the accounting profession is still 
relatively small compared with that of the tax rules or with the profession in the UK 
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or the US (Macharzina and Langer. 2000). Furthermore. it can be seen above that 
Gray (1988) classified Germany as having moderate professionalism, as opposed to 
strong professionalism in the UK and US 
One approach to identifying the factors which may have led to this smaller role is to 
compare the German accounting profession with that of the UK. The main German 
professional body. the Institute of Auditors (Institut der fF1rtschaftsprü4-r in 
Deutschland e. V., IdW), was formed in 1931. Britain. on the other hand, was the first 
country in the world to establish and develop an accountancy profession body in the 
1850s (Parker, 2000). Furthermore, the requirement to audit all but small limited 
liability firms became only compulsory in 1985 with implementation of the 4"' 
Directive. The number of members of the IdW (Wirischuftshritfer) is around 9611 
(ACCA, 2001), whereas some 150000 accountants in the UK belong to professional 
bodies and have the power to audit (Watts, ibid). However, these figures should be 
interpreted cautiously, because not all the qualified accountants in the UK are 
currently in practice while the German accountants cannot be members of IdW 
unless they are in practice (ibid). 
A second important body in Germany is the Chamber of Auditors 
(f, lýirr/schaftsprüferkammer), which was formed by law in 1961. While, the vast 
majority (86 %) of auditors are voluntarily members of IdW, every auditor must be a 
member of the Wirtschaftsprüferkammer (Macharzina and Lange, ibid). The role of 
this chamber imposed by law is to observe professional standards and to educate 
accountants. However, the Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer takes the main part of this 
task by educating members and protecting their interests (Nobes, ibid). One 
important advantage of the German accounting profession is the high educational 
standards its members 
6' (Watts, ibid). As a result of the number of years of 
supervised practice most individuals are not admitted to fully licensed practise 
before the age of thirty. Another professional body of auditors which belong to the 
II "iý ý. ýclrcrfispriifcýrkaninýcr is the so called VCrcidigte ßiichpi4c'r (vBP). They have 
Io\vcr qualifications and are only allowed to audit private limited liability firms 
(GmbH) (Haller, ibid. ). Another potential factor which may underlie the limited role 
of the profession is the very detailed accounting laws and the role of the tax courts. 
\rrýýrciin`ý to Haller 1998, P. 87) "a university de-ree in business administration, law, general 
economics or similar subjects; \ ears of practical experience (including at least four years as an 
auditor)" , alongside a \\ ritten 
and oral examination. 
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This might have left a smaller area for the profession to innovate and contribute in 
this field. McLeay. Ordelheide and Young (2000. p. 84) report that as a result of the 
codified approach to regulation in Germany. the process of developing accounting 
rules was mainly directed by the Ministry of Justice. They also indicate that in 
contrast with the Anglo-American model, the audit profession had a minor role, 
"concerned with clients' compliance with the law rather than the development of 
binding accounting principles and procedures" 
Gordon et al (1998), on the other hand, explain that the profession in Germany has a 
significant impact in moderating strong statutory control. Although the two 
professional bodies do not have the power to develop mandatory accounting rules, 
they still have an indirect influence. For example, the IdW has an important role in 
the interpretation of legal provisions which are written in the form of general 
principles and require detailed explanation. Although the interpretations provided by 
this Institute have practical importance, they are not legally binding (Ordelheide 
1999). Haller (ibid), in turn, indicates that the recommendations of IdW can obtain 
authority from court decisions (Haller, ibid). Moreover, Gordon et al (ibid) argue 
that professional interpretations provide a large number of options which may imply 
more flexibility in German accounting. It can be understood that these interpretations 
are to some extent similar to those produced by the BFH. A third source of such 
interpretations is the large market for information. According to Ordelheide and 
Pfaff (1994, p89), the main sellers in this market are experts from business, the 
public sector and academia. Buyers, on the other hand, are the publishers of 
specialist journals, book publishers, and business and other organizations as indirect 
consumers. They also indicate that firms of accountants participate in this market, 
\\-here many commentaries on accounting law are produced by members of the larger 
accountancy firms. 
Ordelheide and Pfaff (ibid, p. 89) indicate that important contributions by the German 
pro lc ssion can also be made through statements and recommendations produced by 
the vv orking party on external company accounting of the Schmalenbach Societe and 
German Association for Business Economics (Schmalenbuchge, s'ellschaft/ Detiischc 
GG 
(iL'. sc'IL. sC/Wfi flu BL'tric'/is1I irt. s'chaft ). In addition to this, they also report that 
`'`' ;\ bock with a membership of 
1,600 German economists and managers intent on prornotin,, tile 
e\chanuc of ideas between microeconomic research and practice (Glossary on w\\w. Ba\er. com, 2004) 
ýý 
Chapter 3: Accounting in Gcrnnany: 
professional associations of particular industries. such as. "the Economic Committee 
of' the Chemical Industry Association" produce statements on accounting matters 
which have useful relevance, particularly for the industry concerned. 
\, 1cLeay, Ordelheide and Young (ibid, p. 96) identify. three main lobby groups which 
worked actively in the transformation of the 4tß' Directive into German Commercial 
Law: industry, auditors and academics. Through their empirical work. the authors 
lind that a key feature for the success of law making is agreement between these 
three groups, with the academics making a significant contribution. Furthermore, 
they also conclude that 
"with the exception of the levels of lobby Mu activity observed for the 
academic constituency , the active groups 
display a remarkable similarity to 
those documented for the US and similar regulatory regimes" 
The authors indicate that German accounting academic have a significant role 
relative to the levels observed in the US which is, to some extent, explained by the 
active market for legal interpretations in Germany (see above). 
However, the preparer viewpoint was also represented in lobbying activities by the 
Association for Finance and Management and the Combined Association of German 
Industry. Preparers' proposals were published in the Journal Der Betrieb", the same 
journal in which auditors publish their commentaries on new regulations67. One 
important thing is that the composition of GASB reflects the consensus between 
these three lobbying groups in addition to a financial analyst. 
3.7 Main features of German accounting: 
German accounting has its peculiar features which have been the result of the 
interaction of several factors. Macharzina and Langer (2000, p. 229) present a list 
\v hick contains several features of German accounting principles: 
0a strong tax influence 
"a large number of options regarding the recognition and valuation of assets 
" regulated accounting for private companies and partnerships which provides 
a greater range of accounting alternatives (unlike the UK and US) 
The auditors publish at first in Der Betrieb but later in Dic» l i'irtschaftsprufirn, u 
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" `subordination of the `true and fair view' concept to compliance with the 
individual provisions of law" 
" `ongoing development of accounting principles, primarily by tax courts" 
" the moderate influence of the German accounting profession on the 
development of accounting principles, compared with the UK and US 
" "The opportunity to control net income in a way disguised from readers of 
financial statements" (income smoothing). 
It can be seen that some of these features are discussed above within a different 
framework68 
However, one useful approach to study the main features of German accounting is by 
using Gray's dimensions which are presented in Figure 3.3 and 3.4 below. Yet, only 
three of the four dimensions presented in these figures and stated in Table 3.1 can be 
used to describe accounting practices: conservatism versus optimism, uniformity 
versus flexibility, and secrecy versus transparency (Gordon et al, ibid 69 ). 
1-i urthermore, some concepts related to these characteristics (such as creditor 
protection) are of significant importance to German accounting and are explained in 
detail where appropriate. 
3.7.1 Conservatism versus optimism: 
lt is widely known that German accounting is strongly influenced by the prudence 
principle and usually described as conservative (Schultz and Lopez, 2001). As stated 
in Table 3.1 above and as shown in Figure 3.2, German accounting was classified by 
Gray as moderately conservative. However, some aspects of German accounting, 
such as the way in which profits are distributed, may indicate that it should be 
categorized as highly conservative (Gordon et al, 1998). From the literature about 
German accounting, it seems that its conservatism is based on two main principles: 
creditor protection and preservation of capital in addition to the tax influence. These 
t\\ o principles will be explained as the underlying causes of this main feature of 
German accounting. This will be followed by the main aspects of the conservative 
side of German accounting. 
°ý For example the influence of tax is discussed in the taxation as a source of accounting regulations. 
`'`' This is the main reference chosen to `guide the explanations of this section. 
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3.7.1.1 Creditor protection: 
Baetge et al (1995) emphasise that the most important characteristic of German 
accounting is the significance of the principle of creditor protection. 
The concern with this principle can be traced back to the Common Prussian Law of 
1794 and the first German Commercial Code in 1861. The main concentration in 
these laws was given to asset and liability valuation, which gave the balance sheet 
priority over the profit and loss account (Baetge et al, ibid. Gordon et al (ibid, 299). 
on the other hand, state that 
"Historical experience of corporate collapse and the importance of long-term 
credit as source of finance has ensured that protection of creditors is a 
primary feature of commercial law as it affects accounting" 
Moreover, Baetge et al (ibid) explain that the principle of creditor protection is 
partially related to the fact that bank loans are an important element in financing 
German firms. They also refer to the fact that "German banks are required by law to 
verify credit worthiness based on year-end financial statements when issuing large 
loans". Consequently, analysis of these statements pays specific attention to the 
ability of firms to service debt (Gordon et al, ibid). The relative importance of bank- 
lending for German firms is discussed above and also in Chapter 2, as well as in 
Chapter 5. 
3.7.1.2 Preservation of capital (maintenance of capital): 
One main factor underlies the prudence of German accounting is the tendency in 
German firms to safeguard their sources of internal finance. Baetge et al (ibid) see 
that preservation of capital is primarily for the safeguarding of a firm and that. on a 
long term basis, is reflected in the presentation of the financial statements. Goldberg 
and Godwin (2002) suggest that the orientation towards preservation of capital 
alongside creditor protection is the main reason for the conservative bias in German 
accounting. 
According to Ordelheide and Pfaff (ibid, p. 150), the maintenance of equity capital is 
related to the high leverage of German firms (see above 
70 ). They also indicate legal 
rules (related to assets and liabilities) are the principal means of ensuring that firms 
"do not allow their capital base to shrink". Preservation of capital can be simply 
70 it is retcrenced in many positions earlier that there is an ar``ument about this. 
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explained as a principle which requires prudent distribution of profits in order to 
recycle a considerable part of these profits back into the firm (internal linance). 
Radebaugh, Gebhardt and Gray (1995, p. 173) state that hidden reserves are in the 
interest of stakeholders other than creditors such as employees. local and tax 
authorities, who "prefer to trap cash in the business, thereby securing its future 
existence". One important thing is that the concept of capital maintenance is strongly 
interlinked with the concept of creditor protection, in a way it seems to be difficult to 
separate them from each other (Baetge et al, ibid). 
3.7.1.3 Aspects of conservatism in German accounting: 
Different practices in German accounting provide evidence of how conservative this 
system is. Gordon et al (ibid) give examples, which are: the prudent calculation of 
distributable profit: the valuation of fixed assets in accordance with the historical 
cost convention: that internally generated intangible assets may not be recognised: 
requirements in law for provisions for uncertain liabilities: provisions for losses on 
incomplete transactions (anticipating future losses). There is also a reference to 
hidden reserves which can be created as a result of discretionary reserves and 
undervaluation of assets. 
Different authors, on the other hand, indicate that the conservatism of German 
accounting is evident in the calculation of distributable profits. Ordelheide and 
KPMG (2001) argue that the strong influence of prudence in German accounting 
concentrates on the interests of the creditors by minimizing profits rather than 
providing valuable information. Leuz and Wüstemann (2004) explain that creditor 
protection in Germany has been reflected in the choice of measurement rules 
l avoured by creditors and limiting payouts to shareholders. 
Fiston, Thornburg and Weidinger (2003, p. 4,5) provide a list with the practices 
under German accounting which they describe as "mundane resources which lead to 
more conservative accounting under HGB". The following is part of that list 
(compare with information in Table 3.4): 
" Assets are valued at historical or production costs; market value or higher 
costs of replacement are not allowed 
" [cases are normally classified according to tax rules. and thus seldom 
capitalized on the balance sheet. 
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" Goodwill arising from consolidation can be deducted immediately against 
equity. However, this is not true any more after December 2000 (see Table 
4.3 in Chapter 4) 
" Extensive use of provisions. 
0 Provisions for future debt may be set aside from pre-tax profits 
0 Deferred tax assets arising from loss carry-forwards must not be recognized. 
and most other deferred tax assets need not be. 
Secrecy 
Transparency 
l ure 3.3: Gray's cultural dimensions (measurement and disclosure) 
Source: Gray (1988) 
3.7.2 Secrecy versus transparency: 
Table 3.1 and Figure 3.3 show that German accounting is categorized by Gray (1988) 
as highly secretive. However, Gordon et al object to this classification and argue that 
information produced by German firms is reasonably extensive and that such 
categorization might have been caused by the reputation for using hidden reserves' 
II Still. they do not provide any explanation or justification of this viewpoint 
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One important thing to note is that these arguments took place prior to the significant 
reforms in German regulation. 
In recent years accounting disclosure has become a major issue in accounting 
literature worldwide. It is clear that accounting disclosure in Germany. in turn, has 
been a concern of German legislators since 1998. Prior to 1998, some crucial 
disclosure practices (e. g. cash flow statements and segment reporting) did not exist 
in the legal requirements of German reporting. Yet many larger companies provided 
them voluntarily (Leuz, 2004, Gordon et al, ibid). New disclosure legislation was 
enacted in 1998 to require all listed firms to present cash flow statements and 
segment reports in their group accounts on or after 31,1999 (Leuz. 2004). 
Consequently there were two accounting standards (GAS 2, GAS 3) regarding these 
two important issues. Increasing disclosure requirements in German legislation and 
German accounting practice is a direct result of the shift from a strict creditor-based 
view to a more shareholder-oriented view (Rieckers and Spindler, 2004). 
German law still does not contain any provision for action against members of 
management and supervisory boards to hold them directly liable to shareholders and 
investors for any misleading disclosures and the exclusion of pertinent information 
from accounts (Baums and Scott, 2003). However, some recommendations to cover 
this lack of legislation are included in a plan for a legislative action (ibid). 
Lcuz and Wüstemann (ibid, p. 463), provide a list of the most important 
supplementary information requirements for listed firms and which are expressed in 
the German securities law as additional requirements to those basic ones set forth in 
commercial law. The following is a summary with these requirements: 
1. Disclosure of cash flow statement, segment reporting and a statement of 
changes in equity (see above). 
2. Publication of a prospectus of which annual individual and group accounts 
are an essential part. 
3. Publication of at least one complete set of interim financial statements. 
4. Immediate disclosure of any important new facts which could considerably 
influence its share prices 
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5. The Frankfurt Stock Exchange Regulation (Börsenordnung) requires 
companies seeking listing in the Prime Standard segment: to provide 
quarterly reports, to comply with international standards and to provide "ad 
hoc" disclosure in the English language 
Still the argument of whether level of disclosure practiced by German companies is 
good enough to compete with that implemented by IRAS is left for the following 
chapter. 
In fact German law has minimum disclosure (fundamental) requirement for business 
organisations of all legal forms (Ordelheide and KPMG, 2001). Yet, for higher 
quality and levels of disclosure the legal form and the size of business can be a 
determining factor. For example, most corporations are required to add notes to the 
accounts and a management report, while small ones are exempted from preparing a 
management report. Another example is that valuation rules in corporations are more 
investor-oriented than those for non-corporations (Leuz and Wüstemann, ibid). 
It can be noticed from the explanation above the capital market has been a significant 
mechanism in structuring a high level of accounting disclosure. An important 
example is the level of disclosure practices required by the private law of the 
Deutsche Börse which organised segments such as the Neuer Markt, SMAX 
previously and organises the Prime Standard currently (see Chapter 2). This may 
have an important implication for the level of disclosure in companies which do not 
belong to the stock market, such as unlisted AGs and KGaAs and GmbHs (see 
Chapter 2 for all legal forms of German businesses). 
3.7.3 Uniformity versus Flexibility: 
Table 3.1 and Figure 3.4 show that, German accounting practice was classified by 
Gray (1988) as marginally uniform (mixture of uniformity and flexibility) (Roberts 
et al, ibid). Still, Choi and Mueller (1992); and Nobes and Parker (1995) (as cited in 
Nobes 2000) classified Germany as Macro-uniform. Feige (1997 a), on the other 
hand, criticises these two later models, and the classification of German accounting 
as uniform. He argues that German accounting is not as uniform as it is perceived 
through these models. To prove this. Feige used the treatment of currency translation 
as an example to say that, at least in this area, British accounting is more uniform 
than German. Mueller and Nobes (1997), in turn. indicate that Feige's study is full of 
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flaws, in particular, the empirical part 72 and that the issue of currency translation is 
an outlier 73 . 
Feige (1997 b. p. 768). in turn, states that the issue of currency 
translation is not an outlier. as there many major issues on which the HGB does not 
have any rules ``(e. g. cash flow statements , 
leases, financial instruments. ýý 
governments subsidies)". He argues that some degree of uniformity is caused by the 
provisions of tax law, such as depreciation rates, rather than the detailed rules of the 
HGB. As one can see there is no agreement on the uniformity of German accounting 
especially that Mueller and Nobes (ibid) concentrate on criticising Feiges empirical 
work rather than arguing for uniformity 75; nevertheless, the researcher agrees with 
their criticisms. 
Gordon et al (ibid) report that there are some aspects which may reinforce the notion 
of the uniformity of German accounting. Nevertheless they argue that despite these 
aspects, there is some degree of flexibility. For example, they indicate that although 
the chart of accounts has a long history in Germany, it is not mandatory. It may be 
important to indicate that these charts are the main argument on which Nobes based 
his classification (Nobes 1994). Gordon et al (ibid, p. 298) also argue that because 
of the stakeholders system, uniformity in the German published accounts is the 
means of ensuring comparable treatment of stakeholders (investors, management, 
creditors and employees; see Chapter 2). However, they suggest that flexibility of 
access to additional relevant information moderates this uniformity. Furthermore, 
they identify an unusual feature of German practice as the variability allowed in 
valuing the net assets of the subsidiary on acquisition". Finally, one can also argue 
that the whole concept of GoB discussed above is reasonably flexible. 
72 The weak points in Feige's study are: a very small sample, all the sample is in one industry, 
Including only two countries, the sample year is 1994 which is after the integration of the 4"' Directive 
and far from the time of the classifications of Muller, Choi and Nobes. 
73 That is because it is concerned only with group accounts and that it is also on those "rare major 
issues on which the HGB has no rules (Mueller and Nobes, ibid, p. 126) 
' This seems odd, as one cannot expect to find requirements about the cash flow statement as long as 
German firms are not obliged h\ law to prepare. (Cash flow statement was first required in 1998) 
one should know that their reply to Feige was concentrated on defending their methodolo``\ and 
their models in general rather than arguing for "uniformity'". on \ hich was the main criticism made 
by Feige (1997 a). 
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Statutory control 
Professionalism 
Figure 3.4: Gray's cultural dimensions (Authority and Enforcement) 
Source: Gray (1988) 
3.8 The German Audit Market: 
For the purpose of this study, the German audit market can be narrowly defined as 
the (Troup of professional entities which are in charge of auditing the financial 
statements of German firms. The identity of the auditor employed by German firms 
is of concern in this research as a possible influence on the choice of GAAP, so an 
overview of the composition of the German audit market is required. 
A number of studies in the German financial literature focus on the structure and 
developments in the German audit market. Quick and Wolz (1999) provide a survey 
of' these studies which are summarized in Table 2.4 below. It can be seen that, in 
general, there is high concentration in the German audit market. Yet, the results 
shown below should be compared cautiously because of some important 
methodological differences 
76. 
-`' Apart from differences in size of samples (stated below). they use different surrogates for the size 
0t the audit market. 
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Table 3.5: A Survey of Studies on German Audit Market 
Study Sample Result Notes on 
period concentration 
Schruff (1973) 1967/68 Gini-coefficient: G=0.86"/ High concentration 
Albach (1976) 1951- 1951 G=0.625 Not very high 
1972 1972 G=0.67 
Helmenstein (1996) 1987- 1987 G=0.775 High concentration 
1991 1991 G=0.810 
Lenz (1996) 1990 Concentration ratio: CR3 = 0.76 Increasing 
CR4 = 0.82 CR7 = 0.887 concentration'' 
Marten and Schultze 1994 G=0.89 (based on sales) Increasing towards 
(1997) G=0.89 (total of balance sheet) largest 7 
ßuijink et al (1996) 1970 1970 CR4= 0.09 Remarkably low 
1994 1994 C R4= 0.16 
Quick and Wolz (1999) 1994 1991 CR4= 78.5 Increasing towards 
1994 C R4= 79.2 largest 7 
Source: based on information in Quick and Wolz (1999) 
One important limitation which should be considered when comparing the results 
shown above is that the studies use samples which are significantly different in size 
and type of firm. For example Lenz (1996) studied 2265 stock corporations8' (AGs), 
whereas Marten and Schultze (1997) used a sample of 250 listed firms. 
Quick and Wolz (ibid) note that there is a general trend of concentration to the 
benefit of the largest seven audit firms. The largest seven in Germany during the 
period covered were: KPMG, C&L Deutsche Revision, WEDIT (Deloitte & 
Touche), Schitag (Ernst & Young), BDO, Price Waterhouse and Andersen. 
Furthermore, concentration is also high in favour of the two leading firms, KPMG 
sind C&L Deutsche Revision. 
The map of the German audit market in recent years has witnessed significant 
changes and more concentration. One can think of two possible reasons for this: on 
"A commonly used concentration measure 
'R This study is criticised for using a poorly selected sample. 
'`' Although the measures of these two studies shown in this table are different. Professor Hanzrudi 
l nz in unpublished paper in (1998) reports that they are higher than those reported by Schruff ( 1973) 
1 -his remarkably low concentration could be explained by choosing' "inappropriate" surrogate for 
measuring the size of audit market (Quick and Wolz, ibid). 
Mistakenly Quick and Wolz (ibid) report that the\ are listed stock corporation. This cannot be true 
as the number of listed AG has never been larger than 1000 (ties Lenz (1998) 
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the one hand. mergers between audit firms have taken place. so that the number of 
large firms is less. On the other hand, there is an increasing tendency of German 
firms to import international capital (Theissen 2004). which in turn may increase 
their tendency to use large multinational audit firms. 
German companies in Hoppenstedt (2003), in which the sample firms of this 
research are listed, are audited by approximately 237 audit firms' 2. Table 2.5 
provides important information on the distribution of these firms: 
Table 3.6: Distribution of Auditors over Listed Firms (2001) 
Auditor Number of audited firms Percentage 
KPMG 156 15.5 % 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 151 15.0% 
"l-list & Young 102 10.1 % 
Arthur Andersen 93 9.2 % 
Deloitte and Touche 16 1.6% 
BDO 58 5.7% 
Other 434 43.0 % 
10103 100.0% 
It can be seen that the international Big 5 audit 51.3 % of listed firms. However, the 
proportion belonging to Deloitte and Touche is very small. Furthermore, BDO had 
the next largest proportion. 
In t act, it is not in the scope of this research to measure the concentration ratios to be 
compared with the ones shown above84. However, different indications suggest high 
concentration in this market. First is the high percentage of the number of firms 
audited by these big firms, especially the largest two. Second, is the fact that the vast 
majority of DAX firms and other large firms are audited by the Big5 (see Chapter 6). 
As total assets and sales of audited firms are the commonly used surrogates 
measuring concentration, one would expect high concentration especially given the 
tact that DAX firms are exceptionally large 8 
These are the firms listed in Hoppenstedt which includes firms listed on German stock markets 
other than Frankfurt. However, this number is approximate because for about 30 firms, the name of 
the auditor was not available. 
This number includes firms listed on other stock markets (other than FWB). 
The relative importance of piece of information for this research is much less than the time cost 
needed especiall-\ that one can confidently conclude that concentration is high as explained above. 
This can be seen clearly in Chapter 7 \\-here such firms are considered as outliers and c\ en with 
e xtrenme values compared with the rest of the sample. 
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The high concentration of the German audit market is not unusual compared to the 
UK audit market, in which the largest four held 90% of the market for listed firms 
(based on audit fees) in 2002 and 96 % after the demise of Andersens (Beattie. 
Goodacre and Fearnley, 2004). The German audit market for listed companies seems 
noticeably less concentrated than in the UK with a significant share of the market 
outside the big 4 or 5. Yet, in general, the international audit market does not 
significantly differ from the German with respect to the names of the largest audit 
firms (for an overview the international market see (Chapter 5). 
3.9 Implications of this chapter for the current research: 
Overall, this chapter provides a detailed insight into the characteristics of German 
accounting compared with Anglo-Saxon accounting to which IAS and US GAAP 
belong. Traditional German accounting is strongly influenced by the concept of 
creditor protection rather than being investor oriented. In general. this is reflected in 
the fact that German accounting is more conservative and less transparent than 
Anglo-Saxon accounting. This also implies that German companies are sacrificing 
their secrecy, and from a German point of view, may be risking their firms' future by 
being less conservative86 when they switch to IRAS. 
The fact that the German audit market is not as concentrated as the UK market may 
gave impiications for inc reiationsnip oeiween auuiwr cnoice ana the cnoice or 
GAAP. In Germany audit firms outside the Big-5 audit nearly 50% of listed 
companies and therefore the act of choosing a Big-5 auditor may be a more powerful 
signal than in the UK, where the Big-4/5 dominate the audit of listed firms (see 
Section 3.8 above). 
16 Recall that one of the main foundations of the conser\ atism in German accounting is the concept of 
capital maintenance, which is concern with the 
future urowth of the firm (see Section 3.7.1). 
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4 Chapter 4: German GAAP, IAS and US GAAP 
4.1 Introduction: 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an explanation of the relationship between 
German GAAP (hereafter GGAAP), IAS (IFRS) and US GAAP (IFRS and US 
GAAP collectively IRAS)87. It is structured into six main sections: First, it describes 
the general attitude of German interested parties towards IAS (IFRS) and US GAAP 
prior to incorporating them into German Law. Second, the case of Daimler Benz is 
used to illustrate different important points. Third is a discussion about income 
smoothing. Fourth, the main differences between the three models of accounting (or 
maybe two88) are explored. Fifth, follows a discussion of the value relevance of 
GGAAP compared with IAS and US GAAP. The final section is a brief overview on 
the prospective use of IAS in EU member states. 
4.2 The use of IRAS prior to 1998: 
It is argued in Chapter 2 that there has been a lack of a strong equity culture in 
Germany. Furthermore, it was explained that German accounting has traditionally 
focused on creditor protection and is strongly connected with tax accounting. 
According to Glaum (2000, p. 24) 
With increasing transparency and competition in international capital 
markets, the growing importance of international portfolio diversification, 
with foreign institutional investors acquiring stakes in German corporations, 
with the firms themselves seeking to broaden their equity base internationally, 
German accounting has come under intense pressure" 
As a result of these pressures, German firms were forced to orient their financial 
accounting towards the information needs of investors rather than the traditional 
orientation towards creditor protection. 
IRAS had been used by a few large German companies prior to its recognition by 
German legislation in 1998. German firms needed to adopt international accounting 
practices for different reasons. Glaum (2000, p. 23) reports two main reasons for this: 
while some German firms such as Daimler-Benz, Deutsche Telecom and VEBA 
ý^ 
, -fis 
defined in before it stands for Internationally Recognised Accounting Standards, which would 
include both l\S and USGAAP. 
If \\ c considered that IAS and US GAAP belong to one model (An`` lo-Saxon) 
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were "effectively forced" to adopt US GAAP to satisfy the SEC requirements for 
listing on the NYSE. other German firms such as Bayer, Adidas, and Schering 
adopted IAS to enhance their image and attract international investors. 
The adoption of IRAS by German companies prior to 1998 was through three 
different routes. First, firms which were listed on US Markets such as Daimler Benz 
had to reconcile their accounts to US GAAP through form 20 F (see below). Second. 
other companies incorporated options from IAS or US GAAP into their reporting 
supposedly within the framework of the HGB. Third some firms such as Adidas 
provided supplementary statements according to IAS. Table 4.1 below provide some 
information on a small sample of larger German firms which used IRAS during the 
mid nineties (Pallett, 1997). 
One important issue is that companies claiming compliance with IAS may not in 
practice be compliant or not fully compliant. In other words, some firms may claim 
that they follow specific accounting standards, while their observance of these 
standards is incomplete. Street, Gray, and Bryant (1999, p. 46) examine 49 annual 
reports for 1996 from different countries claiming compliance with IAS x`' . 
This 
sample includes the annual reports of three German firms: Bayer, Heidelberger 
Zement and Schering. The authors find that there are significant cases of non- 
compliance on the level of both measurement and disclosure requirements of IASs. 
They also conclude that "While many companies may appear anxious to seek the 
international investment status that comes with the adoption of IASs they are not 
always willing to fulfil all of the requirements and obligations involved". 
Furthermore, Taylor and Jones (1999) examine how and where companies refer to 
the use of IAS and the implications of this behaviour in a sample of companies 
(including German companies), claiming compliance with IAS in the annual reports 
lOr 1996. They classify companies into categories and classes, according to their 
policy in using IAS90. The authors conclude that a significant number report the use 
of LAS with exceptions (such as is the case in German firms). They also indicate that 
the majority of these cases do not discuss the monetary impact of the exceptions 
S° Tile compliance was either stated in the notes to accounting, and or audit opinion. 
90 For e\amplc. they have a category for companies that refer to use of IAS in the footnotes and audit 
report, and another category which refer to IAS in the footnotes onl\. Furthermore, they classify 
companies according to the e\tent of using IAS (for instance. \\ Nether they use IAS along ith home 
country standards or not). 
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which, in turn, implies that they "choose those standards they like and disregard 
those that they do not like" (p. 568) 
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-4.3 Debate on the need for using Anglo-Saxon accounting in Germany: 
In 1991, the SEC rejected an application made by some German firms asking for an 
exemption from the reconciliation requirements which apply to foreign registrants. 
arguing for the capability of German accounting and its disclosures. As a result of 
this rejection, the debate on whether German accounting should adapt to the Anglo- 
American model became public (Harris, Lang and Möller. 1994). Many German 
commentators have argued against the idea that German accounting is inferior to the 
Anglo-American accounting in satisfying the needs of global financial markets for 
investor-oriented reporting (Glaum ibid). 
The main concern about the move of German accounting towards Anglo-American 
accounting is, in fact, caused by the significant difference in dealing with profits 
under the two models. As explained in Chapter 3, the conservatism of German 
accounting caused by creditor protection and capital preservation concepts is evident. 
There is no doubt that German accounting is not investor-oriented as Anglo- 
American accounting is. However, it could be argued that the long-term perspective 
in dealing with profits in German accounting works for the survival of the firm, in 
contrast with the short-term perspective in Anglo-American accounting (Pallett, ibid). 
In tact, the vast majority of arguments about the quality of German accounting 
compared to the Anglo-American model are mainly based on measuring and 
managing earnings. Booth, Broussard and Loistl (1997, p. 590) indicate that 
"theoretically, neither country's GAAP can be considered superior to the other. The 
difference between them may simply reflect a different view of what constitutes 
earnings". Therefore, because of the importance and sensitivity of this subject, it is 
fully discussed in a later section below. 
\t the early stages of this debate about the use of international accounting in 
Germany, C&L Deutsche Revision AG ran a survey in 1994 addressed to the top 
financial managers of larger German companies and university professors92 (Glaum 
and Mandler. 1997). The focus of the questions of this survey was on the attitude of 
the participants towards international accounting harmonisation and towards the 
potential adaptation of German accounting to Anglo-American rules. The researcher 
'), This can be an indication on the importance of German academics in the German accounting 
practice and support information gi%en on this 
in Chapter ?. 
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believes that it would beneficial to include these results as summarised by Glaum 
and Mandler (1997, p 464): 
" Managers had a largely positive attitude towards the current German 
accounting' (at that time), and did not consider it to be inferior to US 
accounting with respect to value relevance. Professors. on the other hand. 
were more positive towards international accounting than the managers. 
" While, managers were sceptical about particular US GAAP standards. 
professors had more conflicting views. 
" The vast majority of the participants were in favour of the adoption of 
international accounting standards. However, nearly all of them thought that 
harmonisation should be limited to consolidated accounts. 
" Whereas managers were in favour of a free choice between three sets of 
accounting standards (as it was after' 1998), the professors thought that 
adoption of IAS should have been compulsory for consolidated accounts. 
In their explanation of the professors' opinion, the authors argue that the expected 
reform in Commercial Code would devalue professors' know-how. However, this 
know-how would also increase in the transitional period because it is much easier for 
professors to acquire knowledge about new regulations than other interested groups. 
The increase in professors' expertise, in turn, will be reflected in increased 
publications and seminars. Still, Glaum and Mandler state that the interest element is 
not evident in the professors' view93. 
On the other hand, the arguments employed to explain the managers' view relate to 
income measurement and management (see below). Apart from the arguments about 
earnings management, and because of the complex relationship between managers 
behaviour and firm characteristics, the authors test a group of hypotheses base on the 
impact of these characteristics on managers' attitudes towards IRAS (discussed in 
detail in Chapter 5). Additional hypotheses examined are not directly related to the 
firm. They state the hypothesis that the greater the discretion managers have. the 
greater their opposition to the adoption of IRAS is. Conversely. they also 
hypothesise that: managers' support for IRAS increases if they have extensive 
`'' The\ do not test an\ h\ pothesis about it and confine their examination to mana``ers' attitudes. 
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knowledge and experience of US accounting practice: the more they belie\ e in the 
importance of accounting data in capital markets, the more they believe the HG B to 
be a barrier to attracting international investors (see results above). 
Moreover, Glaum and Mandler (ibid) examined the differences between managers' 
opinions and those of the academics and found that they were statistically significant. 
However, another survey with a broader sample size was conducted at the beginning 
of 1998. Glaum (ibid) used this survey to compare the responses of only those who 
were questioned in 1994 with their earlier responses. Results of this comparison 
show that the attitude of German financial executives towards adoption had changed 
significantly. Managers seemed to have accepted the idea that German accounting 
was not capable of meeting the needs of global stock markets. Furthermore, they had 
become more welcoming to the move to IRAS. Moreover, it was evident from the 
whole sample that there had been a significant shift in managers' attitudes towards 
accepting IAS rather than US GAAP as the basis for the internationalization of 
German accounting. 
One main related issue was about the need to reconcile to US GAAP for listing on 
US exchanges. The German point of view against reconciliation and in favour of 
mutual recognition was expressed by Herbert Biener, from the German Justice 
Ministry and the senior civil servant responsible for accounting (1994, p. 340) 
(although one should remember that this is inevitably an official point of view): 
"Reconciliation is misleading and confusing for all those involved if it has 
the consequence that enterprises disclose two different kinds of net income 
and net assets. What will happen when a German public company listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange published a profit there, but on the stock 
exchange in Frankfurt a materially lower profit or loss? '" 
He further questions the reaction of the German tax authorities when they realize that 
provisions under GoB which are tax deductible are shown as equity under US 
GL\AP94 (see income smoothing below). Moreover, it would be rather difficult to 
explain this to people who are not familiar with accounting rules. Bieler (ibid. p. 341 
also argues that 578 foreign companies were listed on German exchanges in 1991 
`'' p'l'c should note that this argument disregard the fact that taxation in Germany is not related to 
consolidated accounts. This because the 
discussion is focused on the introduction of Anglo-American 
,, ccoýunting disregarding whether they are 
for suggested for individual accounts or consolidated ones. 
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without the need for reconciliation. He argues that this did not cause any damage to 
investors and that lack of comparability is not a good reason for refusing mutual 
recognition. 
In general, this showed that although the opposition to the introduction of Anglo- 
American accounting in Germany was quite strong in the early nineties, the opinions 
in the late nineties of several interest different parties had become more flexible. 
4.4 The case of Daimler-Benz 
Daimler-Benz AG (hereafter DB) is a commonly used example in the literature on 
German accounting. It has been an important example for different reasons which 
are also the same reasons for which it is discussed here: First, it is widely known that 
DB was the first German company to be listed on NYSE and consequently raised the 
issue of compliance with US GAAP. Second, the substantial differences between the 
information produced under each of the two GAAPs raised many criticisms and 
concerns about German accounting. Finally, DB can serve as a perfect example for 
practitioners and academics of how international differences in accounting can have 
substantial effects. 
The former Daimler-Benz (Daimler Chrysler currently) was the largest industrial 
group in Germany in terms of sales in 1993. DB shares had been traded on the eight 
German stock exchanges. It was the holding company of four `corporate units'. 
Mercedes-Benz, AEG, Deutsch Aerospace and debis. Prior to its listing on NYSE, 
DB had had its shares listed on the exchanges in Basel, Tokyo, London, Switzerland, 
Paris and Vienna (Daimler Benz AG, 1993). 
Radebaugh, Gebhardt and Gray (1995, p. 167), suggest that although DB was 
planning to invest in a plant in Tuscaloosa, Alabama (USA), it had other reasons to 
seek a listing on NYSE, because this direct investment in Tuscaloosa was small 
compared to the total investment by the DB group. The following is a summary of 
lhesc reasons: 
" Direct access to the largest stock market in the world, through which DB 
could market its planned large equity offerings, which could not have been 
easily absorbed by the relatively small German stock market. 
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" NYSE was expected to increase demand for DB shares and to increase the 
number of shareholders. This is especially because: some US institutional 
investors were not permitted to invest in securities not registered with the 
SEC; transaction costs in Germany were higher than in the US: US investors 
may have perceived information deficiencies when purchasing shares listed 
on non-US markets. 
" There was a fear that the major shareholders (Deutsche Bank AG and the 
Emirate of Kuwait) were intending to reduce their investments in Daimler- 
Benz. 
It is widely believed that a major obstacle to the listing of German firms on US stock 
exchanges has been the requirement to comply with USGAAP (see Harris et al, 1994; 
Cairns, 1994)95. In the early 1990s, for example, Deutsche Bank considered listing 
its shares on the NYSE, but was deterred by the disclosure requirements (Matthews 
and Kraus, 1993). 
The move taken by DB by listing on NYSE was not welcomed by larger German 
firms, such as Bayer and Siemens, which had been holding out for mutual 
recognition. In fact mutual recognition had been strongly advocated by different 
interested parties in Germany (Ball, ibid). An example of the strong defence of 
mutual recognition is apparent in the different statements by Biener (ibid): 
"There is no doubt that improved comparability is helpful, especially for 
investors, but, in a market economy, this issue can be solved by competition. 
If investors prefer enterprises to give comparable information, competitors 
will consider whether in this case additional information should be used to 
influence the market price of their securities. This way is preferred in 
Germany". (p. 340) 
However, one year before the statement quoted above, in March 1993. Dr Gerhard 
[iener, the chief financial officer of DB (as cited in Van Hulle, 1993, p 388) stated: 
as the English language has become the world language, the Anglo-Saxon 
accounting rules are getting stronger bases and are becoming the world's accounting 
`'i This ma\ not be the case for companies from countries other than German\ . Different non-US 
firms had been listed on NYSE before DB. 
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language. It is clear that the term `Anglo-Saxon used by Liener does not include UK 
accounting, simply because it was not an option for DB. 
By reconciling its financial statements to US GAAP, DB stated its first-ever reported 
loss (Ball, 2004). In 1993, DB had net income of DM 602 million under GGAAP. 
This net income was converted into a large loss of DM 1.839 million under US 
GAAP. Before explaining the major reasons behind this substantial change. it would 
be more appropriate to show how the main items appeared in the reconciliation. 
Table 4.2 presents these items and their proportional effect on both the reported 
earnings and the equity of DB under GGAAP: 
Table 4.2: Reconciliation of Earnings and Equity of DB in 1993 from GGAAP to US GAAP 
Changes in earnings Changes in equity 
DM (Mio) % DM (Mio) % 
1. Adjusted net income/equity under GGAAP 602 17,584 
2. Changes in appropriated retained earnings (4,262) -708.0 % 5,770 32.8 % 
3. Long-term contracts 78 13.0% 207 1.2 % 
4. Goodwill and Business acquisitions (287) -47.7 % 2,284 13.0% 
6. Pensions and other postretirement benefits (624) -103.7 % (1,821) -10.4% 
7. Foreign currency translation (40) -6.6 % 85 0.5 % 
8. Financial instruments (225) -37.4% 381 2.2 % 
9. Other 292 48.5 % (698) -4.0 % 
10. Deferred Taxes 2,627 436.4% 2,489 14.2 % 
1 1. Net income/equity according to USGAAP (1,839) 26,281 
DE= linel I- linel 
Source: based on information from Radebaugh et al (ibid) 9`' 
The following is a summary with the explanations presented by Radebaugh et al 
(ibid) for the most significant adjustments in the reconciliation to USGAAP. First, 
the item `changes in the appropriate earnings' is caused by differences in the 
recognition and valuation of provisions, which had been created by DB to prevent 
these amounts from being distributed to shareholders. Second, the item "goodwill 
and business acquisitions" is the result of the fact that the net assets of businesses 
acquired by DB prior to 1988 were valued at historical cost rather than fair value 
97 
furthermore, further adjustments were required because of the amortization of 
ooodvv'ill. Goodwill \\-as usually amortised over a period of 5-15 years (tax-driven), 
vv'hcrcas it could be amortised under US GAAP over a period of up to 40 years. 
`"' RadebauEli et al present this list for 3 wars: 1991,1992 and 199'3. However, only one \ ear is 
illustrated here. 
97 This \w as changed in 1988 but only for net assets acquired after 1987 
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Third, as a result of actuarial assumptions and requirements of SFAS 87 and SFAS 
106, DB had to increase provisions for pension costs and similar obligations. Fourth. 
the deferred tax adjustment can be explained by two main factors: the difference in 
the method of calculating deferred taxes and the income tax effects of the 
adjustments made for the reconciliation. German companies use the liability method 
for deferred taxes, but recognise them only to the extent that deferred tax liabilities 
exceed consolidated deferred tax assets. Furthermore, deferred tax assets are 
recognised only on temporary differences resulting from adjustments related to 
consolidation and not valuation. Under US GAAP, on the other hand, deferred taxes 
are computed for all temporary differences using the liability method and are based 
on statutory tax rates. As shown in Table 4.2 above, the major source of difference 
which led to showing this big loss shown under USGAAP is the DM 4.262M 
reduction under the heading of changes in appropriated earnings. According to Ball 
(ibid), this item is the sum of two amounts: `Extraordinary Results' and `Gain on 
Sale of Securities', which are reported in the company's 1993 Consolidated 
Statement of Cash Flows. Furthermore, he explains that these amounts are hidden 
reserves which were released to cover the losses of this particularly bad year. 
In general, the differences shown in the reconciliation of DB support the 
conservatism and smoothing hypotheses generally linked with G GAAP in the 
I iterature. 
Although Daimler Benz must have known the highly negative result of the 
reconciliation, they were encouraged to take this step. Gray et al (1995, p. 168) try to 
explain this by stating that "the decision of Daimler-Benz's management to publish 
accounting data based on U. S. GAAP can be thought of as an unusual signal of its 
confidence in the future financial results of the company'. 
While the conservatism of German accounting is discussed in Chapter3, income 
smoothing is discussed in the following section. 
4.5 Earnings management and income smoothing: 
Earnings management and income smoothing is an essential characteristic of 
German accounting. One may think that it could be better to discuss it in Chapter 
which focuses on the main features of German accounting. However. the researcher 
has chosen to discuss it in this chapter, mainly because it is believed to be a major 
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factor underlying significant difference between German accounting and Anglo- 
Saxon accounting. 
Furthermore, Ball. Kothari and Robin (2000) conclude that "German accounting in 
particular is widely presumed to be more conservative. because German managers 
have unusual discretion to reduce reported income during good years. Ho«-ever. they 
also have unusual discretion to delay recognition of economic losses, and thus to 
increase reported income in bad years". Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (20033), on the 
other hand, proved that Germany is among those countries in which income 
smoothing is evident98. 
The following are some of the factors suggested by Ball (2004, p 121) as incentives 
to smooth income in code law countries: 
" Stock-related compensation schemes are not widespread in a stakeholder 
system. "Managers are evaluated to a lesser degree on the basis of 
shareholder value" (one stakeholder alone). Risk aversion among managers 
creates the need to reduce earnings volatility. 
" Employee bonuses and stockholder dividends based on reported earnings, 
creates motivations to reduce income volatility. Reporting a loss may 
eradicate bonuses and dividends (smoothing will secure profits for bad years). 
" Additional taxes on retained earnings generate strong incentives to hide 
earnings in excess of those needed to pay considered necessary dividends and 
bonuses. 
" To plan tax collections, governments do not like volatile earnings (they also 
do not want to see a fall in revenues in times of recession). 
lo smooth income, management need to use accounting policies which reduce 
income in good years, but can be also used to increase it in bad years (Pallett, 1995). 
Earnings can be managed by hiding reserves in good years and drawing on these 
rescrvves in later years to cover any losses and reduce volatility. Hidden reserves can 
he created by recognising provisions99 (e. g. excessive provisions for future losses or 
hiture expenses); transfers to reserves (e. g. crediting a shareholders equity reserve 
"`Countries were clustered in different clusters, where Germany \\ as clustered with Japan as insider 
economies. 
In accounting terms. 
this means debiting earnings using credit entry such as provisions. 
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account); asset valuations by write-down (e. g. excessive allowances of bad debts). In 
bad years these accounting entries can be reversed to increase book income (Ball. 
Kothari and Robin. 2000). Daimler-Benz (1993) is a widely used example for this 
type of income smoothing. 
An important question is what does the move to IRAS 1 00 mean for income 
smoothing? What are German managers going to have to give up? 
Glaum and Mandler (ibid) indicate that German Commercial Code contains 
considerably more scope and options than US GAAP for smoothing income. They 
also state that German managers enjoy more freedom to accumulate and transfer 
hidden reserves and. consequently, smooth their companies' profits. Günther and 
Young (ibid) also explain that particular accounting practices that can be used to 
manage earnings in code law countries are not permitted in common-law accounting. 
The authors report four types of revenue reserves used in Germany as an example for 
these practices. 
Still, the opportunity for earnings management under IAS is controversial. A recent 
study by Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2004), examined whether German listed 
companies complying with IAS engage significantly less in earnings management 
than those using German GAAP. The authors conclude that IAS increases the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals and that it does not significantly constrain 
earnings management. Gontcharov and Zimmerman (2002) also examine earnings 
management in German listed companies, but across three groups of companies: 
GGAAP, IAS and US GAAP. The researchers conclude that earnings management is 
more restricted under US GAAP than under IAS or GGAAP. Furthermore, they 
conclude that the level of income smoothing in firms reporting under IAS and those 
reporting under GGAAP is nearly the same. On the other hand, some would think 
that the convergence of IAS towards US GAAP should reduce the opportunities for 
income smoothing (Burns 1998 as cited in Weißenberger et al. 2004). However. 
\\ eißcnberger et al (ibid) state that there are greater opportunities for earnings 
management within IAS. They also state that the similarity between GGAAP and 
l: \S is higher than between US GAAP and GGAAP. Dumontier and Raffournier 
100 Recall that this includes lAS and LSG. AAP 
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(1998), conversely. argue that adopting IAS making earnings management more 
difficult because it restricts the use of hidden reserves. 
Overall, while it is fairly evident in the literature that US GAAP restricts income 
smoothing, it is not evident that IAS does so to the same extent. 
4.6 Significant differences between GGAAP, IAS and US GAAP 
This section aims to illustrate that despite the international efforts for convergence in 
accounting practices, there are still significant differences between the three sets of 
accounting standards used by listed German firms. Yet, it should be emphasised that 
Table 4.3 shows differences between the three sets related to the most significant 
issues in accounting regulations, but not all differences. Apart from the differences, 
this comparison shows that there is still a lack of regulation on some important 
accounting issues. Moreover, the researcher focuses the comparison on the period 
around the end of 2001, which is the sampling period for this research. 
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'Fable 4.3: Comparison between GGAAP. LAS and US GAAP around the , ear 2001 
G GAAP IAS (IFRS) US GAAP 
Valuation issues: 
Property, Plant and 
equipment: 
dismantling, removal 
and restoration costs 
cannot be capitalised 
Revaluations are not 
permitted. 
Depreciation is tax 
driven 
Intanible assets' 02: 
internally generated 
assets, including 
development costs, 
cannot be capitalised 
Revaluation is not 
permitted. 
Amortization is tax- 
(1rIVcil. 
Goodwill103: 
Property, Plant and 
equipment: 
The cost of 
acquisition includes 
appropriate 
dismantling, removal 
and restoration costs. 
Revaluation to fair 
value is allowed. 
Depreciation is based 
on the useful life of 
an asset. Methods are 
reviewed periodically. 
Intangible asset: 
internally generated 
assets, including 
development costs, 
should be capitalised 
if specific criteria are 
met. 
Revaluation is 
permitted in certain 
circumstances 
Amortization period 
may exceed 20 years 
if justified 
Goodwill: 
similar to GGAAP Should be cao)italized 
Property, Plant and 
equipment: 
Similar to IAS 
Revaluations are not 
permitted 
Depreciation: based 
on useful life of an 
asset. However, a 
periodic review is 
not required 
Intangible asset: 
research and 
development 
expenses are 
expensed as 
incurred, but some 
software cost can be 
capitalised in certain 
stages of 
Revaluation is not 
permitted 
Gnndiwi fl- - 
Comments 
Valuation policies 
under US GAAP. in 
general. are as 
conservative as G 
GAAP. Howw ever, it 
shows GGAAP is 
tax driven. 
Until Jan 2002. it 
and amortised over a should b capitalised 
useful life of and amortised over a 
maximum 20 years. useful life of a 
maximum 40 years. 
Amortised similar to GGAAP After Jan 2002, 
proportions should periodic testing of 
he taken through goodwill for 
This can be interpreted as that useful life can be used but it is not the norm. because of the influence 
01 tax accounting. 
"`, I 
. xcludin` oodww 
ill, which is shown separately 
103 Goodwill as regulated with GAS-I (Published by the Federal Ministry of Justice in December ? 000. 
Prior to that. it was allowed to be written off or amortised against reserves over four \ ears. 
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(i (IAAI' IAS (IFRS) US GAAP Comments 
income statement 
and not against 
reserves. 
Investment Property: 
can not be valued at 
fair value 
Inventories: 
the lower of 
historical cost and 
market value. 
Purchase market 
prices generally are 
considered to be 
more relevant than 
sales market prices in 
assessing the current 
market (net 
realisable value) of 
inventory. 
LII ,O is acceptable; 
nevertheless FIFO 
and average cost are 
the common 
methods. 
Investment Property: 
may be valued at fair 
value 
InventnriPc" 
the lower of historical 
cost and net realisable 
value. However, 
determination of net 
realisable value is 
based on the 
estimated selling 
price. 
All three main 
methods are permitted 
(with LIFO rarely 
used) 
impairment is 
required instead of 
amortization. 
Investment property: 
Must be stated at 
depreciated 
historical cost. 
Inventories: 
Similar to IAS 
Similar to IAS, but 
more common use of 
LIFO 
Provisions: 
In general they are 
influenced by 
prudence to a large 
extent. Provisions 
made for uncertain 
liabilities and for 
losses on incomplete 
trmnsactions. 
Often are measured 
at an amount higher 
than the most 
probable estimate. 
f'rov isions are 
recognised for 
certain repairs and 
maintenance 
A provision is 
recognised on the 
basis of a legal or 
constructive 
obligation. 
A provision is 
recorded at its best 
estimate. 
Repairs and 
maintenance 
provisions are 
prohibited. 
Similar to IAS Prudence is strong 
in Germany, where 
provisions are 
widely used. 
If a best estimate for 
a provision is not 
clear, the minimum 
of the range of 
potential losses is 
provided for. 
No prohibition on 
repairs and 
maintenance 
provisions. 
USGAAP seem to 
be more flexible 
towards provisions 
than IAS. 
expenses. 
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G GAAP IAS (IFRS) US GAAP Comments 
Equity: 
Governed by specific No capital There is no specific 
capital maintenance maintenance rules. rules that are clearly 
rules. linked to this 
Some long-term 
financing is 
considered as equity 
even if repayment is 
expected. 
Equity issue costs 
are recognised in 
income statement 
(I. S. ) as incurred. 
Some shares may be 
classified as liabilities 
Equity issue costs are 
recognised directly in 
equity. 
concept. 
Preferred shares may 
be classified 
between debt and 
equity. if their 
redemption is not 
controlled by the 
company. Otherwise, 
all shares are 
classified as equity 
Treasury stock held 
For reissue is 
classified as current 
aisset with gains and 
losses from reissue 
recognised in I. S. 
Deferred tax: 
Recognised only to 
the extent that 
consolidated deferred 
tax liabilities exceed 
consolidated deferred 
tax assets (Partial 
provision based on 
liability method) 
In practice deferred 
tax assets, except 
those that arise from 
consolidation 
procedures, are 
seldom recognised. 
In practice deferred 
tax often is provided 
using, an enterprise's 
av cra-e effective tax 
rate rather than the 
statutor\ rate. 
Treasury stock is 
deducted from equity 
and no gain or loss is 
recognised from 
trading in own shares 
Recognised nearly for 
all timing differences 
calculated at tax rate 
expected at time of 
settlement (full 
provision using 
liability method). 
Deferred tax assets 
are recognised when 
recovery is probable 
Deferred tax is based 
on enacted or 
substantively enacted 
statutory tax rates. 
Treasury stock is 
deducted from 
equity and changes 
in value, whether 
realised or not, are 
not recognised. 
Full provision for all 
timing differences 
under liability 
method. However, it 
has a special 
treatment for 
deferred tax assets in 
1 the balance sheet04 
Recognised to the 
extent that recovery 
is highly probable. 
It is based on 
enacted tax rates. 
104 Deducting-, a valuation allowance when a recovery of less than A °"o is likely 
(Priccww aatcrhouse('oopers, 2000) 
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G GAAP IAS (IFRS) [1S GAAP Comments 
Interest 
capitalisation: 
Borrowing cost may 
not be capitalised. 
Borrowing costs may 
be expensed as 
incurred or capitalised 
if certain criteria are 
met. 
Required to be 
capitalised when it 
relates to 
construction of 
certain assets 
Profits on long-term 
contracts: 
Reporting on 
completion 
(completed contract 
method) 
Yet, contingent 
losses on long-term 
contracts must be 
accrued. 
Leases: 
Classifications of 
leases are generally 
driven by tax 
guidelines (so some 
operativ,, leases 
under G GAAP may 
be operational leases 
under IAS or US 
GAAP) 
Foreign currency 
translation: 
Unrcalised gains 
resultim, from 
translation of foreign 
currencv transactions 
arc not allowed 
There are no legal 
requirements for 
translating the 
Iiiaiicial statements 
of foreign 
subsidiaries for 
consolidation 
Reporting on the 
percentage of 
completion method. 
Completed contract 
method is prohibited. 
Classification of a 
lease is based on its 
substance. 
Unrealised gains 
resulting from the 
translation of foreign 
currency transactions 
are Allowed 
There is a variety of 
detailed rules for the 
translation of inter 
Reporting on the 
percentage of 
completion. 
However, the 
completed contract 
method is 
permitted. 
Concepts of 
classification, in 
general, are similar 
to those in IFRS. 
However, with more 
extensive detailed 
rules which cause 
differences in 
application. 
Less regulated 
under G GAAP and 
more prudent under 
USGAAP'°5 
Requirements for 
currency translation 
are comparable to 
those of IAS except 
for the case of hyper 
1 0`'. inflation 
Lack of regulation 
in G GAAP 
Until the 
publication of GAS- 
14 in 2004 June, 
there were clear 
lack of regulations. 
purposes: 
nevertheless a 
\ aricty of methods is 
lease; IFRti recognise and fain or lose result from a sale or a leaseback of an operating ýý here under 
US(, AAP are recognised immediately 
106 
; 1ccordin, to IFRSs, statements of 
foreign entity adjusted to current price level before translation. 
; \ccordin'-' to USGAAP, they are remeasured using the reporting currency as a 
functional currenc\ . 
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G GAAP IAS (IFRS) US GAAP Comments 
used. 
Segment reporting: 
Segmentation is 
based entirely on the 
internal reporting 
structure. 
Disclosures required 
are: internal and 
external revenues, 
results (depreciation 
and some other items 
included), assets, 
investments, capital 
expenditure and 
liabilities. 
Segmentation is based 
on the principal 
source, risks and 
returns, as well as the 
internal reporting 
structure. 
Disclosures required 
are: revenues, results, 
capital expenditure, 
total assets and 
liabilities (other 
items). However, 
income tax, interest 
revenue, interest 
expense, 
extraordinary items 
and major customers 
are not required. 
Business and 
geographical, one of 
which may be as 
primary format; 
whereas the other can 
be secondary format 
(depends on their 
impact upon business 
risks and returns). 
Segmentation is 
based entirely on the 
internal reporting 
structure. 
Disclosures required 
are: revenues, assets, 
results and major 
customers107 
However, liabilities, 
depreciation, 
amortization, interest 
revenue, interest 
expense, income tax, 
capital expenditure 
extraordinary items 
and exceptional 
items are only 
required if they are 
parts in internal 
reporting' 08. 
While disclosures 
under IFRSs are 
more than 
GGAAP. 
disclosures under 
US GAAP are 
Discontinuing 
operations: 
"There is no a concept 
For a discontinuing 
operation. 
An operation is 
discontinuing when 
either there is a 
binding sale 
agreement or there is 
an announced plan for 
the discontinuance, 
whichever is earlier. 
A component of an 
entity can be treated 
as a discontinued 
operation only when 
it is abandoned or 
spun off. 
more extensive 
than both. 
More regulations 
and more 
disclosures are 
required under US 
GAAP 
Different disclosure 
107 For external customers comprise > 10 % of consolidated revenues, total revenues and segment that 
reported the revenue should be disclosed 
W8 Or in case they are regularly reported to a chief operating decision maker. 
86 
Chapter 4: German GAAP. IAS and US GAAP 
G GAAP [AS (IFRS) US GAAP Comments 
issue: 
Related Party Related Party Related Party 
disclosure: Disclosure: Disclosure: 
Only from April 
2002: regulated by 
(; AS 11. 
Related party 
relationships where 
control exists should 
be disclosed. 
Disclosures required 
include: a description 
of the transaction, 
volume, receivables, 
payables, pricing 
policies 
Earnings per share 
(EPS): 
EPS is not required 
to be disclosed. 
Financial 
Related party 
relationships where 
control exists should 
be disclosed, although 
some enterprises are 
exempted. 
Disclosures required 
include: purchases or 
sales of goods, 
purchases or sales of 
property and other 
assets, rendering or 
receiving of services, 
agency arrangements, 
leasing arrangements, 
transfer of researcher 
and development and 
management 
contracts, etc109. 
Earnings per share 
EPS : 
Basic and diluted EPS 
must be disclosed on 
the face of the income 
statement. 
Financial instruments: 
There are no 
exemptions at all. 
Disclosures required 
are more extensive 
than those of IAS 
Earnings per share 
EPS : 
EPS data for 
continuing 
operations, 
discontinuing 
operations, 
extraordinary items 
and the cumulative 
effect of accounting 
changes are 
disclosed. 
Financial 
instruments: 
There are no specific 
rules comparable to 
those of IAS. 
A financial review by 
management is 
encouraged. 
Level of details 
depends on the risks 
of the instruments. 
instruments: 
It has more 
disclosure 
requirements than 
IAS for financial 
instruments. 
109 fl'hc list oi'required disclosures is longer than this, this part is mentioned to show that it is more 
c \tensi\ c than those of GGAAP. 
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(º (iAAP IAS (IFRS) US GAAP Comments 
Exceptional items: Exceptional items: Exceptional items: 
Presentation of May be disclosed The term exceptional 
exceptional items separately in the is not used. Yet, 
have more restrictive income statement. similar items should 
rules than under IAS be disclosed on the 
face of income 
statement. 
Source: based on information from KPMG (2004a), KPMG (2004b), PricewaterhouseCoopers (2002) 
and (2003), GASC (2004) and Haller (1998) 
It should be mentioned here that despite the several works that provide detailed 
comparisons across different GAAPs in terms of different accounting policies, there is 
an apparent lack of literature on the overall impact of these differences on the reported 
earnings and reported assets and liabilities. However, a recent study by Elston, 
Thornburg and Weidinger (2003) reveal that sales, net income, assets, and equity are 
significantly lower and liabilities significantly higher when reported under HGB than 
when reported under IAS. Still, when compared to US GAAP, only net income and 
total assets were significantly lower when reported under HGB. Although their study 
provides a good comparison between the information reported under GGAAP and that 
reported under IRAS, it does not provide a similar comparison between IAS and US- 
GAAP. The reason for this is that each of the sample firms report under GGAAP and 
either of IAS or US GAAP (two sets of financial statements). Their results in general, 
support the notion of conservative German accounting discussed in Chapter 3. 
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4.7 Value relevance under G GAAP, IAS and US GAAP: 
When lobbying for a particular set of accounting standards, one approach is to argue 
its value relevance. Many financial and accounting studies have concentrated on the 
issue whether the different accounting systems have a significantly different 
relationship with capital market. However, a very limited number of these studies 
have examined the relationship between returns in the German stock market and 
reported earnings by German firms. 
Bartov, Goldberg and Kim (2002) explain that accounting regulators in different 
countries set their own rules for measurement, recognition and set limits on 
management's discretion in determining earnings. Furthermore, differences in 
enforcement levels, the objectives of financial reporting, and opportunistic use of 
accruals by management may lead to varying levels of value relevance of reported 
earnings. 
The value relevance of accounting standards can be examined through studies of 
association which analyse the relationship between accounting data and stock returns 
(or prices)" over a long time period. This section is intended to discuss the results 
of the important association studies in which German accounting is examined. These 
studies are different from the event study, which examines the reaction of the share 
price to accounting or other disclosures over a short event window. The association 
between accounting measures and stock market data is usually analysed using 
regression equations. Dumontier and Raffournier (2002. p. 128) define the purpose of 
these studies; "they only posit that if accounting data are good summary measures of 
the events incorporated in security prices, they are value-relevant because their use 
might provide a value of the firm that is close to its market value". 
The value relevance of German accounting was compared with that of the US GAAP 
in a study by Harris, Lang and Möller (1994). They examine the association between 
the reported earnings (under GGAAP) and DVFA earnings"'. One of their basic 
arguments is that the strong link between tax accounting and commercial accounting 
110 Prices are considered to be an unreliable measure in this t%pe of study (Dumontier and Raffournier, 
ibid p. l3 1). 
It is the result of adjusting reported earnings according to a list of adjustments produced by the 
German Federation of Financial Analysis and Investment Ach ice (DVFA). It is considered a 
'second 
earnings measure reported 
b\ many German firms (Harris et al, ibid. 
89 
Chapter 4: German GA. AP. LAS and US GAAP 
and the significant influence of the creditor protection concept reduces the value 
relevance of accounting data in Germany. An example given is that German 
accounting does not recognise items such as gains from foreign currency translation 
or profits on the percentage of completion of long-term contracts. Another example 
is the excess of depreciation allowed for tax purposes and provisions for losses of 
low probability. The authors also think that the use of hidden reserves in German 
companies can mislead investors. The following is a summary of the findings of 
Harris et al (ibid), which is of particular importance for this research, 12: First, as 
opposed to the view that accounting data are essentially irrelevant for German firms. 
data are significantly associated with stock price levels and returns. Additionally, the 
explanatory power of earnings (reported under GGAAP) for returns' 13 is comparable 
to that in the US. Yet, the explanatory power of shareholders' equity for prices is 
significantly lower in Germany than in the US. Second is that the explanatory power 
of accounting data increases with consolidation' 1 4. Third, there is a little evidence 
that the explanatory power of reported earnings increased following the introduction 
of the EU Directives115. Fifth, there is evidence that the DVFA adjustments have a 
positive effect on the explanatory power of the reported earnings. This last result is 
also confirmed by Booth, Broussard and Loistl (1997), who find that earnings 
adjusted by DVFA are more value relevant than that provided under GGAAP. Given 
the fact that these DVFA adjustments are founded to undo the impact of some 
GGAAP rules and to increase the comparability with IRAS (Busse von Colbe et al, 
2000), the value relevance of DVFA does not mean value relevance of German 
accounting. 
\lford, Jones, Leftwich and Zmijeweski (1993, p. 213), on the other hand, conclude 
that accounting earnings from Germany (and few other countries) are less value 
relevant than the US GAAP earnings 
116 
'" This is noted because, other studies involved Germany will not be dealt with in similar detail. 
H Means having the returns as an dependent variable and that earnings as an independent variable. 
They find that unconsolidated data performs poorly compared with consolidated data. 
' ý- Harris et al (ibid, p. 207) find such a result surprising; nevertheless the. try to explain this through 
a suggestion by German business managers indicating that "the changes (other the move to full 
consolidation) may have had little substantive effect and may in fact have introduced some ambi`guit\ 
in the reported results" 
' Their sample contained large number of countries; nevertheless each of them Nv as compared with 
the US (1, -\: \P (county b\ country). Furthermore, accounting data in Australia, France, the 
Netherlands and the UK proved to be more timely and value relevant than that of the US. 
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Furthermore, Joos and Lang (1994) find that German accounting is more 
conservative than that of the UK and France. However. they also find that there is no 
evidence that German accounting produce data with a lower association with share 
price, compared with UK accounting. 
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) examine the hypothesis that increasing disclosure leads 
to statistically significant benefits. They also assume that IAS and US GAAP have 
higher levels of disclosure. The authors examined a sample of German firms using 
either IAS or US GAAP They find that reporting under IAS and US GAAP by 
German firms is associated with lower bid-ask spreads and higher share turnover, 
which are used as proxies for information asymmetry. 
They examine the hypothesis that commitment to increased levels of disclosure by 
German firms reduces the information asymmetry component of the firm's cost of 
capital. They study a sample of German firms using IAS or US GAAP compared 
with a control sample using G GAAP117 . 
Their results show that this international 
reporting strategy is associated with statistically significant lower bid-ask spreads 
and higher share turnover. They conclude that their results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that firms obtain economically significant benefits from meeting the 
increased levels of disclosures required by IAS and US GAAP. 
Leuz (2003), on the other hand, examines the value relevance of earnings reported 
under US GAAP or IAS by testing the significance of differences in the bid-ask 
spread and trading volume using a sample of firms trading in Germany's Neuer 
Markt (reporting under either IAS or US GAAP). The hypothesis was that if US 
GAAP is superior to IAS, then firms reporting under US GAAP should have lower 
information asymmetry and higher market liquidity. He finds insignificant 
differences in bid-ask spread and share turnover between IAS and US GAAP firms. 
Furthermore, he concludes that his findings do not support the argument that US 
GAAP is of higher quality than IAS. These results are consistent with the opinion 
that [AS and US GAAP are equivalent in their ability to reduce information 
asymmetries in stock markets and that the differences are irrelevant to investors. 
117 The control sample is constructed on the basis of industry and firm size. This means that each firm 
using international standards has a matching 
firm from the same industry and with comparable size 
using GGAAP firm. 
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I3artov, Goldberg and Kim (2002) argue that US GAAP and IAS are the products of 
common-law countries. This means that they have been developed in the private 
sector, are not influenced by taxation and come from countries where companies are 
by tradition financed through stock markets. Furthermore, the problem of 
information asymmetry between agents and principals is dealt with through financial 
reporting and timely public disclosure. Hence, they are expected to focus primarily 
on the needs of shareholders and investors for relevant information. GGAAP. on the 
contrary, is the product of a code-law country. This means that it has developed in a 
highly politicized environment, focusing on different stakeholders including the tax 
authorities. This focus results in the need for income smoothing rather than earnings 
informativness118. Thus, the authors expect that information produced under IAS or 
US GAAP has higher relevance than information produced under GGAAP. They 
also argue that US GAAP is more thoroughly defined than IAS, and hence they 
expect it to produce more value-relevant information than IAS. The authors find that 
results are consistent with their expectations, which indicate the higher earnings 
quality of U. S. GAAP, and IAS over German GAAP and that US GAAP is superior 
to IAS. 
Finally, Elston, Thornburg and Weidinger (2003) find that accounting information 
under HGB, in particular total assets and net income, are significantly more 
conservative (lower) than under IAS or US GAAP. Furthermore, they find that 
asymmetrical information problems exist between German companies and their 
underwriters (banks) 119 under HGB reporting. The authors conclude that these 
problems lead to higher costs of certification 120 and IPO underpricing. 
As one can see above, there is a general indication that the accounting information 
reported under GGAAP is less value relevant than information reported under IAS or 
US' GAAP. Still, the results of Harris et al (ibid) cast some doubt on this conclusion. 
It should be made clear that the results (ibid) of the analysis is made on earnings 
' "Stakeholders system is argued to be insider system. where information is used internally rather than 
he ing produced for outsiders. 
119 The authors do not provide any formal definition for an underwriter (they also call certifier), but 
the context of the study suggests that they mean the banks \ hich help the compan\ in issuing shares 
(lPOs) and certifications of these shares. 
'-In -'eneral, costs of \I POs. 
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reported under GGAAP and not DVFA earnings 121. which have more value 
relevance. 
4.8 Future of IAS in Europe 
As mentioned earlier in this research, companies that are listed on EU stock 
exchanges should apply IAS to years beginning on or after 1 January 2005. In 2002. 
11ricewaterhouseCoopers conducted an independent survey involving 650 chief 
financial officers (CFOs) across 15 European member states to investigate their 
opinions about the application of IAS (IFRS) in the year 2005 and its expected role 
in creating a pan-European capital market. The following is a brief summary of the 
significant results of this survey. The researcher believes that this summary enriches 
this chapter by casting light on the future of IAS in Europe, including Germany as a 
leading member in this union. 
It may also be important to indicate that Germany had the largest number of 
participants in this survey (82 CFOs, 13% of the number of CFOs interviewed). 
Table 4.4: Opinion of European Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) on the future of IAS 
Issue Response Comments 
Will IAS help establish a 80 % of respondents are convinced 
pan-European capital that conversion to IAS will be "very 
market? beneficial" to their companies and to 
Europe. (p. 5) 
Has the adoption of IAS 
brought any benefits? 
Does the EC's IAS 
proposal go far enough? 
Should the use of IAS be 
permitted before 2005? 
70 % of IAS users believe that IAS 
adoption benefited their company. 
Only 41 % of the non-users think that 
using IAS will benefit them. 
81% (90%) of respondents are in 
favour of earlier adoption 
PwC indicates that it is 
difficult for non-users to 
appreciate the benefits of 
IAS before they conduct 
an "impact assessment". 
This high rate in 
Germany shows that the 
vast majority are willing 
to use IAS if able to do 
so. 
However, 45 % of respondents are Most of those are the 
using selected IAS data prior to 2005: largest firms, of which 
two thirds opposed 
mandatory disclosure 
before 2005. 
121 Because one can argue that DVFA earnings can not be considered as representing German 
accounting. DVFA are oriýginallý established to have comparable results with those reported under 
li01-cW'il (IAAPS. 
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Issue Response Comments 
Use of IAS for US GAAP 55 % of respondents think that US The deadline for US 
users: GAAP should continue until US GAAP users to adopt 
GAAP and IAS converge. IAS is 2007 
Furthermore, 60% of respondents 
who currently use US GAAP would 
adopt ]AS prior to 2007 if it was 
accepted by the SEC. 
Using IAS for individual 71% (82% of the current users) of the 
accounts respondent approved this idea. 
Using IAS for internal 72 % of companies adopting IAS 
adopt it as the basis for internal 
reporting management reporting 
Are European firms ready 20% of respondents report that they 
for IAS? are fully prepared. 
92 % of non-users report that they are 
confident that they will be able to 
meet the deadline. 
85 % of firms surveyed have yet to 
adopt [AS. 
The highest use of IAS is reported in Use of IAS in these two 
Austria (40 %) and Germany (39%) countries is permitted by 
law 
However, the survey indicates that 
this readiness is conditional upon 
substantial training efforts. 
Does IAS adoption affect The majority of respondents `feel' PwC consider this to be 
the way shareholders and that adoption of IAS does not have an surprising and that it is a 
analysts view company important effect on evaluation of the dangerous assumption. 
performance? companies' performance by 
shareholders and market analysts. 
A majority of non-users think that 
adoption of IAS will be an important 
improvement in the disclosure and 
transparency of their financial 
reporting 
Plan transition early At the time of this survey 60 % of PwC saw that this was 
companies have not yet started not surprising, because 
transition planning. at that time, the EU's 
IAS regulation had not 
Three initiatives should be completed become law yet. 
before external reporting can be Furthermore, the 
considered: "scoping all aspects of standard on the use of 
the transition, development of IAS for the first time had 
internal IAS reporting processes and not been published yet. 
staff training across the organization" 
(p. 3) 
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Issue Response Comments 
What do preparers want The EU's CFOs want greater 
from IAS in the futures? convergence of international 
reporting requirements, with many 
pushing IAS and US GAAP to have 
similar solutions. 
CFOs want IAS to be "developed and 
continuously improved to ensure that 
they are principles-based, practical, 
simple, transparent and grounded in 
economic reality" 
The views presented in Table 4.4 show, in general, the positive rating of IAS by 
European CFOs. Furthermore, they provide a good indication of their perceptions of 
the implications of the adoption of IAS. 
As indicated above German managers are important participants in this survey, and 
hence the opinions presented above should be useful for the explanations provided in 
the next chapter for the purpose of developing the current research's hypotheses. 
4.9 Present developments and Future prospects of the use of IAS in Germany: 
Following the survey of PricewaterhouseCoopers, there was a survey by Mazars in 
2003) which also involved German firms. However, this survey provides some 
important points about the use of IAS in Germany rather than other EU countries. At 
the beginning of this chapter, there is a section which explains about the use of IRAS 
in Germany prior to 1998. This survey gives us the opportunity to have an overview 
()I' the present developments of the use of IAS and some future prospects. The 
following are only some of the main points concluded by this survey about German 
listed firms'` 2: 
1. Nearly 87% of German listed firms view the conversion to IAS as a real 
opportunity to improve the internal organization of their company (compared 
with European average of 57%). 
2.82 % have already initiated an internal project for switchin to IAS 
(European average »%). 
,. Nearly 90% of German listed (surveyed) firms have already analysed the 
differences between GG\AP and IAS (European average 62%). 
I- This sur\c\ also includes non-listed firms. Howe\er. these points are only about the listed firms. 
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4. Over 44% are involved in lobbying the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) (European average 20%). 
5.80% believe that the use of IAS will bring about a higher degree of 
transparency and comparability between financial statements (European 
average 73%). 
In general, it can be noted that Germany on these points (and the majority of other 
points which are not listed here) is above the European average in the move towards 
IAS. This survey concludes that the fact that German firms have been able to use 
lAS for many years without the need for reconciliation to their local GAAP is a key 
factor behind their advancement in this area. 
4.10 The implications of this chapter for the current research: 
This chapter clearly indicates that German accounting is less value relevant than 
IRAS. It also indicates that in the last few years managers of German companies 
have had a more positive view of IRAS (and its importance for shareholders and 
internal reporting) compared with the early nineties. This background is essential in 
understanding some of the motives for adopting IRAS, which underline the 
hypotheses in Chapter 5. For example, the argument that German GAAP is less 
value relevant implies that firms using it may suffer some competitive disadvantage 
in the capital markets as compared to firms using IRAS. On the other hand, firms 
adopting IRAS may lose some flexibility in earnings management. The potential for 
earnings management clearly exists in German GAAP, but there is (arguably) less 
scope under IAS and more restrictions on it under US GAAP. 
It is also understood from this chapter that German accounting lacks regulations on 
some important issues, whereas US GAAP, for example, is widely known to be 
cxtensively regulated. 
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5 Chapter 5: Literature Review and hypotheses development 
5.1 Introduction: 
This chapter has two main goals: First is to provide a review of the literature which 
focuses on the main topic of this research. Second is to develop through a review of 
the related literature a set of hypotheses that will be tested in this research. 
As explained in Chapter 1, the current research aims to explain the choice of 
accounting standards by German listed firms. The choice between G GAAP, IAS or 
US GAAP is a decision which belongs in the literature about firm behaviour. To the 
researcher's knowledge, very few financial studies have focused on this particular 
issue. 
Due to the limited number of studies of the voluntary adoption of a specific set of 
accounting standards, studies of this type exploit the fact that there is a parallel 
literature on another related issue with a similar background, which they use to 
justify their hypotheses. An important common factor between these studies is that 
all of them hypothesise that particular firm characteristics are determinants of the 
managerial decisions regarding accounting practices. In general, they examine the 
determinants of the following: voluntary disclosure, the extent of compliance with 
mandatory disclosure, voluntary purchase of audit services, voluntary compliance 
with IRAS, the choice of IAS or US GAAP and finally, the extent of observance of 
IRAS. All the studies surveyed in this chapter are shown in Table 5.1. 
It is important to indicate that the basic idea of the current research is based on the 
work of Dumontier and Raffournier (1998), who examine the voluntary compliance 
with IAS by Swiss companies. The authors assume that disclosure under Swiss 
GAAP is much lower than under IAS. Hence, they consider that voluntary disclosure 
and the purchase of discretionary audit `- is behaviour whose costs and advantages 
are similar to voluntary compliance with a particular set of accounting standards 
such as IAS. As a consequence, the hypotheses which had been used to explain 
voluntary disclosure were used to explain the behaviour of the adoption of IAS by 
Swiss companies. 
In -, cneral, 
this means the appointment of auditors voluntaril\ where the use of auditors is not 
required h\ Law such as in the case of quarterl\ reviews (in nman\ countries). 
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Like Swiss companies. German companies adopting IRAS are committing 
themselves to increased levels of disclosure (Leuz and Verrecchia (LV' ). 2000). 
Moreover, in general German accounting is considered to be inferior to IAS or II S 
GAAP (see Chapter 4). It is commonly accepted in the literature that use of IAS is 
associated with increased levels of disclosure. LV (ibid) refer to a statement by The 
', conomist (4/27/1996, p. 79) that IAS disclosure requirement are "far tougher than 
those of most countries". Furthermore, Leuz and Wüstemann (2004, p. 475) 
cmpirically proved that the level of public disclosure by German firms is lower than 
that by UK and US firms and that `financial statements of German firms are 
generally less informative than those of the UK or US" (see Chapter 4). In this case. 
it is acceptable to consider voluntary compliance with accounting standards such as 
[RAS as similar to voluntary disclosure. In other words, the higher levels of 
disclosure required by IRAS make it logical to expect that the factors which drive 
voluntary disclosure will be similar to the factors which lead a firm to adopt a 
particular set of accounting standards such as IAS or US GAAP. 
Very recently, Weißenberger et at (2004) published their survey-based work on the 
choices of accounting standards in the German market. They also examine the 
factors leading German companies the choose IRAS rather GGAAP and those 
leading them to choose IAS rather than US GAAP (or vice versa). Although, it 
seems that they are testing the same decisions examined in the current research, they 
chose a very different approach. Whereas Weißenberger et at investigate (the 
assumingly) direct motives of firms behind the choices (see Table 5.1), the current 
research examines the characteristics of the firms making the choices. Still, studying 
the characteristics of these firms is an indirect way of examining these motives. For 
cxample, in the discussion on firm size presented below, we study all the possible 
motives that may lead managers of larger firms to adopt IRAS. While Weißenberger 
ct at survey companies on these motives, the current study tries to through some light 
on motives through the relationship between different characteristics and the choices 
(see Chapter 1 and also Table 5.1 below for further details on \Veißenberger et al's 
study). 
The current study is based on financial statements for the financial year ending 
bctvv, ccn December 2001 and September 2002. Therefore. any improvements in the 
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quality of German GAAP which were introduced after this date will not affect the 
hypotheses (see Chapters 2,3 and 4). 
5.2 A brief outline of the studies on compliance with IRAS: 
The studies considered in this section are those concerned with voluntary adoption of 
IRAS and the choice of IAS or US GAAP. It is important to note that a substantial 
part of the literature review, including the hypotheses and results of the related 
studies, is incorporated in the later sections concerned with developing the main 
hypotheses of the current research. Therefore, to avoid being repetitive. this section 
is intended to present a very brief outline of these studies. 
Samples: Table 5.1 shows information about the samples in these studies. It can be 
seen that, whereas some of them focus on a specific country where more than one set 
of accounting standards are permitted for listed firms such as Germany (Leuz (2003): 
Weißenberger et al (2004)), Switzerland (Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998), other 
studies examine samples which comprise companies from many countries (El- 
Gazzar et al (1999); Cuijpers et al (2002) Ashbaugh (2001); Tarca (2004)). 
Hypotheses: As mentioned above all these studies, in general, hypothesise that the 
choice of a specific set of accounting standards is associated with specific 
characteristics of the firm. Arguments which support their hypotheses are borrowed 
to support the hypotheses of the current research (see below). The various variables 
used to test these hypotheses are shown in Table 5.1. 
Statistical analyses: All these studies used logistic regression models for 
multivariable analysis. This type of regression model differs from that used in 
disclosure studies. As explained in Chapter 6. the dependent variable in logistic 
regression is a binary variable that can be used to represent a choice between two 
alternatives (two sets of accounts, for example). Whereas the disclosure studies use 
linear regression, in which the dependent variable is of an interval scale (continuous). 
This can be very useful in this type of study where the level of disclosure is 
measured in a continuous form using particular indices. 
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Chapter 5: Literature Review and h_jpothe. 5c. s ck'velopmenl 
5.3 Hypotheses on the choice of IRAS or German GAAP in the `lain market: 
This section provides a detailed justification of the main hypotheses of this research 
based on the extant literature. Furthermore, results of previous studies are shown 
separately at the end of the explanation given for each hypothesis. The hypotheses 
provided in this section are concerned with the choice of IRAS (or G GAAP) in the 
Main market, which is tested separately from the Neuer Markt. Hypotheses on the 
choice of IAS or US GAAP both in the Neuer Market and the Main market are 
presented in a later section at the end of this chapter. 
One should note that, for the purpose of this research, all the hypotheses are 
postulated in both the null and the alternate form. 
5.3.1 Firm size 
Firm size is the most common factor considered as a significant determinant which 
might drive a firm's behaviour140. In modern economies, companies usually face 
different legal provisions according to their size, with the legal requirements for 
large companies differing from those for small sized companies. In Germany, for 
example, laws define different levels of corporation size. According to these criteria, 
only large groups, for example, are obliged to draw up group accounts, whereas 
small groups' 41 and subgroups are exempted (Ordelheide and KPMG, 2001, p. 13 81). 
Another example is that the proportion of employee members on the supervisory 
board is determined by the number of employees. 
In a country, large companies work in an environment which is, to some extent, 
different from the one in which smaller firms work, with different laws, different 
markets, different segments in stock exchanges, different ways of raising funds, and 
a different relationship with government. For instance, size can be the criterion 
\v, hich determines the segment to which a company may belong on a stock exchange. 
such as the FWB. Large companies have more chances to market their products in a 
\v ider range of markets and to enter markets with barriers to the entry of smaller 
companies. Moreover, governments usually have special relationships with some 
large firms through which they try' to achieve some economic and political goals. 
14 T'hc most common factor found in the literature related to the subject of my study. 
For sire criteria (see Ordelheide and KPMG, 2001, p1 
i78) 
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This was only a brief introductory summary of some factors which indicate the 
different environment in which larger firms work. 
Many disclosure studies support the hypothesis of a positive relationship between 
firm size and increased levels of disclosure in financial reporting. Studies by Chow 
and Wong-Boren (1987), Cooke (1989,1991), Hossain et al (1994), Hossain et al 
(1995), Naser and Wallace (1995), Inchausti (1997) and Leuz (2004) are just a 
sample of many studies which test size as a decisive variable explaining the extent of 
voluntary financial disclosure by firms. 
In the financial literature a variety of arguments are introduced for the size 
hypothesis. However, it should be emphasised that not all the arguments considered 
here will be valuable for supporting this research's hypotheses.. The main aim is to 
review the extant literature on companies' behaviour in terms of the relationship 
between size and disclosure, purchase of auditing services 142 and choice of 
accounting practices. The following are the most commonly used arguments in the 
existing literature: 
Agency costs: one of the most important arguments for the size hypothesis is agency 
costs. Jensen and Meckling (1976) explain that agency costs increase with the 
amount of outside capital. Agency costs rise as a result of the separation between 
management and ownership (this includes shares and debt). Conflicts of the interests 
between managers (agents) and both shareholders (principals) and debt-holders 
create the need for bonding and monitoring contracts between the mangers and both 
shareholders and debt-holders. The costs of such contracts are the components of 
agency costs. Jensen and Meckling (ibid) divide these costs into equity agency costs 
and debt agency costs. Bonding and monitoring costs of equity will include the costs 
of external auditing and performance compensation schemes, whereas debt bonding 
and monitoring costs will include the costs of writing covenants. 
Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman (1981) suggest that in larger firms, the proportion 
of the capital held by outsiders is higher than in smaller firms. They used the size 
variable to control for the agency costs of outside capital. because they assumed that 
, lgcncv- costs increase with size. Many later studies made use of this notion to argue 
For size. such as Chow (1982), Cho\\ and Wonýg (1987). Hossain et al (1994), 
142 Voluntary auditing which is not required by laws 
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I lossain et al (1995) and Ahmed and Nicholls (1994). Apart from Chow (1982) who 
studied voluntary external auditing, all these studies hypothesise that greater 
disclosure in different forms will reduce agency costs in larger firms. 
Ettredge et al (1994, p. 138), on the other hand, try to explain why companies 
purchase timely quarterly reviews (voluntary auditing carried out by external 
auditors and not required by law). They explain the increase in agency costs and ho« 
it is affected by size in two dimensions: internal agency costs and external agency 
costs. At the internal level the assumption is that "the number and complexity of 
intra-company relations and, in turn, agency costs increases with the size and 
complexity of the company" (p. 138). In larger and more complex firms, managers 
cannot control both planning and operations. Thus these activities will be separated 
and this leads to multidivisional organisations and as a result of that to an increase in 
internal agency costs. Their explanation about external agency costs was the same as 
provided by other authors. The following is a general statement by Hossain et al 
(1994, p337) determining the relationship between increased disclosures and agency 
costs: "Agency theory predicts that larger firms will disclose more information in 
their accounts to alleviate the potential for wealth transfers from suppliers or outside 
capital to managers". 
One of the main functions expected from the adoption of an accounting system is 
monitoring which is a major means of reducing agency costs. If we agree that 
financial reporting under internationally accepted (or recognised) accounting 
standards, namely IAS or US GAAP (IRAS) is of high quality 
143 and that their 
superiority to German GAAP is evident, one may argue that the adoption of such 
standards will serve the goal of reducing agency costs in German companies. 
In fact the importance of the argument of agency costs as a function of size might be 
lessened by the system of corporate governance and ownership structure in German 
companies, which is different from that in the UK or the US. Block holdings and 
cross holdings in large German companies' shares is a common feature of German 
o\vvnership structures. Moreover, the role banks play as c)\Vners and representatives 
ýý ith proxy v'otes'44 on the supervisory board may make our argument less important 
The issue of the value relevance of IRAS is discussed in a different part of this research 
1.14 In Gcrmam many of small shareholders delegate their \ oting right to their banks to vote on behalf 
them (s« Chapter 2). 
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(see Agarwal and Elston 2001: Lehmann and Weigand. 2000). Therefore, the size of 
German companies may not be such a good proxy' for agency costs. To the some 
extent, the overlap between the size hypothesis and ownership structure is 
overwhelming in the arguments about agency costs. Therefore, more discussion on 
this topic is presented in the section about ownership structure (Section 5.3.3). 
Costs and benefits: a second factor which supports the hypothesis of size is the cost 
element. Chow (1982) puts forward the cost-benefit argument in favour of size. The 
author suggests that costs of setting up a "monitoring/bonding" system are almost 
fixed and that it is a costly process, especially for smaller firms. Therefore, the 
marginal cost of operating this system is likely to decrease with firm size. Other 
studies such as Cooke (1989), Hossain et al (1994) and Ahmed and Nicholls (1994) 
see that additional activities to produce additional disclosure are costly exercises 
which small firms cannot afford. 
For the cost argument, Dumontier and Raffournier (1998) rely on two opinions. The 
first is Singhvi and Desai's (1971) argument that in large firms, detailed information 
is already produced for internal purposes. The second point of view is the argument 
by Lang and Lundholm (1993) that because of the fixed component of disclosure 
costs, the cost per unit of size decreases. This latter point of view is nearly the same 
point which was made by Chow (1982) eleven years earlier. 
One can argue that switching an accounting system from one which uses national 
accounting standards to another one which uses IRAS will be costly to the extent 
that small firms will not be able to afford it. This last argument by the researcher 
may be debatable in the case of a sample of German listed companies, which are 
relatively large. As explained earlier in Chapter 2, German companies which are 
listed on the German stock exchanges are the largest in Germany. Thus ability to 
bear the costs of compliance with sophisticated accounting systems may not be a 
differential factor among these listed companies. However. this argument is 
introduced just to present a complete overview of the size hypothesis. Moreover. to 
the researcher's knowledge there is no empirical research which measures the costs 
of the transformation to IRAS. PricewaterhouseCoopers (2002a) provides a survey 
of more than 650 chief financial officers (CFOs) across the 15 EU member states 
ith regard to the major changes required to create a single European capital market. 
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This survey casts light on one major component of the costs of adopting IAS which 
is training employees, although it does not quantify the costs. 
Proprietary costs: a third argument for the size hypothesis is that disclosing detailed 
information in the financial statements may put small firms at a competitive 
disadvantage as compared to their counterparts in larger firms in the same industry. 
Craswell and Taylor (1992) put forward this argument under the name of 
"proprietary costs". Gray, Meek and Roberts (1995, p48) define proprietary costs as 
"costs which arise when information is revealed that potentially damages the firm, 
such as if it results in increased competition or government regulation". Craswell and 
Taylor (1992) hypothesise that the disclosure of reserves by small Australian gas and 
oil companies may provide "proprietary" information about their only productive 
resources while, for large companies, such information may not cover all the 
reserves of which the managers are aware. 
The German market is like most markets in the world in that one finds both small 
and large firms in the same industry. For example, in the chemicals sector as defined 
by Deutsche Börse, one can find BASF AG, which a DAX firm145 and which has 
92,545 employees. On the other hand, this sector includes smaller companies such as 
"SIMONA" with only 1,035 employees 146. In such a case, a relatively small 
company like SIMONA, which reports under German GAAP, may face proprietary 
costs in providing the same level of disclosure as BASF, which reports under 
German GAAP, but with more voluntary disclosures required under US GAAP147 
Political costs: The fourth line of reasoning which might support the size hypothesis 
is the political visibility of large firms. Watts and Zimmerman (as cited in Tendeloo, 
1003) point out that larger firms are more likely to choose downward earnings 
management, because they are more vulnerable to government scrutiny. On the other 
hand, under political pressure larger companies may need to signal that they are not 
manipulating earnings by using higher quality accounting rules that restrict earnings 
management, (and then may be less government intervention). 
Other political costs can be the result of the implicit contracts which larger 
companies have with particular groups in society such as trade unions, consumers 
'', The largest thirty firms in Germany 
''" both numbers are taken from the annual reports of the companies for the year ended on 31/12 2001 
147 BASF states in its annual report 2001 that accounting standards they use conform to US GAAP to 
the c\tent permissible under the German Code. 
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and environmental groups (Milne 2001). These groups expect larger companies to 
provide extensive disclosures about their policies concerning emplovices. marketing 
and environment. Although this factor may not be strong enough to convince a 
company to use IRAS, it is only one factor among many that lead firms to seek a 
more transparent GAAP. Cook (1989) argues that very significant firms in the 
Swedish economy are vulnerable to additional political costs. He suggests that the 
adoption of social responsibility accounting in their corporate annual reports is one 
of the devices they adopt to deal with these additional political costs. Although 
Craswell and Taylor (ibid) mix this argument with the argument about proprietary 
costs, they point out that the disclosure of additional information is likely to boost 
the image of the company. As a result of this it may be able to improve its chances to 
"muster public support to overturn political actions" (ibid, p. 300). 
Hossain et al (1994) suggest that higher taxation is an example of political 
intervention. However, this argument about reducing the political costs related to 
higher taxation may not apply to German companies adopting IRAS, as German 
consolidated accounts are not the basis for taxation. So the adoption of IRAS should 
have little impact on taxation. 
Analysts following: Hossain et al (1994) put forward an argument by Barry and 
Brown (1986) suggesting that the annual reports of large companies are more likely 
to be examined by financial analysts. Therefore they have an incentive to voluntarily 
disclose more information than smaller companies as non-disclosure may be taken 
by investors as "bad news". Furthermore, Lang and Lundholm (1993) argue that 
incentives for private information acquisition are greater in larger firms. Hence. 
profit for trading private information is higher in larger firms. As a result of this, 
larger firms may face greater demands for more disclosures. Furthermore, one can 
also argue that with little disclosure analysts may be inclined to recommend a Buy 
because of associated uncertainty. 
tic\, cral studies in the literature, such as Hussain (2000) and Hope (2002). prove that 
firms' size is positively correlated with analyst following. 
Results of previous research: Most of the studies in the literature support the size 
hypothesis. Chows and Wong-Boren (1987). Cook (1 s989,1991), Hossain et al (1994. 
1995). Naser and Wallace (1995). Inchausti (1997). and Leuz (2004) are just a 
113 
Chapter 5: Literature Revier' and hl pothese. s development 
sample of the studies which show a significant positive relationship between size and 
companies' financial disclosures. Studies by Chow (1982) and Ettredge (1994) find 
that size is an explanatory variable in companies' decision to have their accounts 
audited voluntarily. Finally, Dumontier and Raffournier (1998) find a significant 
positive relationship between size and the propensity of Swiss companies to comply 
with IAS. 
Conversely, Zimmerman and Gontcharov (2002) examine whether the choice of 
accounting standards affects the level of earnings management. The authors indicate 
that according to their samples, companies using IAS and US GAAP sample are 
smaller that those using German GAAP. This in fact may conflict with all the 
arguments above. However, the reason for this unexpected result may be the use of 
limited sample. Their sample includes companies in DAX, MDAX and NEMAX 50 
and excludes a substantial part of German listed firms such as those in SMAX and 
those which are not classified. Yet, it is an interesting result because it contradicts all 
the expectations and the arguments for size stated above. 
Relying on all the previous arguments and the results of previous empirical work, the 
researcher presents the following hypothesis: 
Hl():: Ceteris paribus, the tendency to adopt IRAS by German listed firms is not 
associated with size or negatively related to company size. 
HI, :: Ceteris paribus, the tendency to adopt IRAS by German listed firms is 
positively related to company size. 
Variables offering a proxy for size: there is a variety of variables suggested in the 
literature as proxies for size. Cooke (1989,1991) suggests three proxies for size: 
annual sales, total assets and number of shareholders. Because of the major 
multicollinearity revealed between these variables, Cooke uses them in three 
separate regression models. The number of shareholders as a proxy of size can be 
easily criticised. In a large firm with highly concentrated ownership, the number of 
shareholders can never be the perfect proxy for size. Chow (1982), Chow and Wong- 
Boren (1987). Leftwich et al (1981) suggest the sum of the market value of the 
equity and the book value of debt. Although this measure for size is quite common 
in the literature, it can be also criticised. With the volatility of share prices. market 
value cannot be a consistent measure of size.. perfect example of this is the hi`h- 
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tech boom in the late nineties. Some researchers, on the other hand. may prefer to 
avoid the impact of the accounting numbers by choosing the number of emplo\ ees as 
a proxy of size. None of the studies in the literature reviewed by the researcher uses 
the number of employees. However, research on other issues employs this proxy (see 
Bergstrom, 1998 and Santalo, 2002). 
From the variables discussed above, the researcher has chosen the variables: total 
assets, turnover and the number of employees. The latter is chosen to provide a 
different measure of size which is not influenced by accounting measures. 
5.3.2 Hypothesis on quality segments: 
As explained in Chapter 2, prior to 2003, Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FWB) had 
three quality segments, which are organized by law: DAX, MDAX and SMAX. 
Although the main criteria for including companies in DAX and MDAX are size and 
exchange turnover, the inclusion of firms in SMAX was not related to firm size. In 
general companies in these three segments are required to adhere to additional 
transparency requirements. Conditions for participating in these segments include: 
having a minimum free float of 20%, producing quarterly reports, holding one 
analyst conference per year and disclosure of the shareholdings of management and 
supervisory board members (Deutsche Börse AG, 2001) 
The researcher would argue that German firms which are classified in one of these 
segments are more likely to use IAS or US GAAP. First, nearly half the firms 
classified in these segments are amongst the largest firms in Germany. Therefore, the 
size effect is expected to be significant within these segments. Detailed arguments 
for the size impact are presented above in this chapter. However, one may argue that 
this classification would be a proxy for size, so that there is no need to test it 
sel)arately. Still, this is not entirely true, because many of Germanys largest firms 
are not in DAX or MDAX (or even SMAX). For instance, Bertelsmann AG, Hoechst 
: 1G and Energie Baden-Württemberg AG , Were among the largest 30 firms in terms 
of three measures of size: turnover, total assets and employee numbers 
148 
nevertheless they are `unclassified' (are not in quality segments). Furthermore, 
nearly 2 3% of the largest 70 German firms were not classified in DAX, MDAX or 
X48 \'attenfall Europe AG is among the largest thirty but onl\ in terns of total assets. On the other 
hand spar 
Handels AG is also among the largest 30 but in terms of employ ee numbers and total 
rC\ enucs. 
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SMAX (e. g. Porsche AG. SAI Automotive AG and Debitel AG)1411. In addition size 
is not a criterion for inclusion in SMAX. As described by Deutsche Börse (2001. 
p. 8), SMAX "was developed to provide these companies with a stage to tell their 
story. Thus they can rise above the mass of second-tier stocks and increase their 
attractiveness for analysts and investors". SMAX firms were also required to adopt 
lAS or US GAAP from 2002 onwards (This was of course before the closure of 
SMAX in 2003''0) (Deutsch Börse, ibid). For these two reasons SMAX firms are 
considered more likely to report in accordance with IRAS. 
Firms in these quality segments have to produce more transparent accounting which 
might be associated with a greater tendency to use IRAS. In addition SMAX 
ºnembers have voluntarily subjected themselves to this regime of greater 
transparency. 
Based on the arguments above, the following argument is suggested for empirical 
testing: 
H2() : Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt IRAS is 
either not associated to being either in SMAX, MDAX or DAX or negatively with it. 
1-1, -),: Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt IRAS is 
positively associated to being either in SMAX, MDAX or DAX. 
This hypothesis will be examined using a binary variable (see Chapter 7). 
5.3.3 Hypothesis on Ownership structure 
The separation between ownership and control is a substantial characteristic of firms 
in a modern economy. This separation generates agency costs resulting from 
conflicts between managers and shareholders. The researcher prefers to present a 
simple definition of ownership structure for the purpose of introducing the 
arguments related to this hypothesis. Ownership structure may be defined, 
' as the 
allocation of companies' shares between investors. It should show the concentration 
oC shares and proportions of equity held by outsiders and insiders (management). 
As the classification at the end of 2001 
1ýo Rccall the sample period of the current research is 2001'2002. 
ISI ;\ simple definition suggested 
by the researcher to introduce the argument and the h\ pothesis. 
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It should be indicated here that ownership structure and size are quite interlinked. In 
fact, the argument about agency costs in the previous section on the size hypothesis 
is mainly based on the effect of size on the form of ownership structure and, in turn, 
on the existence and size of agency costs. The way the ownership of a firm is 
structured may determine the level of agency costs in the firm. For example, in a 
firm owned completely by managers, there will be no external agency 152 costs 
because there is no separation between ownership and control. On the other hand, in 
a firm with outside shareholders, external agency costs will emerge. However the 
allocation and concentration of these shares held by outsiders can be a decisive 
factor in the size of the agency costs. 
The ownership hypothesis is discussed by different researchers from different points 
of view. As will be seen below, literature on the impact of the ownership structure on 
accounting is discussed from different perspectives. While some authors discuss the 
impact of management ownership (management shareholding), others discuss the 
impact of the diffusion of ownership. The aspect of ownership structure studied by 
Hossain et al (1994), Craswell and Taylor (1992) and Dumontier and Raffournier 
(1998) is the diffusion of shares, whereas the aspect studied by Chow is management 
shareholdings. Leftwich et al (ibid), on the other hand, look at the involvement of 
banks and insurance companies (outside directors) in firms' decisions. 
Chow (1982) hypothesises that the propensity to engage in voluntary auditing is 
negatively related to managers' ownership share. His idea is that, since the conflict 
between the manager and the firm's shareholders is negatively related with 
managers ownership share, the need for the voluntary external auditing is also 
negatively related with this (less agency cost and less need for monitoring). 
Dumontier and Raffournier (1998) suggest that accounting is a means which 
principals may employ to monitor their interests. Thus they argue that in order to 
play an effective role in monitoring, accounting should not give the opportunity to 
managers to manipulate accounting numbers by using inadequate methods or 
employing frequent accounting policy changes. Their idea was that International 
\ccounting Standards may be more efficient than Swiss accounting principles in 
achicv'ing the monitoring role of accounting (less flexible and ww ith more disclosure). 
15' as discussed in the size hypothesis, 
Ettredgge (1994) divides agency costs into internal and external 
costs 
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The authors' hypothesis was that shareholders of firms with relatively dispersed 
ownership are more likely to impose IAS as a monitoring activity. while managers 
would impose it as a bonding activity. 
Drawing on Holthausen and Leftwich (1983), Craswell and Taylor (1992. p. 299) 
state that, although it is difficult to determine to what extent a firm is owner rather 
than manager controlled, "the extent to which ownership of the firm is widely held, 
rather than closely held is likely to reflect this distinction". Therefore they suggest 
that managers of firms with relatively diffuse ownership are more likely to disclose 
quantified information about reserves153. With a similar idea, Hossain et al (1994) 
state that in firms in which share ownership is widely held, interest conflicts between 
principals and agents are more likely than in more closely held firms. Voluntary 
information disclosure is expected to be greater in the first type of firm, so that 
principals can efficiently monitor their wealth, and managers can signal to owners 
that they are acting in their best interests. 
Finally, the researcher suggests that the peculiar ownership pattern in Germany may 
influence the logic of the arguments employed above. Many aspects make German 
ownership and governance structure very different from other countries such as the 
[1S and the UK. Such aspects are: concentrated firm ownership, strong bank 
presence and family ownership. The following quote from Franks and Mayer (2001, 
p. 944) may give a good brief description: 
"Germany is a good example of an insider system. It has fewer than 800 
quoted companies, compared with nearly 3000 in the United kingdom, and 
85% of the largest quoted companies have a single shareholder owning more 
than 25% of voting shares. Corporate ownership is characterized by a 
strikingly high concentration of ownership, primarily in the hands of families 
and other companies. Corporate holdings frequently take the form of 
complex webs of holdings and pyramids of intercorporate holdings. Bank 
control influence and control are extensive where shareholdings are widely 
dispersed" 
franks and Mayer (ibid) provide an example of the pyramid structure in German 
companies: at the beginning of the 1990s, Daimler Benz had two block-holders, 
'' Their study is about disclosure of reserves in Oil companies 
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Deutsche Bank (28.37%) and Mercedes Automobil Holdings (225? 3%) (Level one of 
the pyramid). Nearly 50% of the shares of Mercedes Automobil Holdings, in turn. 
were owned in equal proportions by two German holding firms, Stern and Stella 
(level two of the pyramid). Stern and Stella, sequentially. had four block-holders 
(level three of the ownership pyramid). 
Results of studies examining the effect of ownership structure are mixed. Studies by 
Craswell and Taylor (1992), Raffournier (1995) and Wallace and Naser (1995) find 
that there is no significant relationship between ownership structure and the extent of 
disclosure. However, Hossain et al (1994) and Ruland, Tung and George (1990) find 
that this factor is significantly related to voluntary disclosure levels. Leuz (2004) 
finds that firms' free float is positively associated with cash flow and segment 
disclosures by German companies. For the studies related to compliance with IRAS, 
Dumontier and Raffournier (1998) conclude that ownership structure has an 
important influence on the tendency of Swiss companies to comply with [AS. On the 
other hand, Cuijpers et al (2002) find that ownership structure is not correlated with 
the tendency of firms to adopt non-local GAAP. However, the authors explain that 
this result is related to choosing the concentration of ownership as a proxy for 
ownership structure, which is considered by the authors as an imperfect proxy for 
ownership structure. Contradiction in the results of the different studies may be 
explained by various traditions of corporate governance in different countries and 
differences in organisations' cultures. The unique corporate governance system in 
Germany makes it more interesting to test whether this peculiar structure would lead 
to a different result from the one found by other researchers. 
Iii short, whereas some arguments above are about the impact of the proportion of 
Cree float, another stream of arguments are concerned with the impact of 
management ownership. The following hypotheses are postulated to represent these 
tvv-o streams, in addition to another hypothesis which is concerned with the influence 
of banks on the companies' GAAP choices. 
Drawing on these arguments, the researcher would introduce the following 
hypothesis: 
H )pro : Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt IRAS is 
either not associated vv ith the 
dispersion of share holding or negatively related with it. 
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f13u, : Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt IRAS is 
positively associated with high dispersion of share holding. 
113/i0 : Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt IRAS is 
either not associated with the proportion of outside ownership or positively related. 
H3h, : Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt IRAS is 
negatively associated with the proportion of outside ownership. 
[13c0 : Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt IRAS is 
either not associated with the presence of banks through their representatives on the 
supervisory board or positively related. 
H3c, : Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt IRAS is 
negatively associated with the presence of banks through their representatives on the 
supervisory board. 
It was not possible to test this hypothesis on bank representatives because of the lack 
of data (see Chapter 6). 
Variables used to proxy for ownership structure in previous studies: most of the 
previous studies employed ownership concentration as a proxy for ownership 
structure. However, the way the concentration is calculated varies in these studies. 
These differences are related to many factors such as the availability of data and the 
researchers' personal points of view. Craswell and Taylor (1992), for example, used 
the percentage of shares held by the largest 20 shareholders. Disclosure of this piece 
of data is required by the Australian Stock Exchange. Hossain et al (1994) use the 
percentage of shares held by the largest ten shareholders. Chow (1982), on other 
hand, derived his proxy for the average percentage ownership of common stock held 
hv, officers and directors for a number of industries 
154 
. 
However, the latter describes 
the limitations of this variable which is used just because of lack of data available for 
that year. Dumontier and Raffournier (1998) use the free float, whereas Cuijpers et al 
(2002) calculate a Herfindahl index based on the ownership percentages of the ten 
largest shareholders of a company. The latter indicate that they prefer "inside" versus 
154 this proxy is derived from Federal Trade Commission (FTC) statistics in its 1926 publications (see 
Chovv . 
1982. p288) 
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--outside" ownership to ownership concentration; nevertheless such data was not 
available to them. 
For the purpose of this research, three types of proxies should be adopted. For the 
hypothesis on the dispersion of shares, the ownership structure (e. g. free float or 
ownership concentration) may be the most suitable proxy. For the second h\ pothesis, 
the proportion of equity held by managers can be a good proxy. 
However, different methodological issues rose with collection of data. For example. 
the large number of firms where the management ownership is zero led the 
researcher to change the variable to a binary variable. This change has an implication 
on the hypothesis itself (see Chapters 6 and 7). 
5.3.4 Leverage 
The ratio of debt of a firm to its equity is known as "gearing" in the UK and 
"leverage" in the US. The leverage ratio show how the capital of a firm is structured 
(capital structure). This ratio differs across firms in a single country and at an 
aggregate level, leverage differs across countries. Differences in leverage level 
across companies in a single country are directly linked to managerial and financial 
decisions and can be influenced by several factors such as investment decisions and 
the firm's cost of capital. In addition to that it can be influenced by firm-specific 
characteristics such as size. Differences across borders can be influenced by factors 
's5 such as interest rates and cultural dimensions (Islamic culture, for example) 
In contrast with several studies, Raj an and Zingales (1995) find that at an aggregate 
Icvel, firm leverage is comparatively similar across the G-7 countries with the 
exception of the UK and Germany (surprisingly 156) which are found to be relatively 
less levered. Yet, it is not the concern of the current research to discuss the factors 
that affect leverage. Moreover, Mayer (2000) reports that "bank oriented systems" 
are expected to be characterised by high levels of bank finance. On the other hand. 
he indicates that unlike Japan, bank lending to corporations in Germany is not high 
iii comparison with the UK and US (see also Franks and Mayer. 2001) (see Chapter 
2 Gor more discussion). 
15, This introduction is based on a personal point of v te" \\ ithout a specific reference. 
'"' Germany traditionally is associated with high Ic\ erage (see Chapter 2) 
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Leverage in this research is to be tested as a determinant affecting German listed 
companies' choice of accounting standards for their financial reporting. The 
relationship between leverage and accounting practices has been a subject of 
different studies from different perspectives. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that managers of highly levered companies \%-ill 
have a strong incentive to engage in risky activities which promise high profits with 
a low probability of success. Gains from the success of such activities will be 
captured by owner-managers, whereas their failure will be borne by creditors. This 
argument suggests that potential wealth transfers from debt-holders to shareholders 
increase as leverage increases. Most of the arguments in the literature on leverage 
and its effect on managerial decisions and accounting practices were based on this 
suggestion by Jensen and Meckling (e. g., Leftwich et al (1981), Craswell and Taylor 
(1992), Hossain et al (1994), Hossain et al (1995), Dumontier and Raffournier 
(1998)). The main notion of the disclosure studies is that with increasing leverage, 
agency costs increase and increased disclosure is required to reduce them. 
Components of agency costs associated with debt as reported by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976, p. 342) are the following: "I. the opportunity wealth loss caused by 
the impact of debt on the investment decisions of the firm, 2. the monitoring and 
bonding expenditures by the bond holders and the owner manager (i. e., the firm) and 
. the 
bankruptcy and reorganization costs. " 
The idea of agency costs caused by the conflict of interests which arises between 
shareholder and debt-holders and using accounting practices to reduce them is 
criticised by Schipper (1981) in her comments on the work by Leftwich et al 
(1981)157. She suggests that such a conflict could be solved by bond covenants. 
chipper argues that if managers are attempting to transfer wealth from bond-holders 
to shareholders, this will mean that they are acting in the interest of shareholders and 
that there is no agency problem in this case. Moreover. she argues that if the 
managers are maximising their own wealth using firm assets, they will do so 
regardless of the proportion of debt to equity. Still, her argument above is based on 
the concept that agency costs exist by virtue of the relationship between shareholders 
157 One of the earliest studies examined the relationship 
between leieraue and accounting` practices 
(interim reporting) 
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and managers, while she disregards another type of agency costs which is created by 
the relationship between debt-holders and managers (defined above). 
The relationship between accounting and leverage may take various forms. In some 
cases the process of setting debt covenants, which are a tool for monitoring the 
agency relationship between management and debt-holders, make use of the 
accounting figures. Furthermore, debt covenants may also refer to accounting data 
when they impose constraints on leverage ratios (Weintrop, 1990). On the other hand, 
in some countries financial statements can be an essential information resource for 
banks (as loan providers) and bond-holders. This explanation about the relationship 
between accounting figures and covenants may support the argument that using high 
quality accounting standards will give the financial statements of a firm more 
credibility and make them more reliable for banks and other investors in debt 
securities. 
Craswell and Taylor (1992) indicate that managers tend to avoid accounting methods 
which lead to probable violation of technical borrowing limitations expressed in 
accounting numbers. Dumontier and Raffournier (1998) argue that the volatility of 
profits can be used to monitor the agency relationships between shareholders and 
creditors. Therefore, using accounting standard which restrict earnings management 
helps in facilitating this monitoring role, which is more needed in highly levered 
companies. However, although the role of US GAAP in restricting earnings 
management is fairly evident in the literature, the role of IAS in restricting earnings 
management is still debatable (see Chapter 4 for a discussion on this issue). 
Another argument for a positive relationship between the need for increased 
disclosures and leverage is that the increase in leverage will make lenders more 
cautious about their position and priority for payment in case of bankruptcy, for 
example. More disclosure and the use of sophisticated accounting standards may 
make firms less risky (reduce information asymmetry) and encourage lenders to 
provide more debt. 
I Iovv cvcr, although the arguments above adopt the view that there is a positive 
relationship between leverage and disclosure, a negative relationship also can be 
justified through another stream of arguments. Zarzeski (1996, p 24) proposes that 
companies ww ith lower leverage are likely to have higher levels of investor-oriented 
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disclosure". The explanation provided is that companies with high leverage are 
expected to exist in countries with high uncertainty avoidance (conservatism). 
developed bank-firm relationships and cross-holding ownership (Germany as 
discussed in Chapter 3). In such cases firms will share private information with their 
creditors. 
According to Agarwal and Elston (2001), German banks may engage in managerial 
decisions conforming to their position as debt-holders rather than shareholders or 
representatives with proxy votes. Thus, more disclosure and a high quality set of 
accounting standards may reveal such behaviour to the public and other investors. 
This potential result may support the argument that high leverage will negatively 
affect the tendency of German companies to adopt IRAS. 
Furthermore, Tarca (2004) argues for using leverage as a proxy to capture the firm's 
dependence on equity capital. This implies that firms with higher leverage are 
relatively less dependent on equity capital, and are hence less likely to face 
shareholders' demands for information. This, in turn, means less pressure to use 
disclosure to reduce information asymmetry with shareholders. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) find that leverage increases with size in all countries (G7) 
except for Germany, in which the relationship between leverage and size was 
significantly negative. They explain that this is against all the theoretical 
expectations; nevertheless they do not provide an explanation for this. Spremann and 
Gantenbein (2001, p. 18) explain that this negative relationship "reflects the legal 
specialities of German corporate and bankruptcy law as well as the special 
relationship between SMEs and their banks'". Edwards and Fischer (1994, p. 129) 
also report that the largest companies in Germany have a general tendency not to 
rýiise much finance from banks. Given the hypothesised positive relationship 
between size and adoption of IRAS, one would expect leverage in German firms to 
have an inverse relationship with their tendency to use IRAS. 
Leuz (2004). on the other hand, does not expect any particular sign for the 
relationship between leverage and disclosures of cash flow statements and segment 
reporting by German companies. He justifies this in relation to the special features of 
the German institutional environment. In his results he finds a positive relationship 
between the disclosure of cash flow statements and leverage. Hovvev-er. a negative 
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relationship is found between segment reporting by German companies and leverage. 
The positive association for the disclosure of a cash flow statement is explained by 
the high demand for cash flow statements, in particular for highly levered firms. 
whereas the negative relationship between segment reporting and leverage is related 
to cost savings in private information acquisition, which are interpreted by the 
researcher as a result of the ability of managers in highly levered companies to share 
private information with lenders. When introducing his hypothesis about leverage. 
I, cuz reports that although bank debt agreements in Germany are widespread, banks 
have other means than the annual report to receive the information they need. 
Results of previous studies: results of previous studies about leverage influence are 
varied and not all of them are consistent with the predictions of agency theory. Chow 
(1982) and Ettredge et al (1994) find a positive relationship between the firm's 
leverage and voluntary auditing. For voluntary disclosure studies, Chow and Wong- 
Boren (1987) conclude that there is a positive but insignificant relationship between 
leverage and voluntary disclosure. The univariate analysis by Craswell and Taylor 
(1992) provides an insignificant result, whereas the multivariate analysis proves a 
significant positive correlation between leverage and the disclosure of reserves by oil 
and gas companies. Hossain et al (1994) find that leverage in the univariate analysis 
is marginally significant. The multivariate test shows that it is insignificant, 
nevertheless mistakenly they state that their results are consistent with Craswell and 
Taylor (1992). Yet Hossain et al (1995) find a marginally significant relationship 
between leverage and voluntary disclosure. With regard to studies related to 
compliance with IRAS, Dumontier and Raffournier (1998) find that the relationship 
between the propensity to comply with IAS and leverage is not significant. 
l' urthermore, Cuijpers et al (2002) conclude that they do not find any evidence of the 
impact of leverage on the probability of using non-local GAAP. Street and Gray 
(2002) do not assume any relationship between leverage and the extent of 
compliance with IAS. 
In ocneral, as can be seen from the above, there is no strong evidence in the literature 
that supports the leverage hypothesis. Although there are a few arguments for a 
positive relationship between leverage and the tendency to adopt IRA. another 
stream of arguments supporting a negative relationship appear to overshadow them. 
Therefore. the researcher tends to favour this last group of arguments. 
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114(): Ceteris paribus. the tendency of German companies to voluntarily adopt IRAS 
is either not associated with leverage or positively with it. 
H4, : Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German companies to voluntarily adopt IRAS 
is negatively associated with leverage. 
Proxies for testing leverage: Although the leverage concept as defined above is in 
general the same in the finance and accounting literatures. the way it is measured 
may differ across the different studies according to different perceptions about debt 
and equity. Chow (1982) and Chow &Wong-Boren (1987). for example, suggest 
book value of debt to size, which is in turn measured by the market value of owners, 
equity plus book value of debt. Hossain et al (1994) and Hossain et al (1995) 
measure leverage by book value of long-term debt to the book value of owners' 
equity. Ettredge et al (1994), on the other hand, measure leverage by long-term debt 
as a percentage of total assets. Dumontier and Raffournier (1998) suggest two 
measures for leverage: total debt to total assets and long-term debt to total assets. For 
the purpose of this study, total debt to total assets is proposed as a measure of 
leverage (see Chapter 6). 
5.3.5 Profitability 
Profitability is a significant variable which affects different groups of financial 
statements users. Figures related to profitability are used by analysts and investors to 
evaluate companies' performance. The importance of profit figures have persuaded 
many researchers to think that profitability can have an effect on managers' 
behaviour which includes the choice of accounting practices. 
Some of the studies about disclosure and its determinants examine the relationship 
between firms' profitability and the extent of financial disclosure by these firms. 
Inchausti (1997, p. 54) employs three theories to explain the probable impact of 
profitability as a determinant of profitable firms' disclosure. He suggests that 
according to agency theory, managers exploit profitability to attain personal 
advantages using external information. Hence, detailed disclosure will help them to 
keep their position and their compensation arrangements, although profit related pay 
in Germany is not as frequent as it is in the UK and LIS. Second, he argues that 
according to signalling theory. shareholders will be interested in signalling "good 
fC\V s- (by their companies) to the market in order to avoid undervaluation of their 
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shares. lý inally, the author suggests that "political process theory" implies that very 
profitable firms will disclose more information in order to justify the level of profits. 
Furthermore, Lang and Lundholm (ibid. ) indicate that the signalling theory also 
suggests a negative relationship between disclosure and profitability, where 
disclosure can be employed to explain `'bad news". Hoy ever. Inchausti (ibid. ) 
indicates that although the signalling theory may suggest two contradictory 
relationships (positive and negative) between profitability and disclosure of 
information, given the evidence and underlying reasons, he considers the positive 
relationship. 
Gray, Meek and Roberts (1995b, p. 560) provide a similar idea to that explained by 
Inchausti when they use the statement by Akerlof (1970) "there is a cost in being 
perceived as a "lemon" by the market". Based on this, they suggest that 'well-run'" 
firms will employ voluntary disclosure to be distinguished from other firms with 
lower performance, in order to raise capital on the best available terms. 
Leuz (2004), on the other hand, mixes the argument for profitability with the 
industry hypothesis by stating that in industries where proprietary costs are likely to 
be high (high competition), profitability is likely to be negatively associated with 
disclosure. 
Dumontier and Raffournier (1998) argue that firms with superior profits may employ 
IAS as a signal to the market that they do not manage earnings to reduce volatility 
which is used to measure the risk of companies' shares. Their justification of this 
argument is that earnings management under IAS is more difficult than under Swiss 
GAAP. As explained in Chapter 4, earnings management by German companies is 
evident in companies reporting under GGAAP. However, it is indicated above in the 
section on leverage that although earnings management is difficult under US GAAP. 
it may be possible under IAS (see also Chapter 4). 
Street and Gray (2002) do not justify the use of the profitability hypothesis. However- 
they state that they do not predict any direction of association between the extent of 
compliance with IAS and the profitability of a firm. The reason for this. as reported 
by the authors, is the mixed findings of previous studies. 
In addition to the arguments mentioned above and from the authors own point of 
ie\\, companies with high profits may tend to associate their superior performance 
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with distinguishing their company from other companies in the market by using 
financial reporting of a `high quality' such as US GAAP and IAS. 
In a country like Germany which has a macro-economy-based and statute-based 
accounting system158. political pressures are more likely to appear with regard to 
accounting information. An example of such political pressures can be the pressure 
put onto profitable companies by labour unions. Labour unions may use high profits 
to negotiate for higher wages. The argument is that full disclosure required by a high 
quality set of accounting standards may help companies to explain particular facts 
about these profits and to stand against such negotiations. However, Leuz (2004) 
lessens the validity of this argument by reporting that negotiations by labour unions 
do not take place at the level of the firm and that their representatives on the 
supervisory board give them private access to such information. 
Results of previous studies: Inchausti (1997) does not find any significance in the 
relationship between voluntary disclosure and the profitability of Spanish firms. 
Leuz (2004) finds a negative but insignificant association between profitability and 
cash flow statement disclosures, whereas a significant negative association is found 
between profitability and segment reporting by German companies. The explanation 
for this is that proprietary costs related to segment reporting are higher than those 
related to cash flow statements. For Swiss companies, Dumontier and Raffournier 
(1998) do not find any significant association between profitability and the tendency 
of these companies to comply with IAS. Finally, Street and Gray (2002) do not find 
significant relationship between profitability and the extent of compliance with IAS. 
Although the results by Leuz (ibid) indicate a negative relationship between the 
profitability of German firms and disclosure, based on the arguments above, the 
researcher tends to hypothesise that: 
[15 : 
Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt IRAS is 
either not associated with their profitability or negatively related with it. 
11 5, : Ceteris paribus. the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt IRAS is 
positively associated with their profitability. 
iss As classified by Nobes (see Nobes, 2000, p ý9) 
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Variables used to proxy for profitability: Gray et al (1995b) measure profitability 
as the ratio of profit after tax and interest to sales (i. e.. return on sales). Differently 
from this, Leuz (2004) provides three measures for profitability: operating income to 
net sales, operating income total assets (ROA) and ROA relative to industry 1 9. 
Three different measures are presented by Dumontier and Raffournier (1998): net 
income to equity, earnings before interest and tax to equity, and earnings before 
interest and tax to total assets. Street and Gray (2002). on the other hand, measure 
profitability as the ratio of net income before tax to total shareholders' equity. 
Previous studies do not provide explanations for the proxies suggested. One 
limitation on all these proxies is that the measured profits may vary significantly 
from year to year. Despite this limitation, the current research follows the steps of 
the previous research by choosing the measures: operating income to total assets and 
operating income to turnover (see Chapter 6). 
5.3.6 Auditor Identity: 
Auditing is an economic and social activity which has historical roots. However. it 
has become a crucial activity since the growing separation between ownership and 
management which first emerged significantly with the industrial revolution. The 
level of the auditing firm or the identity of the auditing firm is a variable which has 
attracted many researchers to test whether it has a significant effect on different 
aspects of companies' behaviour. To present the hypothesis of auditor identity, it is 
necessary to provide a brief review of the big auditing firms and developments in 
their size as result of mergers and the extension of their activities. 
International auditing firms and work quality: some auditing firms have become 
international and provide their services across the world through their branches in 
some countries or jointly with local professionals in other countries. Few studies 
have explored the relationship between the size of auditing firms and the quality of 
\v ork they provide. DeAngelo (1981) concludes that the larger the auditor160, the less 
the opportunistic behaviour, and the higher the quality of audit. Later research by 
Palmrose (1988) and Caplan and Raedy (2003) support the conclusion of DeAngelo. 
Ii, ) The last measure as explained by the author is the firm's RO. -\ (earnings before tav interest and 
extraordinary items) minus the average 
ROA of all sample firms with the same industr\ classification 
ý`'" DeAngelo assumed that the larger companies are the ones which hay ea larger number of clients. 
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DeAngelo (1981) suggests that being in the big-8 maybe a good proxy for auditor 
quality. 
The number of audit firms which are considered to be the biggest in the international 
auditing market and good quality providers has changed several times during the last 
two decades. In the period of studies by DeAngelo and Palmrose (1960-1985) the 
number was eight firms: Arthur Andersen and Co, Arthur Young and Co, Coopers 
and Lybrand, Deloitte Haskins & Sells, Ernst and Whinney, Peat. Marwick, Mitchell 
& Co, Price Waterhouse and Touche Ross and Co. Mergers took place between 
some of these firms which led to decreasing the number to six (the Big 6) during the 
period of the study by Caplan (1975-1995). The so called Big 6 were: Arthur 
Anderson, Ernst & Young, Coopers and Lybrand, Deloitte & Touche, KPMG and 
Price Waterhouse. In 1998, a merger between Price Waterhouse and Coopers & 
I , ybrand produced PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC). Finally, the break-up of 
Andersen as a result of the collapse of Enron reduced the number to four (the Big 
4)161. During the years these firms have extended their activities to a wide range of 
services such as consulting in management and technology and advice on tax and 
corporate finance. 
Data for this empirical research is extracted from the annual reports for the fiscal 
vcar 2001. At the time Arthur Anderson was still considered as one of the Big-5. 
Chapter 3 provides an explanation of the concentration of the German audit market, 
which shows that PricewaterhouseCoopers and KPMG had the largest market shares. 
Relation between auditor identity and firms' behaviours: the identity of auditing 
firms is a common variable in several studies which have examined different aspects 
of firms behaviour. The extant literature is rich with arguments for the influence of 
auditors. Watts and Zimmerman (1986, p323) argue that 
": auditors have incentives to lobby with the SEC and FASB for more complicated 
accounting. Such increased complexity could increase the quantity of auditing and 
the demand for the auditor's services". 
IIm ever, the authors report that the auditors vVill oppose complexity- if it will 
decrease: the demand for their services. This may cast light on the potential interest 
that auditors have in recommending a certain set of accounting standard such as IAS 
IH this information is common know ledge and not from a certain reference 
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as t; S GAAP. where the Big 5 in particular have an advantage over other firms and 
auditors generally may be better informed than the preparers of accounts. 
Several studies have examined the influence of choosing one of the Big-6'6i2 firms on 
different issues related to accounting, particularly in the empirical literature about 
disclosure. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) indicate that the role of auditors can 
increase the market value of a firm by imposing increased disclosure and 
consequently reducing its agency costs. Hossain et al (1994) rely on the arguments of 
previous agency theory literature which refers to the role of auditors in reducing 
agency costs by limiting the opportunistic behaviour of agents (see size hypothesis). 
Nobes (2000) argues that international accountancy firms are one of the groups 
involved in the process of accounting harmonisation. His point of view is that their 
work across the world, which includes preparation, consolidation and auditing of 
financial statements, will be easier with harmonised accounting practices. Moreover. 
it will increase the mobility of their staff. The researcher agrees with Nobes and 
would add that dealing with IRAS will lead to cost savings for these international 
1-irms. These cost savings will not be confined to the areas mentioned by Nobes. If 
their clients use IRAS, international firms will not need to train their staff to deal 
with an enormous number of GAAPs. Furthermore, it will make it easier and cheaper 
For the central offices of these firms to monitor the quality of the work achieved by 
their offices abroad and by other partners. Operating in foreign countries is risky and 
producing work under their names may threaten their reputation. Thus in some 
countries where the profession is not well developed they do not use their names. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) present an example of this: when Price, Waterhouse 
and Company, first operated in the US in the early days of the auditing profession 
there, they did not work under that name. This example of the US is still the case of 
many developing countries nowadays' 
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A good example for the role large auditors play in lobbying for international 
accounting standards is a statement by Ian Wright (Global Corporate Reporting 
Group Leader, P\vC) and Jochen Pape (Chair PwC Global IAS Board, Pw C): 
"Pricc\v-aterhouseCoopers supports strongly the goal of a single set of global 
accounting standards. This could be achieved by the global adoption of International 
\s they \v cre for at the time of most these studies 
"" For example, in I ib\ a. some of the Big -5 still work jointly with Libyan auditors. 
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Accounting Standards (IAS) or by convergence between national standards and LAS. 
The adoption of IAS by the European Union creates the opportunity to achieve that 
goal and we hope that this survey will alert those involved in the process to the need 
for urgent action. " (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2002b. p. -3)) 
Furthermore, the researcher sees that companies switching to a sophisticated set of 
accounting standards such as IAS or US GAAP will probably need high quality 
advice and maybe technical assistance (transition stage). which will be easily 
available from large accounting firms such as the big 5. Even during the years after 
the adoption of IRAS, the regular issuing of new standards will cause companies 
problems in applying them. Therefore, adoption of IRAS is more probable for 
companies which contract with big auditing firms, which are more likely to be highly 
efficient in providing such services. Dumontier and Raffournier (1998, p225) support 
this view by referring to the "superior international training" of the employees of 
such firms and to the competitive advantage of controlling the application of IAS 
caused by "existence of economics of scale in the development of competence in 
international accounting standards". Although the authors do not provide an 
explanation for this statement, the researcher's argument above about post adoption 
problems may give a plausible interpretation. The authors use another argument by 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986), which is the positive relationship between auditor 
Firms' reputation and independence from their client. They suggest that large auditor 
firms may strengthen and enhance their reputation as independent auditors by 
encouraging their clients to adopt a stringent set of accounting standards. 
Finally, Leuz (2003, p. 451), indicate that an amendment of the German Commercial 
Code in 1998 has considerably increased the legal liability of the auditors with 
regard to the enforcement of 'IRAS'. He also reports that according to (§§331 and 
32 1 [GB), auditors and directors could face criminal prosecution for misleading and 
fraudulent financial statements' ý''. 
Empirical results of previous studies seem to be supportive. In the study by Hossain 
et al (1994), results from the univariate analysis find a significant relationship, while 
the multivariate test shows no significant relationship between voluntary disclosures 
and auditor identity. However, Hossain et al (1995) do not find any significant 
relationship. Craswell (1992) on the other 
hand. showed that auditor type is a 
l`'' There is no further explanation provided by Leuz to clarif\ this point. 
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significant explanatory variable influencing the extent of discretionary disclosure of 
reserves by oil and gas companies. Finally. in the results of Dumontier and 
Raffournier (1998), the univariate analysis showed a significant relationship between 
compliance with IAS and being audited by one of the big-6. whereas the multivariate 
analysis showed an insignificant relationship. Consequently the hypothesis here is: 
H6O : Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German companies to voluntarily adopt IR -\S 
is either not associated with being audited by a Big-5 firm or negatively related with 
that. 
H6,: Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German companies to voluntarily adopt IRAS 
is positively associated with being audited by a Big-5 firm. 
Proxies for auditing level variable: 
Alongside the big 5, there are three big auditing firms which operate in the German 
audit market: Bayerishce Treuhandgesellschaft AG, BDO Deutsche Waren-treuhand 
AG and Grant Thornton. Still, as explained in Chapter 3, the concentration in this 
market is quite high in favour of KPMG and PwC. Street and Gray (2002) chose the 
measure the effect of the big-5 plus BDO and Grant Thornton. However, for the 
purpose of this study, the researcher has chosen to use the big 5 as a proxy for high 
quality auditing. The reason for this is that it is empirically proved by previous 
studies that the big 5 are high quality providers. Furthermore, there is no empirical 
evidence, to the researcher's knowledge, which may help to distinguish more high 
quality auditors from the rest of the other firms in the German auditing. Finally, it is 
also assumed that firms other than Big-5 are less international. A dummy variable 
\v ill be used to code the big-5/non big five firms (see Chapter 6). 
5.3.7 Listing Status 
Likc firm size, listing status is a factor which is commonly chosen as an independent 
variable affecting the extent of financial disclosure'ý' Listing status is considered by 
sc\'eral researchers as a determinant of firms' behaviour. It has been studied on 
different levels. Whether companies are listed only on one domestic stock market, 
listed on more than one domestic stock market or listed on both domestic markets 
and foreign markets. In this research, attention is given just to whether companies 
k"S 11owc\ c r. It is less frequently used 
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are listed abroad, because it would appear that cross-listing in a single country is not 
an influential factor in the process of adopting IRAS. All companies in the sample 
are mainly listed on the FWB. but the vast majority are also listed on at least one 
more German stock market (see Chapter 2). 
Gray et al (1995a, p43-44) suggest some major reasons for listing on foreign markets: 
the need to access additional capital, the desire to improve the marketability of a 
company's shares by broadening the shareholder base, the perceived benefits of an 
enhanced firm image in international markets and as a general reason to lower the 
cost of capital. Furthermore, Cooke (1989) states that multiple listed companies are 
often interested in foreign exchange since foreign operations are often financed by 
foreign capital (hedging reasons). 
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) hypothesise that multi-listed firms will decrease their 
cost of capital by compliance with an "international reporting regime" such as IAS 
or US GAAP. Furthermore, they argue that reporting under IRAS is most useful to 
foreign investors. In general, harmonised accounting practices through one set of 
accounting standards will give investors in the international stock markets a more 
adequate frame for better comparability on which their decisions will be based. The 
researcher argues that firms which look forward to an international listing will 
probably try to use an international language to communicate with investors cross 
borders. Whether it has been successful or not, IAS is intended to be this 
international accounting language. Gray et al (ibid) argue that in the context of 
capital market pressures a motivation for companies to voluntarily disclose more 
information is the desire to lower the firm's cost of capital. They explain that 
additional information reduces uncertainty about the firm. When a firm reduces its 
information risk, it expects investors to accept a lower rate of return and 
subsequently reduces the cost of capital. 
The accounting and disclosure requirements of foreign capital markets can be a 
barrier to international listing. One famous example of this is the SEC requirements 
for firms seeking listing on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or other US 
markets. All foreign firms listed on the NYSE are required to prepare their accounts 
under US GAAP or at least to reconcile them to US GA: AP166 The Neuer Markt in 
160 
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(ºermany. in turn, required all companies, including German ones, to prepare their 
financial statements either under US GAAP or IAS. Conversely. the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) accepts the use of IAS or the GAAP adopted in member states of 
the European Union (mutual recognition). This may sound like an advantage for 
companies which seek listing on the LSE, but it is against the interest of the 
investors, who need comparable financial statements (arguably, it is still in the 
interest of LSE, which aims to get more listed firms). 
Gray et al (1995a, p43) expect that internationally listed companies face more 
pressures than those listed only at home. Subsequently, "these pressures may result 
in relatively more and more harmonised voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 
internationally listed companies". Drawing on Choi and Mueller (1984), Cooke 
(1989) states that companies seeking multiple listing to finance international 
operations need increased disclosure to adapt to local customs to meet the 
requirements of banks and other suppliers of capital. Furthermore, Cooke argues for 
the quotation status hypothesis using the agency costs notion. His point of view is 
that agency costs may vary according to quotation status. He argues that multi-listed 
companies have higher agency costs than those which are solely listed on domestic 
markets, because they probably have a larger number of shareholders and more 
dispersed shares (monitoring problems) (see size hypothesis). Moreover, Cooke also 
states that multiple listed firms are much more visible to the public than other firms; 
therefore pressures are placed upon them by investors, their agents, and other users 
for adequate levels of disclosure. 
The researcher would argue that international investors may not trust the quality of 
accounts produced under German GAAP. The reason for this is that the quality of 
German GAAP and its value relevance is questionable (see Bartov et al, 2002). The 
example of Daimler Benz and how its earnings turned into losses after the 
reconciliation to US GAAP in 1993 may be a good example that supports the 
argument (see Chapter 4). Furthermore, it can be argued that German accounting is 
vv ell known for being essentially based on the principle of creditor protection 
167 
which has resulted in excessive prudence. This characteristic of German accounting 
may affect its ability to compete in international markets such as LSE or NYSE 
scc the part of nm\ stud\ which discusses the main features of Gernman accounting 
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where local companies use accounting standards aimed at providing shareholders' 
information. 
In Germany, not many companies have their shares listed abroad. Most of the 
German internationally listed firms are included in DAX. Whereas the most popular 
stock exchanges for their listings are the Swiss Exchange (SWX), Paris and NYSE 
(see Chapter 7). The small proportion of internationally listed companies may raise a 
question about the validity of this hypothesis. However, statistical tests should be run 
to show whether German companies are more likely to comply with IRAS once they 
turn to international capital markets. 
Results of previous work: Most of the studies, which tested the effectiveness of 
listing status as a determinant of certain firm behaviours, support this hypothesis. 
Gray et al (1995) conclude that participation in international stock markets is 
significantly associated with additional voluntary disclosures in annual reports by 
multinationals. Studies by Hossain et al (1994; 1995) support the notion that listing 
status is statistically related to the levels of voluntary disclosure. Cooke (1989) 
indicates that quotation status is the most significant variable in explaining the 
variability in voluntary disclosure in Swedish companies. Furthermore, in his study 
about Japanese firms (1991), Cooke concludes that multi-listed firms disclose more 
information in their Japanese annual reports than firms listed only on the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange. In Germany, Leuz (2004) finds a significant positive relationship 
between listing abroad and segment reporting as well as the disclosure of cash flow 
statements. 
With regard to studies considering compliance with IRAS, Dumontier and 
Raffournier (1998) find that listing status is an important explanatory variable for 
S\\iss firms' voluntary compliance with IAS. 
Based upon the arguments provided above the researcher would provide his 
hypothesis in the following form: 
117(): Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German listed firms to adopt IRAS is either 
not associated with listing abroad or negatively related with it. 
H71 : Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German listed firms is positively- associated 
\v ith listing abroad. 
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Proxy for testing listing status: what is commonly used to proxy for the listing 
status are dummy variables which take the form of 1 or 0. In such case an 
internationally listed firm will be given 1, whereas 0 will be given to the ones whose 
listing is confined to German stock markets. 
5.3.8 Hypothesis - Foreign investors: 
It may be argued that the impact of foreign investors should be studied under the 
section of listing status. Foreign investors, however, can have impact on firms even 
if they are not listed on foreign exchanges. In the Main market companies tested in 
the current research, for example, there are 83 firms that have significant foreign 
investors, but only 7 of these firms are multi-listed. This makes it clear that the 
presence of foreign investors and their potential effect on accounting choices should 
be studied separately from the hypothesis on listing abroad. The main difference 
between this hypothesis and the one on listing abroad is that it is concerned with 
existing international investors rather than prospective investors (the concern of 
listing abroad). 
In short, it was argued earlier that German GAAP is highly influenced by creditor 
protection and the preservation of capital, which clearly conflicts with an investor 
orientation. This of course limits the usefulness of GGAAP information for foreign 
investors who are, in particular, seeking useful information rather than creditor 
protection. This is sought in the provision of fair disclosure and transparency (see 
Chapter 3 for the characteristics of GGAAP, Chapter 4 for comparison with IAS and 
US GAAP). 
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000. p. 6) indicate that foreign investors need to be given 
special attention with respect to firms' financial reporting: 
"German managers have had difficulty "explaining" their (German GAAP) financial 
results to foreign investors and have claimed that a lack of international acceptance 
of German financial statements has led to disadvantages when raising capital". 
The authors report that managers have changed their reporting and disclosure 
policies in response to this concern. Deutsche Bank's spokesman emphasises the 
influence of existing foreign investor by stating: we are doing this [adopting IAS 
standards] to prevent investors from turning away from Deutsche Bank because they 
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think they are not getting enough information (UT: SI. 12/20/1995. p. 10 as cited in 
LV (ibid, p. 6)). 
In fact, to the researcher's knowledge, neither disclosure studies nor studies of 
compliance with accounting standards have empirically tested the impact of this 
factor. However, Glaum and Mandler (1997) was an exception; it tested the 
hypothesis that the acceptance of Anglo-American standards by German executive 
managers is positively related to the proportion of capital held by foreign investors. 
The authors found that the effect on managers' acceptance of Anglo-American 
accounting was not statistically significant. 
Kinnunen, Niskanen and Kasanen (2000) test the hypothesis that earnings reported 
under IAS are more useful to foreign investors than to local investors. The authors 
tested this hypothesis on the Helsinki Stock Exchange, where the market is 
structured into two segments: one is for shares restricted to domestic investors, while 
the other segment is for shares available to anyone. They ran separate regression 
models using earnings under IAS and Finnish GAAP. Their results indicate that local 
GAAP (Finish) earnings that are restated in accordance with IAS help to meet the 
information needs of foreign investors, but are of limited use to local investors. 
Volts (2003) sees that the adoption of IRAS by German companies is a key demand 
of foreign institutional investors. He argues that the numerous options to recognise 
income, the use of hidden reserves, and lack of transparency prevent institutional 
investors from accurately measuring the value of a company, and also from making 
fair comparisons with other companies using IRAS. 
Based on the arguments above, the following hypothesis is suggested: 
H&io : Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt IRAS is 
either not associated with the presence of foreign investors amongst its shareholders 
or negatively related with it. 
H8u, : Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt IRAS is 
positively associated with the presence of foreign investors amongst its shareholders. 
One may argue that preferences of foreign investors would not have any influence on 
the managerial decision unless they are represented on the management board or the 
su})crvisory board. In other words, the existence of 
foreign managers on one of these 
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two boards may be an indication of the potential influence (see Chapter 2 for 
explanation on German corporate governance). Therefore. the following hypothesis 
is proposed to test this: 
H8 bo : Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt IRAS is 
either not associated with the presence of foreign members of the executive and 
supervisory boards or negatively related with it. 
H8h, : Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt IRAS is 
positively associated with the presence of foreign members of the executive and 
supervisory boards 
Both hypotheses in this section are statistically tested using binary variable (see 
Chapter 6 for details) 
5.3.8.1 Internationality (internationality of business) 
Most large corporations in the modern economy operate and have activities in 
countries other than their original country. These activities can be in the form of 
sales, manufacturing or services. Multinational corporations have been a subject of 
several studies. However, many of them avoid defining the term "multinational". 
The reason for this may be that researchers assume that the definition is clear to their 
readers. The researcher believes that this is not true and that defining this term is 
necessary to support the full understanding of these studies. It can be difficult 
sometimes in such studies to separate discussions about multinationals from those 
about internationally listed companies (for such studies see Gray et al, 1995a, 
Saudagaran and Meek, 1997). The similarity between the two issues comes as a 
result of the fact that both types of companies are linked with foreign environments. 
The difference in this environment is the groups which are interested in the financial 
statements of these companies. While the internationally listed companies focus 
mainly on investors in foreign markets and regulators of these markets such as the 
SEC in the US, multinationals will have to deal with a greater variety of interested 
groups such as governments, suppliers and labour unions. However, it should be 
indicated here that a firm can be classified as both internationally listed and a 
multinational. The International Labour Organisation in its preamble for Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy 
presents a definition for MNCs (International Labour Organization, -'001, p. 2): 
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'Multinational enterprises include enterprises. whether they are of public. mixed or 
private ownership, which own or control production. distribution. services or other 
facilities outside the country in which they are based 
The importance of this definition in this part of research is to separate what are 
known as multinationals and what are known as internationally listed companies1 ý'ý 
The factor of listing status discussed above as a determinant of companies' 
behaviour is concerned with the latter (internationally listed firms). On other hand, 
the former "multinationals" is the focus of this hypothesis. 
This characteristic is believed to have an important influence on these firms' 
behaviour. Cuijpers et al (2002, p7) explain that "companies operating 
internationally have a much more heterogeneous group of stakeholders than 
companies that mainly operate nationally". The authors argue that multinationals are 
more likely to adopt "non-local GAAP" in order to provide standardised information 
for these diverse stakeholders. Moreover they suggest that the listing status 
hypothesis focuses only on international shareholders and largely ignores the other 
stakeholders such as governments, customers and suppliers. The hypothesis of 
Cui_jpers et al was that the probability of adopting non-local GAAP by is positively 
associated with the extent of this company's international operations. Dumontier and 
Raffournier (1998), on the other hand, argue that firms which operate internationally 
are more visible on foreign markets. In these foreign markets, customers, suppliers 
and governments are interested in the financial statements of these companies. Hence, 
managers of these multinational companies may adopt IAS to make their financial 
reports more readable and understandable in an international context. Raffournier 
(1995) also argues that when these users (stakeholders) examine the financial 
statements, they are more likely to refer to the practices of domestic firms. Thus he 
suggests that foreign companies are tempted to comply with the standard rules of the 
countries in which they operate (although he presents this argument under the 
hypothesis on listing status). 
Further a recent study by Street and Gray (2002. p56) argues that "multi-national 
companies seeking access to international stock markets may be subject to several 
1`8 The researcher will use the term 'multiple listed for firms which are listed cross borders. Ho,, Ne\er, 
this term ma\ mean also 
firms N\ hick are listed on more than one German exchange. As explained 
. aho\ e. the international perspective 
is the one considered in this research. 
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regulatory authorities and reviews'. The authors state that this may put managers and 
independent auditors under pressure to focus more on the completeness and accuracy 
of the annual accounts. Moreover. they indicate that multi-nationals may be more 
likely to compete for raising capital with companies which adopt detailed accounting 
regulations such as US GAAP or UK GAAP. The last argument is an example of the 
mixing up of discussions on multinationality and listing abroad. It seems difficult 
sometimes to argue for the hypothesis of listing status separately from the hypothesis 
of internationality. Although Street and Gray study the determinants affecting the 
extent of compliance with IAS, their arguments may support the researcher's 
argument that pressure from these markets will drive multinational German 
companies to adopt IRAS. 
Apart from the studies dealing with compliance with IAS, there are several ones 
which discuss the relationship between accounting practices and internationality. 
Saudagaran and Meek (1997) suggest that voluntary disclosures can be used by 
MNCs as a way to cope with international diversity in accounting standards. Like 
Gray et al's work, Saudagaran and Meek's paper does not make a clear distinction 
between multinational and internationally listed companies. Finally Saudagaran and 
Meek (ibid) refer to a finding by Zarzeski (1996) that companies in systems with 
high cultural secrecy increase their levels of disclosure as they grow larger and 
increasingly multinational and as they increase their sourcing of finance from 
stockholders (this is against the argument on leverage). This last observation might 
be related to Germany in which the accounting system is traditionally associated 
with high secrecy (see Chapter 3). 
In addition to the arguments above, the researcher would introduce some other 
arguments to support this hypothesis. Multinationals have to deal with certain 
accounting issues which need well developed and stringent regulations. In Germany. 
for example, "foreign currency translation is not regulated" (Ordelheide and KPMG, 
2001, p 1397). This example explains the need to employ recognised and accepted 
accounting standards to solve such issues. Furthermore, one may argue that in some 
countries. political pressures may be put on foreign companies' branches and 
subsidiaries. Some governments may have doubts about the activities of these 
companies. Moreover, they will be cautious with any financial information provided 
by these foreign companies for tax purposes. It is possible then that they choose to 
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report under IRAS in order to increase their credibility and to enhance their image. 
Finally. for hedging reasons companies may tend to raise finance from local banks in 
the countries in which they have subsidiaries. Adoption of IRAS can be a useful step 
(credibility and enhanced image) in getting financed from by these banks. 
Results on the relationship between the extent of business abroad and accounting 
practices is somewhat inconsistent. Cuijpers et al (2002) conclude that the likelihood 
of using non-local GAAP increases with the geographic spread of firms businesses. 
Street and Gray (2002) indicate in their results that there is not any significant 
relationship between the extent of compliance with IAS and foreign business. Leuz 
(2004) presents the results of applying two models which include foreign business as 
a determinant variable in cash flow and segment reporting disclosures. The first 
result is that foreign business factor is "unexpectedly insignificant". The other result 
is more confusing as he finds a significant negative coefficient. Leuz (ibid) describes 
his results about foreign business as puzzling and inconsistent with his expectations. 
Still, Dumontier and Raffournier (1998) indicate that both univariate and 
multivariate analyses show a positive influence of internationality on voluntary 
compliance with IAS by Swiss companies. 
Based on the arguments stated above, the researcher suggests the following 
hypothesis: 
H90: Ceteris paribus: the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt IRAS is 
either not associated with the foreign business of a firm or negatively related with 
that. 
H91: Ceteris paribus: the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt IRAS is 
positively associated with the foreign business of a firm. 
Proxies for internationality: variables suggested to proxy for nationality are 
different and reflect various concepts of internationality. Dumontier and Raffournier 
choose the proportion of foreign sales. Whereas Cuijpers et al (2002) choose the 
number of geographic segments reported by a firm. Leuz (2004) use the percentage 
of revenues generated outside Germany. Finally, Street and Gray use the percentage 
of foreign sales (foreign sales divided by total sales). One may argue that the number 
of foreign subsidiaries can be employed as a proxy 
for internationality. This proxy 
may reflect the extent to which a firm 
is involved in foreign countries. For the 
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purpose of this study, the researcher suggests both proxies: the percentage of sales 
abroad and whether the company has a subsidiary or subsidiaries abroad or not. 
Whereas the first proxy is clearly a continuous variable. the second proxy is a binary 
variable (see Chapter 6). 
One may think of a possible relationship between internationality of business that of 
listing status. The very small number (relatively) of multiple listed firms compared 
with that of firms having subsidiaries abroad does not support this idea (more is 
Chapter 8) 
5.3.9 Industry (line of business): 
In many aspects it seems that industry for a company can be like a family for a 
person. It is important to indicate this close relationship between a firm and its 
industry as this will help explain the effect which industry can have on the firm. The 
limits or boundaries of an industry are not easy to draw. These boundaries are 
determined by several factors such as competition and regulation. 
Accounting regulations and standards can be sometimes tailored for specific 
industries. Banks and financial institutions, for example, are usually regulated by a 
different set of accounting rules and standards. Companies operating in the oil and 
gas sector for example, have different accounting issues which, in some cases, need a 
'separate set of rules or standards. In fact, many industries have certain accounting 
problems of their very own, which need special attention on the part of standards 
setters. 
A Research by KPMG and Goldman Sachs in 2002 identifies specific areas that are 
influenced by the change IAS and expected be significant for particular sectors. For 
instance, they state that development costs and environmental provisions and major 
repairs are important for the Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals sector. whereas revenue 
recognition and intangibles are important to the Media and Telecom sectors. This 
clearly supports the argument that the voluntary compliance with IAS (or US 
GAAP 169) can be influenced by how negative/ positive the impact of the switch to 
IRAS on these specific areas would be. 
169 Because these are also areas ww hich can be clearly influenced by the adoption of US GAAP 
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Disclosure studies give some attention to the industry hypothesis. As reported by 
Naser and Wallace (1995), firms in Hong Kong may provide additional disclosures 
corresponding to the nature of their industry (that is in addition to the minimum 
disclosure requirements). They also expect that companies in the property sector \v ill 
have less information to disclose than those in other sectors. Yet. this cannot be 
considered as a non-disclosure policy related to competition factors for example. 
Inchausti (1997) uses signalling theory to suggest that if a company does not 
implement the same disclosure policies adopted by other companies within the same 
industry, the market may view this as "bad news"'. On the other hand, Cooke (1989) 
argues that disclosures by a lead company in a certain industry may encourage other 
companies in the same industry to adopt the same disclosure policies. However, in 
the researcher's view this may conflict with the concept of proprietary costs, which 
suggests that more disclosure by some firms, especially small ones, can put them at a 
competitive disadvantage as compared to firms within the same industry (see size 
hypothesis). Naser and Wallace (ibid) present the industry hypothesis in a different 
way from other researchers. Their hypothesis is that non-conglomerate firms provide 
less disclosure than ones classified as conglomerate. They explain that conglomerate 
companies have a larger scope of operations than firms in other industries. However, 
their hypothesis does not seem to be worth testing because having more or less 
information to disclose does not reflect your policy towards voluntary disclosure. In 
other words, having little information to disclose because of the nature of the 
business does not necessarily mean that the company wants to disclose less. Hence, 
this limited disclosure is not the result of a managerial decision to increase disclosure 
or not. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) indicate that some auditing firms specialise in certain 
industries. Thus, it is probable that IRAS could be suggested by auditors to their 
clients in specific industries. Similarly, the researcher argues that local GAAP may 
not be sophisticated enough to deal with accounting issues peculiar to certain 
industries. This will be an incentive to the companies to seek accounting standards 
which satisfy their special needs in financial reporting. Cuijpers et al (2002) support 
this notion as they report that firms in some industries may prefer to use IRAK 
because of certain provisions they do not find in local regulations. In fact the 
proprietary costs argument also can be employed to support this hypothesis. In 
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industries with high proprietary costs, the researcher would expect that companies 
wi 11 be reluctant to comply with IRAS because of potential competitive disadvantage. 
On the other hand, in other industries with lower proprietary costs, compliance with 
IRAS may be more likely. As explained above in the size hypothesis, a considerable 
size gap exists in some industries in Germany. This may validate the argument of 
proprietary costs, so that the researcher will expect in such an industry a low 
propensity to comply with IRAS. 
As in most the previous hypotheses, results of previous studies are inconclusive. 
Leuz (2004) concludes that voluntary segment disclosure is higher in industries with 
low proprietary costs 170. Harris (1998) and Shin (2002) find evidence of a 
relationship between market competition and voluntary disclosure. Cuijpers et al 
(2002), on the other hand, do not find a significant difference in the tendency to 
adopt non-local GAAP across manufacturing and non manufacturing industries. 
Finally, Street and Gray (2002) find a significant impact of industry type on the 
cxtcnt of compliance with IAS. 
The researcher suggests that industry type has an impact on the decision by German 
companies to adopt IRAS. Thus, the industry hypothesis is suggested in the 
tollowing form: 
Hl O: Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt IRAS is 
not related to the industry to which they belong. 
H101: Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt IRAS is 
related to the industry to which they belong. 
Proxies for industry: In modern economies companies tend to be conglomerate and 
it is difficult to decide which industry they belong to. For instance, many companies 
novv adays are engaged in both manufacturing and services to the extent that a 
researcher will be confused whether to classify a company as a manufacturer of a 
service provider. Street and Gray (2002), for example, divided industries into five 
groups with five dummy variables: Manufacturing 1, Manufacturing2. Transportation 
and Commerce, Wholesale, Services and Other. Cuijpers et al (2002) divided them 
into: manufacturing and non-manufacturing. On the other hand, Cook (1989) 
1 70 \t the sample period (1999), the German firms Nvere not required to pro\ ide complete segment 
reporting. 
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classified industries into four divisions: manufacturing. trading. services and 
conglomerate. Cook gives these four divisions the dumm- 0 and one variable. For 
German companies, Leuz (2004) used the sectors provided by Deutsche Börse based 
on the Composite DAX industry classification. Apart from the conglomerate issue, 
to classify firms adequately, the researcher would need to obtain a description for 
each firm's activity. Because this would not be cost-effective. the researcher prefers 
to use the classification made Deutsche Börse, which is also used by Leuz (2004)171. 
As explained in Chapter 6, dummy variables (0/1) will be used for each industry 
category. 
5.4 Hypotheses on the choice of IAS or US GAAP both in the Main market 
and the Neuer Markt: 
Whereas in the Main market the choice of accounting standards can be G GAAP, 
IAS or US GAAP, the choice in the Neuer Markt can only be IAS or US GAAP. 
This section discusses the hypotheses on the choice of IAS or US GAAP, which 
takes place both in the Neuer Markt and the Main market. As shown in Chapter 6, 
only 23 Main market firms used US GAAP for the year 2001. This is a relatively 
small number compared with 67 firms used IAS, and more than 205 firms used 
GGAAP. However, the number of firms using US GAAP in 2001 in the Neuer 
Markt is not much smaller than the number of those using IAS (134,110 
respectively). Leuz (2003, p. 465) states, in a footnote, that: "It is interesting that the 
split between IAS and U. S. GAAP has been roughly half and half throughout the 
history of the New Market. " 
To the researcher's knowledge, only Leuz (2003) and Tarca (2004) examine the 
choice of IAS or US GAAP172, and very lately Weißenberger et al (2004). 
The main aim of Leuz (ibid) is to examine whether there are significant differences 
in bid-ask spread and share turnover (as proxies for information asymmetry) between 
Firms reporting under US GAAP and those using IAS (see Chapter 4). Still, in a 
further section, Leuz analyzes the firms' accounting standards choices in the Neuer 
Markt. Leuz argues that examining firms' choices provides additional evidence on 
the quality of the two sets of standards. This argument is based on the fact that two 
171 sectors in Deutsche Börse are nine. Ho\\ ev er. the ones used by Leuz are five. The researcher 
expects to reduce the number as well according to 
data availabilit\. 
1" 1'0 some extent, this can be supported h\ the 
fact that these t\\ o studies do not refer to any other 
studies v ith a similar scope. 
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(IAAPs compete in the Neuer Markt implying that "firms trade off the costs and 
benefits of choosing IAS and US GAAP" (p. 465). The hypotheses suggested by 
Leuz to explain the standards choice are based on the assumption that US GAAP is 
of higher quality than IAS. Based on this assumption, Leuz likens the choice of US 
GAAP to the choice of voluntary disclosure of higher quality information, and hence 
he borrows from the literature on voluntary disclosure to state his hypotheses on the 
use of US GAAP. This is clearly the same idea used in the hypotheses about 
choosing IRAS in the current research. Leuz (ibid) hypothesises that firm size, 
current and future financing needs and firm performance are determinants of 
compliance with US GAAP, simply because they are determinants of voluntary 
disclosure. However, he does not give any explanation of the logic of these 
hypotheses or the reason for choosing them in particular. 
Ashbaugh (2001) also indicates that US GAAP has more stringent disclosure 
requirements than IAS and that companies complying with US GAAP provide more 
standardized information. Still, this comparison is based on information from the 
mid-nineties (1993-1996). Substantial changes in IAS during late nineties may make 
this assumption questionable. Furthermore, the author states that US GAAP is 
perceived as being "too restrictive in its accounting method choice and/or too 
demanding in its disclosure requirements" (p. 145). Ashbaugh also argues that 
compliance with US GAAP implies additional costs which may not be incurred 
when using IAS. However, she indicates that the evidence for this last argument is 
"anecdotal" (p. 146). Furthermore, she does not test any hypotheses on the choice of 
IAS or US GAAP, as she treats them as one choice versus the choice of domestic 
GAAPs of the sample firms (see Table 5.1). 
Tarca (ibid) examine the choice of accounting standards through a sample of 
companies from the UK, Germany, France, Japan and Australia. The author 
investigates different levels of choices. First, she examines the choice between 
national standards and IRAS. Second, she studies the choice of adoption (use of 
I RAS instead of local GAAP) or supplementary use. l inally. she examines the 
choice of IAS or t1S GAAP within three groups of firms: all firms use IRAS (in the 
form of adoption or supplementary use). only firms adopting IRAS. only firms using 
lI:; AS in a supplementary form. According to Tarca (ibid'), adopters are firms that 
declare in the accounting police note or audit report that they comply with US (ºAAP 
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or IAS instead of their domestic GAAP. Supplementary use, on the other hand. 
includes: firms that use one or more policy of IRAS: firms which provide a 
reconciliation statement to IRAS: and firms that provide an additional set of financial 
statements in accordance with IRAS. Tarca suggests that the institutional framework 
is the main factor in the choice of the accounting standards at the first two levels 
(national/international and adoption/supplementary). Furthermore, she suggests that 
size, foreign revenue, leverage and industry can also be determining factors on these 
choices. Although the author explains her hypothesis about the institutional 
framework, she does not explain the rest of hypotheses (still, she refers to the 
literature of disclosure). 
At the level of choosing IAS or US GAAP, Tarca provides only two hypotheses 
which are: First, firms listed in the US (NYSE or OTC) are more likely to adopt US 
GAAP. Second, firms which are listed on non-US foreign exchanges are more likely 
to use ]AS. However, the author still tests for the variables: size, foreign revenue, 
country of domicile, leverage and industry. Unlike Leuz (ibid), the author does 
provide any justification for testing these variables and does not even hypothesise 
any direction for the relationship between these variables and the choice of IAS or 
US GAAP. 
Weißenberger et al (ibid) have a different approach in testing the choice between 
IAS and USGAAP, and hence the majority of the factors they test are different from 
the other studies. They survey companies through seventeen statements (questions) 
that are related in different ways to choice of accounting standards. However. it 
should be pointed out here that many of the statements of this survey are not clear at 
all and there are no explanations for them, therefore the researcher is unable to 
discuss them here (see Table 5.1). Still, only six of the factors studies were 
associated with the choice of IAS or USGAAP. As concluded by the authors (p. 14), 
German companies using IFRS support the following views: the idea that it is more 
similar to GGAAP than USGAAP. more common and accepted in Europe and it 
offers more opportunities to influence the process of standard setting. On the other 
hand, companies using US GAAP believed that it would be more beneficial in the 
US market and of more global importance than LAS. Moreover. they do not expect 
that the SFC would accept IAS in the near future. 
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In 2000 KPMG conducted a survey involving Chief Financial Officers from 17 
1L, uropean countries173 to investigate their views on several issues relating to IAS and 
US GAAP. Respondents to this survey belonged to three groups of firms: domestic 
GAAP users, IAS users and US GAAP users. These three groups of respondents 
rated the quality of IAS and US GAAP differently. Overall, while 49 % of 
respondent rated IAS as being "high quality", 54 % of respondents rated US GAAP 
as being "high quality". The survey indicates that, in general. respondents have a 
perception that there is small difference in the quality of the two sets. Furthermore. 
CFOs also believe that US GAAP is complex and too detailed compared with IAS. 
At the same time, the respondents generally think that specific accounting 
differences between the two sets are not significant enough to influence the choice of 
GAAP. 
Yet, KPMG (2000, p. 15), indicate that "the main factor in favour of IAS is the cost 
of implementation". According to their results, 70% of domestic GAAP users 174 
think that IAS would be cheaper to implement. Based on this argument, it is possible 
to apply the hypotheses proposed for the Main Market to the Neuer Markt. 
On the other hand, the respondents believe that the most influential factor in 
choosing between IAS and US GAAP is the potential for increasing the availability 
of capital and that US GAAP provides better opportunities in this regard. This can be 
explained by the large capacity of the US capital market and the insistence by the 
SEC on the use of US GAAP. 
Tarca's results (ibid) support this notion, as listing on NYSE is the only significant 
factor in choosing US GAAP rather than IAS across her three models175. Leuz (2003) 
does not test the hypothesis of US listing. Although he does not state the reason for 
this, it can be understood that was not possible simply because his sample is taken 
from the Neuer Markt. Only four firms on the Neuer Markt are also listed in the US, 
three of which were on NASDAQ (as at the end of 2001). Still his results show that 
the only significant factor in choosing between IAS and US GAAP is the financing 
needs of the firm (whose proxy is sales growth). Leuz explains that this is consistent 
with the results of KMPG (2000) that firms with large finance needs are more likely 
17-, Countries in this survey are the EU member states (at that time) plus S\w itzerland and Norway. 
174 Those are assumed to be not biased towards either LAS or US GAAP (KP\IG. ibid) 
''; Table 5.1 shows that size and country of domicile were marginally significant, but this result is not 
consistent across the three models. 
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to seek listing in the US, and hence are more likely to comply with US GAAI'. 
Furthermore. results show that free float is negatively associated (but marginally 
significant) with the adoption of US GAAP. Leuz explains this by stating that firms 
which are intending to list in the US are more likely to keep hold of a larger 
proportion of the firm's capital. ' 76 (see above). Furthermore, Leuz also reports the 
results of a survey by Peemöller, Finsterer, and Neubert (1999). who investigated the 
Views of 26 firms in the Neuer Markt. Their responses suggest that existing and 
intended US listings are significant factors in choosing to adopt US GAAP. 
As noted above, the literature on the choice between IAS and US GAAP is limited. 
This makes it difficult to postulate hypotheses on these specific firms' behaviour. 
However, the following section presents two groups of hypotheses: hypotheses based 
on the existence of direct US influence (US listing, US subsidiaries and US investors) 
and hypotheses that are based on the idea that US GAAP is much more detailed and 
costly than IAS. 
Overall, it should be remembered that for all the hypotheses suggested on the choice 
between IAS and US GAAP, the likelihood of adopting US GAAP is increased in 
the case of the Neuer Markt firms, because the incremental cost of implementing US 
GAAP is smaller for them (difference between cost of US GAAP and that of IAS, 
which is the alternative set) 177 
5.4.1 Hypothesis on US listing: 
As explained above the most significant factor thought to influence the choice of US 
GAAP is listing in US markets. At the end of 200117x, 15 German firms were listed 
on the NYSE, of which only one belonged to the Neuer Markt (Pfeiffer AG)179. This 
may be explained by the fact that the vast majority of the Neuer Markt firms are 
180 
relatively small or of medium-size. On the other hand, only 5 German firms were 
listed on NASDAQ. Hence, it is not possible to test this hypothesis for the Neuer 
176 Although Leuz do not explain his hypothesis or choices of proxies, it seems that he is assuming 
that companies with large financing needs (sales growth) are Iikel\ to be planning to list in the US. 
I'^ In other words, the difference between the cost of implementing US GAAP and IAS, is probably 
smaller that that between the cost of implementing US GAAP and G GAAP. 
''` 17 at the end of 2003 
IT) ; \Ithough it is medium-sized 
firm, it is a market leader in its business. USA is one of its important 
markets. Furthermore, it had been listed on NYSE even before it was listed on the Neuer Markt (Kaen 
and Sherman. 1999) 
'N'() The list of firms listed on NYSE clearl\ indicates that size is an important determinant in choosing 
to list shares on N)'SE. 
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Markt. because of these small frequencies. However. it can be tested for the Main 
Market, where the number of firms listed on the US is much larger. 
Based on the arguments above the following hypothesis is suggested: (Like in the 
Main Market section, hypotheses are stated in both alternative and null form) 
HI 10 : Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt US GAAP 
is either not associated with being listed in the US or negatively related with it. 
HI I: Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt US GAAP 
is positively associated with being listed in the US. 
5.4.2 Hypothesis on US subsidiaries: 
In general, many of the arguments stated above in the hypothesis on internationality 
can be applied here. It is common knowledge that the large capacity of US product 
market attracts companies from across the world. German companies have a big 
interest in this market. In a visit to the US, the German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder 
states: "I don*t think there's another I. uropean economy that is a interwoven with 
A nerica as Germ. an. y's, " Furthermore he adds "More than 800.000 jobs exist with 
German subsidiaries (in the U. S. ) and, conversely. 500,000 jobs in (American 
subsidiaries) in Germany. That shows the relationship. " (Deutsche Welle, 2003) 
This statement by the German Chancellor indicates the significance of German. 
subsidiaries in the t_US. 
Considering the significant differences between G GAAP and US GAAP, German 
companies that have subsidiaries in the USA may need to provide more 
understandable and comparable financial statements to their US users' 8' . who would 
normally prefer to deal with a familiar reporting system. One can argue that the US 
market is significant enough to be a strong incentive for interested firms to adopt US 
standards. It can be also argued that the incentive can be stronger for companies 
from the Neuer Markt (as argued above about the incremental cost of applying US 
(iAAP for Neuer Markt companies). 
. 
Another related argument is that man), firms believe that listing in the US is a means 
of accessing the US market or to finance their operations there (see the hypothesis on 
$1 These users include different interested parties such as government, suppliers and banks. 
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internationality" above). Furthermore. Kaen and Sherman (1999. p. 128) suggest 
that visibility of the company in a country's financial markets may enhance the 
visibility of its image, brands and products in the product and labour market. Enrich 
Hartmann, chairman of the board of management and CI: O of VEBA, reports that: 
"Improving our access to the immense US market for products, services and capital 
is our most important reason for coming the New York Stock Exchange" (ibid. 1999, 
p. 151). From this last statement, it is clear the aim of accessing the product and 
service market may be linked with aim of accessing the capital market. Therefore, 
one can argue that German companies which already operate in the US market are 
very likely to be intending to list in the US capital market to finance their US 
operations and to enhance their image in that product labour market. One should also 
point out that the desire to enter the US debt market (for hedging reasons) can be 
also an important incentive. 
H12O : Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt US GAAP 
is either not associated with having a subsidiary the US or negatively related with it. 
I-1121 : Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt US GAAP 
is positively associated with having a subsidiary the US. 
It is clear that the only type of variables that can be used to test this hypothesis is a 
binary variable (see Chapter 6) 
5.4.3 Hypothesis on US investors: 
This hypothesis is mainly based on the hypothesis on the existence of foreign 
investors stated above. Therefore, to be brief, one could say that to attract US 
iivestors, either through the German capital market or the US capital market, 
German firms would prefer to produce information that is more readable and 
comparable for US investors who are probably used to information produced under a 
vcrv different information system. This can be easily read and understood in the 
hypothesis on US listing and foreign investors above. The case of Daimler-Benz, 
mentioned above and explained in Chapter 4. may be of particular importance for US 
investors, because it might have made Americans more cautious about (º GAAP. 
One can also argue that even if German firm were reluctant to list their shares in the 
l IS because of the costs of using US GAAP, the increasing percentage of German 
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shares held by institutional investors may put similar pressure on them to use I. 
GAAP. Brändle and Noll (2004) reports that institutional investors are important 
external monitors in the US and UK, who are also becoming large block-holders in 
Germany. Their portion of all shares of German listed companies increased form 4% 
in 1990 to approximately 13% in 1998. The authors use the example of Ca1PERS. 
the California public employee pension fund, to illustrate the increasing role of US 
institutional investors in the development of German corporate governance towards 
the Anglo-Saxon model. The message of Ca1PERS is that companies wanting 
CTIIPERS to invest in them have to comply with specific standards with regard to 
corporate governance system. The Economist182 (as cited in Economist. com, 2004) 
states that large American investment institutions such as CaIPERS, Fidelity and 
TIAA-CREF are typical examples of the growing influential foreign shareholders. 
Based on arguments presented above on the role that foreign institutional investors 
have had in the introduction of IRAS in Germany. one may argue that the US 
institutional investors such Ca1PERS would use their influence to recommend the 
adoption of US GAAP rather than IAS. 
Based on this the following two hypotheses are suggested: 
H130 : Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt US GAAP 
is either not associated with US shareholders or negatively related with it. 
H1 1: Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt US GAAP 
is positively associated with US shareholders. 
In the section on the hypotheses of Main Market above, it was suggested that having 
foreign managers can be a proxy for the influence foreign investors can have. A 
similar can be applied here by suggesting that having US managers is a proxy for the 
influence of US investors. 
H 14 : Ceteris paribus, 
the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt US GAAP 
is either not associated with the existence of US managers on the management board 
or the supervisory board or negatively related with it. 
"'The 1: conomist May 3"' 22001 print edition but as a secondary reference 
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H14 : Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt LS GA. AP 
is positively associated with the existence of US managers on the management board 
or the supervisory board. 
These two hypotheses are tested using binary variables. Although the variable 
suggested to test the hypothesis H130 was intended to be a continuous variable 
(percentage of equity held by US investors), it is changed to a binary variable for a 
practical reason (see Chapters 6 and 7). 
Additional hypotheses from the disclosure studies: 
Apart from the hypotheses stated above for the choice between IAS and US GAAP, 
it is possible to adopt the idea suggested by Leuz (2003) that firms complying with 
US GAAP are committing themselves to increased levels of detailed disclosure and 
higher costs. It should be remembered that this is the same basic idea used to 
postulate the hypotheses for the main market by assuming that IRAS is of higher 
quality and involves more detailed disclosure than GGAAP. 
Because these hypotheses are discussed above in detail, they are postulated here 
without any further explanation. 
5.4.4 Size: 
H150 : Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt US GAAP 
is either not associated with size or negatively associated with it. 
Hl 51 : Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt US GAAP 
is positively associated with size. 
5.4.5 Ownership structure: 
H16() : Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt US GAAP 
is either not associated with proportion of free float or negatively related with it. 
Hl 61 : Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt US GAAP 
is positively associated with the proportion of free float. 
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5.4.6 Auditor Type: 
HI 70 : Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt US GAP 
is either not associated with having a Big-5 auditor or negatively associated with it. 
HI 7' : Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt US GAAP 
is positively associated with having a Big-5 auditor. 
5.4.7 Leverage: 
Hl 8() : Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt US GAAP 
is either not associated with leverage or positively associated with it. 
H181 : Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt US GAAP 
is negatively associated with leverage. 
5.4.8 Profitability: 
Hl 90 : Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt US GAAP 
is either not associated with profitability or negatively related with it. 
H191 : Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt US GAAP 
is positively associated with profitability. 
5.4.9 Industry: 
H200 : Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt US 
(iAAP is not associated with the industry to which a firm belongs. 
H 20, : Ceteris paribus, the tendency of German firms to voluntarily adopt US GAAP 
is associated with the industry to which a firm belongs. 
5.5 Summary: 
The result of this chapter is two groups of hypotheses on the two main choices 
available in FWB: the choice between GGAAP and IRAS and the choice between 
LAS and US GAAP. 
The group of hypotheses on the choice between GGAAP and IRAS can be 
summarised in one null form as the 
following: the tendency to comply with IRAS by 
German listed firms is either not associated with size, being in a quality segment, the 
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proportion of equity capital held by managers, the proportion of free float. leverage. 
profitability, auditor identity. listing status. internationality of business. 
internationality of investors and industry type or is negatively related to size. being 
in a quality segment, the proportion of free float, profitability. having a Bi`-s auditor. 
listing abroad, having foreign subsidiaries, having foreign investors / or positively 
related with the proportion of equity capital owned managers and leverage. 
For the choice between IAS and USGAAP, on the other hand, two main types of 
hypotheses are tested. The first type of hypotheses on the choice of USGAAP or IAS 
is based on the presence of a U. S. element. In short, these hypotheses can be 
summarised in the following null form: that the tendency to comply with USGAAP 
is either not associated with listing in the U. S., having U. S. investors, having U. S. 
subsidiaries and U. S. managers or negatively related to them. It should also be 
mentioned that analysis on the choice between IAS and USGAAP is run in two 
separate parts: Neuer Markt and Main Market. 
The second type of hypotheses comprises those built on a basic assumption that US 
GAAP over IAS is more stringent and requires more disclosures than IAS. These 
hypotheses are, in general, almost similar to the ones above tested on the choice 
between GGAAP and IRAS. They can also be summarised in one null hypotheses as 
the following: the tendency of German companies to choose USGAAP is either not 
associated with size, being in a quality segment, the proportion of equity capital held 
by managers, the proportion of free float, leverage, profitability, auditor identity, 
listing status, and industry type or is negatively related to size, being in a quality 
segment, the proportion of free float, profitability, having a Big-5 auditor / or 
positively related with the proportion of equity capital and leverage. 
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6 Chapter 6: Research design 
6.1 Introduction: 
This chapter is intended to be an introduction to the statistical analysis presented in 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 8. It provides explanations on the following main points: data 
resources, the study sample, the process of data collection and the statistical analysis. 
This last part aims to justify the use of the different statistical techniques and how 
suitable they are for the purpose of this research. 
6.2 Data resources 
The main data resource for this research is Hoppenstedt Aktienführer, which is to the 
researcher's knowledge is the most comprehensive database for German listed 
companies. Examples of leading researchers who have used Hoppenslecit are: Leuz, 
(2003) Franks and Mayer (2001). This database is described by the library of 
Michigan Business School as: -"... a directory of German companies gathered from 
data that the companies must submit to the German government. It is an excellent 
source (provided you can speak German) of information on specific companies in 
Germany" 183. The researcher compared this database with other databases available 
(Datastream and Amadeus). The researcher found that for the purpose of this study, 
Hoppenstedt is the most suitable database. One advantage is that it provides data for 
most of the variables in this research in one place. Another advantage of 
Hoppc'nstedt to other databases is that it is consistent in the data it provides about 
di1 ferent firms. In Amadeus for example, it is possible to find that some data, such as 
auditor name, is available for some firms, but not for others. For a sample of firms 
checked by the researcher, the auditor information was not available184 . 
Furthermore, 
one cannot find in Amadeus information about the accounting standards used in the 
annual reports. Datastream, on the other hand, is commonly used in the financial 
literature for market data such as shares prices and returns rather than company 
accounts. Moreover, company accounts in Datastream do not include information 
about either accounting standards or auditors, which is essential for this research. 
18' http: / \v \v \v bus. urn ich. edu, KresgeLibrary 'Co Ilections'BY Topic'step4. htm 
114 If this piece of information is not available for a firm, Amadeus state that "There is no auditors' 
information available for this company". However, for a random sample of firms checked by the 
researcher it seemed that Amadeus do not 
disclose this information for an% firm. The same note 
applies to exports 
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Data was also taken from annual reports of the chosen companies. These annual 
reports were either hard copies or soft copies. Hoppenstedt 2002 includes 
information about all firms whose shares were traded in Frankfurt and other German 
stock markets at the end of the year 2001. However, Hoppensiedi 2002 does not 
include the consolidated accounts for the financial year 2001 for most of these firms. 
Therefore, Hoppenstedt 2003 was used as the main source for this data. In addition 
to that, Hoppenstedt 2002 was used as the source for listing status and ownership 
structure. Furthermore, the number of firms in Hoppenstedt 2002 is different from 
that in Hoppenstedt 2003, simply because of changes in the listing status of some 
companies or mergers that have taken place during 200218'. The researcher started 
with firms in Hoppenstedt 2002. Therefore, data for firms included in Hoppenstedt 
2002 and not Hoppenstedt 2003 was obtained from the annual reports of these 
companies. 
6.3 Main Market 
6.3.1 Study Sample: 
As mentioned in Chapter (2), firms in the main market are the ones whose shares are 
traded in either the official or the regulated markets' 86 . 
These firms are studied 
separately from the ones in the Neuer Markt. This separation came because firms in 
the Main Market have different GAAP choices from the ones in the Neuer Markt. 
Whereas in the Main Market the choice is IAS, US GAAP or German GAAP, the 
choice in the Neuer Markt is either IAS or US GAAP. Institutional differences 
between the two market is another reason to study them separately 
Firms that are classified as "Freiverkehr" 187 are excluded from this study, which is 
confined to listed firms. 
As shown Table 6.1, a series of exclusions was made in order to obtain a complete 
data set and in order to eliminate some companies whose inclusion would have been 
inappropriate. The number of firms in the Main market as in Hoppenstedl 2002 is 
458188. The researcher has chosen to eliminate firms that are a subsidiary of another 
"i Hoppenstedt provided this explanation via a personal email to the researcher. 
"° -Amtlicher Markt" and "Geregelter Markt" 
Unofficial regulated market which can be equivalent to "Over the Counter". 
'" This number is consistent with that produced by the World Federation of Exchanges (12- 10-2002). 
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German listed firm'89 included in the sample. This elimination is simply to avoid any 
double counting, because the subsidiary's accounts will be included in the parent's 
consolidated accounts. This double counting may cause bias in the results (see Leuz 
2004). The largest proportion of these firms (84%) is "unclassified" 19('. The second 
exclusion was made to eliminate firms that do not have consolidated accounts. This 
is simply because the only available choice for them is GGAAP. Among those 
excluded because they were subsidiaries there are 25 firms that do not produce 
consolidated accounts. This means that 25 firms are excluded for both reasons. 
li inally, financial firms (defined below) are also excluded because of the very nature 
of their accounts. The different way in which their accounts are presented in 
Hoppenstedt is not consistent with the accounts of the other sample firms. Therefore, 
the sample still includes some financial firms whose accounts are comparable to the 
accounts of firms in the rest of the sample (see Table 6.7). The majority of these 
firms are in the real estate business, whereas the rest are engaged in businesses 
related to the stock markets such as "Deutsch Börse". This means that the financial 
firms excluded are the banks and insurance firms. Among firms that are subsidiaries 
there 17 firms of a financial nature. This means that they were excluded for two 
reasons. 
'fable 6.1: Finding the Target Sample 
Segment Orig. No 
% 
Owned 
% 
No. Cons 
% 
Finan. S 
% 
Target sample 
% %191 
DAX 30 100 3 10 - 5 16.7 22 73.3 6.7 
MDAX 70 100 5 7.1 - 6 8.6 59 84.3 18 
SMAX 106 100 2 1.9 3 7.5 9 8.5 92 86.8 28 
Unclassified 252 100 53 21.0 37 14.7 7 2.8 155 61.5 47.3 
Total 458 100 63 40 27 328 100 
Produced by the researcher: Orig. No: original number, Owned: owned b\ another sample firm, No. 
Cons: don't consolidate, Finan. S: accounts of different nature 
As a result of the exclusions mentioned above and shown in Table 6.1, the researcher 
ended \w-ith a target sample of 328 firms. This table also sho\\s the percentage of 
each market segment included in the target sample. 
The criterion was whether the stake held in the subsidiary's capital is greater than or equal to 50% 
190 Not classified in segments 
191 This column designed to read the percentages downwards (\ crtical) 
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"Table 6.2, on the other hand, shows that consolidated accounts for \, ears ended in 
2001 were missing for a number of firms, despite numerous attempts by the 
researcher to obtain them. The reason that these firms do not have their consolidated 
accounts in Hoppenstedt or on the Internet is that most of them either have Egone 
bankrupt or are having difficulties in producing their accounts 192. 
Taking out the firms with missing accounts from the target sample, results in the 
sample for the main market, which represents 89.4% of the target sample. Such a 
high percentage may seem to be a good support for drawing inferences and 
conclusions. However, it is common knowledge that a large sample can be useless or 
may be misleading if all companies were not fairly represented. Therefore, it was 
necessary to look closely at these firms and how different they are from the sampled 
firms. It can be seen from the table 6.2 that the missing firms are unclassified firms. 
Data and information for the missing firms were collected from the annual reports 
available for previous years (ending in 2000 or 1999). According to this information, 
nothing seems to be unusual about these companies or different from the rest of 
unclassified firms. Furthermore, the vast majority of these firms seem to be GGAAP 
firms, which compromise 67 % of the whole sample and 86 % of the unclassified 
firms. The above can give assurance that the sample represents the listed companies 
to an acceptable extent 193. Although one may argue that survivorship bias still exists 
in this data, this type of bias is commonly found in the accounting and finance 
studies. Still the sample in this study is larger than those in several well recognized 
studies in this area, such as Dumontier and Raffournier (1998), El-Gazzar et al 
(1999), Gray and Street (2002) and Ashbaugh (2001), who start their data collection 
with large target samples but end up with biased samples after series of eliminations 
94 for different reasons including missing data' 
The data relates to just one financial year, but for a large number of companies 
representing a remarkably high proportion of all companies listed in both the Main 
N larket and the Neuer Markt; it should be considered as a snapshot sample from a 
larger population which exists across time periods. Therefore, this also justifies the 
use of statistical inference techniques, which are discussed in Section 6.5.2. 
This information is via a personal email from Hoppenstedt and emails from some of these firms. 
"I, his issue has been discussed with a number of statisticians \ is email. 
street and Gray (2002). for example, exclude companies only because they do not publish reports 
in English language. 
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Table 6.2: Missing Cases 
Segment Target sample Missing cases Sample studied 
DAX 22 - 22 100% 
MDAX 59 - 59 100% 
SMAX 92 - 92 100% 
Unclassified 155 33 21.3% 122 78.7% 
Total 328 33 10.1% 295 89.9% 
6.3.2 Accounting standards within the Main market 
It is not possible to present information on the choices of accounting standards by 
the firms whose annual reports are not available. Therefore, Table 6.3 shows the 
distribution of the use of the three types of GAAP within the sample studied and not 
the whole target sample. However, we should note that it is the target sample in the 
DAX, MDAX and SMAX categories, because the missing annual reports are 
confined to those unclassified. 
Table 6.4, on the other hand, depicts GAAP choices over all the segments after 
exclusions. It can be seen from Table 6.4 that the lowest proportion of firms that use 
German GAAP is within the DAX segment. Furthermore, the proportions of firms 
using local GAAP within SMAX and Unclassified are the highest. It is also shown 
that the distribution of GAAP among segments, before the exclusions made to obtain 
the target sample, is not very different from that in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3: Distribution of accounting standards over Main Market segments before exclusions 
Segment DAX MDAX SMAX Unclassified 
GAAP %%% 
G GAAP 5 16.6 36 51.4 81 76.4 N/A 
IAS 16 53.3 23 32.9 22 20.8 N/A 
US GAAP 9 30 11 15.7 3 2.8 N/A 
Total 30 100 70 100 106 100 2 53 
Produced by the researcher 
'`', it is not possible to show the distributions of accounting standards over the unclassified firms 
hecause of the missing cases. 
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Table 6.4: Distribution of accounting standards over Main Market segments after exclusions 
Segment 
(; AAP 
DAX 
% 
MDAX 
% 
SMAX 
% 
Unclassified 
% 
G GAAP 4 18.2 29 49.2 67 72.8 105 86.1 
lAS 12 54.5 20 33.9 22 22.8 12 9.8 
US GAAP 6 27.3 10 16.9 3 3.3 5 4.1 
Total 22 100 59 100 92 100 122 100 
Produced by the researcher 
6.3.3 Data collection 
This section explains the nature of the data collected for the variables employed in 
this study. However, the justification for the choice of such variables is explained in 
chapter 5. The data in the financial statements presented in Hoppenstedt were 
checked against the original financial statements for a sample of firms. The result of 
this test showed the reliability of this database as a source of company accounts 
information. The process of data collection is described below according to the 
different variables 196: 
6.3.3.1 Size 
Proxies chosen for size are employee numbers, total assets and turnover. Data for all 
these variables are available in Hoppenstedt 2003. The number chosen for the 
employee numbers variable is the average number 197. The figure "Balance sheet 
total 198 represents the total assets variable (see Section 6.3.3.6 for more explanation 
on this). Finally, "Turnover"199 is the figure chosen by the researcher to represent 
sales and revenues in all firms. 
6.3.3.2 Internationality 
In the previous chapter, the researcher suggested the international sales figure as a 
suitable proxy for internationality. Still, not all German firms disclose international 
sales. After much work on the annual reports of the sample firms, the researcher 
realised that this figure is missing for a considerable number of firms. This was 
'"This section discusses the nature of data collected and the issues related, whereas the previous 
Chapter discusses the justification and the logic behind choosing these different proxies. 
197 In Hoppenstedt, it is "Durchschnitt" under the section "Beschaeftigte" 
Translation of "Bilanzsumme" 
Reported as "Umsatz" in all firms in Hoppenstedt except for financial firms whose accounts are 
different 
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either because the annual reports for some firms were not available 200 or because of 
disclosure deficiencies. In some cases firms do not disclose this piece of data for 
competition reasons 201. Furthermore, the researcher has emailed"' and faxed firms 
with missing values. Still, the number of firms which responded to this 
correspondence was very limited. Doidge et al (2002) includes a list with the 
percentage of firms in 18 countries that have foreign sales data available on 
Worldscope. Germany came fourth in the list (after Italy, Malaysia and Japan 
203 respectively) with a percentage of 68.3% 
As a result of this, the alternative proxy suggested for this variable is a binary 
variable signifying whether a firm has a foreign subsidiary or not. Analysis of the 
data collected shows that 90.8 % of the companies having sales abroad, have at least 
a foreign subsidiary. This can be a good indication that, to a large extent, these two 
variables can substitute each other. 
Another alternative that might be suggested here is the number of foreign 
subsidiaries. However, the latter can be criticised, as the number of subsidiaries does 
not reflect the materiality and importance of the subsidiaries. In other words, one 
foreign subsidiary in a specific country can be more important than a group of 
204 subsidiaries in another country 
6.3.3.3 Listing status 
Although Hoppenstedt 2002 provides this piece of data, it does not include the 
changes in the firms' listing status in the period between October 2001 and before 31 
December 2001. Thus, Hoppenstedt 2003 is used to ensure that such changes are 
taken into account. In general, only 42205 listed German firms are listed abroad, of 
\Vhich 7 are financial firms. Table 6.5 below provides summarized information on 
the multi-listed firms included in this study. It is clear that a largest percentage of 
these firms are in DAX and MDAX. The firms' size may be the most convenient 
200 Such firms were not excluded to reach the sample because the main resource of data was 
Hoppenstedt and not the annual reports (i. e. firms still can exist in the sample even if its annual report 
was not available) 
2Puma AG is one example for this 
2" Such firms have been emailed more than one time 
We should note that this was over the sample period, ww Ih ich is bet\\ een 1975 and 1999. What may 
he surprising is that this percentage in the UK and the US is 60.1 and 51.3 respectively 
"' Still the foreign sales can be tested informally within a reduced sample 
'`" In addition to these -12 firms, other 3 firms which traded ox er the counter are listed abroad. 
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explanation for this observation. More details on cross listing are provided in 
Appendix 3. 
Table 6.5: German firms listed abroad (only the ones included in the study) 
Segment Number of firms Foreign exchanges 
DAX 17 47.1 % NYSE, SwX, Paris, NYSE, Tokyo. Toronto, London, 
Luxembourg, Madrid, Amsterdam, Ant\\ erp. 
Barcelona, Brussels, Milan and Vienna 
(also San- Francisco and Philadelphia in case of 
Daimler Chrysler) 
MDAX 8 23.5 % SwX, London, NYSE, Luxembourg and Brussels 
SMAX 2 5.9% SwX and NYSE 
Unclassified 4 8.8 % NYSE, SwX and Amsterdam 
Neuer 5 14.7 % NASDAQ (also NYSE in the case of Pfeiffer Vacum) 
35 206 100.0 
Produced by the researcher 
6.3.3.4 Ownership structure 
For ownership concentration the proxy is the free float207, which is taken from 
Hoppenstedt 2002. This number represents the percentage of capital available to the 
general public208. On the other hand, management ownership is tested through a 
proxy named MAN I that represents the percentage of outstanding capital held by 
members of both the executive board and the supervisory board209. For sensitivity 
analysis, two other variables are tested. MAN2: This is MAN I plus the percentage 
held by families that are represented by a family member on the management or 
supervisory board. Families' ownership can be identified under the section 
"Shareholders' 210 in Hoppenstedt. The researcher assumed that a member on the 
management or the supervisory board is a member of a particular family just if they 
are carrying the same family name211. Second is MANS : that is MAN I adjusted by 
the percentage held by families regardless of being represented by any members on 
the management board (see Leuz, 2000). Another proxy suggested to test the 
'06 5+7 financial ones (excluded from the study) = 42. Still, 29 are included in the anal,, sis of the 
Main Market because 5 are in the Neuer Markt and 1 from unclassified is not included 
'"' it is under the name "Streubesitz" in Hoppenstedt 
"s AAs defined by Oxford Dictionary of Finance and Banking (1977) 
101' The\ are in Hoppenstedt under the names: Vorstand for the executive board and Aufsichtstrat for 
the superN isorý board 
210 This section in German is named is "Aktionäre" 
This of course ww ill exclude ownership of families that are not sharing their name with a manager 
c\ en if he was in realit\ a member of this 
famil\. Therefore Mani is introduced 
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hypotheses related to ownership structure is a binary variable that indicates whether 
a member of a local German bank is on the supervisory board. The researcher has 
chosen to exclude this variable because of lack of data and problems in 
identification2'2. 
6.3.3.5 Auditor Identity 
The identity of a firm's auditor at the end of the financial year 2001 is presented in 
Hoppenstedt 2003 next to their financial statements. The binary variable is given one 
when the auditor is one of the Big-5 and 2 when the auditor is not one of the Big-5213 
Table 6.6 provides an idea on the distribution of this type of auditors over the 
different market segments. It can be noticed that vast majority of DAX firms are 
audited by Big-5 auditors. Furthermore, the percentage of DAX firms having a Big-5 
auditor is larger than that in MDAX and SMAX. Although the differences seem to 
2 be large, they are not statistically significant14. 
Table 6.6: A crosstabulation between market segments and auditor ID 
Segment Non-Big 5 Big-5 Total 
DAX 4 18 22 
18.2% 81.8% 
MDAX 23 36 59 
39.0% 61.0% 
SMAX 42 50 92 
45.7% 54.3 % 
Unclassified 52 70 122 
42.6 % 57.4 % 
Total 121 174 295 
41% 59% 
Produced by the researcher 
6.3.3.6 Leverage 
For the purpose of this study and as suggested in chapter 5, leverage is calculated as 
the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. In Hoppenstedt 2003, liabilities are 
presented under the heading "Verbindlichkeiten"215. This number includes long-teen 
debt and short-debt (but does not include deferred taxes or provisions such as 
21 Still the researcher spent long time working on annual reports to extract this piece of information. 
2IKPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young, Deloitte & Touche and Arthur Andersen (the 
later was still existed at the period of this stud\. 
214 Chi-square for this distribution is measured and it was not significant even at 0.1, which indicates 
the relationship het\s cen market segments and auditor ty pe is not even marginally significant. 
l 
. 
iteral translation of this is "accounts payable". Howe\ er, this might imply that they are current 
liabilities. but in fact the, are not. 
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pension provisions). In order to calculate the leverage ratio, the researcher divided 
this figure by the total assets. This variable is coded as "LEVER". 
It is important to note that under the Anglo-Saxon model, one might expect current 
liabilities to be subtracted from current assets in the balance sheet (net current assets). 
This gives raise to the question of whether Hoppenstedt takes account of this 
difference in its presentation of the total assets figure ('Bilanzsumme') or the total 
debt figure. Therefore, the researcher checked a random sample of the annual reports 
of companies reporting under each GAAP to see whether the database is consistent 
in presenting this regardless of the GAAP used. It seems that Hoppenstedt reports 
assets separately from the liabilities (i. e. current liabilities are not netted off). 
Therefore Hoppenstedt consistently reports total assets and total liabilities regardless 
of the GAAP used by the company. 
It is also worth noting that the definition of leverage used here is arguable because it 
includes short-term debt, which is not commonly considered when defining leverage. 
However, total debt is the only figure available in Hoppenstedt and thus the 
researcher chose to be consistent in using this measure. Furthermore, this definition 
of leverage is used by other studies such as Dumontier and Raffournier (1998). 
6.3.3.7 Profitability 
Two measures are suggested in this research to proxy for profitability: the ratio of 
"profits before tax''' 16 to total assets (PROFIT 1) and ratio of "profits before tax" to 
turnover (PROFIT2). All figures are taken from Hoppenstedt 2003 
6.3.3.8 Foreign investors: 
This variable is named (FORINVES) and includes all types of foreign investors 
existing on the body of investors. Shares in German companies are mostly bearer 
shares. This is assumed to mean that those mentioned in Hoppenstedt are only the 
significant investors, who may be holding more than 5% (Khoudja, 2003). This 
observation also applies to the US investors, who are signified by another variable 
(USINVES). 
6.3.3.9 Industries 
The primary basis for classifying the sample firms into main industrial areas was the 
sectors designed by Deutsche Börse. The number of the sectors included in the 
''`' This is in Hoppenstedt under the name "Ergebnis `-, e\\ . 
Geschäftstätigkeit" 
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current research is 17, after excluding Banks and Insurance companies? I ^. For the 
purpose of this analysis, two categorical variables were designed to test for the 
industry effect. Using a categorical variable is equivalent to using a group of dummy 
variables218, as each category can be represented by a dummy variable except for the 
reference. In other words, 5 categories should be represented by only 4 dummies 
(Norusis, 2001). As shown in Table 6.7, industries were classified in a categorical 
variable with five categories (INDUS 1) that are in level 2 21 9. Sectors after that were 
regrouped into another categorical "INDUS2" with three categories. 
Table 6.7: Distribution of firms within the categories of INDUS I 
Sector DAX MDAX SMAX Unclassified Total 
Utilities 2 - 1 6 9 
Transportation 3 3 - 3 9 
Utilities and Transport 5 22.7 3 5.1 1 1.1 9 7.4 18 6.1 
Basic resources 1 3 - 6 10 
Machinery 2 10 7 9 28 
Food and Beverages - 2 4 12 18 
Industry - 3 16 11 30 
Construction - 4 12 12 28 
Automobile 3 3 4 5 17 
Manufacturing 6 27.3 25 42.4 43 46.7 55 45.9 131 44.1 
Pharmaceuticals 1 10 10 3 24 
Chemicals 2 1 1 3 7 
Pharma and Chemicals 3 13.6 11 18.6 11 12 6 4.9 31 10.5 
Consumer Cyclical 1 4 9 5 19 
Retail 2 5 11 10 28 
Finance 1 6 3 12 22 
Media - 1 4 7 12 
Trading 4 18.2 16 27.1 27 29.3 34 28.7 81 27.8 
l'elecommunication 2 3 8 12 25 
Soltware 1 1 - 2 4 
Technology 1 - 2 2 5 
Technology 4 18.2 4 6.8 10 10.9 16 13.1 34 11.5 
Total 22 100 59 100 92 100 122 100 295 100 
Produced by the researcher 
217 The number of sectors at the time of this study is 19 (including Banks and Insurance). However, 
the number at the current time (2004) is 18 (companies in the Machiner\ hay e been allocated to other 
sectors) (see \\N\-vv-. Deutsche-boerse. com) 
2l variable is defined as "Categorical" ' in SPSS, NN-ill be treated as a `group of 
dummies. 
21 " Le\ elI is considered to be the 17 sectors designed b\ Deutsche Börse. whereas the levels 2 and 3 
include the sectors after being regrouped h\ the researcher. 
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fable 6.8: Distribution of firms within the categories of INDUS? 
Sector DAX MDAX SMAX Unclassified Total 
% 0/o %% °/0 
Utilities 2-169 
Transportation 33-39 
Telecommunication 238 12 25 
Software I1-24 
Services 8 36.4 7 11.9 9 9.8 23 18.9 47 15.9 
Basic resources 13-6 10 
Machinery 2 10 79 28 
Food and Beverages -24 12 18 
Industry -3 16 11 30 
Construction -4 12 12 28 
Automobile 3347 17 
Pharmaceuticals 1 10 10 3 24 
Chemicals 21137 
Technology I-225 
Manufacturing 10 45.5 36 61 56 60.65 53.2 167 56.6 
Consumer Cyclical 1495 19 
Retail 25 11 10 28 
Finance 163 12 23 
Media -147 12 
Trading 4 18.2 16 27.1 27 29.34 27.9 81 27.5 
Total 22 100 59 100 92 100 122 100 295 100 
Produced by the researcher 
6.4 The Neuer Markt: 
The number of firms in the Neuer Markt as in Hopenstedt 2002 is 285. However, 
the figure presented by the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) is different (272). 
The reason for this may be the number of firms that went bankrupt in the period 
(October 2001- December 2001)220 (see chapter 2). For the Neuer Markt, the same 
exclusions are made to reach the sample. Just 5 of the firms are subsidiaries of other 
firms included in the sample. Unlike in the main market, firms in the Neuer Markt 
are required by Deutsche Börse regulations to comply with either IAS or US GAAP 
(Deutsche Börse AG). This requirement is unconditional on consolidating their 
accounts. Thus, those firms that do not produce consolidated accounts are excluded 
on the grounds of consistency. Furthermore. three firms of a financial nature are 
excluded to reach the target sample. As shown in Table 6.9. however. there were 
(firms whose accounts were unavailable. Despite these missing cases. the percentage 
20 "l hc researcher has received emails from some firms. which are in Hoppenstedt 2002 tells that they 
e nt bankrupt before the end of 2001. 
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of the sample studied to the target sample is still high. As with the Main market in 
the previous part, data from previous years for the missing cases \\ erc checked 
closely to see whether these missing firms are systematically different. The missing 
part from the target sample does not seem to cause any concern. 
Table 6.9: Determining the Target Sample for the Neuer Markt 
Segment Orig. No Owned No. Cons Finan. S Target Sample 
Neuer 272 353 261 95.9% 
Produced by the researcher 
Table 6.10: Missing firms and sample size in the Neuer Markt 
Target Sample Missing cases Sample studied 
261 (100%) 17 6.5% 244 93.5% 
Produced by the researcher 
6.4.1 Accounting standards in the Neuer Markt: 
The sample includes 134 firms complying with IAS and 110 firms complying with 
[ 1SGAAP. 
6.4.2 Data for the Neuer Markt: 
Although the hypotheses related to Neuer Markt are somewhat different from those 
related to the Main Markt; the same set of data was collected for the firms in the 
Neuer Markt. 
6.4.3 Industries in the Neuer Markt: 
The number of sectors in the Neuer Markt is smaller than that in the Main Market. 
Some of these sectors have very small frequencies. In the first categorical variable, 
INDUS I (6 categories), these sectors are included in one category labelled 
"OTHER". In the second categorical variable, INDUS2 (5 categories), the sectors 
I1CHNO and TELECOM were included in "OTHER"; whereas the categories 
PHARMA, SOFTWARE and MEDIA stayed separate as in INDUS 171. 
"' 't'hese categories were designed to sho\v the best results (see Chapter7) 
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Table 6.11: Distribution of industries within INDUS] 
Sector Frequency `%, 
Chemicals 1 
Pharmaceuticals 23 
PHARMA 24 9.8 % 
Software 107 
SOFTWARE 107 43.9 % 
Technology 54 
TECHNO 54 22.1 % 
Media 29 
MEDIA 29 11.9% 
Telecommunication 12 
TELECOM 12 4.9% 
Automobile 5 
Industry 6 
Utilities 1 
Transportation 4 
Retail 1 
Financial 1 
OTHER 18 7.4% 
244 
6.5 Statistical analysis 
The first section analyses the choice between GGAAP and IRAS. This section is 
concerned with the Main Market and is presented in Chapter 7. However, because 
companies in the Main Market have three choices (GGAAP, IAS and USGAAP), 
statistical analysis is designed to analyse the choice on the level of the three groups 
as well (explained more below). 
The second main section analyses the choice between IAS and US GAAP, which 
takes place in both the Main Market and the Neuer Markt. This section is presented 
in Chapter 8. The analysis of the decision on IAS or US GAAP in the Main Market 
ill be examined through a subsample of this market. This Subsample comprises the 
90 companies that use IRAS (see Figure 6.1 below). 
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Accounting Choices 
Main Market 
Choice between GGAAP and IRAS 
Choice of GGAAP, IAS or US GAAP 
Choice IAS or US GAAP 
(Analysis on a subsample comprising 
only the `90' IRAS companies) 
Neuer Markt 
Choice between 
lAS and US GAAP 
Figure 6.1: Accounting Choices in both the Main Market and the Neuer Markt 
Another division of the statistical analysis is into three main types of analysis: 
univariate analysis, bivariate analysis and multivariate analysis. Figure 6.2, presented 
at the end of this chapter, provides clear details on the design of the statistical 
analysis in this research. 
Yet, before continuing with this section, it may be more appropriate to introduce 
Table 6.12 which provides a summary with the variables, their level of measurement 
and the result of the normality test. 
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Table 6.12: A summary with variables in the study 
Variable Measurement 
Level 
Normality test 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov) 
Main Neuer 
ACCSTAND Nominal 
EMPNO 1222 
. 
000 . 
000 
ASSETS Interval 
. 
000 . 
000 
TU RNOV Interval . 
000 
. 
000 
LEVER Interval . 
200223 
. 
000 
PROFIT] Interval . 000 . 000 
PROFIT2 Interval . 
000 
FRFLOAT Interval 
. 
000 
. 
000 
MAN I Interval . 
000 
. 
000 
MAN 2 Interval . 
000 
. 
000 
MAN3 Interval 
. 
000 
. 
000 
AUDID Norninal224 
LIST Binary 
FORSUB Binary 
USSUB Binary 
FOINVES Binary 
USINVES Binary 
USLIST Binary 
INDUS Categorical 
6.5.1 Univariate analysis 
Univariate analysis is concerned with examining one single variable. Bryman and 
Cramer (2001, p5) define univariate analysis as "the various ways of analysing and 
presenting the information relating to a single variable". Univariate analysis mainly 
presents information about frequency distribution, central tendency and dispersion. 
Hie nature of univariate analysis is based upon the nature of a variable. Frequency 
distributions, measures of dispersion and measures used to analyse nominal variables, 
for example, are not suitable in the case of variables of an interval nature (continuous) 
such as leverage and total assets (Babbie et al, 2003, p76). Therefore, in order to 
make use of these useful statistical tools, such as frequency distribution, the 
"' In SPSS, interval and ratio variables are lumped into a single variable "Scale" (Babbie et al, 2003). 
. \ccordino to Norusis (1998, p6l) "the distinction between inter\ al and ratio scales is seldom, if ever, 
important in statistical analy sis. 
This level of significance shows that the LL= VER is normally distributed. Furthermore, it is the 
only normally distributed variable. 
221 Binary variable can be classified as categorical or nominal. 
I ORINVES AND USINVES were originally measured in interval scale. As a result of the large 
number oof' zero cases, these variables were coded as binar\ (see Hosmer and Lemeshow ( 000) 
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continuous variables were analysed in categorical form. However, in order to enrich 
the findings of this research, these variables are analysed again in their form as 
continuous variables. Some descriptive statistics such Mean, Standard Deviation. 
Minimum and Maximum are the type of univariate analysis that may be applied to 
continuous variables. 
6.5.2 Analysis of differences and associations: 
The statistical tools that can be used to analyse differences and associations namely 
significance tests (can be classified as univariable and bivariable analysis are 
employed to find differences between GGAAP, IAS and US GAAP across the 
different variables. Although the researcher does not consider the results of these 
tests in drawing his final research conclusions, they are considered as a primary step 
before the multivariable analysis and used to guide the discussions of its results. 
A similar methodological approach is adopted by previous studies such as 
Dumontier and Raffournier (1998) Gray and Street (2002) and Leuz (2003) (see 
literature review in Chapter 5), it should be mentioned here that the use of the 
significance tests when having large sample, as in these studies and the current 
research, may be arguable (Garson, 2004). The researcher's point of view is that the 
data used in the current research and in these studies are only a sample (a snapshot) 
of all possible data sets that could be obtained from sample companies. If this 
research is repeated 6 months after or was carried out 6 months before, the results 
would probably show some variance across the different surveys (Maletta, 2004227). 
Second, to avoid criticisms about using the P values, the researcher uses the so- 
callcd confidence intervals which can be more reliable than the P values in 
concluding about mean differences (Simon, 2004228). 
Two main groups of these tests (parametric and non-parametric) are used in this 
research. 
"`' There is real consensus on how to classify these tests. Whereas t-test, Mann-Whitnev, and 
ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis can be classified as univariable analysis because they analyse difference 
between `groups 
in terms of a single variable, Chi-square and crosstabulations can be classified as 
biv iiriable analysis because they study the relationship between two variables. 
2' Personal email contact ww ith Pr Hector Maletta, a consultant in the University of Salvador, 
; \n cntina. This idea is also supported 
by Dr Ian Dobbs and Mr Tony Miller from the Business School 
of Nc\\ cýistle University and Mike Speed Professor of Statistics & Associate Dean for Technology 
Mediated Instruction in Texas A&M Universit\ 
Personal email contact ww ith Dr Ste\ e Simon, a Research Biostatistician in the Children's Mercy 
Organisation, Kansas. USA 
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6.5.2.1 Parametric tests 
They are the statistical techniques which make assumptions on the nature of the 
populations from which the observations or data were drawn (Siegel and Castellan, 
1988). The following are the parametric tests conducted in this research: 
6.5.2.1.1 The independent t-test (2-sample t-test): 
The test in general is a parametric test employed to examine whether two means are 
significantly different from one another. There are three types of t-test: the single t- 
test, the independent t-test and the paired t-test (Brace et al, 2003). As in this 
research we have more than one group and these groups are independent of each 
other, the independent t-test is the suitable choice. This test differences between the 
IRAS group (joining the two groups using IAS and USGAAP) and GGAAP group in 
the Main Market; whereas it tests the differences between the IAS group and 
USGAAP group either in the Main Market or the Neuer Markt. For the case with 
three groups of firms (German GAAP group, IAS group and US GAAP group), the 
independent t-test, can still be used. However, this will require running the test more 
than one time (one time between every two groups). A more efficient procedure than 
this is to run ANOVA. 
6.5.2.1.2 Analysis of variance (ANOVA): 
ANOVA is considered as an extension of the t-test that allows us to compare the 
means of more than two groups. ANOVA shows us whether the scores of 
independent groups significantly vary across these groups. However, a disadvantage 
of ANOVA is that it does not show us whether the G GAAP group is significantly 
different from the IAS group, whether the G GAAP is significantly different from 
the US GAAP group, or whether IAS group is significantly different from the US 
GAAP group. This drawback can be overcome by Tukey post-Hoc multiple 
comparisons procedure. This procedure will show whether there is any significant 
difference between each pair of groups on all the parametric variables. 
6.5.2.1.2.1 Assumptions of the Independent t-test and ANOVA: 
The following are the assumptions on which Student's t-test and ANOVA are based. 
with a summary of their implications for the data set of the current work: 
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" The dependant229 variables should be of interval or ratio scale. Variable of 
interval scale are: leverage, total assets, employees number, turnover. free 
float, and profitability and management ownership (before being transformed 
into a binary variable). 
" The variables are normally distributed. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov normality 
test shows that the Leverage is the only variable which is normally 
distributed; nevertheless, Bryman and Cramer (2001) explain how robust 
these tests may be to departures from normality. 
0 The samples variances are all equal. Levene's test is run to check this 
assumption. In SPSS, this test can be run as an option under both ANOVA 
and the Independent t-test. For the Independent t-test, SPSS provide results 
under two conditions: equal variances assumed and equal variances not 
assumed. 
" Samples should be random and independent. It is explained above that 
randomness should not cause concerns here. The second thing is that the 
samples involved in these tests are independent from each other as a firm in 
the IAS group, for example cannot be in the USGAAP group or GGAAP 
group 
Finally, even if the assumptions for these tests are not fully met, their results can be 
used to be compared with those of non-parametric tests (Bryman and Cramer, ibid). 
Furthermore, Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) suggest that the results of the t-test can 
be used to indicate which variables are qualified to be included the multivariable 
models. 
6.5.2.2 Non-parametric tests: 
Non-parametric tests do not require assumptions about the shape of the underlying 
distribution. Non-parametric or distribution-free tests do not depend on assumptions 
about the particular form of the distribution of the sampled populations and are not 
based on strict assumptions (Bryman and Cramer. 2001). For the purposes of this 
research, the need for this type of test applies to all the continuous variables except 
for leverage (LEVER), which is the only normally distributed variable. 
2) For ANOVA in SPSS, the variable ACCSTAND is called "Factor", \' hereas the other variables 
such as leverage should be included 
in the "Dependent list". In other words, what \ou consider as an 
independent \ ariable in the regression analysis is the dependent variable in ANOVA(v ice versa) 
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6.5.2.2.1 Mann-Whitney U test: 
For two independent samples, this test is the most commonly used alternative to the 
independent-samples t-test (Norusis, 1998). This test is employed to compare the 
two groups GGAAP and IRAS or IAS and US GAAP 
6.5.2.2.2 Kruskal-Wallis: 
In the case where there are three groups or more such as is the case with having 
GGAAP, IAS and US GAAP, the Kruskal-Wallis test is the right choice. This non- 
parametric test is the alternative to one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) (ibid). 
6.5.2.2.2.1 Assumptions underlying the Mann-Whitney U test and Kruskal- 
Wallis: 
In fact there is no absolute agreement between statisticians on the assumptions 
underlying non-parametric tests. Brace et al (2003) and Pagano (2001) agree that 
these tests can be run when data are of interval or ratio scale, but with serious 
violation to the assumptions of parametric tests such as ANOVA or the Independent 
t-test (normality and equality of variances). (Garson, 2004) and SPSS 11.0 guide, on 
the other hand, emphasize on an assumption that samples tested be similar in shape. 
Although there is no any particular test to check such assumption, the SPSS 11.0 
guide suggests that this can be achieved using "Explore". Therefore, histograms with 
normal curve for all the variables in the different groups were plotted and compared. 
This comparison was mainly based on eyeball inspection230. The researcher did not 
see any significant differences which might cause concern. 
6.5.2.2.3 Chi-square: 
The chi-square test may be employed to reveal the significance of differences 
between two or more independent samples. According to Siegel and Castellan (1988, 
p. 1 11), the measurement of the data analysed by this test "may be as weak as 
nominal or categorical scaling". Chi-Square can be also used for a combination 
between nominal and ordinal variables. It is described as "the most widely used test 
of significance, which estimates the probability that the association between 
variables is a result of random chance or sampling error by comparing the actual or 
observed distribution or responses we would expect if there were absolutely no 
association between two variables" (Babbie et al. p. 305). For the purpose of this 
''" This \V als based on personal communication with a number of statisticians via email and an advice 
Dr. Simon Kometa (SPSS specialist in Newcastle University ) 
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study. chi-square is employed to investigate the association between the choices of a 
set of accounting standards as a dependent variable and each of the independent 
variables. 
6.5.2.2.4 Crosstabulations (Contingency tables): 
It is necessary to explain contingency tables within the explanation of the chi-square 
test, because they are the bases for calculating the chi-square statistic. 
Babbie et al (2003, p. 137) define a crosstabulation as "a matrix that shows the 
distribution of one variable for each category of a second variable". Contingency 
tables should be prepared in order to calculate the chi-square statistic. However, it is 
not the sole function of these tables. Crosstabulations or contingency tables can be 
used to explore the relationship between two variables. They can give you an 
approximate idea of whether there is an association between two variables or how 
strong this association is. On the other hand, the direction of such a relationship 
cannot be determined through contingency tables unless both variables are ordinal 
(ibid). 
6.5.2.2.4.1 Assumptions for Chi-square 
The most commonly known assumptions for Chi-square test in the literature are: 
" The data are assumed to be a random sample. 
" In the contingency tables, the expected frequencies for each category should 
be at least 1. 
" No more than 20% of the categories should have expected frequencies of less 
than 5. Statisticians suggest that when the contingency tables have 20% of its 
cells with expected frequencies of less than five or when any of the cells has 
an expected frequency less than one (zero cell), that the resulting test statistic 
may be magnified and will lead to inappropriate conclusions (Siegel and 
Castellan 1988). For such violation, chi-square corrected for continuity 
(Yates' correction) can be used; nevertheless, this correction is valid only for 
2x2 tables (ibid). 
Violations of these assumptions, if any, will be reported when presenting the 
continucncy, tables in the following chapter. 
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6.5.3 Multivariable analysis 
6.5.3.1 Logistic Regression 
A logistic regression is a regression with a dependent variable that is a categorical 
dichotomy and one or more independent variables that are continuous or categorical. 
Logistic regression allows us to "predict which of two categories a person is likely to 
belong to given certain other information" (Field 2000 p163). However, prediction is 
not the only purpose of the logistic regression. A logistic regression can be also used 
for the purpose of classification and for the purpose of testing hypotheses (Menard, 
2001). For the purpose of this research, multivariable logistic models are used to test 
a group of hypotheses that specific factors are associated with the fact that a 
company belongs to a particular category. 
Me choice between GGAAP and IRAS and between IAS and US GAAP can be 
represented by a binary variable, and hence logistic regression was the right choice 
for the multivariable analysis. 
6.5.3.1.1 The choice of logistic regression over discriminant analysis: 
Discriminant analysis is a statistical technique which can be used to find the most 
significant factors that discriminate between two or more groups or to predict a 
category membership. It might therefore seem to be relevant to the current research. 
Both discriminant analysis and logistic regression enable researchers to predict a 
categorical dependent variable on the basis of a number of predictors or independent 
Variables. However, logistic regression has some advantages over discriminant 
analysis23 1. Unlike in discriminant analysis, the independent variables in the logistic 
regression need not be normally distributed, linearly related or have equal within- 
group variances (Garson, 2004). Furthermore, logistic regression allows us to use 
categorical independent variables. According to Brace et al (2003), the coefficients 
and the odds ratios produced by logistic regression are easier to interpret than values 
computed under Discriminant analysis which is quite arbitrary and tells us relatively 
little about the basis on which the prediction is being made. Another advantage of 
logistic regression over discriminant analysis is its applicability when group sizes are 
very unequal (Garson, ibid. ). Therefore. the researcher believes that the choice of 
logistic regression is the most obvious choice for the purpose of this study. 
'1 \Ithough the later is or at least it used to be) a popular tool for predicting bankruptcy 
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6.5.3.1.2 Equations of the logistic regression 
The logistic regression can be explained through its relationship with the linear 
regression and how different they are from each other. This difference is explained 
by the following equations: 
The simple linear regression is used to predict the value of Y from a 
predictor X, through the following equation: Y =, ß 0+, ß jX+E; (6.1) 
On the other hand, a multiple linear regression predicts the value Y from a set of 
predictors through the following equation: Y =ß0+)3 ,X 1+ß. 3, X , +... +ßX +s; 
(6.2) 
Whereas the last equations are used to predict the value of Y, the logistic regression 
models are used to predict the probability of Y occurring given known values of 
predictors (Field 2000). The following shows the equations of logistic regression that 
are to be compared to the ones above: 
The probability of Y occurring given a single predictor: P(Y) _e 
_(ßl+ý V, + 
(6.3 ) 
l +c 
The probability of Y occurring given a set of predictors: P(Y) =1 1 +e -z 
(6.4) 
Where the logit232 Z =, ß 0+ß 1X , +, ß ZX 2+... +ß X +s; 
In the equations (6.3) and (6.4) e is the base of natural logarithms, whereas the other 
coefficients are the same linear combination in the equations (6.1) and (6.2). 
Field (2000) explains that when having a dichotomous dependent variable, the 
assumption of a linear relationship between variables will be violated. Logarithmic 
transformation can be used to treat this problem. The logistic regression model 
Ovcrcomes this problem because it expresses the multiple linear regression equation 
in logarithmic terms (ibid). Still the logit (the dependent variable) should be linear in 
each continuous independent variable (Hosmer and Lemeshow. 2000, Menard 2001). 
The probability value of Y varies between 0 and 1. In the case of this research. 
values close to one means that a firm is very likely to belong to a certain group 
(IIZ: AS or G GAAP in the Main Market and IAS or US GAAP in the Neuer Markt). 
this is the statistical name for this equation. 
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On the other hand. a value of Y close to zero means that a firm is very unlikely to 
belong to a particular group. 
6.5.3.1.3 Multinomial Logistic Regression 
The multinomial logistic regression (also called Polytomous logistic regression) is an 
extension of the binary logistic regression explained above (Menard 2001). The use 
of this extension allows us to deal with a dependent variable with more than two 
categories. It is explained by Norusis (2001) that when you have two groups of 
which one has experienced the event of interest and another one has not, the logistic 
regression model will be written as: 
P(event) 
log _ ß0+ß1X +/ßX2+... +1ß/ ',, 
1- P(event) 
(6-5) 
According to Norusis (ibid), in this case we have 
, 
just one non-redundant logit. 
because modelling the logit log 
(1- P(eventresults in the same logistic P(event) 
regression coefficients but with reversed signs. 
The probability of an event occurring divided by the probability of that event not 
occurring (the left part of the equation (6-4) is called the Odds ratio (Field, 2000). 
When a dependent variable has J possible values, the number of non-redundant 
logits will be J-1. Each logit compares each category to a baseline category. This 
type of logits is called the baseline category logfit: 
P(category; 
log Pio+16J1+ßi2X2+... +13; /, 
X 
/) P(category., 
(6-6) 
'I'\V--O subscripts are assigned to each coefficient: the first identifies the logit (i) and 
the second identifies the variable (P) . 
For the case of the Main Market where we have three categories (groups), we have 
tvv o logits (3-1 that is (J-1)). The group of German GAAP is chosen as the 
baseline category (the reference category). Therefore, the following logits were 
formed: 
(r = 10(y -ß; o ß, i i 
ß, 
_ý 2 
ß 
J (6-7) `, ' (y P(G G. - AP) 
180 
Chapter 6: Research de i, (ri7 
g z= log 
P(US GAAP) 
=ß. +/3 X +ß X , +... +/3 X P(G GAAP) 'o '' ' '' 'ý' p 
(6-8) 
ý'3= 0 (6-9) 
The third logfit is equal to zero because it is a redundant logit. This can be simply 
explained by the following equations: 
.. ý_ 
P(G GAAP) 
=1, and ". " log(t) =0 r_ P(G GAAP) 
ýýýýýý=o 
The probability of which a firm belongs to a certain group is calculated using the 
results from the logits (6-7), (6-8) and (6-9). The formula to calculate this probability 
is: P(group; ) - ýexp(g; 
) 
(6-10) 
1exp(9k) 
k=I 
An additional pairwise comparison that includes both IAS and US GAAP can be 
formed by changing the baseline category to either IAS or US GAAP group. The 
researcher chose to put the IAS group as a base line. Thus, the third logit will take 
the following form: 
P(US GAAP) 
_ log - ß, 0+ß 1X i+ß,; X , +... +ß,,, X,, P(G GAAP) 
(6-11) 
Ibis last logit will not be used in calculating the equation (6-10). However, it can 
givc additional information when interpreting the results of regression. 
6.5.3.1.3.1 Assumptions for the logistic models: 
Both, binary logistic regression and multinomial logistic regression have the same 
underlying assumptions (SPSS Inc, 2001). This may also be confirmed by Menard 
(2001) and Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000). Assumptions for logistic regression are 
discussed and in Chapter 7, where they are tested in on a section on evaluatinýi. the 
adopted model. 
181 
Chapter 6. Research design 
6.6 Summary: 
The Figure 6.2 presented below summarises the statistical analysis suggested. The 
chart provides a complete view of the statistical work and how it is designed to suit 
the different choices decisions by German companies in FWB. 
Analyses on the different choices in 
the Main Market and Neuer Markt 
Univariable analysis II Bivariable analysis 
f Descrintive statistics Crosstahulations 
Freuuencv distribution 
2-Sample t-test Mann-Whitney '0- Chi-square 
(for the choice of GGAAP or 
IRAS and choice of IAS or 
US GAAP) 
ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis 
(For the choice of GGAAP, IAS 
or US GAAP) 
Univariable models 
Figure 6.2: Designed statistical analysis 
Multivariable analysis 
Multiple Logistic 
Regression 
For: choice of 
GGAAP or IRAS 
and choice of 
IAS or US GAAP 
Multinomial 
Logistic Regression 
For the choice of 
GGAAP, IAS, or 
US GAAP 
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7 Chapter 7: Choice between German GAAP and IRAS 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents and discusses the results of the analysis of the underlying 
reasons for the choice between G GAAP and IRAS in the main market, while 
analysis of the choice between IAS and US GAAP is presented and discussed in 
Chapter 8. As shown in diagram 7.1, results are presented at three levels: univariable 
analysis, bivariable analysis and multivariable analysis. 
Analyses on the choice of 
G GAAP or IRAS 
Univariable analysis Bivariable analysis Multivariable analysis 
Descrintive statistics 
Frequency distribution 
t-test, Kruskal-Wallis 
and their non-parametric 
equivalents 
Univariable models 
Crosstahulations 
Chi-square 
Figure 7.1: Analysis design for the choice between GGAAP and IRAS 
7.2 Descriptive statistics on continuous variables: 
Multiple Logistic 
Regression 
Table 7.1 provides a summary of important descriptive statistics which may help in 
reading the different results presented later in the chapter. 
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7.2.1 Continuous variables: 
Table 7. I: Descriptive statistics of the continuous variables 
Variable Unit Min Max Mean Range 25th 50th 75`x' 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
EMPNO Person 1 477100 16395 477099 575 2080 8177 
EMPNO exc. extremes-" 1 57386 5142.1 57385 547 1769 5501 
TOASSET ¬ Mio 3.5 207410 5020 207407.5 99.5 306.4 1 155 
TOASSET exc. Extremes 3.5 8016 766.5 8012.5 94.4 256 737.3 
TURNOV ¬ Mio 0 152873 4079 152873 1112 334.2 1427 
TURNOV exc. Extremes 0 9076 953.5 9076 103 276 919.5 
PROFIT] % -133 37 0.009 170.7 -0.7 3.2 7.9 
PROFIT] exc. Extremes -26.1 37.4 3.6 63.5 0.4 3.4 8.2 
PROFIT2 % -148 82 -0.225 148.89 -0.42 2.97 7.1 
LEVER 1%6.8 93.8 0.474 87 32 47.1 63.2 
FRFLOAT %0 100 35 100 13.5 32.6 49.7 
Variables as defined below Table 7.4 
Columns 7,8 and 9 of Table 7.1 show three percentiles for each variable. Comparing 
the maximum values of variables such as EMPNO, TOASSET and TURNOV with 
the 75th percentile of these variables shows the large gap between the vast majority 
of value and the extreme values (defined below). In other words, whereas 75% of the 
firms have a number of employees in the range of between 1 and 8,177 (8176), 25% 
are in the range between 8,177 and 477,100 (460,746234). The same note applies to 
the variables TOASSET and TURNOV. This is caused by the extreme values in 
most of the DAX companies and a few other companies. Therefore, the researcher 
chose to compare the descriptive statistics of these variables with those after 
excluding the extreme values. This exclusion resulted in very different descriptive 
statistics, where the range is much smaller. This also shows how the mean was 
distorted by these extreme values. 
7.2.1.1 Outliers and extreme values: 
The impact of outliers can affect and distort the results of any the different types of 
statistical analyses (Bryman and Cramer, 2001). Such values had to be identified and 
their effect investigated by sensitivity analysis. As there is no universal definition of 
\v hat constitutes an outlier, the researcher chose to use the Box-plot definition, which 
is defined by Norusis (1998) and used in SPSS. According to this definition, the 
values which are 1.5 box lengths from the upper or lower edge of the box are called 
outliers (box lenth = (7. 
`I' percentile - 25"' percentile)). Values which are 3 box- Z__ 
1 11 11 . Tlhcse descriptive statistics are calculated after excludirn \\ hat \\ as defined as extreme values. 
ý'' This figure is to show how wide the range covered bý the highest quartile (the last 25°ýý) is. 
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lengths from the upper or lower edge of the box are called extreme values (Bryman 
and Cramer, ibid; Norusis, ibid). Although the researcher identified both values. the 
ones taken out in Table 7-1 above are the extreme values and not the outliers 23 
7.2.1.2 Dichotomizing particular continuous variables: 
Variables measured on an interval or ratio scale (continuous) are in statistical terms 
stronger than any other type of variables (Castellan and Siegel. 1988)236. Therefore 
dichotomizing a continuous variable is debatable. Streiner (2002, p. 262) explains 
that it "results in lost information and reduced power of statistical tests". Hoyt ever. 
in particular situations such a procedure is imposed by practical needs. The variables 
MANI, MAN2, MAN3, FORINVES and USINVES were primarily measured on an 
interval scale. Yet, the majority of values (more than 50%) in these variables are 
zero. Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) and Streiner (2002) suggest that such variables 
should be dichotomized into 0 and 1. Therefore, these five variables are treated as 
binary variables. 
7.2.1.3 Frequency distributions for continuous variable: 
The best way to study the frequency distribution for continuous variables is to break 
them into intervals (Babbie et al 2001). There are no universal rules for categorizing 
continuous variables. Hence, this process was achieved through different schemes 
vvhich took into account the nature of each variable. Those schemes are explained in 
separate footnotes below. Although information about frequency distribution can be 
found in the contingency tables shown later below, Tables 7.2 and 7.3 give a clearer 
View. 
This \v as because the researcher wanted onl\ to illustrate how such values can impact the analysis. 
23( Variables meant here are categorical and ordinal. 
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Table 7.2: Frequency distribution of the continuous variables 
Variable Interval Level Frequency Percent 
Employee numbers 37 > 19580 Large (1) 35 11.9% 
3434 -19580 Medium (2) 79 26. % 
<3434 Small (3) 181 61.4% 
295 100.0% 
Total assets > 2738 Large (1) 45 15.2 % 
¬ Mio 441 -2738 Medium (2) 79 -16.8% 
< 441 Small (3) 171 58.0% 
295 100.0% 
l urnover > 3290 Large (1) 44 14.9% 
Mio 539 - 3290 Medium (2) 76 25.8 % 
> 539 Small (3) 175 59.3 % 
295 100.0% 
1238 > 0.063 High 93 31.5 % 
Decimal 0-0.063 Low 124 42.0 % 
(Profit to total assets) < 0.0 Unprofitable 78 26.4 % 
295 100% 
Profitability 2 239 > 0.055 High 94 0.3 % 
(Decimal) 0-0.055 Low 123 1.0% 
(Profit to turnover) < 0.0 Unprofitable 78 96.9 % 
295 100% 
Free float240 > 0.475 High (1) 81 27.5 % 
(Decimal) 0.20-0-475 Medium (2) 120 40.7% 
< 0.20 Low (3) 94 31.9% 
295 100.0% 
leverage 
241 
> 0.648 High (1) 65 22.1 % 
(Decimal) 0.358 - 0.648 Medium (2) 145 49.0 % 
< 0.358 Low (3) 85 28.9 % 
295 100.0% 
237 Employees' numbers, total assets and turnover are categorized by isolating the outliers, as defined 
above, in the category "High", whereas the rest were divided above and below the average (Medium 
and Low respectively). 
Both profitability variables are categorized by isolating unprofitable in a separate category 
"Unprofitable", whereas profitable firms were categorized as above and below the average. 
Although the frequencies seem to be similar to that of Profitability 1. there is clear difference when 
\ ou look closely at the data set (i. e. in several cases, a firm where categorized as High in 
Profitabilitvl, whereas it was categorized as Low in Profitability 2). This implies that we may get 
different results for each of the two variables. 
1"' Firms in the category "Lowy" are those with free float of less than 20 ýýo (the minimum free float for 
DAN and SMAX), whereas the values larger than 20 % are divided above and below the average 
(Medium and High respectively). 
"" leverage is categorized by dividing the v ariable into three equal intervals after excluding outliers. 
Outliers are included back in the "High" cateý_ory. Interestin`ul\. these categories are consistent with 
categories used in a stud\ h\ Spremann and 
Gantenbein (2001). 
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7.2.2 Categorical variables: 
Apart from the variables used to represent industries, all the categorical variables in 
this part of analysis are binary variables with two possible outcomes. The following 
table shows the frequency distribution these variables: 
Table 7.3: Frequency distribution of the categorical variables 
Variable Distribution 
AUDID YES 174 59% 
Hasa Big-5 auditor NO 121 41 % 
295 
LISTSTAT YES 25 8.5 % 
Listed abroad NO 270 91.5 % 
295 
FORSUB YES 234 79.3 % 
Has a foreign subsidiary NO 61 20.7 % 
295 
FORINVES YES 83 28.1 % 
Has Foreign investors NO 212 71.9% 
295 
FORMAN YES 102 34.6% 
Has a Foreign manger NO 193 65.4% 
295 
MAN I YES 93 31.5 % 
Does management ownership exist? NO 202 69.5 % 
295 
MAN2 YES 124 42% 
(including families ownership) NO 171 58 % 
295 
MAN3(including families ownership 2) YES 135 45.8 % 
NO 160 54.2% 
295 
SEGMENT YES 173 58.6 % 
Is the company classified in DAX, MDAX or NO 122 41.4 % 
SMAX? 295 
INDUSI U&T 18 6% 
Industry variable with 5 sectors MANUFI 131 44.4% 
P&C 31 10.5% 
TECHNO 34 11.5 % 
TRAD 1 81 27.5 % 
295 
INDUS2 SERVIC 47 15.9% 
Industry variable with 3 sectors MANUF2 167 56.6% 
TRAD2 81 27.5 % 
''' \\'Ihcreas in MAN-. the families' ownership is only considered when a member of the family is on 
the supervisory or the management board, 
in MAN3 families' o\\ nership is considered whether they 
I1 a\ c members on these boards or not. 
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The percentages and frequencies presented in Table 7.3 do not seem to need any 
comments. Furthermore, explanations about the contingency tables below highlight 
more about these observations. 
7.3 Correlation Matrix: 
The correlation matrix presented in Table 7.4 below includes all the variables 
examined in this chapter. This matrix is mainly produced to provide better 
understanding of the complex relationship between these variables. Correlations 
between the variables can help in explaining the results obtained from the different 
types of statistical analysis presented below. It is also intended to help in avoiding 
multicollinearity which can be caused by high correlation between independent 
variables. 
In Table 7.4, one can see the very high significant correlation between the size 
variables which indicates that these variables provide similar information content. 
Some of the observations in the matrix are expected according to the extant 
literature. Examples of such observations are: the significantly negative correlation 
between free float (FREFLOAT) and management ownership (although it is not for 
MAN 1) and the significantly negative correlation between leverage and profitability 
(see Chapter 8 for further explanation). 
Furthermore, whereas some of the observations can be clearly explained or justified, 
some other observations do not have clear justifications. For example, it is easy to 
understand the significant positive correlation between FORINVES, USINVES, 
FORMAN and USMAN. The explanation of this is that each company which has US 
investors is classified as having foreign investors. Furthermore, it is likely to have 
US managers and to be, in turn, classified as having foreign managers. On the other 
hand, there is no a clear or direct explanation for the significantly negative 
correlation between USSUB (having a subsidiary in the US) and each of the 
management ownership variables. 
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7.4 Crosstabulation and Chi-square results: 
As explained in Chapter 6 crosstabulations (contingency tables) are employed to 
examine the relationship between the choice of GAAP and each variable separately. 
This relationship is shown in the distribution of each variable over the two groups of 
firms (G GAAP firms and IRAS firms). 
As with the frequency distribution, to take advantage of this statistical tool, the 
continuous variables should be in the ordinal form shown in Table 7.2 above. 
One general rule to be remembered in reading these tables is: the larger the 
differences across the groups, the stronger the association (Babble, 2003). However, 
a relationship is only stated, if the chi-square statistic is significant. Calculation of 
this statistic is based on these tables. Results of the chi-square test are also shown at 
the bottom of the relevant tables. 
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7.4.1 Crosstabulations and chi-square test for categories of continuous variables: 
7.4.1.1 Size: 
Table 7.5 contains three contingency tables which investigate the relationship the 
between size, represented by three variables, and the choice of G GAAP or IRAS. 
Table 7.5: Size categories and choice between GGAAP and IRAS 
Small Medium Large Total 
Group / EMPNO < 3434 3434 -19580 > 19580 
G GAAP 144 
70.2% 
53 
25.9% 
8 
3.9% 
205 
100% 
IRAS 37 
41.1% 
26 
28.9% 
27 
30.0% 
90 
100% 
Total 181 
61.4% 
79 
26.8% 
35 
11.9% 
295 
100% 
Z2=44.769 P=. 000 
/ TOASSET <¬ 2738 Mio 441 - 2738 > 2738 
(; GAAP 136 
66.3% 
57 
27.8% 
12 
5.9% 
205 
100% 
I RAS 35 
38.9% 
22 
24.4% 
33 
36.7% 
90 
100% 
Total 171 
58.0% 
79 
26.8% 
45 
15.3% 
295 
100% 
47.322 P= 
. 
000 
/ TURNOV <¬ 539 Mio 539 - 3290 > 3290 
G GAAP 138 
67.3 % 
54 
26.3% 
13 
6.3% 
205 
100% 
IRAS 37 
41.1% 
22 
24.4% 
31 
34.4% 
90 
100% 
Total 175 
59.3 % 
76 
25.8% 
44 
14.9% 
295 
100% 
, 
»=40.445 P=. 000 
Vmriables as defined below Table 7.4 
i\s can be seen in Table 7.5, the proportional distribution over the different size 
categories is very similar across the three proxies for size. 
The proportional differences between the companies using IRAS and those using G 
GAAP. within the levels "Large" and "Small", are substantial (larger than 10 
percentage points244). The largest proportion of G GAAP companies is classified as 
"Small", whereas the smallest proportion is classified as "Large" . 
Although, the 
largest proportion of IRAS companies is also classified as "Small'". It is substantially 
Babbie et al (ibid) suggest that a 10 °o can be used as a rule of thumb, the\ also state that others 
,. u,, -, cst 
6°,, or 8° o as a rough indicator of an existing relationship. 
1i 
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less than that of G GAAP firms. On the contrary. the proportion of IRAS firms in the 
"Large, category is considerably bigger than that of G GAAP companies. 
This is a clear indication that companies using G GAAP are more likely to be 
smaller than those using IRAS in terms of employees' numbers, turnover and total 
assets. Both groups of firms have the smallest proportion in the category "Medium". 
The high significance of chi-square statistics (shown at the end of each contingency 
table in Table 7.5) indicates that the relationship between each of the size variables 
and the choice of GAAP is significant at 0.00024. 
The scatterplot presented below in Figure 72 and Figure 7.2 show clearly that 
companies using IRAS are distributed across higher levels of employee numbers and 
total assets than G GAAP companies. That is IRAS firms seem to have more assets 
and more employees. Firms have a very similar distribution over the levels of 
turnover. Hence, there was no need to present another scatterplot which is nearly 
identical to those presented below. 
Still, it is clear that not all GGAAP firms are small. From Figure 7.2, one can see 
that some very large companies are using GGAAP (a discussion of this observation 
is presented below at the end of this section). 
I RAS Jw - 
GAAP choice 
G GAAP 7<, "ý iy - C; ' 
I11-I1 
0 00 100000 00 200000 00 300000 00 400000 00 
Employee numbers 
l i`gure 7.2: A scatterplot of employee numbers across GGAAP and IRAS groups 
'' ; AIthouýgh the relationship is significant at a higher level of confidence (0.999), the level of 
c0ntidence used for this stud-, is 95 °o 
which is the most commonly Used in social research. 
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Figure 7.3: A scatterplot of total assets across IRAS and GGAAP groups 
The direction of the relationship between size variables and the choice of IRAS or G 
GAAP is clearly shown through the proportional distribution in the contingency 
tables in Table 7.5. This distribution implies that the likelihood of complying with 
IRAS is positively related to size. However, the proportions of both IRAS and G 
GAAP companies in the category "Medium" are nearly equal. This raises a question 
about the linearity of this relationship. This is further investigated through the 
multivariable analysis and discussed in the discussion section at the end of this 
chapter. 
7.4.1.2 Quality Segments: 
"kable 7.6 below investigates the relationship between quality segments in the Main 
market and the choice of GAAP. 
This table shows that the vast majority of companies using IRAS are classified in 
duality segments (see Section 2.5.2.4.2). On the contrary, more than half the 
companies using G GAAP are not classified. This pattern of distribution suggests 
that a firm using IRAS is very likely to be a member of DAX, MDAX or SMAX. 
One can also state that a firm which is a member of a quality segment is more likely 
to be using IRAS. This statement is consistent with the alternative hypothesis stated 
earlier in Chapter 5 (see Table 7.35 at the end of this chapter). 
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Iable 7.6: Quality segments and the choice between GGAAP and IRAS 
Classified NO YES Total 
Group 
G GAAP 105 100 205 
51.2% 48.8% 100% 
I RAS 17 73 90 
18.9% 81.1% 100% 
Total 122 173 295 
% 41.4% 58.6% 
X2 =26.955 P= . 
000 
As shown above, the hypothesis about quality segments is tested through the binary 
variable which indicates whether a firm is classified in a quality segment or not. 
However, it is worthwhile checking whether compliance with IRAS within these 
segments follows a specific pattern or not. Therefore, the relationship between the 
different segments and the GAAP choices is investigated through Table 7.7 below. 
Unlike the other tables in this chapter, percentages in this table are to be read 
vertically instead of horizontally. 
In Table 7.7, interestingly, one can see that the percentages of firms using IRAS in 
SMAX, MDAX and DAX increase as we move to a higher segment. In other words, 
the percentage of IRAS companies in DAX is substantially larger than that in 
MDAX, which is in turn, substantially larger than that in SMAX. Furthermore, the 
percentage of IRAS firms in SMAX is larger than that in "Unclassified". To some 
extent this can be attributed to the size effect, which is positively correlated with 
quality segments. 
Although Table 7.8 is presented to investigate the relationship between size of firms 
and their quality segments, a discussion of this relationship is postponed to the end 
of this chapter where it can be discussed in the light of the results of the 
multivariable analysis. 
Fable 7.7: Quality segments and the choice between GGAAP and IRAS 
GAAP / Segment DAX MDAX SMAX Unclassified Total 
G GAAP 4 29 67 105 205 
18.2% 49.2% 72.8% 86.1% 69.5% 
IRAs 18 30 25 17 90 
81.8% 50.8% 27.2% 13.9% X0.5% 
Total -- 
59 92 112 295 
100.0% 100.0°%o 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
cc 'Section 2.5.2.4.2 for definitions of segments SS 
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Fable 7.8: Relationship between size and quality segments 
Size246 / Segment DAX MDAX SMAX Unclassified Total 
Large 20 18 0 7 45 
44.4% 40.0% 0.0% 15.6% 100.0% 
Medium 2 30 17 30 79 
2.5% 38.0% 21.5% 38.0% 100.0% 
Small 0 11 75 85 171 
0.0% 6.4% 43.9% 49.7% 100.0% 
Total 22 59 92 122 295 
7.5% 20.0% 31.2% 41.4% 100.0% 
See Section 2.5.2.4.2 for definitions of segments 
7.4.1.3 Leverage (OR-LEVER): 
Leverage is one of the continuous variables which are categorized for the purpose of 
using contingency tables and chi-square. The descriptive statistics show that the 
mean leverage in the German Main Market firms is about 0.48 which may not be any 
higher than the average in many other countries 247. In addition to that it shows that 
25% of these firms have leverage of more than 0.63. 
It can be seen Table 7.9, there are considerable differences in the distribution of 
firms in both the "High" and "Medium" categories. Companies using G GAAP have 
a larger proportion in the high category than firms using IRAS (14.1 % point 
difference ? 48 ). In the medium category, conversely, IRAS firms have a larger 
proportion than that of the G GAAP firms (12.4 % point difference). These 
observations imply that G GAAP companies are more likely to have higher leverage 
than IRAS companies. Furthermore, the chi-square statistic suggests that the 
relationship between the levels of leverage in German firms is significantly linked 
with the choice of GAAP. 
Reasons that may explain the inverse relationship between leverage and the choice of 
I RAS are fully discussed in Chapter5 where the hypothesis on leverage is postulated. 
This result leads to rejecting the null hypothesis as presented in Table 7.36 at the end 
of this the chapter. 
'46 ncc differences between the categories of size variable are negligible, total assets is chosen here 
to represent size 
24- A conclusion by Rajan and Zingales (199 ) indicating that German\ and the UK have the lowest 
Ic\ era, -, c 
levels in the G7. (This is also indicated by Spremann and Gantenbein (2001)) 
ý'ý Remember that it is compared with difference of 10 0ä points, which is considered substantial. 
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Table 7.9: Categories of leverage and choice between GGAAP and (RAS 
Leverage Low Medium High Total 
Group < 0.358 Mio 0.358 - 0.648 > 0.648 
G GAAP 58 93 54 205 
28.3 % 45.4% 26.3 % 100% 
I RAS 27 52 11 90 
30.0% 57.8% 12.2% 100% 
Total 85 145 65 295 
28.8% 49.2% 22% 100% 
Z Z =7.682 P= . 
021 
In the scatterplot shown below, it can be seen that at average leverage level of 0.65. 
there are more GGAAP than IRAS firms. 
IRAS- ' ;ý f7. tý) : %, ": v.. iäýX: CX? nn) 
GAAP Choice 
(. GAAP Gfifbýýý 1 U3k '.. 
0.20 0.60 
0 40 0.80 
Leverage 
Figure 7.4: A scatterplot of leverage across IRAS or GGAAP groups 
The inverse relationship between leverage and the choice of GAAP stated above 
raises the question about the relationship between size and leverage in German 
companies. As discussed in Chapter 5, leverage in German firms is expected to be 
negatively associated with size (unlike in other industrial countries). The Pearson's 
coefficient in the correlation matrix shown in Table 7.4 above proves this. 
l'urthermore. a crosstabulation between the categories of leverage and those of size 
vv as associated with a significant chi-square statistic at 0.05'4`' . 
Tfliis finding is 
consistent with findings of Rajan and Zingales (2001) and with the finding that size 
24 " The researcher thinks that there is no need to depict this table here. 
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is positively associated with the choice of IRAS. This particular relationship is 
discussed in Chapter 5. Yet, in short, some relate this to the special relationship 
between small and medium German firms and their banks. 
7.4.1.4 Profitability: 
Profitability is represented by two variables: PROFITI (profits to total assets) and 
PROF IT2 (profits to turnover) which are measured on a continuous scale. Table 7.10 
presents crosstabulations between the GAAP groups and each of the two profitability 
variables. Table 7.10 below shows that, within the three levels of PROFITI, 
differences between the proportions of the two GAAP groups are not important. In 
general, the two groups have the largest percentages classified as of "Lowe" 
profitability (< 6.3 %). The chi-square statistic implies an insignificant relationship 
between profitability and the choice of GAAP. 
Unlike PROFITI, the difference between the proportions of G GAAP and IRAS 
companies in the High category of PROFIT 2 is quite large (10.1 % points). 
However, the chi-square statistic is still small and insignificant. This simply 
indicates that there is no relationship between profitability (PROFIT2) and the 
choice of GAAP. 
Table 7.10: Categories of profitability and choice between GGAAP and IRAS 
Unprofitable Low High Total 
PROFITI <0%0 `%, - 6.3 `%, > 6.3 0/ 
G GAAP 58 84 63 205 
28.3% 41.0% 30.7% 100% 
I RAS 20 40 30 90 
22.2 % 44.4% 33.3 % 100% 
Total 78 124 93 295 
26.4% 42.0% 31.5% 
=1.185 P=. 553 
PROFIT2 <0% 0%-5.5 `% > 5.5 % 
(º GAAP 58 88 59 205 
28.3 % 42.9% 28.8 % 100 % 
IRAS 20 35 35 90 
222% 38.9% 38.9% 100% 
Total 78 123 94 295 
26.4% 41.7% 31.9% 
,ýl=;. 
1 22 P=. 210 
Variables as defined below Table 7.4 
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7.4.1.5 Free Float 
"fable 7.11 below shows that, in both categories "High" and "Low". there are 
considerable differences between the percentages of G GAAP firms and IRAS firms. 
At the medium level, on the other hand, the difference is výery- small. Within the 
companies categorized as of low free float, G GAAP firms seem to have a 
considerably larger proportion than that of IRAS firms. Conversely. under the 
category "High", IRAS firms seem to have substantially larger proportion than that 
of G GAAP firms. The chi-square statistic is significant at . 
05, which indicates a 
significant relationship between free float and accounting choices. 
Table 7.11: Categories of free float and choice between GGAAP and IRAS 
OR-FRFLOAT Low 
Group <21.2% 
Medium 
21.2-43.6%º 
High 
> 43.6 
Total 
G GAAP 74 82 49 205 
36.1 % 40.0% 23.9 % 100% 
IRAS 20 38 32 90 
22.2% 42.2% 35.6% 100% 
Total 94 120 81 295 
31.9% 40.7% 27.5% 
%2=6.948 P=. 031 
Variables as defined below Table 7.4 
7.4.2 Crosstabulation for nominal and binary variables: 
7.4.2.1 Auditor identity (AUDID): 
From Table 7.12, it seems that the majority of companies using IRAS are audited by 
Big-5 firms. G GAAP firms, in contrast, are nearly equally split between Big-5 firms 
and other auditors. This makes the percentage of G GAAP audited by other than Big- 
auditors substantially larger than that of IRAS companies (47.3 %; 26.7 % 
respectively). 
The significance of the chi-square statistic at 0.001 indicates a significant 
relationship between auditor choice and GAAP choice. 
Fable 7.12: Having Big-s auditors choice between GGAAP and IRAS 
GAM / Big-5 YES NO Total 
G GAAP 108 97 205 
52.7% 47.3% 100% 
I RAS 66 24 90 
7 . 3' % 26.7% 100% 
"Total 174 121 295 
% 59% 41 % 
x' =1 1.0 24 P= . 
001 
Variables as defined below Table 7.4 
'1oo 
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Based on the assumption that firms audited by Big-5 auditors are very likely to be 
the largest, it is worthwhile checking whether the relationship between auditor 
choice and the choice of IRAS or G GAAP is confounded by the effect of size. 
Therefore, Table 7.13 presents a crosstabulation between the categories of size and 
auditor type. 
Although the vast majority of large firms are audited by Big-5 auditors (38/45= 84.4 
the majority of firms audited by Big-5 are classified as "Small". Furthermore. 
small firms are split in nearly two equal proportions (83/171; 88/171) over the two 
types of auditors. Although the relationship is significant according to the chi-square 
test, further analysis shows that 22 (25 %) firms of small firms with Big-5 auditors 
and 33.3 % of medium firms with Big-5 auditors are using IRAS. This indicates that 
the relationship between the type of auditor and choosing IRAS is separate from the 
size effect. It also shows that the Big-5 had deep penetration of the market for the 
audit of listed companies. 
Table 7.13: Categories of size and the choice of auditors 
Big-5 / Size Small Medium Large Total 
NO 83 31 7 121 
68.6% 25.6% 5.8 % 100.0% 
YES 88 48 38 174 
50.6% 27.6% 21.8% 100.0% 
Total 171 79 45 295 
58.0% 26.8% 15.3 % 100.0% 
X2=16.160 P=. 000 
size variable is TOASSET (total assets) 
7.4.2.2 Listing status: 
As explained in previous chapters, not many German firms are listed abroad. From 
the 42 firms listed abroad, only 30 firms belong to the target sample of this study 
(excluding 7 non-financial firms and 5 Neuer Markt firms 250). 
; bout 76 % of multi-listed companies use IRAS. Table 7.14 below shows the 
proportional differences between G GAAP group and IRAS group are substantial. It 
can be seen that the percentage of IRAS firms listed abroad is considerably higher 
than that of G GAAP firms. Furthermore, the result of the chi-square test seems to be 
highly significant. This result confirms a significant relationship between listing 
status and the choice of IRAS or G GAAP. The distribution in Table 7.14 indicates 
'5`) The number in Table 7.14 is 29 because Infineon Technologies AG. which is listed on NYSE is 
e \c laded because it is owned h\ Siemens AG (*0.9('0). 
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that firms using IRAS are more likely to be listed on foreign exchanges than those 
using G GAAP. Still the most of IRAS companies are not multi-listed simply 
because, in general, the percentage of German firms listed abroad is very small. 
Table 7.14: Listing Status and choice between GGAAP and IRAS 
GAAP/Listing abroad NO YES Total 
G GAAP 198 7 205 
96.6% 3.4% 100% 
IRAS 68 22 90 
75.6% 24.4% 100% 
Total 266 29 295 
% 90.2% 9.8% 100% 
X2 =31.204 P= . 
000 
As with the different variables tested above, it is important to investigate whether the 
size factor has a strong influence on the relationship. A crosstabulation between size 
categories and listing status shows that a substantial majority (80 %) of the multi- 
listed firms are classified as "Large", whereas only one firm is classified as "Small". 
This may in fact undermine the hypothesis of listing status. Multivariable analysis 
presented later in this chapter can provide useful information on this. 
7.4.2.3 Management ownership: 
Variables on management ownership indicate whether managers, either on the 
supervisory board or the executive board, hold shares in the company or not. 
Although the three management variables are assumed to have different information 
content, Table 7.15 shows that proportional distributions of G GAAP and IRAS 
companies are similar across the groups of MAN 1. MAN2 and MAN3 
25' 
. 
For 
example, in the three variables, firms that have management ownership are equally 
split between using G GAAP or IRAS. The results show that the relationship 
between the three variables and the choice of GAAP is insignificant. 
(' rosstabulations and chi-square results of MAN' and MAN -3 are nearly 
identical, so that the% are 
prescnted gis one variable. 
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Table 7.15: Management ownership and choice between GGAAP and IRAS 
GAAP / MAN1 YES NO Total 
G GAAP 63 142 205 
30.7% 69.3 % 100.0% 
(RAS 30 60 90 
33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 
Total 93 202 295 
% 31.5% 68.5% 100.0% 
2 =0.197 P=. 658 
MAN2, MAN3 YES NO Total 
IRAS 87 118 205 
42.45 57.6% 100.0% 
G GAAP 37 53 90 
41.1% 58.9% 100.0% 
Total 124 171 295 
% 42.0% 58.0% 100.0% 
2 =0.045 P=. 832 
Variables as defined below Table 7.4 
7.4.2.4 Foreign subsidiary (FOR-SUB): 
This variable studies the effect of having a subsidiary abroad. A significant 
percentage of German Main Market companies ( 65 %) have subsidiaries abroad. 
The percentage of firms having a subsidiary abroad is high in the two groups. 
However, it is substantially higher for the group of firms using IRAS. 
The chi-square statistic indicates a significant relationship between having a 
subsidiary abroad and the choice of GAAP. German companies that have 
subsidiaries abroad are significantly more likely to comply with IRAS. 
Finally, the proportional structure in Table 7.16 suggests that firms using IRAS are 
more likely to have a subsidiary abroad. 
fable 7.16: Business abroad and choice between GGAAP and IRAS 
Foreign subsidiaries NO YES Total 
Group 
G GAAP 52 153 205 
25.4% 74.6% 100% 
I RAS 9 81 90 
10.0% 90.0% 100% 
'dotal 61 234 295 
% 20.7% 79.3 % 
, ý' =9.003 
P= . 003 
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7.4.2.5 Foreign Investors (FORINVES): 
This variable indicates whether "significant" foreign investors hold a part in a 
company's equity capital or not (see Chapters 5 and 6). 
Table 7.16 depicts that there are no important proportional differences in using IRAS 
and G GAAP between firms with and without significant foreign investors. For 
example, the percentage of G GAAP firms that have foreign investors is not very 
different from that of IRAS firms (4.3 % point). 
The relationship between the existence of foreign investors and the choice of IRAS 
or G GAAP is not significant as indicated by chi-square statistic shown at the end of 
Table 7.17. 
'kable 7.17: Foreign investors and choice between GGAAP and [RAS 
Foreign investors NO YES Total 
Group 
G GAAP 150 55 205 
73.2% 26.8% 100% 
IRAS 62 28 90 
68.9% 31.1% 100% 
Total 212 83 295 
% 71.9% 28.1% 
, ý' =0.567 P=. 451 
7.4.2.6 Foreign management: 
This variable indicates whether there are foreign members on the supervisory board 
or the executive board. 
Within the Main Market amongst firms that have foreign board members, the 
proportion of companies using IRAS is considerably higher than that of those using 
(º GAAP. 
According to the chi-square test, the relationship between the existence of foreign 
managers and the choice of IRAS or G GAAP is significant at 0.01. Furthermore, the 
distributional differences imply that companies using IRAS are more likely to have 
foreign managers. 
`04 
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I able 7.18: Foreign managers and choice between GGAAP and IRAS 
Foreign managers 
Group 
NO YES Total 
G GAAP 144 61 205 
70.2% 29.8% 100% 
I RAS 49 41 90 
54.4% 45.6% 100% 
Total 193 102 295 
% 65.4% 34.6% 100% 
x =6.902 P= . 
009 
7.4.2.7 Industry variables: 
It should be remembered that the industry variables are treated as either nominal 
variables (2 variables) or binary variables (8 variables). Crosstabulations below use 
these two variables. INDUS]: This nominal variable includes 5 categories of 
industries. Table 7.18 shows that large proportional differences in GAAP choice 
exist in two categories: Manufacturing (MANUFI) and Pharmaceuticals and 
Chemicals (P&C). Both groups IRAS and G GAAP companies have their largest 
proportion classified as "Manufacturing". However, within this particular category 
the proportion of G GAAP firms is larger than that of IRAS firms. On the other 
hand, in the category "P&C" the proportion of IRAS firms is larger than that of G 
GAAP firms (still, the difference may not be substantial). 
The chi-square test shows that the relationship between industry classification and 
the choice of GAAP is significant. This relationship is further investigated by 
running a crosstabulation for each of the industry binary variables with the 
accounting standards choice (not presented here). Whereas being in PANDC (P&C) 
is significantly related with choosing IRAS at 0.05, being in the UANDT (U&T) is 
marginally significant with choosing IRAS at 0.10 (this will be discussed at the end 
o l' this chapter). 
Table 7.19: Industry sectors (as defined below Table 7.4) and choice between GGAAP and IRAS 
INDUS 1 U&T MANUFI P&C TRADI TECHNO Total 
Group 
G GAAP 9 97 16 61 22 205 
4.4% 47.3 % 7.8% 29.8% 10.7% 100% 
IRAS 9 34 15 20 12 90 
10.0% 37.8% 16.7% 212% 13.3% 100% 
! 'otal 18 131 1 81 34 295 
,' =10.841 
P= 
. 
028 
? o> 
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IND US2: 
This is a nominal variable which aggregates the industry sectors to a smaller number 
of categories 252 : Utilities and Transportation (U&T). Manufacturing and 
Pharmaceuticals and chemicals (P&C). 
Table 7.20 below does not show important differences between the two groups of 
firms within MANUF I and P&C. In the U&T the proportional difference seems to 
be quite large, although it is not substantial. 
Moreover. the result of the chi-square test indicates that the relationship between 
being in any of these industry groups and choosing IRAS or G GAAP is not 
significant. 
Table 7.20: Industry sectors (INDUS2) and choice between IRAS and GGAAP 
INDUS2 SERVIC MANUFI P&C TRAD1 
Group 
G GAAP 27 117 61 205 
13.2% 57.1% 29.8% 100% 
IRAS 20 50 20 90 
22.2% 55.6% 22.2% 100% 
Total 47 167 81 295 
15.9% 56.6% 27.5 % 100% 
, =4.534 P=. 104 
Variables as defined below Table 7.4 
7.5 Student t-test for independent samples: 
As explained in Chapter 6, the t-test is run for all the variables across the two groups, 
IRAS and G GAAP (two independent samples) regardless of the violation of the 
253 related assumptions 
Utilities and Pharmaceuticals (UST), Manufacturing (MANUF? ) and Pharmaceuticals and 
Chemicals (P&C) 
's' 
, 1lthough the main assumptions 
are the normalit\ and the equalit\ of \ ariances, it is agreed that the 
t-tcst is robust to the normality assumption (see Bryman and Cramer, 2001). (see also footnote 246) 
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Results show that mean of the three size variables and the free float variable 
(F REFLOAT) is larger in IRAS companies than in GGAAP companies. The 
confidence interval for each of these variables indicates that one can be 95% 
confident about direction of these differences. 
On the other hand, in terms of leverage and profitability variables, the confidence 
intervals shown in Table 7.21 indicate that we cannot be sure about the differences 
across these variables because contain both positive and negative sign. In other 
words, we can not be sure about the direction of the differences in the population. 
The robustness of these results is confirmed by removing outliers once and by 
transforming data to natural logarithm values in another''`. 
Variables tested informally: as explained earlier, the variables MAN 1, MAN2, 
MAN3 and FORINVES are transformed into a binary form because of the large 
number of zero frequency. They are examined informally as continuous variables 
using all the statistical tests presented in this chapter, so that results can be compared 
with those of testing them as binary variables. No significant results are observed, 
however (see Table 7.22). 
7.6 Mann-Whitney: 
This test is the non-parametric equivalent of the t-test. Because all the variables 
cxcept leverage are not normally distributed this test may be more appropriate (see 
Chapter 6260). The results of this test shown in Table 7.22 show that differences in 
terms of size, profitability (PROFIT2) and free float are significant at . 
05. Except for 
the result on profitability, these results confirm those obtained by the t-test. 
Table 7.22: Results of Man-Whitney for GGAAP and IRAS 
Variable Z value P value 
(1-tailed) 
EMPNO -4.397 . 
000 
TOASSET -4.807 . 
000 
TURNOV -4.388 . 
000 
PROFITI -0.792 . 
215 
PROI= lT2 -1.834 . 
034 
FREFLOAT -2.736 . 
00 3 
Variables as defined below Table 7.4 
ýý') still, these transformations did not result normal distributions. 
'°" Chapter 6 (about research design) explains that the parametric tests are robust to the normalit\ 
assumption and that they can be used next to the non-parametric tests. 
? 09 
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7.7 Differences between the three groups: G GAAP, IAS and LS GAAP in the 
Main Market: 
This section examines differences between the three groups of companies using 
GAAP. IAS or US GAAP in terms of size, free float, leverage and profitability. 
Although Chapter 8 is devoted to analysing the choice IAS and US GAAP, this 
section is useful to compare the characteristics of G GAAP, IAS and US GAAP 
Main Market companies separately. 
7.7.1 ANOVA: 
Table 7.23, shows that there are overall significant differences between the three 
groups: IAS, US GAAP and G GAAP in terms of size and free float. On the other 
hand, overall differences between these groups are not significant in terms of 
profitability and leverage. Furthermore, confidence intervals of these significant 
differences indicate that we can be fairly confident about the direction of these 
differences. 
Multiple comparison tests (explained in Chapter 6) show that in terms of employee 
numbers, total assets and turnover companies using US GAAP are significantly 
larger than those using IAS, which are, in turn, significantly larger than G GAAP 
firms. Confidence intervals which are depicted for each of these differences indicate 
the stability of the significant differences. 
Yet, excluding outliers in further analysis shows that US GAAP group and IAS 
group are not significantly different in size; nevertheless each of them is still 
significantly larger than G GAAP firms. 
[; urthermore, results in Table 7.23 show that there is an overall significant difference 
hct\% cen the three groups in terms of free float. However, multiple comparisons show 
that difference between the IAS and G GAAP group is not significant. Results show 
that percentages of free float in US GAAP firms are, on average, larger than those in 
companies using IAS or G GAAP. IAS firms, in turn, have larger proportions of free 
float than G GAAP firms, although the difference is insignificant. 
ANOVA results and multiple comparisons do not show any significant differences 
hctvv ceº1 the three groups in terms of leverage and profitability. Although differences 
are not significant. they indicate that lAS firms are more profitable than those using 
US G. ý\.. AP, which are 
in turn, less profitable than G G. \AP companies. According to 
? 10 
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the hypotheses on profitability, IAS are expected to have more profitability than G 
(JAAP firms but not more than US GAAP firms. 
In terms of leverage, differences seem to be trivial, although, in general, G GAAP 
firms have higher leverage than those using IRAS. Although this result is not 
significant, it is consistent with the expectation of the leverage hypothesis. 
Transforming variables into logarithmic form does not result in significant size 
differences between companies using US GAAP and those using IAS. However, 
differences are still significant between each of the IRAS groups and G GAAP 
group261. Moreover, as a result of this transformation, free float differences became 
insignificant. 
01 
titi11, 
US GAAP firms are insignificantly larger (P value of . 103) than G GA; 1P firms 
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7.7.2 Kruskal-Wallis 
As explained in Chapter 6. this test is the non-parametric alternative to ANOVA. 
Results shown in Table 7.24 are fairly consistent with those obtained by ANOVA. 
although the differences in size variables across the IAS group and US GAAP group 
are insignificant, even without excluding outliers (because in ANOVA results, they 
only become insignificant by removing outliers). As with the results of ANOVA. 
excluding outliers, results in insignificant size differences. 
Table 7.24: Results of Kruskal-Wallis between GGAAP IAS and US GAAP 
Variable Kruskal-Wallis 
C11i- Sig. 
square268 
Significance of 
IAS &G GAAP 
pairwise comparisons267 
IAS & US GAAP & 
US GAAP G GAAP 
I. MPNO 20.592 . 000 11.773 . 001 0.971 . 
325 12.206 . 000 
TO ASS ET 25.674 . 000 12.782 . 000 1.913 . 
167 17.213 . 000 
TURNOV 20.940 . 000 1 1.269 . 001 1.480 . 
224 13.047 . 000 
LEVER 1.471 . 
479 0.959 
. 
327 0.002 
. 
967 0.778 
. 
378 
PROFIT] 0.640 . 
726 0.627 
. 
429 0.002 
. 
967 0.093 
. 
760 
PROFIT2 3.381 . 
184 2.931 
. 
087 0.020 
. 
887 0.857 
. 
355 
FRFLOAT 11.511 . 003 2.634 . 
105 4.971 . 026 9.795 . 002 
Note: bold typeface indicates a statistically significant correlation at the 0.0 level 
Variables as defined below Table 7.4 
, °1 These comparisons Nv'cre run in a different way from that used in ANOVA. This was b\ defining 
just two groups each time the test is run. 
"ý "This is the statistic produced b\ Kruskal-\Vallis test 
_l, 
Chapter 7: Choice between German (;. ß. 1I' and IR IS 
7.8 Results of multivariable analysis: 
Introduction to the technique multivariable analysis is provided in Chapter 6. Results 
of Multivariable logistic regression can be presented in the form of a full model 
which include all the variables suggested by the theoretical hypotheses. or in the 
form of a constructed model. Therefore, the researcher chose to present both options. 
However, there are a few considerations which should be highlighted before 
continuing with the multivariable analysis and the modelling process. 
7.8.1 The number of predictors: 
Before proceeding with the process of modeling, it is important to emphasize that 
problems may occur when the number of predictors is too large. Peduzzi et al (1996, 
p. 1379) state that "the validity of the logistic model becomes problematic when the 
ratio of the numbers of events per variable analyzed becomes small. The parameter 
estimates may be biased and the usual tests of significance may not be valid". They 
discuss three possible types of error: "overfitting" (too many variables of which 
some may cause noise), "underfitting" (omitting important variables) and 
"paradoxical" fitting (incorrect direction of association). There is an agreement on a 
rule of thumb for the number of EPV (events per variable) between Peduzzi et al 
(ibid) and Harrell et al (1996). Agresti (2001, p212) explains this rule by the 
following: "if y=1 only 30 times out of n =1000, for instance, the model should 
contain no more than about three x terms"269. That is if the number of events is 30 
(number of companies using IRAS `y'), the number of independent variables (x 
terms) should not be more than 3 regardless the size of the sample (even if it was 
1000 companies). Other arbitrary rules are suggested in the literature270. The first 
rulc seems to be the most conservative one. According to this rule the sample of the 
main market allows us to have a maximum of 10 independent variables. 
" 
, A,, resti (, bid) reports that this 
is approximate and does not mean that one can have 50 variables if 
thc\ have 500 outcomes of each tý pe. 
2170 The number of observations should be 30 times the number of predictors (in the case of my stud, 
this gives the same result as the one stated above). Another rule is to have a predictor for each 10 
cýiýcs (Garson, ncsu, 200-I) 
214 
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7.8.2 Significance for the Wald test for coefficients 71 
There is no agreement between statisticians on the level of significance required to 
leave predictors in a multiple model (Menard 1995,2001). It is even possible to 
leave variables whose coefficients are not significant in a model if they are 
"important control variables" 272 (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000, p106). For the 
purpose of this study, the significance of the predictors «as not the primary 
consideration. One should also remember that many of the hypotheses in this 
research are "unidirectional". This means that one can consider half the P value 
given in the output for coefficients of these variables representing such hypotheses. 
7.8.3 Categorization of size variables: 
The researcher chose to categorize the size variables which are highly skewed for 
three reasons273: the number of outliers within the size variables is large274. Gujarati 
(2003) claims this can distort the regression line. He also argues that if outliers are 
genuine 27', one should not reject them. Categorization can help by isolating the 
outliers in a separate category27ý'. Furthermore, measuring size in terms of turnover 
or total assets can be influenced by the GAAP used (the dependent variable). The 
employee number, in turn, can be affected by the type of industry. Therefore, 
categorization is suggested for neutralizing the bias in these measures. Finally, these 
variables showed as non-linear in the logit277. Norusis (2001) suggests that if the 
relationship between predictors and logit is non-linear, categorization may be used to 
investigate such relationships. Streiner (2002, p. 262) also concludes that 
"dichotomizing a continuous variable is justified only when the distribution of that 
variable is highly skewed or its relation with another variable is non linear". 
271 The significance for coefficients is calculated for the Wald test statistic which is (ß / SE)2 
272 Deciding which variables are important for the model is judgmental. 
27. Arguments against this were illustrated earlier in this chapter. These justifications are here to 
signif that the researcher is aware of the reservations some statisticians have about such procedures. 
27.1 Hie are calculated by the formula illustrated earlier in this chapter 
20 Do not result from errors in the process of data entr\ 
This \N as suggested by Professor John Matthews in a meeting with the researcher in the Schools of 
Mathematics and Statistics at the University of Newcastle. 
Linearity in the logfit is a main assumption for the logistic model. Testing for linearit\ was 
aºchic\ cd h\ using Bo\-Tidwell and polynomial regression. Modelling this linearit\ b\ adding 
quadratic terms did not `gi\ c satisfactory results (the process of modelling \\ as done under supervision 
fro111 Professor Jim Jaccard from "State university ofNeww Yore: " \ is email) 
-' 1 
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7.8.4 Univariable models: 
Univariable models are run for all the independent variables to see how each of them 
works as a predictor without holding the other variables constant. Results presented 
in Table 7.25 below can also be useful in building a model by helping us to choose 
which variables should be in the model in the first step of modelling (see explanation 
of purposeful selection below). 
Fable 7.25: Results of univariable models for all variables 
B S. E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 95.0% C. I. 
Continuous variables: 
S EM PN O . 026 . 
007 13.489 
. 000 1.027 1.012 1.041 
SASSETS . 037 . 
015 6.641 . 010 1.038 1.009 1.068 
STURNOV . 104 . 
030 12.298 . 000 1.109 1.047 1.176 
LEVERAGE -. 649 . 
632 1.056 
. 
304 
. 
522 
. 
151 1.802 
PROFIT 1 . 
431 
. 
749 
. 
331 
. 
565 1.538 
. 
355 6.676 
PROFIT2 . 
030 
. 
065 
. 
221 
. 
639 1.031 
. 
908 1.171 
FREFLOAT 1.348 . 
483 7.805 . 005 3.850 1.495 9.913 
Dummy variables 
F_SUB 1.118 . 
386 8.372 . 004 3.058 1.434 6.518 
SEGMENTE 1.505 . 
303 24.629 . 000 4.506 2.486 8.165 
AUDITOR . 904 . 
276 10.702 . 001 2.470 1.437 4.245 
L_S 2.183 . 
488 19.994 . 000 8.876 3.409 23.11 
FORINVS2 . 
208 
. 
277 
. 
566 . 
452 1232 
. 
716 2.119 
FORMANG . 681 . 
261 6.800 . 009 1.975 1.184 3.295 
BIM AN 1 . 
120 
. 
270 
. 
196 
. 
658 1.127 
. 
664 1.913 
BIMAN2 -. 055 . 
257 . 
045 
. 
832 
. 
947 
. 
573 1.566 
BIMAN3 -. 012 . 
254 
. 
002 
. 
962 
. 
988 
. 
601 1.625 
Industry variables (categorical) 
INDUSI - 10.407 . 034 
INDUS 1(1)2 1.115 . 
537 4.309 . 038 3.050 1.064 8.742 
IN DUS I (2) . 
067 
. 
326 
. 
042 
. 
838 1.069 
. 
565 2.024 
INDUS I (3) 1.051 . 
442 5.644 . 018 2.859 1.202 6.803 
INDUSI(4) . 
509 . 
442 1.327 . 
249 1.664 . 
700 3.955 
INDUS2 4.446 . 
108 
INDUS2(1) . 815 . 
392 4.330 . 037 2.259 1.048 4.868 
INDUS2(2) . 
265 . 
308 . 
740 . 
390 1.303 
. 
713 2.384 
Note: bold typeface indicates a statistically significant coefficient at the 0.05. The dependent variable 
is, i\vcn 0 for GGAAP and I for IRAS. 
Variables as defined below Table 7.4 
7.8.5 Full model: 
\s explained in section 7.8.1. a multivariable model in this study should have a 
maximum of 10 independent variables. Hovvcvcr. a full model which includes all the 
Significance in some of the categories may and may not be reflected in the overall significance 
INDUSI(I), (2), (3) and (4) are: Utilities and Transportation, Manufacturing, Pharmaceutical and 
Chemicals, Technology and Trading (respectively). 
'16 
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variables suggested by the hypotheses is useful to show how the whole set of all of 
them works together. Still, we need to consider the fact that it is meaningless to 
include some variables in the same model because they proxy for the same thing. 
such as the three size variables and management ownership v ariables. Having 
variables which are highly correlated with each other results in multicollinearity. 
which can lead to inaccurate results (see below). The full model presented below 
include only one size variable which is categorised employees' number 
(OREMPNO)280. The management ownership variable MAN 12 is quiet different 
from MAN2 and MAN3, which are highly correlated with each other. Therefore, 
MAN I and only one of the other two variables are included in the model. 
While Table 7.26 presents a full model with only one size variable, one profitability 
variable and two management ownership variables, Appendix 10. E shows the other 
possible models which include the variables excluded here. 
Table 7.26: A full model with all the variables 
B S. E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 95.0%º C. I. EXP(B) 
LEVERAGE -0.820 0.806 1.035 0.309 0.440 0.091 2.138 
PROFITI -0.165 0.808 0.042 0.838 0.848 0.174 4.134 
FREFLOAT -0.125 0.693 0.033 0.857 0.882 0.227 3.434 
SEGMENT 1.330 0.395 11.330 0.001 3.780 1.743 8.200 
F SUB 0.414 0.439 0.891 0.345 1.514 0.640 3.578 
AUDID 0.748 0.317 5.566 0.018 2.114 1.135 3.936 
LS 0.534 0.591 0.816 0.366 1.705 0.536 5.425 
FORINVS2 0.218 0.393 0.306 0.580 1.243 0.575 2.687 
FORMAN 0.504 0.365 1.907 0.167 1.656 0.809 3.387 
INDUS2 3.206 0.201 
INDUS2(1) - 0.697 0.471 2.194 0.139 2.008 0.798 5.054 
INDUS2(2) -0.027 0.354 0.006 0.939 0.973 0.486 1.950 
OREMPNO 9.930 0.007 
OREMPNO(High) 1.763 0.559 9.930 0.002 5.829 1.947 17.447 
OREMPNO(Mid) 0.395 0.357 1.224 0.269 1.484 0.737 2.986 
MAN I 1.535 0.885 3.004 0.083 4.639 0.818 26.307 
MAN 33 0.080 0.672 0.014 0.905 1.083 0.290 4.043 
Constant -3.020 0.714 17.916 0.000 0.049 
Model Chi-square: 74.076 (Sig:. 000) -2 Log Likelihood = 288.840 
Note: bold typeface indicates a statistically significant coefficient at the 0.05. The dependent variable 
is given 0 for GGAAP and I for IRAS. 
Variables as defined below Table 7.4 
's 'Flic reduced model constructed later includes total assets (ORASSET). Therefore, emplo\ ces' 
number is presented here to show how both variables can have similar results. 
'5I The one which does not consider family ownership as management ownership 
S- INDI. 'S2(1)= Services (SERVIC2) whereas INDUS)(ý)=Manufacturing (MANUF? ) 
'17 
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According to the results represented in Table 7.26. only three N ariables SEGMENT. 
AUDID and OREMPNO are significant at 0.05. whereas another variable MAN I is 
marginally significant at 0.1. Further discussion on the relationship between the 
independent variables can be found in the following sections. The confidence 
intervals of the odds ratio which clearly include the value 1 imply overfitting and the 
need to a model with a smaller number of predictor. 
Statistics on the goodness of fit of this model will be presented below when 
compared with those of the constructed model (Main Model). 
7.8.6 Main Model (constructed model): 
The main aim of having a model with selected variables is to avoid overfitting which 
result in unreliable estimated coefficients. Variable selection and building models 
can be a complicated process. Experts in the field of logistic regression suggest 
different schemes to build a multiple regression model. According to Agresti (2002, 
p 212), "many model selection procedures exist, no one of which is always best". 
I-Iosmer and Lemeshow (2000, p91) state that "clear and careful thought" is needed 
and "successful modelling of a complex data set is part science, part statistical 
methods and part experience and common sense". For the purpose of this research, 
"Backward elimination", which can be considered as a type of stepwise regression, is 
used. 
Backward elimination is preferred to forward selection because it reduces the risk of 
eliminating variables which are only significant in the presence of other variables in 
the model (a suppressor effect). The risk of excluding such variables is high when 
using forward inclusion, in which the process starts with one single variable. Usually 
both methods provide the same results, but when the results differ, backward 
elimination may uncover relationships missed by forward inclusion. Backward 
elimination is described as "the most robust choice" since all model terms will be 
a chance of inclusion in the model (Design Expert. 2001, p. 10-3). 
: although the use of this type of regression is criticised for the purpose of testing 
tlicorv, it is agreed that it is suitable for exploratory work where previous research is 
limited (which is the case in this research) (Menard, 2001 and Agresti, 2001). 
Furthermore, the criticism that backward elimination is not the best choice for testing 
theory- is based on a concern about factors which are important in theory could be 
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eliminated just because they do not meet the criterion of inclusion in the model. In 
fact, this also should not be of concern to our study for the following reasons: 
" Some independent variables which were thought to be important were refitted 
back in the model, but proved be redundant. 
0 Constructing a model (independently 283) in accordance with the so-called 
"purposeful selection" approach (generally guided by the instructions 
suggested by Hosmer and Lemeshow (ibid. )284 ) can lead to the same model 
as one of few alternative models suggested by this approach (more is 
explained at the end of this section). 
The approach of backward elimination is based on the idea of starting the model with 
all the independent variables (see above the full model). Variables will only be 
removed if they do not substantially affect the goodness of fit of the model. Removal 
of variables is based on one of three criteria: likelihood ratio statistic, conditional 
statistic and Wald statistic (Field 2001). For the purposes of this research, the 
likelihood ratio statistic, which is believed to be the best criterion (ibid. ), is 
adopted285. This means that variables which do not have significant influence on the 
likelihood ratio statistic are eliminated. Whereas Appendix 10.6 depicts the different 
steps of elimination, the final results of this modelling process are presented in Table 
7.27: 
Table 7.27: Results of the Main (constructed) model 
Variable 286 B S. E. Wald Sig. 287 Exp(B) C. I for exp ()6) 
SEGMENT (+) 1.1 15 0.339 12.857 0.000 3.369 1.734 6.544 
AUDITOR (+) 0.723 0.311 5.396 0.010 2.062 1.120 3.796 
FORMANG (+) 0.606 0.314 3.713 0.027 1.833 0.990 3.395 
BIMAN 1 (-) 0.847 0.363 5.448 0.010 2.333 1.145 4.754 
OR3ASSET (+) 22.509 0.000 
ORASSET(High) 2.184 0.465 22.065 0.000 8.880 3.570 22.086 
ORASSET(Mid) 0.544 0.368 2.181 0.070 1.723 0.837 3.545 
Constant -3.132 0.445 49.481 0.000 0.044 
Model Chi-square: 74.076 (Sig: . 
000) -2 Log Likelihood = 288.840 
Note: bold typeface indicates a statistically significant coefficient at the 0.07 The dependent 
variable is given 0 for GGAAP and I for IRAS. Variables as defined below Table 7.4 
Without being influenced with results of backward elimination. 
The modelling here is not fully based on the guidelines b-\ Hosmer and Lemeshow. It is widely 
recognised among statisticians that personal judgment is essential in this type of modelling. 
285 This is Backward LR in SPSS. 
"So The expected signs for the variables are in the parentheses. 
One tailed significance because the hypotheses tested are directional. 
S IN Note that ORASSET (categorised total assets) has overall significance. \V hereas its categories ma\ 
ha\ c different significance levels from each other (see discussion section 7.10) 
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Using the results shown in the Table 7.27 above. the models can be set in another 
form which is the predicted probability of the event (complying with IRAS )2 : 
P(IRAS) =1 I +e-Z 
ii'here Z (Logit 1) = -3.132 + 1.115 SEGMENT + 0.72-3A UDID + 0.606F01? 1,1 I. V + 
0.847 BIMANI + 2.184 ORASSETI + 0.544 ORASSET2 
From the results above, one can see that the variables FORINVES, LEVER, PROFIT 
were excluded as they were redundant in multiple settings. On the other hand, 
BIMANI290, which was not significant at all in the univariable analysis, became 
significant in the multivariable model. Further analysis showed that ORASSET is the 
suppressor variable which caused BIMAN 1 to become significant. This may be 
explained by the inverse significant relationship between size and management 
ownership represented by BIMAN1291. A substantial majority (85 %) of the firms 
with management ownership are classified as "Small". 
Furthermore, some of the variables were redundant in the presence of other 
particular variables. The listing status variable, L. S, was significant when 
OR-ASSETS was not in the model. However, it is far from being significant when 
any of the size variables is in the model. This simply related to the fact that multiple 
listed companies are almost all large (see above). Dumontier and Raffournier (ibid), 
for example, use the total assets "LASSET" in a different model from that including 
the listing status variable "LIST". Agresti' statement (2002, p. 217) provides an 
important conclusion for this discussion In selecting a model, we are mistaken if we 
think that we have found the true one". 
: -fis stated above, similar results were obtained by the researcher when the 
"purposeful selection" approach was followed. As a first step to build a model under 
this approach, Agresti (ibid) recommends researchers study the effect of each single 
predictor on the dependent variable. This can include graphical smoothing for a 
continuous variable and a contingency table for a discrete variable. Hosmer and 
Lemeshow (1989,2000), on the other hand, suggest contingency tables and chi- 
square for discrete variables, but also sagest "univariable'" regression for 
continuous variables. Only variables which show a particular level of significance 
will be qualified for entry in the first multivariable model. They also suggest that the 
-)., `' The formula shown above is the original form ww hich shows the lo-it as a function of the IVs 
- Using MAN I in both continuous and dummy form gives similar results. 
'191 ('rosstabulation is not presented 
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t-test can work as a good univariable technique for this purpose. According to them 
the variables whose P values are less than . 
25 in the univariable models can be 
qualified for entry in the first stage of modelling (see results shown in Table 7.25). 
Yet_ they do not set a similar criterion for X2 292. 
An enormous number of models can be constructed using the different combinations 
of variables. Agresti (2002, p. 217) states that "Although selection procedures are 
helpful exploratory tools, the model-building process should utilize theory and 
common sense". The researcher looked at more than 35 multivariable models with 
different combinations (a sample is shown in Appendix 10.5)2`''. Judgments made in 
the process of deleting and refitting variables were based on the following: 
significance of the model (model chi-square 294 ), significance of the variables 
included in the model and R; 2295 Because of the relationship between the criteria 
used in the backward elimination above (likelihood ratio) and the ones used in this 
process, the researcher found that this judgmental process can lead to results that are 
compatible296 to those reported in Table 7.27. 
7.8.7 Model Evaluation: 
Many studies which used logistic regression fail to report information about 
assessing the model fit and similar information (Peng and So, 2002). In order to 
avoid such failure, the following sections are devoted to providing a reasonable level 
o l' supplementary analyses through which the Main model can be evaluated 297 - 
This 
c\valuation is made through the three following stages suggested by Menard (2001): 
" Evaluating the overall model 
" Evaluating the individual predictors 
" Testing the assumptions of the model 
" Residual diagnostics 
"'' Still they warn that attention should be given to any contingency table which contains zero cells. 
They add that including variables which have zero frequencies will cause "undesirable numerical 
outcomes to occur" (ibid, p 93). 
"'' lt does not seem to be practical to show results of all these models here, but a part of these results 
iý presented below. 
This is explained below in the Model Evaluation section. 
This variation measure is not a priority in choosing whether to include a variable in the model or 
not simply because the main purpose of the model is more than maximizing the variation explained in 
the Outcome (more explanation on this in 
Section 7.8.8.14). 
"1' Because of there is more than one model that can be suggested as a result of this approach. The one 
reported in Table 7.27 is one of these possible alternati\ es. 
-I oo some extent, this is 
judgmental as there is no general agreement on what to report. 
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7.8.8 Evaluating the overall model: 
This section aims to answer the question set by Menard (2001, p. 18) "can we be 
confident that there is a relationship between all of the independent variable, taken 
together, and the dependent variable, above and beyond what we might expect as a 
coincidence, attributable to random variable in the sample we analyze? " (p 18). 
7.8.8.1 Goodness of Fit measures: 
In general terms, goodness of fit statistics aims to test the fit of the model against the 
data. This section illustrates the results of the most commonly used measures in this 
area. 
7.8.8.1.1 Model Chi-square (G,,, ): 
The "Model chi-square" is the equivalent to the overall "F" test for the linear 
regression (Norusis, 2001, Field 2001). It is measured as the difference between the 
"-2 LL 299 of the model containing only the constant and the complete one. In other 
words, it is the drop in the "-2LL" as a result of including the predictors in the model. 
Like many statistics in this field, it has a chi-square distribution. Norusis (2001) 
suggests that it tests the null hypothesis that all the predictors in the current model 
(except the constant) have coefficients of 0. Field (2001, p. 178) defines it as "a test 
o l' the statistical significance of the combined effects of the independent variables 
\w- ithin the model". Finally, Menard (2001) advises that for most purposes, 
researchers should focus onGAI I. As shown at the 
bottom of Table7.27, the model 
chi-square of 74.076 is highly significant. This indicates that the Main model is 
significantly better than including only a constant term. This also implies that the set 
oof' variables significantly improves the prediction of the log odds. Finally, we can 
rcject the null hypotheses that the coefficients for all of the terms in the model are 
zero. The full model chi-square was 77.281 (implies slightly higher significance) 
7.8.8.1.2 Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit index: 
One of the most commonly used tests for measuring how well a model fits the 
obscr\ ed data, is Hosmer and Lemeshow's (H-L) Goodness of Fit test. This test is 
calculated using a contingency table created by dividing the sample into ten equal 
x Log Likelihood ratio. a commonly used statistic to measure how vv ell the estimated 
model fits the data 
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sized groups (approximately) based on the estimated probabilities299. This table 
compares the expected values with observed ones. The statistic derived from this 
table has a chi-square distribution. In this test we expect the expected and observed 
values to be close and consequently we expect an insignificant chi-square statistic 
(H-L. ibid). The following is the contingency table for H-L goodness of fit test and 
the result of that test. 
Table 7.28: Contingency table for Hosmer and Lerneshow test30° 
C GAAP IRAS Total 
Observed Expected Observed Expected 
1 29 28.340 1 1.660 30 
2 30 28.334 1 2.666 31 
3 22 23.497 5 3.503 27 
4 19 22.862 8 4.138 27 
5 26 25.804 7 7.196 33 
6 26 23.417 6 8.583 32 
7 22 20.613 10 11.387 32 
8 16 17.096 14 12.904 30 
9 12 11.786 21 21.214 33 
10 3 3.252 17 16.748 20 
Result of H-L test: Chi-square = 7.932 Sig. = 0.440 
The insignificant chi-square at the end of Table 7.28 indicates that the model is a 
good fit. This means that the observed events are not significantly different from the 
expected ones, which is desirable in this case. This result is consistent with the 
model's chi-square. The statistic produced by this test for the full model stated above 
is 4.515 with significance level of 0.808 (this indicates that the full model has better 
fit) 
7.8.8.1.3 Other measures: 
T\vo other measures which may help with the same purpose are Pearson and 
Deviance Goodness of Fit statistics301. These two statistics had significance levels of 
0.2177 and 0.3 17 respectively. These large P values give more assurance of the good 
lit of the model. 
't)t) This number b\ default in SPSS, it can be different and change to more or less in other packages 
such as AS. 
'01 From this table one needs to check the groups ww ith expected number cells expected 
frequencies of less than 5. H-L (ibid) accepted 5 cells with frequencies of less than 5. 
SIISS can be unreliable in producing these statistics (Peng and So, 2002). Therefore, these two 
measures were produced using the Nlinitab package. 
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7.8.8.1.4 Measuring the multiple association between the predictors and 
outcome: 
In the I inear regression, the statistic R2 is a very important measure of the usefulness 
of the model. Gujarati (2003) says that it is ""a summary measure that tells how well 
the sample regression line fits the data" (p8l ). It is also thought to be a measure of 
the proportion the variation in the outcome accounted for b\, the explanatory 
variables. For the logistic regression, there may be some debate about the analogue 
to R2 (Field 2001, Menard ibid. ). Garson (2004), for example. suggest many 
measures of which are: Cox and Snell's R-Square, Nagelkerke's R-Square and 
Pseudo-R-square. Results of show that Cox and Snell R-Square = 0.222, while 
Nagelkerke's R-Square =0.314. On the other hand, Gujarati (ibid) and Menard (ibid) 
support the use of McFadden R; (also Rý11 ). R; can be calculated using different 
formulas of which: 
Model chi - square / Original - 2LL = 74.076 /(74.076 + 288.840)'"-' =0.204 
According to this result, it seems that about 20.4% of the variation of the outcome is 
explained by the independent variables. Although this amount of variation seems to 
be moderate, we should remember that our aim from this regression is to attain 
reliable estimates of the coefficients and not maximize this statistic (see Gujarati, 
-1003). One should also note that the two other measures above give better results. 
Finally, the comparable measures of the full model were: Cox and Snell R-Square 
=0.230, Nagelkerke's R-Square = 0.326 and McFadden R; = 0.213. in general, 
results seem to be similar to the ones of the reduced model. 
7.8.8.1.5 Accuracy of prediction: 
One can measure who well a model performs by measuring its accuracy in 
classifying the sample into the two groups: GGAAP firms and IRAS firms. Table 
7.2) shown below is a classification table which is produced by SPSS. 
Table 7.29: Classification table 
Predicted % correct 
Observed G GAAP IRAS 
(i GAAP 191 14 9- 
IS5? 38 4?.? 
Ov crall percentage 77.6 
Notire here that the original -ALL is calculated b\ adding the model chi-square to the model 2LL 
hccausc it is the change in -? LL that is resulted form including variables in the model. 
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Table 7.29 compares the compares the observed and predicted group membership by 
classifying firms which have a predicted probability of 0.5 or greater as IRAS. 
According to this table, a high percentage of the G GAAP firms were correctly 
assigned to their right group. Conversely, it seems to be less predictive in the IRAS 
group. In total 229 out of 295 companies were correctly classified which gives an 
overall percentage of 77.6 % 303. Using the full model increase the number of 
correctly predicted IRAS to 41, but with the same overall percentage of 77.6% (less 
correctly predicted GGAAP cases (188 instead of 191 above)) 
Menard (2001) suggests three alternatives for measuring predictive efficiency which 
are /, /,, 
0, and z1, . 
For the purposes of this study, the researcher chose lambda-p 
(A 
/) 
), which is the most conservative measure304 
A,, = (Number of firms in the smaller observed category - number of firms 
incorrectly predicted by the model)/ number of firms in the smaller observed 
category 
= (90-66) / 90 = 0.27 
This level can be described as a moderately strong reduction in error. To measure the 
significance of this index, the binomial d statistic should be calculated (Menard, 
ibid). 
cl = (Pt, -pt, ) / 
VP, (1-Pt, ) /N Let: P, =proportion of errors without the model, 
pp,, = proportion of errors with the model, and N= total sample size. 
Furthermore, P,, = the number of firms in the smaller category305 / total sample size 
Then cl = (0.305-0.224)/ 0.305(1- 0.305) / 295 = 3.035 with statistical 
significance p=0.000306 This indicates that the proportion predicted incorrectly by 
the variables in the model differs significantly from that predicted without it. 
Another measure can be calculated here without much detail is tau-p (z ý, 
). 
", lt is shown in the output by SPSS that the highest percentage can be achieved by chance is 69.5 % 
which is calculated by classifying the firms in the largest observed group (GGAAP) correctly. 
Considering this, the model performs better than this by a margin of 9.1 °4,. To know how significant 
is this performance of the model over chance, we should look at "d" test shown below 
'0' This measure was recommended by Professor Scot Menard via email. Furthermore, it may be more 
dppropriate when a model involves only dichotomous predictors (Menard 2001). 
''" I'his is onl\ in the case of this measure where the "expected number of errors" equals the number 
of firms In the smaller category . 
This is calculated differently in the case of r 
'"`' d is assumed to be normall\ distributed. Therefore its significance is checked in the tables of the 
normal cur\ C. 
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T 17 = 
0.472 d=6.961 307 with statistical significance 1) = . 
000 
The index TP shows better performance in classification than that measured by ;, /) . 
Finally, one should remember that the main aim of this study is to test theory. This 
simply makes the goodness of fit more important than measuring the accuracy of 
prediction (Menard, 200 1)308. It should be mentioned here that the full model shown 
above has exactly the same overall percentage of 77.6%. 
7.8.8.2 Evaluating individual predictors: 
This section concerns the interpretation of the coefficients and the odds ratios of the 
variables included in the model. Furthermore, it explains some other variables which 
were excluded from this model. 
7.8.8.2.1 Interpretation of coefficients and the odds ratios: 
This section discusses the contribution of the different variables in this model whicll 
contribute to the prediction of the outcome. For ease of interpretation, it is 
commonly known that it is better to interpret the exponentiated coefficients exp ß 
(Fxp (commonly known as odds ratio) rather than the coefficients themselves. 
Interpreting the relationship between the exp ß and the odds of an event 1('9 does not 
need logarithmic transformation (Field 2001). In other words. it is easier to 
understand the change in the odds of an event than the change in the log of the odds. 
Its interpretation is the change in the odds of an event (probability of event 
/Probability of non-event)310 as a result of one unit change in the predictor311. The 
following is an interpretation for all the variables included in the model shown above. 
Iii general positive coefficients indicate the positive relationship between the 
variables and the log of the odds. They also indicate that the odds ratios are greater 
than 1. An odds ratio greater than one means an increase in the odds. Conversely, an 
odds ratio of less than 1 (negative coefficient) indicates a decrease in odds. 
'07 J result from the same formula shown above but with P, calculated differentl\ (see Menard 
X001) 
Although Menard (2001) provides some measures for this purpose, he tells that the literature in the 
area is verv limited and not vv ell developed. 
09 . I -lie odds of an event = P(c"l'c'nt) 
/ P(no event) 
One should alwa\ s bear in mind that there is difference hem een the odds ratio and the odds. The 
relationship hct\veen them is that the odds ratio determines the change in the odds. 
Positive coefficients lead to odds ratios of larger than" F. This \\ ill also mean that an increase in 
the predictor causes increase in the odds of the outcome 
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SEGMENT: If a German listed firm is classified in a market segment (DAX. 
MDAX or SMAX), the odds of its compliance with IRAS increase by a factor of 
3.369312. In other words German listed "classified" firms are more likely to comply 
with IRAS than the unclassified ones. The 95 % confidence interval ranged from 
1.734 to 6.544, means that we can be fairly confident that the odds ratio cannot take 
the value -I"313. This means that such result can be generalized to the population' 4 
(Field 2001, Norusis, 2001). AUDID: the fact that a German listed firm has a Big-5 
auditor increase the odds of adopting IRAS by a factor of 2.06. That is to say that 
their tendency to adopt IRAS is more than that for those employing a Non-BigS 
auditor. FORMAN: the positive coefficient and the odds ratio with a value larger 
than 1 indicates that the presence of a foreign manager on either the supervisory 
board or the executive board increases the odds of complying with IRAS (by 1.833). 
The same interpretation applies to the odds ratio of BIMANI which indicates that 
the odds of using IRAS by a German listed firm increase by 2.3 33 when managers 
hold a proportion of its shares. Finally, being in the highest category of assets 
(ORASSET (High)) increases the odds of using IRAS by 8.880 times3 1' than for the 
ones in category (Low). The odds ratio of ORASSET (Mid) indicates that being a 
Firm in the Medium category increases the odds of being an IRAS firm comparing 
with those in the category (Low), but with much smaller factor than that for the ones 
in the higher category. 
One important thing to be emphasized in these results is that the confidence intervals 
for the exp (ß) for all the variables except for FORMAN do not contain the value "1 ". 
As mentioned above, having such confidence interval indicates that the direction of 
the relationship is stable in the population as a whole (see Footnote 311). In other 
ww ords, this makes us confident about the effect of the variable. Furthermore. also for 
the variables FORMAN and FORSUB, the confidence interval barely crosses the 
3ý' The odds ratio is the exponentiated coefficient 1.1 1? (e 
12 ). The logit is based on the value of 
"1" for the odds of event (adopting I RAS). Recalling the fact that odds ratio greater than "I" increase 
the odds of the event, the switch in SEGMENT from "0" to "I" means the odds will equal 1x2.668 
\n odds ratio of 1 is the equivalent to a coefficient of zero (simply because e°= 1 ). Odds ratio of 
"1" means that does not have impact on the odds of the event. 
314 We can be confident that the exp 
ß in the population lies some\\ here in the range of this interval. 
Still, one should remember her that the population here is data of companies at any points of time 
other than the sample \ ear. 
Note that one can interpret the odds ratio in slightly different \v a\ s. 
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value 1. This implies that we can be fairly confident about the results for these two 
variables (see Hosmer and Lemeshow. 1989)3 1 ý' 
7.8.8.2.2 Interactions: 
An interaction can only be included in the model if the main effects which make up 
this interaction were in this model (Agresti, ibid, Hosmer and Lemeshow. ibid). 
Based on this rule, a group of interactions that may be theoretically plausible were 
set. Few of these terms were significant in univariable 317 models. These interactions 
were introduced to the model above. However, improvements in the model were 
very small. These little improvements were measured in terms of the reduction in - 
2 LL. Therefore, the researcher decided to exclude them to avoid any drawbacks of 
including variables which do not improve the model (overfitting)' 18. This may be 
consistent with a statement by Agresti (2002, p. 174) "if more complex models do not 
fit better, this provides some assurance that the model adopted is reasonable". 
7.8.8.3 Testing assumptions of the model and model diagnostics: 
There is no clear consensus on a group of assumptions for the logistic regression. 
This section concerns testing the assumptions widely accepted in the literature319 
7.8.8.3.1 Linearity: 
Unlike in linear regression, linearity between the independent variables is not 
assumed. However, in a logistic model it is strictly assumed that the continuous 
independent variables are linear in the logit (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989,2000, 
Frank and Harrell, 2001). There was no need to test this assumption here, as in the 
Main model adopted there is not any continuous predictor ''(' . 
Furthermore. 
alternative models which contained continuous variables showed that the logit was 
not linear in the size variables. 
3"' They interpreted similar intervals in a similar way and considered them to be good results. 
'The models including only the interaction term 
l This exclusion was after consultation made by emailing Professor Fred Pampel. Professor Richard 
tichcaffer and Professor Scott Menard 
I`' In addition to specific related references, Professor Marjia Norusis and Professor Scott Menard 
ww ere also consulted by the researcher about the assumptions that to be checked for the case of this 
studv. 
This assumption is checked for the only continuous variable in this study InENIPNO in one of the 
alternativ e models. 
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7.8.8.3.2 Additivity: 
Non-additivity may occur when the change in the dependent variable resulting from 
a one unit change in the independent variable depends on the value of one of the 
other variables. Menard (2001. p75) states that detecting non-additivity is not 
"straightforward" and that researchers are commonly left with a choice between 
assuming an additive model and testing for all plausible interactions (see above for 
testing interactions). 
7.8.8.3.3 Testing for multicollinearity: 
The absence of multicollinearity is widely recognized as an assumption for a logistic 
model. It occurs when one or more of the predictors in the model can he 
approximately determined by some of the other predictors. According to Kleinbaum 
(2001, p. 168), multicollinearity can lead to "highly unreliable" estimated coefficients 
and "consequently, any modeling strategy must check for possible multicollinearity 
at various steps in the variable selection process". In a multiple logistic regression 
one should consider only these variables which would not create high levels of 
rnulticollinearity (Menard 2001). Table 7.30 shows two of most commonly used 
statistics in testing multicollinearity321: 
Table 7.30: Multicollinearity diagnostics I 
ToleranceV VIF 
SEGMENT . 863 1.158 
AUDID . 937 
1.067 
FORMAN . 923 1.083 
MAN 1 . 786 
1.273 
ORASSESI . 697 
1.435 
ORASSET2 . 821 
1.218 
Variables as defined below Table 7.4 
Menard (2001) consider a tolerance value of less than 0.1 to be an indication of 
serious problem with multicollinearity, whereas Garson (2004) set a tolerance value 
of . 
250 and VIF of 4 as indication of "too much"" multicollinearity rule. According to 
1\ 1y crs (1990), a VIF value of larger than 10 can be a problem. From Table 7.30, it 
can he seen that the smallest tolerance value was 0.697. vv pile the largest VIF was 
. 1.435. Such values show that there 
is no sign of multicollinearity. 
'11 SPSS does not produce these statistics for logistic regression. Therefore, as recommended b\ Field 
0001) and Norusis (2001). linear regression was run using the binary outcome to produce these 
statistics. 
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An additional tool to diagnose multicollinearity is to examine the so called 
; igenvalue and Condition Index. Table 7.31 shows both the Eigenvalues and the 
condition index values which can be an additional tool to diagnose multicollinearity: 
Table 7.31: Multicollinearity diagnostics 2 
Dimension322 Eigenvalue Condition index 
1 3.651 1.000 
2 1.082 1.837 
3 . 891 2.025 
4 . 581 2.508 
5 . 404 3.004 
6 . 258 3.764 
7 . 134 5.219 
According to Field (2001), there are no rigid criteria to determine how much smaller 
O arger) an Eigenvalue (Index Condition) 323 needs to be to indicate a 
multicollinearity problem. However, a common rule of thumb suggests that "a 
condition index greater than 15 indicates a possible problem and an index greater 
than 30 suggests a serious problem with collinearity" (Result Coach/ SPSS 11). From 
Table 7.31, it can be seen that the largest Condition Index is far less than the 
criterion quoted above. Finally, the coefficients in the correlation matrix in Table 7.4 
support the results discussed above. 
7.8.8.3.4 Zero Cells: 
11-L (2000) and Menard (2001) emphasize that attention should be given to zero 
cells. There should be no zero cells when contingency tables are produced by 
categorical variables. The contingency tables presented earlier in this chapter show 
that there are no such cells. 
7.8.8.3.5 Autocorrelation: 
Arises only when the data are sequenced in some way as in time series data, which is 
not the case here (Garson, ? 004)'`4. 
7.8.8.4 Analysis of Residuals: 
l'hc residual is the difference between the observed probability and the predicted one 
tusing the model estimates (Norusis, 2001). There are two main purposes of residual 
analysis: one is to detect cases for which model fits poorly and second is to detect 
l'hcrc is I dimension for each parameter. 
i he Condition Index tells about the Elgenva ue in a different N\ a. (a small Eigen values means 
kir, -, c 
Condition Index) 
This \\ as also confirmed h\ Professor Scott Menard \ Ia email 
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cases that exert an undue influence on the estimated parameters oi'the model (Field. 
2001). 
For the purpose of identifying the cases for which the model works poorly. it is 
suggested by Menard (2001) that researchers should use the Studentized residuals 325. 
These residuals can be examined against the criterion that cases with values outside 
of + 2.5 should be looked at closely, whereas cases with values outside of ±3 should 
be cause for concern. 
Pearson residuals (also known as Standardized 326) can be used as well. The Pearson 
residual has larger values than those of the Studentized residuals. Menard (2001) and 
Field (2001) suggest that, with the Standardized (Pearson) residuals. one would 
expect 5% of the sample to have values outside the range +2 and I% outside + 1. 
Table 7.32 shows that the percentage of Studentized residual and Deviance statistic 
outside +2 is much less than 5 %, whereas the percentage of Standardized residual 
values outside + 2.5 is 3 %. 
According to the criteria above, the only cases which need to be looked at closely 
involve 8 companies. If the judgment is based on having standardized residuals 
outside ± 3, only two companies cause concern. One of these companies is Softship 
AG, which is using IAS despite the fact that it is not in a quality segment, with a 
small auditor, has no foreign manager and is categorized as Small. Still, this 
company has a factor which is included in the Main model as a significant predictor. 
Managers in this company own a share in its equity capital (see discussion on results 
in Table 7.36 below). Furthermore, this company has a foreign subsidiary and sales 
abroad. This element of internationality may be a good explanation for the adoption 
of IAS (see discussion below) 
"l'hc second company Sartorius AG is not classified in a quality segment, with a non- 
Big-5 auditor, is categorized as small, but has a subsidiary abroad and at least one 
foreign manager on its management board. These last two factors may be enough 
reasons for a firm to comply with IAS because they are significant factors (see 
discussion on internationality below). Furthermore, looking at the data of this firm in 
particular showed that it has a subsidiary in the US. Having a subsidiary in the US is 
presented in SPSS under the name "Sre" 
', `' presented in SPSS under the name "Zre" 
?, 1 
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also a highly significant factor: nonetheless it is not included in the model above, . 
In fact, there is no need to exclude these two companies after ensuring that the data 
is correct. Furthermore, the other types of residuals (Studentized and Deviance) for 
these companies are still within the range + 2.5. 
As shown in Table 7.33, each of the other firms with standardized residuals within 
the range ± 2.5 has a few characteristics that are consistent with the implications of 
the model above. Hence there is no need for further investigation 
Overall. we should notice that it is only Pearson residuals which have values outside 
the range ± 2.5. This was because values of this type of residuals tend to be larger 
than those of the other types. This note can give us more assurance about the 
mode1328. 
able 7.32: Residual diagnostics in the Main Model 
Residual ±2f2.5 ±3 
Studentized (sre) 7 2.4 %00 
Deviance (dev) 7 2.4 %00 
Standardized (zre) 18 6.1 %72.4 %20.7% 
Table 7.33: Cases for which the Main Model fits poorly 
ACC Segment AUDID FORMAN ß1SIAN Size 
Firms with standardized residuals outside the ±3 range: 
tioltship AG IAS 0 0 0 1 Small 
Sartorius AG IAS 0 0 1 0 Small'2' 
Firms with standardized residuals outside the ± 2.5: 
Zahl-Creation AG USGAAP 1 0 0 0 Small 
Ilurgbad AG IAS 1 0 0 0 Small 
MPC Capital AG lAS 1 0 0 0 Small 
Sanacorp Pharmahandel IAS 1 0 0 0 Med"' 
Sol1ship AG IAS 0 0 0 1 Small 
Uniprofi Real Estate IAS 0 1 0 1 Small 
7.8.8.4.1 Influential cases: 
The residuals investigated above help to determine the cases for which the model fits 
poorly. To find if there is any cases which have a high influence on the model a few 
influence statistics can be produced. The most commonly used statistics for this 
31' Ithough having a subsidiary in the US is a hypothesis for compliance with US GAAP, it is not 
theoretically, justified to explain the use of IRAS in general. 
I laying other types of residuals weithin the acceptable limits is a good indicator (Menard 2001) 
mall in terms of turnoý ýr and asset but Medium in terms of emplo\ Ces, numbers 
Small in terms of employees- numbers but medium in terms of turn o er and total assets 
_ýý 
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purpose are the leverage and the DFBeta values33' (Menard 2001. Field 2001). The 
leverages are assumed to be small and not much larger than the expected value. 
Leverage values of the model above were all very small and very close to the 
expected value of . 
027332 (maximum value of 0.08). 
A DFBeta greater than "1" indicates possible influential cases. All the DFBeta 
values produced by the model above were far less than 1 (maximum value of 0.13)"' 
The finding that there were not any influential points may be explained by the fact 
that all the predictors are dummy variables where outliers do not exist- -4 
7.8.9 Significant factors excluded from the model: 
As mentioned above, some of the variables were excluded from the model presented 
above as they were redundant and insignificant. However, these variables were 
significant in other multivariable models 3 5. These variables are FORINVES, LIST, 
USSUB, PANDC and all size variables (see Appendix 5). 
Although FORINVES (having foreign investors) was insignificant in the univariable 
and bivariate analysis 336 it becomes significant when we control for SEGMENT. 
This suppression effect is the result of the significantly negative relationship between 
these two variables (explained in the discussion section 7.10). 
The impact of the listing status variable (LIST), on the other hand, is masked by the 
size variables. This is almost certainly a result of the significantly positive 
relationship between size and listing status (explained above in the crosstabulations 
and chi-square test). 
All the size variables are, in fact, significant in alternative models. Yet, none of these 
variables is linear in the logit (see discussion section 7.10). 
7.9 Results of the multinomial logistic regression: 
This type of model is explained explicitly in Chapter 6. Whereas. ANOVA and 
Kruskal-Wallis are used above to test differences between the three groups of 
companies (IAS, US GAAP and G GAAP) using one statistical test, the multinomial 
DFBeta, measures the change in the regression coefficients as a result of removing one of the cases. 
\v hereas the Leverages measure the relative influence of each observation of the model's fit. 
The values of leverage lie between 0 and 1. The expected value can be calculated b' the formula 
(k+ I) N, vv, here K is the number of the parameters and N is the sample size = 8295=0.027 
9ý °o of these values are less than 0.0-52 
lt is common knowledge that outliers can have large influences on the estimates of parameters. 
These models are not presented here. 
Recall that bivariable analysis means the use of chi-square 
ý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model is intended to show the relationship between a group of variables and the 
choice of one of the three accounting sets. It may be useful to remind readers here 
that although the choice between IAS and US GAAP is studied in the following 
chapter, this analysis is also useful because it considers the G GAAAP choice 
compared with each of IAS and USGAAP separately. 
The process of choosing was similar to that in the binary logistic regression. 
However, the results were limited by the number of variables that can be included in 
the model. The number of US GAAP firms is only 23, which means that the number 
of events in the smallest group is only 23. This, in turn, limits the number of 
variables in the model to three variables. 
As explained in Chapter 6, the limited number of USGAAP companies makes this 
analysis less important and, consequently, informal. Therefore, only the results of the 
adopted model and the related interpretations are presented with here. The aim is 
simply to show the most important factors associated with the choice between the 
three GAAPs. Table 7.34 contains the results of the multinomial model adopted. 
hible 7.34: Results of the Multinomial Model for choice between GGAAP, IAS and US GAAP 
B Std. Wald Sig". Exp(B) 95%, Confidence 
Error Interval for Exp(B) 
IAS Intercept 2.053 0.624 10.818 0.001 
FREFLOAT -1.251 0.930 1.810 0.178 0.286 0.046 1.771 
USLIST -2.021 0.903 5.007 0.025 0.133 0.023 0.778 
[USSUB=1] -0.280 0.590 0.226 0.635 0.755 0.238 2.402 
GGAAP Intercept 4.059 0.589 47.418 0.000 
FREFLOAT -1.908 0.888 4.613 0.032 0.148 0.026 0.635 
USLIST -1.998 0.816 5.998 0.014 0.136 0.027 0.671 
[USSUB=1] -1.642 0.552 8.841 0.003 0.194 0.066 0.571 
Variables as defined below Table 7.4 
The reference category in the model is the US GAAP group. This allows us to 
compare each of IAS and G GAAP companies with the US GAAP companies (see 
Chapter 6). The model shows that most important predictors in the choice of G 
C ºAAP and US GAAP are free float (FREFLOAT), having a subsidiary in the US 
(U, SSUB) and listing on NYSE (USLIST). 
Hie results of the variable FREFLOAT in the G GAAP" section of Table 7.34 
indicates that a free float increase of one unit (0.01) decreases the loh( of the 
probability ratio between G GAAP and US GAAP by -1.908 (B). In terms of 
One-tailed significance is considered here because the hypotheses related to the % ariables in the 
model are unidirectional. 
`34 
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probabilities, this means that an increase of one unit in the free float decreases the 
ratio of the probability of being a GGAAP company to the probability of being a US 
GAAP company by 0.026. Overall, it can be said that the increase in free float 
increases the probability of using US GAAP to using GGAAP. In the IAS section, 
on the other hand, this variable is not significant. Analyzing the relationship between 
IAS and US GAAP is considered in Chapter 8. 
The results for the variable USLIST suggest that listing on NYSE decreases the 
probability of being a GGAAP company to that of being a USGAAP company by 
0.136. USLIST is also significant factor in determining the choice of IAS compared 
with USGAAB. On the other hand, whereas having a subsidiary in the US decreases 
the probability of being a GGAAP company to that of being a USGAAP one, it is 
not an important factor in determining the choice of IAS compared with USGAAP. 
The model above is based on allocating the US GAAP group as a reference category. 
This does not allow us to compare the probabilities of using G GAAP to those of 
using IAS. Therefore in another step the IAS group was made the reference category. 
Table 7.35 shows that the only significant factor in the model that affects the choice 
between G GAAP and IAS is "USSUB". The results indicate that having a 
subsidiary in the US decreases the ratio of the probability of using GGAAP to the 
probability of using IAS by a factor of 0.256. 
It should be indicated that size in terms of turnover and employees' numbers is also 
an important predictor in determining the choice between GGAAP and USGAAP; 
nevertheless it is not included in the model. Results of size are similar to those of 
free float. This can be related to the significant positive correlation between size 
variables and free float. Adding one of the two size variables to the model masks the 
significance of USLIST as a factor of the choice between GGAAP and USGAAP 
(but not between IAS and USGAAP, where it stays significant). One explanation is 
that nearly all the companies listed on the US are larger companies. Moreover, size is 
highly insignificant in the choice between IAS and USGAAP (tested in Chapter 9). 
_ýý 
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1 <ible 7.35: Multinomial model results with IAS as a reference cateuor\ 
B Std. Wald Sig. Exp(B) Confidence 
Error Interval for Exp(B) 
USGAAP Intercept -2.053 0.624 10.818 0.001 
FREFLOAT 1.251 0.930 1.810 0.178 3.495 0.565 21.635 
USLIST 2.021 0.903 5.007 0.025 7.542 1.285 44.275 
[USSUB=1 ] 0.280 0.590 0.226 0.635 1.324 0.416 4.210 
GGAAP Intercept 2.006 0.297 45.670 0.000 
FREFLOAT -0.657 0.571 1.320 0.251 0.519 0.169 1.589 
USLIST 0.022 0.959 0.001 0.981 1.023 0.156 6.704 
[USSUB=1] -1.362 0.300 20.546 0.000 0.256 0.142 0.462 
Variables as defined below Table 7.4 
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7.10 Summary and discussion of the results: 
Table 7.36 present a summary with the results of this chapter and the related 
hypotheses. However, this table excludes the results of ANOVA. Kruskal-Wallis and 
the multinomial model. Results of the analysis on the three groups: IAS, US GAAP 
and GGAAP are discussed in Chapter 8. 
The hypotheses tested in this chapter are on the choice between GGAAP and IRAS, 
nevertheless a part of the analysis is concerned with the choice between GGAAP. 
lAS and US GAAP. The statistical analysis presented above aims to test each of the 
study's hypotheses extensively through three levels of analysis: univariable, 
bivariable and multivariable. One important observation of this analysis is that there 
is no persistent consistency between the results of the three types. 
The null hypothesis on size is rejected at all levels, indicating that larger German 
firms are more likely to be IRAS companies. However, the relationship between size 
and compliance with IRAS does not appear to be linear. The non-linearity between 
size and the logit (log of the odds of adopting IRAS) is evident by testing for 
linearity using Box-Tidwell. Referring to Table 7.5, percentages of companies using 
IRAS in Large, Medium and Small Category are approximately: 77.1%, 33% and 
20%, respectively 341. One can see that the percentage of medium firms using IRAS is 
not much higher than that of small firms, or at least it is substantially lower than that 
of large companies. The question is what makes the two categories Medium and 
Small have very close percentages, and what makes the difference between the 
percentages in Large and Medium categories so large. To some extent, this may be 
blamed on the fact that "Unclassified" firms comprise a large percentage of the 
category Medium (given the positive impact of being in a quality segment on the 
adoption of IRAS, explained in a later section). However, the medium category is 
still insignificant after controlling for SEGMENT, which means that there are other 
reasons for this non-linearity. Furthermore, the impact of SEGMENT is discussed in 
a separate section below. Still, this non-linearity does not lead to accepting the null 
hypothesis that size is not associated with the adoption of IRAS, especially that the 
overall significance of the size variable as presented in Table 7.27 is high (P value < 
. 
000). 
Percentage presented in the Table 7.5 are calculated horizontally. whereas these percentages are 
calculated \ ertically and not presented 
in the table. 
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Despite the significant tendency in the larger firms to comply with IR: \S. some very 
large firms such as BASF, Linde and Deutsche Telecom are still using GGAAP. 
1ý urther examination of the data of these companies shows that they do not have 
distinctive characteristics compared with other larger firms. In other words, they 
belong to a particular industry sector and are classified in a quality segment. 
However, all these companies seem to have one thing in common that is the absence 
of management ownership (in terms of MAN 1). When family ownership is 
considered (MAN2 and MAN3), only two of these companies appear to have 
management ownership. This may provide some support for the result on the impact 
of management ownership which is discussed in a later section. 
The result that size is a determinant of choosing accounting standards is consistent 
with the results of Dumontier and Raffournier (1998) and Cuijpers et al (2002). 
area (2004), on the other hand finds that size is a significant factor in choosing IAS 
by companies in the "Internationally mixed" sample, but not in the subsample 
comprising German firms 42. This contradicts the results of ANOVA, Kruskal-Wallis 
and the multinomial model discussed above343, which show that size is materially 
different across GGAAP and IRAS firms. However, some concerns about the sample 
taken by Tarca may explain the difference. Her German sample comprises only 13 
companies, which are not chosen randomly and which were likely to be larger 
344 
companies . 
Being in a quality segment (SEGMENT) is one of the significant factors included in 
the adopted model. The null hypothesis is rejected in the univariable, bivariable and 
multivariable analysis. There are no results from the extant literature to be compared 
with those presented here, because this hypothesis has not been tested before. This is 
because of the limited literature on the adoption of IRAS. Furthermore, this kind of 
segmentation exists in the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, but not in the same form in 
other exchanges. It should be remembered here that size is not the only criterion to 
classify a German listed company in a quality segment (different from FTSE 100, for 
She studies a sample of companies from different countries. At the same time she tests a 
subsample of companies of each country . 
\lthough size is not reported in the multinomial above, it is significant but excluded to show the 
significance of US listing. 
harca ordered annual reports form the largest 150 German companies, in addition to the ones 
which \\ ere mentioned in the lists of foreign companies 
in 5 stock exchanges (for example German on 
NYSE lists). Overall the annual reports received numbered only 13 and the, N\ ere all included in the 
study. 
'41 
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example). In general, German companies classified in quality segments are required 
by the private law of the Deutsche Börse to provide information of higher quality. 
Furthermore, classified companies are represented by market indices such as DAX 
and DAX 100 and are therefore the focus of investors' attention. This makes IDAS 
and US GAAP convenient options for these companies to satisfy the strict 
requirements of the stock market and to meet the need for investor-oriented 
information. 
Further analysis using a nominal variable that represents the different se` ments (four 
categories: DAX, MDAX, SMAX and Unclassified instead of a binary variable: 
classified or not) gives the same result. It also shows that the higher the segment is, 
the more the likelihood of using IRAS (see Appendix). 
Another kind of segmentation in German exchanges is the statutory segmentation: 
Official and Regulated markets. The relationship between compliance with IRAS 
and being in one of these statutory segments was also tested (informally), but it was 
not significant. 
The null hypothesis on free float is rejected through the results of all univariable 
tests, but it was not included in the Main Model. Yet, it is significant in another 
multivariable model by omitting SEGMENT. There is clear relationship between 
these two variables. Free float is expected to be higher in companies classified in the 
quality segments DAX and SMAX (but not MDAX345), where they are required to 
have a minimum free float. This may be confirmed by the significantly positive 
correlation between the two variables SEGMENT and FREFLOAT (also a highly 
significant chi-square between categorized free float and quality segments). Because 
ol'this significant relationship, FREFLOAT was masked by SEGMENT. 
The alternative hypothesis on free float states that German companies' propensity to 
comply with IRAS is positively associated with free float. According to agency 
thcory, as explained in Chapter 5, compliance with IRAS in firms with wide 
dispersion of ownership can be a monitoring activity imposed by shareholders, or a 
bonding activity imposed by managers. It also can be considered as a signal by 
managers to owners that they are acting in their best interest. 
'41 NIDAX companies are not required to have a specific minimum free float percentage. 
74" 
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This result is consistent with Dumontier and Raffournier on compliance with IAS by 
Swiss companies. It is also consistent with Hossain et al (1994) and Ruland et al 
(1990), indicating that voluntary disclosure increases with the level of free float. 
('conversely, with the management ownership variables, the results of multivariable 
analysis indicate that one of these variables (MAN 1) is a significant predictor of 
choosing IRAS, whereas the univariable and bivariable analysis accept the null 
hypothesis. Yet, the multivariable model indicates a positive relationship between 
the presence of management ownership and choosing IRAS, which is the opposite of 
that expected. The hypothesis, stated in Chapter 5, is based on arguments from 
previous literature, and is that the likelihood of using accounting standards of high 
quality (i. e. IRAS) decreases with the proportion of management ownership 
(remember that the management ownership variable is expressed here as a binary 
variable), because there is less need for monitoring by outsiders. However, the 
explanation provided in chapters 2 and 5 on the complex environment of ownership, 
control and conflict of interests in German firms may justify having the opposite 
result to that suggested by the literature. The positive relationship, on the other hand, 
may be explained by the tendency of managers who own equity in the company to 
develop its accounting reporting system to what they believe is in the best interest of 
the firm. This can be justified by the benefits that managers would expect from using 
IAS or US GAAP. This may raise a question on what benefit managers do get from 
sharing high quality information with investors. However, this is not absolutely true 
because adoption of IRAS can have more advantages than providing useful 
information for investors. A survey by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2002b) indicates 
that a majority of the European CFOs believe that IAS and US GAAP can be useful 
för internal reporting (see Chapter 4). Another survey by Mazars (2003) shows that 
ncarly 87 % of German listed firms surveyed believes that the conversion to IAS will 
help them to improve the internal organisation of their company. Furthermore, Leuz 
and Verrecchia (2000) proved that the adoption of IRAS by German firms is 
iissoýciatcd with lower bid-ask spreads and higher share turnover. Moreover. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2004) state that financial advisers working in many capital 
markets insist that companies should use JAAS if they are planning a public offering. 
they also state that "using LAS as a common financial language for the \ 11Ole group 
can improve management reporting and 
decision making". Managers wlio own a 
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proportion of their company's equity are expected to consider these advantages of 
IRAS and adopt it, if they believe it can benefit them. 
As explained above, the suppressor variable that makes MAN I significant in the 
multivariable model is ORASSETS. Given, the significantly negative relationship 
between size and MAN 1, one may state that the tendency to comply with IRAS 
increases in small German firms with management ownership. This result may imply 
owner-managers of relatively small companies may be trying to publicise the 
attractiveness and enhance the image of their firms by using IRAS. in order to raise 
capital (equity, debt or maybe both), which is consistent with the explanation given 
above. 
Although the null hypothesis on leverage is accepted through most of the statistical 
tests, it was rejected when tested by chi-square. Still, one needs to remember that 
using chi-square with continuous variables (after they have been converted into 
categorical variables) is only designed to support the appropriate statistical analysis 
for this type of variable (see above and Chapter 6). Hence, one can conclude that 
leverage is not an important factor in the choice between IRAS and GGAAP. 
Dumontier and Raffournier (ibid) and Cuijpers (ibid) also failed to establish a 
relationship between leverage and the choice of international accounting standards. 
Although Tarca (ibid) did not find leverage to be significant in her analysis of the 
füll sample, she finds that it is significant in the analysis of the subsample of German 
lirms. However, it was explained above that the very small sample of German 
companies used by Tarca seems to made her findings unreliable. 
In the case of profitability, the null hypothesis is accepted in all statistical tests, 
except Mann-Whitney. The results of Mann-Whitney (marginally significant in a 2- 
tailed test) presented in Table 7.22 above indicate a significant difference in the 
median of the two groups, IRAS and GGAAP (there is no sign for the difference in 
the Mann-Whitney results). The insignificant results of the t-test show that the 
profitability of IRAS companies is larger than that of GGAAP companies. Although 
this result is consistent with the alternative hypothesis, it may not be enough to 
conclude that there is a significant relationship between profitability and the choice 
of IRAS or GGAAP, especially as it is not even confirmed by the univariable model 
(see Table 7.25). Furthermore, the results of ANOVýA and Kruskal-Wallis indicate 
that profitability can be an important factor in choosing betvveen IAS and US(iAAP 
(vet. this is the concern of Chapter 8). 
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The case of listing abroad is very similar to that of free float. The null hypothesis 
that listing status is not associated with the choice between IRAS and USGAAP (or 
negatively related) is rejected by all types of analysis. However, the variable LIST is 
not included in the adopted model (Main model). The reason is that it is masked by 
the size variable (ORASSET). It was explained earlier that the vast majority of 
multi-listed companies are large. One can say the multi-listed firms are a small 
subset of large firms (but the opposite is not true). This is also reflected in a positive 
significant correlation between the two variables. Therefore, the variable LIST 
becomes redundant when used with size variables in the same model. The reasons 
which may lead German companies listed abroad to prefer IRAS to GGAAP are 
discussed in Chapter 5. In general, it can be stated that German multi-listed 
companies consider IRAS as more investor-oriented and useful as an international 
accounting language to communicate with investors and other interested parties 
abroad. 
Still, one should be aware of the fact that many of the multi-listed companies are 
listed in the US. The percentage of firms using US GAAP in the multi-listed 
companies using IRAS is 36% (27% of the multi-listed companies including 
(; GAAP companies). Although this percentage appears to be important, we cannot 
draw any conclusions from this. Dumontier and Raffournier (ibid) find similar 
results on the listing status of Swiss firms, although they do not discuss the fact that 
a high percentage of their multi-listed companies are also listed on NYSE. Cuijpers 
ct al (ibid) also find that the number of foreign listings is an important factor in 
choosing non-local GAAP. 
ticvcral hypotheses are introduced to link the internationality of a firm with its 
tendency to adopt IRAS. 
The null hypothesis on the presence of foreign investors among the firms 
shareholders is accepted through the univariable and bivariable analysis. However. it 
can be significant when included in a multivariable model that controls for 
SEGMENT (a suppressor variable). The reason that SEGMENT works as a 
suppressor for FORINVES is the significant negative relationship between them. 
This may imply that there are companies with foreign investors which tend to use 
IRAS although they are Unclassified (this was confirmed through the use of 
crosstabulation after excluding classified firms). 
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Still. one cannot conclude that this variable is an important factor in predicting the 
use of IRAS because the model, in which it is significant. does not control for all 
important variables. This may not be totally consistent with the findings of 
Weißenberger et al (2004). who conclude the one of the important motives leading 
German companies to adopt IRAS is the diversification and internationalisation of 
the body of investors. However, one should bear in mind that Weißenberger et al 
mean the aim of diversifying investors and not the presence of international investors. 
Yet, the hypothesis on foreign investors is not commonly tested, and hence there are 
not many results to be compared with those presented here. 
Conversely, the null hypothesis on the presence of foreign managers on either the 
supervisory board or the management board is rejected all levels of analysis 
including the multivariable model. This variable was intended to proxy for the 
impact of foreign investors. However, the frequency distributions in Table 7.3 show 
that the number of companies with foreign managers (102) is much larger than those 
with foreign investors (83). This clearly suggests that the presence of foreign 
investors is not the main reason of the presence of foreign managers. Further analysis 
indicates that having a foreign subsidiary may be the main factor behind this. A 
crosstabulation between FORMAN and FORSUB shows that 90.2 % of the 
companies that have foreign managers have subsidiaries abroad (see also a positive 
significant correlation in Table 7.4). This can be related to the fact that foreign 
managers may be important in managing foreign subsidiaries. The relative 
importance of particular subsidiaries in particular countries may require good 
experience of business in these countries, which can only (at best) be provided by 
foreign managers. The possible explanation is that FORMAN is a significant factor 
only because it is a proxy for international business. Therefore. the explanations 
provided to justify the internationality hypothesis in Chapter 5 should be employed 
here to justify this significant result on foreign management. Moreover. based on this 
assumption, FORMAN can be a better proxy than FORSUB for the impact of 
foreign business. This is because the presence of foreign managers on the 
supers isory board or the management board may be an indication of the importance 
of the foreign subsidiaries. Therefore, the tendency to use IRAS may be more in 
these firms than those vv ith foreign subsidiaries, but without foreign managers. 
Yet, the variable that is basically used to proxy for internationality is FORSUB. The 
null hN pothesis on 
having a foreign subsidiary is rejected through bivariable analysis 
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at . 
01. but only at a marginal level (. 08) in the multivariable analysis. This variable 
was used as an alternative to the proportion of international sales, because of missing 
data. This result indicates that German listed companies that have at least one 
subsidiary abroad are more likely to be using IRAS. From the explanations provided 
in Chapter 5 on this hypothesis. these companies need to use IRAS to provide 
standardised information to different stakeholders in the countries in which these 
subsidiaries are established. Although, FORSUB is marginally significant when 
included in the adopted model, it is excluded because it seems to be redundant. 
Therefore, the researcher chose to keep only one variable in the model to proxy for 
internationality, which is FORMAN. The result for FORSUB (if included in the 
model) indicates that having at least one subsidiary abroad by a German listed firm 
increases the odds of complying with IRAS by a factor of 1.813. 
One of the significant factors included in the adopted Main model is AUDID which 
indicates whether a company has a Big-5 auditor or not. All the statistical results 
presented above support the rejection of the null hypothesis. proving that German 
companies that have a Big-5 auditor have a greater tendency to use IRAS. One of the 
explanations for this is that the big auditors are important mediators in the 
introduction of Anglo-Saxon accounting (IRAS) to German companies which are 
familiar with an entirely different model. Their importance is related to the fact that 
they originate largely in those countries where the Anglo-Saxon model has been 
developed. Apart from this, big auditors may be protecting their reputation by 
advising clients and supporting them in the use of accounting standards which are 
known to be of high quality. Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo and Subramanyam (1998. 
p. 8), argue the larger client base of the Big-6 means that they have more to lose in 
the event of a loss of reputation. "This larger potential loss results in a relatively 
greater incentive to be independent compared to non-Big Six firms that have a much 
smaller client base". Furthermore, there is substantial evidence in the literature that 
Big auditors play an important role in restricting earnings management (Becker et al 
ibid., Gore. Pope and Singh, 2001). It may be much easier and more practical for the 
Big-auditors to market IRAS. «, hich reduce the chances of earnings management. to 
their clients than monitoring and restricting their practices under GGAAP. which has 
larger options for smoothing income. Finally, one should also consider the 
possibility that companies using IRAS or planning to use them are more likely to 
employ Big-auditors. which are most likely to have the best expertise in 
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implementing and maintaining IRAS Signalling theory may also provide a good 
explanation for the positive impact of Big-5 auditors in German companies, which 
may be signalling that they are using the best expertise in this field (more discussion 
is provided in Chapter 8). 
Not many studies in the literature of accounting choice examine this factor and hence 
no results are available for comparison purposes. Dumontier and Raffournier (ibid) 
find the auditor type is a significant variable, but only in the results of the univariate 
analysis and not in the multivariate analysis. Still, the authors do not provide anv 
explanation for this result. 
Finally, in general, the results on the industry hypothesis failed to establish a 
significant relationship between being in a specific industry sector and the choice of 
IRAS. However, as presented earlier, the results of chi-square shows that being in 
PANDC (P&C) is significantly related with choosing IRAS at 0.05, and that being in 
the UANDT (U&T) is marginally significant with choosing IRAS at 0.10. Further 
analysis shows that 93 % of P&C companies using IRAS are in quality segments 
(only one firm is unclassified). Furthermore the majority of them have subsidiaries 
abroad and Big-5 auditors. These three factors explain the significance of using 
[RAS in this particular sector. The same factors seem to be significant in the U&T 
sector, in which all the companies using IRAS have Big-5 auditors. Moreover, all of 
them (except one) are in quality segments. This clearly explains the fact that 
controlling for these factors in a multivariable model cause P&C and U&T to be 
insignificant. In other words, the clear confound between industry sectors and other 
firms characteristics such as size, internationality and the auditor, makes the industry 
variables appear less significant in choosing GAAP. 
The result on industry type in the current research are not consistent with the results 
of the survey study by Weißenberger et al (2004), who find that comparability with 
industry peers is one of the motives which leads German firms to comply with IRAS. 
This can be typified as the so-called "herding effect". However, apparently this 
effect is not evident in our analysis where companies in each sector do not shovv a 
tendency to adopt a particular GAAP (except for P&C and U&T, which are 
discussed above). 
As can be seen in Chapter 8 industry type is significant in the choice between IAS 
and Us' GAAP (discussed in Chapter 8). 
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8 Chapter 8: Choice between IAS and US GAAP 
8.1 Introduction: 
This chapter is devoted to analyzing the choice between IAS and US GAAP. This 
choice takes place both in the Main Market and the Neuer Markt; although in the 
Neuer Markt companies should choose one of these two sets. Therefore, the analysis 
will undertake two parallel investigations by analyzing the choice in each of these 
markets. As explained in earlier chapters, only the Main Market companies that use 
IRAS are included in this chapter. These companies will be referred to as "Main 
Market IRAS subsample". 
Analyses on the choice of 
IAS or USGAAP 
Univariable analysis Bivariable analysis Multivariable analysis 
Descrintive statistics 
Freuuencv distribution 
t-test and Mann-Whitney 
Univariable model 
Crosstahulations 
Chi-square 
Multiple Logistic 
Regression 
Fi-ure 8. l: Analysis design for the choice between IAS and US GAAP both in the Neuer Markt and 
the Main Market 
8.2 Descriptive statistics for continuous variables: 
As in the results for the Main Market, Table 8.1 and 8.2 present a group of 
descriptive statistics for the continuous variables. From Table 8.1, it can be seen that 
none of the variables of the Neuer Markt is normally distributed, whereas Table 8.2 
Shows that only two variables in the Main Market subsample are normally 
distributed. Furthermore, these tables show the significance of the outliers'", which 
. "Io Detined in ticction 7.2.1.1 
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is reflected in big changes in the maximum values and in the mean values as a result 
of removing them. 
Table 8.1: Descriptive statistics of the continuous variables in the Neuer Markt 
Variable Unit Min Max Mean Range 25tß' 50tß' 75t" N. test 
(l) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) Sig. 
FMPNO Person 19 6214 478 6195 138 248 522 No (. 000) 
EMPNO exc. OutlierS348 19 1066 295 1047 128 227 382 No (. 000) 
TOASSET ¬ Mio 3.7 11031 147.2 11027 30.1 52.7 129.4 No (. 000) 
TOASSET exc outliers 3.7 277.9 72.8 274.2 29.2 49 101.5 No (. 000) 
TURNOV ¬ Mio 0.8 2590 102.7 2589 16.6 34.9 116.2 No (. 000) 
TUROV exc. Outliers 0.8 243.4 58.7 242.7 16.0 32.1 83.2 No (. 000) 
PROFITI % -176 110 -21 285 -32 -10 2.6 No (. 000) 
PROFITI exc. Outliers -78.8 29.8 -12.9 108.6 -26.4 -7.9 3.0 No (. 000) 
LEVERI % 1.5 93 31.2 91 15.6 26.4 45.8 No (. 000) 
LEVERI exc. Outliers 1.5 81.1 30.9 74 15.3 26.2 45.0 No (. 000) 
FRFLOAT % 1 100 42 99 29.6 37 47.6 No (. 002) 
FRFLOAT exc outliers 1 74 39.7 63 29.2 35.7 45.0 No (. 002) 
MAN] % 0 76.5 25.8 76.5 3.9 21.3 45.5 No (. 000) 
MAN2,349 % 0 82 31.1 82 10.2 30.5 50.4 No (. 006) 
PROFITI % -176 110 -21 285 -32 -10 2.6 No (. 000) 
PROFITI exc. outliers -78.8 29.8 -12.9 108.6 -26.4 -7.9 3.0 No (. 000) 
PROFIT2 % -1303 64.4 -56.6 -1367 -58 -15.4 2.4 No (. 000) 
PROFIT2 exc. Outliers -134.5 64.4 -20.7 199 -40.0 -9.8 3.1 No (. 000 
Variables as defined below Table 8.5 
Table 8.2: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables in the Main Market (IRAS subsample) 
Variable Unit Min Max Mean Range 25rß' 50'x' 75"' Normality 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
EMPNO Person 15 477100 40629 477085 777 6187 34432 No (. 000) 
1, IMPN0 exc. Outliers 15 78608 12828 78593 570 3597 15947 No (. 000) 
TOASSET ¬ Mio 4 207410 12659 207407 123 905 6949 No (. 000) 
TOASSET exc outliers 4 16624 2285 16621 105 633 3279 No (. 000) 
TURNOV ¬ Mio 0 152873 9897 152873 143 1042 6852 No (. 000) 
TUROV exc. Outliers 0 16748 2849 16748 118 697 3642 No (. 000) 
LEVERI % 6.8 91.3 45.5 84.5 32.3 43.7 57.5 Yes (. 200) 
FRFLOAT % 0 100 41.5 100 21.8 40.1 61.7 Yes (. 195) 
PROFIT] % -77.8 31.6 1.8 109.4 0.9 3.3 7.9 No (. 000) 
PROFITI exc. outliers -9.5 17.3 4.3 26.8 1.8 3.4 7.7 Yes (. 200) 
PROFIT2 % -1184 42 -9.3 1226 0.8 3.5 9.3 No (. 000) 
PROFIT2 exc. outliers -11.7 19 4.3 30.7 1.3 3.5 8.4 Yes (. 200) 
Variables as defined below Table 8.5 
'' Results of Kolniogoro\ -Smirnov (probabilities indicate how significantly different from normalit\ 
the distribution from each variable) 
348 Descriptive statistics after excluding outliers 
``' The two variables are nearly the sane 
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8.2.1 Frequency distribution for the continuous variables: 
Continuous variables are broken down into intervals to study their frequency 
distribution. The size variables are categorized differently from the Main Market. 
where these variables contain larger number of extreme values and outliers'". 
table 8.3: Frequency distribution over the categories of continuous variables 
Variable Neuer Markt Main Market subsamp le 
Interval Level Freq. % Interval Level Freq. % 
OR-EMPNO > 717 Large 42 17.2 > 39013 Large 19 21.1 
(Employees 368-717 Med 41 16.8 Med 23 25.6 
number) <368 Small 161 66.0 < 7551 Small 48 53.3 
244 100 90 100.0 
OR-ASSETS > 186.5 Large 33 13.5 > 8040 Large 20 22.2 
(Total assets) 95.1-186.5 Med 49 20.1 1405-8040 Med 23 25.6 
C Mio < 95.1 Small 162 66.4 < 1405 Small 47 52.2 
244 100.0 90 100.0 
OR-TURNOV 
(Turnover) 
(' Mio 
OR-LEVER 
(Leverage) 
244 100.0 90 100.0 
OR- 
PROFIT 1351 
(Profitability 1) 
> 162.5 Large 38 15.6 > 8829 Large 19 21.1 
81.7-162.5 Med 37 15.2 1528-8829 Med 23 25.6 
< 81.7 Small 
> 0.625 High 
0.32-0.625 Med 
169 69.3 < 1528 
244 100.0 
20 8.2 > 0.63 
87 35.7 0.35-0.63 
Small 48 53.3 
90 100.0 
High 13 14.4 
Med 51 56.7 
< 0.32 Low 137 56.1 < 0.35 Small 26 28.9 
<6.8% High 27 11.1 >5.8% High 31 34.4 
0-6.8 Low 58 23.8 0-5.8% Low 39 43.3 
<0U. P 159 65.2 < 0.0 U. P 20 22.2 
244 100.0 90 100.0 
OR-PROFIT2 > 7.8 % High 32 13.1 > 6.1 % High 33 36.7 
(Profitability 2) 0.0-7.8% Low 53 21.7 0-6.1 % Low 37 41.1 
244 100.0 90 100.0 
ORFRFLOAT2 > 0.44 High 80 32.8 > 50.7 High 28 31.1 
(Free float) 0.25-0.44 Med 141 57.8 0.2-50.7 Med 43 47.8 
244 100.0 
OR-MAN 1 >51 % High 43 17.6 
< 0.25 Low 23 9.4 < 0.20 Low 19 21.1 
X 
90 100.0 
25.5 - 51 Med 66 27.0 X 
< 25.5 % Low 135 55.3 X 
244 100.0 X 
OR-MAN2,3 > 54.4 % High 46 18.9 X 
27.2 -54.4 Med 83 34.0 X 
< 27.2 % Low 114 46.7 X 
243 99.6 X 
tiizc variables in the Neuer Markt are categorised by creating three equal intervals after removing 
Outliers. Outliers then were added back to the highest 
interval. In the Main Market, on the other hand. 
outliers \\ere isolated in one group, \\hich 
is the category "High"'. 
'ý' Profitability and free float variables are categorised in a similar \\a\ to the main Market 
<0U. P 159 65.2 < 0.0 U. P 20 22.2 
-' -ýl 
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8.2.2 Frequency distribution of binary variables: 
The information presented in Table 8.4 is also presented in the contingency tables 
later in this chapter (crosstabulations). although in a different way. Hence. there is no 
need for any comments on this table. 
able 8.4: Frequency distribution of binary variables 
Variable: Neuer Markt Main Market (IRAS) 
Freq. % Freq. % 
AUDID YES 126 51.6 YES 66 73.3 
Has a Big-5 auditor NO Q dQ d v1 -), I IA 
244 100 90 100.0 
FORSUB YES 202 82.8 YES 81 90 
Has a foreign subsidiary NO 42 17.2 NO 9 10 
244 100 90 100.0 
USSUB 
Has a US subsidiary 
YES 121 49.6 YES 62 68.9 
NO 123 50.4 NO 28 31.1 
244 100 90 100.0 
FORINVES2 
Has Foreign investors 
YES 48 19.7 YES 28 31.1 
NO 196 80.3 NO 62 68.9 
244 100 90 100.0 
USINVES2 
Has US investors 
YES 16 6.6 YES 4 4.4 
NO 228 93.4 NO 86 95.6 
244 100 90 100.0 
FOR-MAN 
Has foreign managers 
YES 60 24.6 YES 41 45.6 
NO 184 75.4 NO 49 54.4 
244 100 100.0 
US-MAN 
-las US managers 
YES 27 11.1 YES 13 14.4 
NO 217 88.9 NO 77 85.6 
244 100 90 100.0 
Listing Status YES 22 24.4 
Listin abroad NO 68 75.6 
90 100.0 
ýýý 
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8.3 Correlation Matrix: 
Table 8.5 below presents a correlation matrix for all the variables used in the 
analysis on the Neuer Markt. One of the significant findings in this the matrix is that 
the three size variables are not as highly correlated with each other as in the Main 
Market Furthermore, each of them has a different relationship with the other 
variables (this observation is further discussed below). 
There is also a significant negative correlation between free float and all the 
management ownership variables, which is similar to that found in the Main Market 
(for MAN2 and MAN3 but not MAN13'2). This means that free float is negatively 
related with the proportion held by management (including families, in MAN2 and 
MAN3). In other terms, one can say that a low proportion of equity owned by 
management implies a high percentage of free float. This is consistent with Leuz 
(2003) who uses the free float as an inverse proxy for the presence of insiders. 
Furthermore, leverage is negatively correlated with profitability". This result is 
consistent with the financial literature in that the two ratios are negatively related 
(Chen and Zhao, 2004). 
As in Chapter 7, the correlation matrix is mainly prepared as a background that may 
help in explaining the results of the statistical analysis run later in this chapter. 
35, N1; \N I in the Main Market is positively related with tree float. 
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8.4 Crosstabulation and Chi-square test: 
The following is a group of contingency tables that investigate the relationship 
between the choice of IAS or US GAAP and all the variables used in this study 
including the continuous ones. As in Chapter 7, the chi-square test is run for each 
table. Although continuous variables are mainly tested by the t test and Mann- 
Whitney test below, they can also be tested through crosstabulations and chi-square 
test 353 As mentioned above, analyses include the choice both in the Neuer Markt and 
the Main Market. 
Small frequencies: it is explained in Chapter 6, that a chi-square test based on 
contingency tables in which 20% or more of expected frequencies are less than 5, 
cannot be interpreted. Therefore, Yates' correction is used to treat such cases. This 
problem appeared in the contingency tables for SEGMENT, USINVES, USMAN 
and INDUS I (see below). Still, this observation is only found in the tables of the 
Main Market variables (IRAS subsample). 
8.4.1 Crosstabulations and chi-square test of the categorized continuous 
variables: 
8.4.1.1 Size: 
8.4.1.1.1 Size in the Neuer Markt: 
The relationship between size and the choice of GAAP is examined through the 
contingency tables for three size variables, employee numbers, total assets and 
turnover, after being categorized. From Table 8.6, it can be seen that the majority of 
the Neuer Markt firms are classified as Small. The rest of these firms are equally 
split between "Medium" and "Large". Yet, the table does not show any important 
differences between the distribution patterns of IAS companies and US GAAP 
companies over the three categories of size. 
[he highly insignificant chi-square statistics indicate that there is no relationship 
between the categories of size in the Neuer Markt and their choice of GAAP. 
'; ' Categorization schemes are explained in Chapter 6. 
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Fable 8.6: Categories of size and choice between [AS and US GAAP in the Neuer Markt 
Small Medium Large Total 
Group / EMPNO < 368 person 368 - 717 > 717 
lAS 92 
68.7% 
22 
16.4% 
20 
14.9% 
134 
100.0% 
USGAAP 69 
62.7% 
19 
17.3 % 
22 
20.0% 
110 
100.0% 
Total 161 
66.0% 
41 
16.8% 
42 
17.2% 
244 
100.0 
'= 1.252 P=. 535 
Group/ ASSET <¬ 95.1 Mio 95.1-186.5 > 186.5 
_ IAS 88 
65.7% 
28 
20.9% 
18 
13.4% 
1 34 
100.0% 
US GAAP 74 
67.3% 
21 
19.1 % 
15 
13.6% 
110 
100.0% 
Total 162 
66.4% 
49 
20.1 % 
33 
13.5 % 
244 
100.0 
2 =0.123 P=. 942 
Group/ TURNOV <¬ 81.7 Mio 81.7-162.5 > 162.5 
IAS 90 
67.2% 
22 
16.4% 
22 
16.1% 
134 
100.0% 
US GAAP 79 
71.8% 
15 
13.6% 
16 
14.5% 
110 
100.0% 
Total 169 
69.3 % 
37 
15.2% 
38 
15.6% 
244 
100.0 
, ý2 =0.633 
P=. 729 
Variables as defined below Table 8.5 
8.4.1.1.2 Size in the Main market (IRAS subsample): 
As in the analysis of the Neuer Markt above, the three size variables in Main Market 
companies that use IRAS have very similar distributions. Furthermore. Table 8.7 
below shows that the distribution patterns of IAS and US GAAP companies are not 
significantly different from each other. This observation is confirmed by the chi- 
. square test which produced 
insignificant results. 
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Table 8.7: Categories of size and the choice between IAS and US GAAP in the Main Market (IRAS 
subsample) 
Small Medium Large Total 
Group/ EMPNO < 7551 person 7551-39013 > 39013 
_ IAS 38 
56.7% 
16 
23.9% 
13 
19.4% 
67 
100.0% 
US GAAP 10 
43.5 % 
7 
30.4% 
6 
26.1 % 
23 
100.0% 
Total 48 
53.3 % 
23 
25.6% 
19 
21.1 % 
90 
100.0% 
'= 1.213 P=. 545 
Group/ ASSET <¬ 1405 Mio 1405 - 8040 > 8040 _ IAS 37 
55.2% 
16 
23.9% 
14 
20.9% 
67 
100.0% 
US GAAP 10 
43.5 % 
7 
30.4% 
6 
26.1 % 
23 
100.0% 
Total 47 
52.2% 
23 
25.6% 
20 
222% 
90 
100.0% 
X2=0.948 P=. 623 
Group/ TURNOV <¬ 1528 Mio 1528 - 1528 > 8829 
IAS 39 
58.2% 
15 
22.4% 
13 
19.4% 
67 
100.0% 
US GAAP 9 
39.1 % 
8 
34.8% 
6 
26.1 % 
23 
100.0% 
Total 48 
53.3 % 
23 
25.6% 
19 
21.1 % 
90 
100.0% 
, ý--2.560 
P=. 278 
Variables as defined below Table 8.5 
8.4.1.2 Leverage (LEVER): 
8.4.1.2.1 Leverage in the Neuer Markt: 
According to Table 8.8 below, the percentage of US GAAP companies in the 
category Low is substantially larger than that of the IAS companies in the same 
category. In the category Medium, on the other hand, IAS companies have a larger 
percentage than that of US GAAP companies. This distribution implies that 
companies using US GAAP have lower leverage than those using IAS. In other 
\\ ords, leverage is negatively associated with using US GAAP. According to the 
results of the chi-square test, this relationship is significant at . 
01. 
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Fable 8.8: Categories of leverage and choice between IAS or US GAAP in the Neuer Markt 
Group / Leverage Low Medium High Total 
< 0.32 0.32-0.625 > 0.625 
IAS 65 59 10 134 
48.5 % 44.0% 7.5 % 100.0% 
US GAAP 72 28 10 110 
65.5 % 25.5 % 9.1 % 100.0% 
total 137 87 20 244 
56.1 % 35.7% 8.2% 100.0% 
, ý2=9.131 P=. 010 
8.4.1.2.2 Leverage in the Main Market (IRAS subsample): 
Unlike in the Neuer Markt, Table 8.9 shows that there is no important difference 
between the distribution patterns of IAS and US GAAP companies. Still the 
proportion of companies using IAS in the category "High" is nearly double the 
proportion of US GAAP companies in the same category. This implies that leverage 
in IAS companies is higher than in US GAAP companies. To some extent, this 
observation seems to be consistent with the result in the Neuer Markt above. 
However, the relationship between leverage and the GAAP choice is insignificant as 
indicated by the chi-square test. 
Table 8.9: Categories of leverage and choice between IAS and US GAAP in the Main Market. 
Group / Leverage Low Medium High Total 
<0.35 0.35-0.63 > 0.63 
IAS 19 37 11 67 
28.4% 55.2% 16.4% 100.0% 
US GAAP 7 14 2 23 
30.4% 60.9% 8.7% 100.0% 
Total 26 51 13 90 
28.9% 56.7% 14.4% 100.0% 
-0.829 P=. 661 
8. -1.1.3 Profitability: 
8.4.1.3.1 Profitability in the Neuer Markt: 
In the sample year. the majority of the Neuer Markt companies had losses. Table 
8.10 shows that IAS companies and USGAAP companies have very similar 
distribution patterns over the categories of profitability. Therefore, the chi-square 
statistic vv as highly insignificant and shows that is there is no relationship between 
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profitability and the choice between IAS and USGAAP. The other measure of 
profitability PROFIT2 produces similar results. 
Table 8.10: Categories of profitability and choice between IAS and US GAAP in Neuer Markt 
Group / PROFITI Unprofitable Low High Total 
<0 0-6.8% > 6.8 `%, 
IAS 88 32 14 134 
65.7% 23.9% 10.4% 100.0% 
USGAAP 71 26 13 110 
64.5% 23.6% 11.8% 100.0% 
Total 159 58 27 244 
65.2% 23.8% 11.1% 100.0% 
, ý2 =. 116 P=. 
944 
Variables as defined below Table 8.5 
8.4.1.3.2 Profitability in the Main Market (IRAS subsample): 
From Table 8.11, one can see that, although profitability has a slightly different 
distribution pattern from that in the Neuer Markt, differences between the 
proportions of companies using IAS and those using USGAAP in the three 
categories are not significant (nearly equal proportions in the category "High"). 
Table 8.11: Categories of profitability and choice between IAS and US GAAP in Main Market 
Group / PROFITI Unprofitable 
<0 
Low 
0-5.8% 
High 
>5.8`% 
Total 
IRAS 14 30 23 67 
20.9% 44.8 % 34.3 % 100.0 % 
US GAAP 6 9 8 23 
26.1 % 39.1 % 34.8 % 100.0% 
Total 20 39 31 90 
22.2% 43.3 % 34.4% 100.0% 
XI=0.335 P=. 846 
8.4.1.4 Free Float (FREFLOAT): 
8.4.1.4.1 Free Float in the Neuer Markt: 
As shown in Table 8.12, the majority of both IAS and USGAAP companies are 
classified as having a medium level of free float. The next highest proportions of the 
mo groups are classified as "High". Overall the groups IAS and US GAAP are 
distributed over the categories of free float nearly in the same pattern. As a result of 
this, the chi-square statistic was small and insignificant. This, in turn, means that 
there is an insignificant relationship between the free float in the Neuer Markt 
companies and their choice between LAS and USGAAP. 
'61 
Chapter8. - Choice between I. I S and U5' G. -LAP 
I able 8.12: Categories of free float and choice of IAS and US GAAP in Neuer Markt 
Group / FRFLOAT Low Medium High Total 
<0.25 0.25-0.44 > 0.44 
IAS 10 78 46 134 
7.5 % 58.2 % 34.3 100.0% 
USGAAP 13 63 34 110 
11.8% 57.3 30.9% 100.0% 
Total 23 141 80 244 
9.4% 57.8 32.8% 100.0% 
' X= 1.440 P=. 487 
Variables as defined below Table 8.5 
8.4.1.4.2 Free Float in the Main Market (IRAS subsample): 
Unlike in the Neuer Markt, the IAS companies in the Main Market are distributed 
over the categories of free float differently from USGAAP companies. Table 8.13 
shows that whereas a big majority of the US GAAP companies are classified as 
having "High" free float, a similar percentage of IAS companies are classified as 
having "Medium" free float. This distribution implies that free float is higher in the 
companies using USGAAP than in companies using IAS. The chi-square test 
confirms that this relationship is significant at 0.001. 
Table 8.13: Categories of free float and choice between IAS and US GAAP in Main Market 
Group / FRFLOAT Low Medium High Total 
<0.20 0.20-0.51 >0.5-1 
IAS 14 39 14 67 
20.9% 58.2 20.9% 100.0% 
US GAAP 5 4 14 23 
21.7% 17.4% 60.9% 100.0% 
Total 19 43 28 90 
21.1% 47.8% 31.1% 100.0% 
%2 14.771 P=. 001 
8.4.1.5 Management ownership: 
8.4.1.5.1 Management ownership in the Neuer Markt: 
Iii the previous chapter, the variables representing management ownership were 
transformed into binary variables because of the large number of companies with 
7Cm values. This observation does not apply to the Neuer Market data. Therefore. 
the management ownership variables will be left in their continuous form. However. 
Ihr the purpose of chi-square analysis. they are transformed into three categories to 
make them testable. 
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Results of MAN2 and MAN3 are presented in one table because their results are 
nearly the same. According to Table 8.14, IAS and USGAAP companies are 
distributed in similar proportions over the categories of MAN 1. However. in the case 
of MAN2 and MAN3, the proportional distribution of the IAS group is different 
from that of the USGAAP group. This difference exists in the category "Low". 
where USGAAP companies seem to have a larger proportion than IAS companies. 
Yet, the chi-square statistic is not significant. 
Table 8.14: Categories of Management ownership and choice between IAS and US GAAP in Main 
Market 
Group / MAN1 Low Medium High Total 
<25.5% 25.5°/, -51% >51%, 
lAS 73 35 26 134 
54.5 % 26.1 % 19.4 % 100.0 % 
USGAAP 62 31 17 110 
56.4% 28.2% 15.5% 100.0% 
Total 135 66 43 244 
55.3 % 27.0% 17.6% 100.0% 
2 =0.668 P=. 716 
Group/ MAN2, MAN3 < 27.2% 27.2%-54.4% >54.4% Total 
lAS 57 48 29 134 
42.5% 35.8% 21.6% 100.0% 
US GAAP 57 35 17 110 
52.3 32.1 % 15.6% 100.0% 
Total 114. 83 46 244 
46.9% 34.2% 18.9% 100.0% 
%=2.622 P= . 
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8.4.2 Crosstabulations and chi-square for binary variables: 
8.4.2.1 Management ownership in the Main Market (IRAS subsample): 
The variable representing management ownership in the Main Market is different 
from that in used in the Neuer Markt, because it is a binary variable''. Therefore, it 
is not possible to compare results. Table 8.15, shows that in terms of MANI 
(whether managers own shares in the firm or not), differences between the two 
groups are not clear. 
In terms of MAN2 and MANS (including family ownership355). differences are 
larger. The frequency of management ownership is larger in USGAAP companies 
I z" ' explained in Chapter 7, this transformation is because of the large number of zero values. 
In MAN2, management oww nership includes the ownership of families that have members on the 
tiuper\ isor', board or the management board. In IAN 3. on other hand, family o\\ nership is 
i) 3 
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than in IAS companies. However. these differences are not statistically significant as 
indicated by the chi-square test. 
Table 8.15: Categories of management ownership and choice between IAS and US GAAP in The 
Main Markt 
Group / MAN1 YES NO Total 
IAS 22 
32.8% 
45 
67.2% 
67 
100.0% 
US GAAP 8 
34.8 % 
15 
65.2 
23 
100.0% 
Total 30 
33.3 % 
60 
66.7% 
90 
100.0% 
2 =0.029 P=. 864 
Group/MAN2, MAN3356 YES NO Total 
IAS 29 
43.3% 
38 
56.7% 
67 
100.0% 
US GAAP 12 
52.2% 
11 
47.8% 
23 
100.0% 
Total 41 
45.6% 
49 
54.4% 
90 
100.0% 
2 = 0.546 P =. 460 
Variables as defined below Table 8.5 
8.4.2.2 Auditor identity (AUDID): 
8.4.2.2.1 Auditor identity in the Neuer Markt: 
According to Table 8.16, just above half the companies in the Neuer Markt are with 
a Big-5 auditor. Yet, whereas the majority of USGAAP companies have Big 5 
auditors, it is the opposite for companies using IAS. This implies that companies that 
are audited by Big-5 firms are more likely to be using USGAAP. The relationship 
between the two variables is significant at . 
001. 
Table 8.16: Auditor identity and choice between IAS and US GAAP in the Neuer Markt 
Group / Big-5 YES NO Total 
IAS 53 81 134 
39.6% 60.4% 100.0% 
US GAAP 73 37 1 10 
66.4% 33.6% 100.0% 
Total 126 118 244 
51.6% 48.4% 100.0% 
X, =17.387 P=. 000 
considered as management ownership regardless they have members on the supers isorv or the 
management board or not. 
', `' Results of these t\v o variables are very similar, so that one table can represent them. 
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8.4.2.2.2 Auditor identity in the Main Market (IRAS subsample): 
Table 8.17 shows that a substantial majority of both IAS and USGAAP companies 
have a Big-5 auditor. However, the percentage of USGAAP companies that have 
Big-5 auditor is larger than that of the IAS firms (a difference of 12.5 % points). 
Although this seems to be consistent with results of the Neuer Markt above and with 
our expectation, these proportional differences are not significant (insignificant chi- 
square statistic). 
Table 8.17: Auditor identity and choice between IAS and US GAAP in Main Market 
Group / Big-5 YES NO High 
IAS 47 20 67 
70.1 % 29.9% 100.0% 
USGAAP 19 4 23 
82.6% 17.4% 100.0% 
Total 66 24 90 
73.3 % 26.7% 100.0% 
,=1.359 
P= 
. 
244 
8.4.2.3 US subsidiaries (USSUB): 
8.4.2.3.1 US subsidiaries in the Neuer Market: 
As shown in Table 8.18, a large percentage of US GAAP companies have 
subsidiaries in the USA, whereas a nearly equal percentage of IAS companies do not 
have subsidiaries in the USA. This large proportional difference is an indication that 
companies that have at least one subsidiary in the US are more likely to be using 
I JSGAAP than others. The significance of the relationship is confirmed by a 
significant chi-square statistic at . 
001. 
Table 8.18: Having a US subsidiary and choice between IAS and US GAAP in the Neuer Markt 
Group/ USSUB YES NO High 
_ IAS 53 81 134 
39.6% 60.4% 100.0% 
US, GAAP 68 42 110 
61.8% 38.2% 100.0% 
Total 121 123 244 
46.6% 50.4% 100.0% 
, ý2 = 
11.981 P=. 001 
Variables as defined belo\\ Table 8.5 
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8.4.2.3.2 US subsidiaries in the Main Market (IRAS subsample): 
As in the Neuer Markt, the percentage of the USGAAP companies that have 
subsidiaries in the US is high. 
In Table 8.19, although the differences between the proportions of USGAAP and 
[AS firms in each of YES and NO categories are quite large, the chi-square is not 
significant. This may be explained by the fact that both IAS and USGAAP groups 
have very similar distribution patterns; nevertheless proportion sizes are different. 
Table 8.19: Having a US subsidiary and choice between IAS and US GAAP in Main Market 
Group / USSUB YES NO High 
IAS 44 23 67 
65.7% 34.3 % 100.0% 
US GAAP 18 523 
78.3% 21.7% 100.0% 
Total 62 28 90 
68.9% 31.1 % 100.0% 
,=1.266 P =. 2260 
Variables as defined below Table 8.5 
8.4.2.4 US listing (USLIST): 
8.4.2.4.1 US listing in the Neuer Markt: 
Only 6 companies in the Neuer Markt are listed in the US of which 5 are listed on 
NASDAQ (see Chapter 6 for more details). All these six companies use USGAAP 
(,,, cc Chapter 6 for a list with these companies). This observation support the 
hypothesis that companies listed in the US are likely to use USGAAP, nevertheless it 
was not statistically tested because of the relatively small number of observations. 
Furthermore, removing these companies from the sample does not change the 
results. 
8.4.2.4.2 US Listing in the Main Market (IRAS subsample): 
(il the Main Market, however. the number of German companies listed in the US is 
15 (Appendix 10.4), all of which are listed on the NYSE. Yet, the number of these 
companies included in this research is 11(details in Chapter 6). Furthermore, only 8 
u l' these 1I companies use IRAS. Table 8.20 below shows that within the companies 
listed on NYSE, the proportion of companies using USGAAP is substantially larger 
than that of those using IAS. The chi-square statistic is significant at . 
003 (. 01 ). 
indicating that the relationship between listing on the IIS and the choice of GAAP is 
significant. 
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Table 8.20: Being listed in the US ands choice between IAS and US GAAP in Main Market 
Group / USLIST YES NO High 
LAS 2 65 67 
3.0% 97.0% 100.0% 
USGAAP 6 17 23 
26.1 % 73.9% 100.0% 
Total 8 82 90 
8.9% 91.1% 100.0% 
2=8.61 1 (with Yates' correction) P= . 
003 
8.4.2.5 US Investors (USINVES): 
8.4.2.5.1 US investors in the Neuer Markt: 
As shown in Table 8.21, a small number of companies in the Neuer Markt have 
significant US investors. The USGAAP companies comprise the majority of these 
companies. Furthermore, although the differences between the proportions of IAS 
and USGAAP companies in Table 8.21 do not seem to be important, the chi-square 
statistic is significant at 0.01. 
Table 8.21: Having US investors and choice between 1AS and US GAAP in Neuer Markt 
Group/ USINVES YES NO Total 
IAS 3 131 134 
2.2 % 97.8% 100.0% 
USGAAP 13 97 110 
11.8% 88.2% 100.0% 
Total 16 228 244 
6.6% 93.4% 100.0% 
,ý=9.071 
P= 
. 
003 
Variables as defined below Table 8.5 
8.4.2.5.2 US investors in the Main Market (IRAS subsample): 
Table 8.22 shows that none of the US GAAP companies have US investors, whereas 
only four IAS companies do. This means that there is no relationship between having 
US investors and the choice of IAS or USGAAP in the companies listed on the Main 
N lacket. 
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Table 8.22: Having US investors and choice between IAS and US GAAP in Main Market 
USINVES YES NO Total 
Group 
IAS 4 63 67 
6.0% 94.0% 100.0% 
USGAAP 0 23 23 
0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total 4 86 90 
4.4% 95.6% 100.0% 
, ý2 = 1.437 
X2 with continuity correction =0.375''' P= . 
569 
8.4.2.6 US Managers (USMAN): 
8.4.2.6.1 US managers in the Neuer Markt: 
From Table 8.23, one can see that the proportion of USGAAP companies that have 
US managers on the supervisory board or the management board is larger than for 
IAS companies. This implies that companies using US GAAP tend to have 
supervisory board or management board members from the US more than companies 
using IAS. 
The relationship observed above is statistically significant at . 
001 as indicated by the 
chi-square test. 
Table 8.23: Having US managers and choice between lAS and US GAAP in Neuer Markt 
Group/ USMAN YES NO Total 
lAS 6 128 134 
4.5 % 95.5 % 100.0% 
USGAAP 21 89 1 10 
19.1 % 80.9% 100.0% 
Total 27 217 244 
11.1 % 88.9% 100.0% 
, ý'= 
13.310 P=. 000 
Variables as defined below Table 8.5 
8.4.2.6.2 US managers in the Main Market (IRAS subsample): 
The proportional distribution in Table 8.24 is similar to that in Table 8.23 of the 
Neuer Markt. However, the differences are smaller. Therefore, the relationship is 
insignificant for the Main Market. 
'" Chi-square is this case cannot be used without continuit\ correction because of the zero cell. 
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Table 8.24-. Having US managers and choice between IAS and US GAAP n Main Market 
Group/ USMAN YES NO Total 
IAS 8 59 67 
11.9% 88.1 % 100.0% 
US GAAP 5 18 23 
21.7% 78.3% 100.0% 
Total 13 77 244 
14.4% 85.6% 100.0% 
, ý2=0.656 P=. 418 
Variables as defined below Table 8.5 
8.4.2.7 Quality Segments (SEGMENT): 
This variable is tested in Chapter 7 as a determinant for the choice between GGAAP 
and IRAS. In this section, chi-square will test for the relationship between this 
variable and the choice between IAS and USGAAP. However, this will be only for 
the Subsample of the Main Market, because it is not applicable for the Neuer Markt 
which comprises only one segment. 
Table 8.25 below shows that the distribution of IAS companies across the two 
categories (YES and NO) is nearly identical to that of USGAAP companies. As a 
result of this the chi-square statistic is very small and highly insignificant. 
Table 8.25: Being in a quality SEGMENT and choice between IAS and US GAAP in Main Market 
Croup/ classified YES NO Total 
IAS 54 13 67 
80.6% 19.4% 100.0% 
US GAAP 19 4 23 
82.6% 17.4% 100.0% 
Total 73 17 244 
81.1 % 18.9% 
2_ 
. 
045 , ý2 with continuity correction = 0.000 P =. 832 (1.000) 
8.4.2.8 Industry: 
Binary analysis for the relationship between the industry type and the choice of 
GA AP can be achieved by using either a binary variable for each sector or a nominal 
variable which comprises a group of sectors. As shown earlier in Chapter 6. two 
nominal variables suggested for representing industries are INDUS 1 and INDUS2. 
The distribution of IAS and US GAAP companies over the categories (sectors) of 
each these two variables is shown below: 
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8.4.2.8.1 Industry in the Neuer Markt: 
According to Table 8.26, differences between the proportions of IAS companies and 
USGAAP companies within each of the sectors do not seem to be important. In the 
Media group, however, the difference is considerable (more than 10 percentage 
points). The difference in the Media category suggests that companies in this sector 
are more likely to be using IRAS. 
The chi-square test, on the other hand, indicates that the relationship between the 
choice of GAAP and the sector to which a company belongs is only marginally 
significant. 
Table 8.26: Industry sectors and choice between IAS and US GAAP in Neuer Markt 
INDUSI PHARMA SOFTWARE TECHNO MEDIA TELECI\I OTHER 358 Total 
Group 
IAS 9 58 31 22 59 134 
6.7% 43.3 % 23.1 % 16.4% 3.7% 6.7% 100° 
USGAAP 15 49 23 7 7 9 1 10 
13.6% 44.5% 20.9% 6.4% 6.4°% 82% 100% 
Total 24 107 54 29 12 18 244 
9.8% 43.9% 22.1 % 11.9% 4.9% 7.4% 100% 
,ý =9.263 
P= 
. 
099 
Variables as defined below Table 8.5 
The second categorical variable INDUS2 includes four main categories. As a result 
of this reclassification (Table 8.27), difference between the percentages of IAS and 
US GAAP companies within the group "Other" become substantial. The chi-square 
test indicates that the relationship between INDUS2 and the choice of IAS or 
USGAAP is significant at. 05. 
Table 8.217: Industry sectors (INDUS2) and choice between IAS and US GAAP in Neuer Markt 
USMAN SOFTWARE TECHNO MEDIA OTHER2359 Total 
Group 
IAS 58 31 22 23 134 
43.3 % 23.1 % 16.4% 17.2% 100% 
US GAAP 49 23 7 31 1 10 
44.5 % 20.9 % 6.4 % 28.2 % 100 % 
Total 107 54 29 54 244 
43.9% 22.1 % 11.9% 22.1 % 100.0% 
=8.609 P= . 
03 5 
Variables as defined below Table 8.5 
'" includes groups \v hich have \ er\ small frequencies (see Chapter 6) t7 - 
'ýý' lt includes sectors vv ith' cry small frequencies alongside vv ith PHARM A and TELECOM (the next 
tvvO lar, -, cst sectors after 
SOFTWARE. TECHNO and MEDIA. 
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8.4.2.8.2 Testing Neuer Market industry sectors as binary variables: 
As explained above., one can study the relationship between each of sectors 
(represented by a binary variable) and the choice of GAAP. Table 8.28 presents the 
results of the chi-square test36o From this table, it can be seen the relationship 
between choosing IAS or USGAAP is significantly related with being either in 
MEDIA and OTHER2. It is also marginally significant with being in the PHARMA 
sector. Whereas the Media companies seem to be statistically less likely to adopt US 
GAAP than all other companies, the companies in the OTHER2 category are 
statistically more likely to adopt US GAAP than other companies. 
Table 8.28: Chi-square results for industry binary variables 
in Neuer Markt 
Variable Chi-statistic P value 
PHARMA 3.262 
. 
071 
SOFTWARE 0.039 
. 
843 
IECHNO 0.174 
. 
677 
TELECOM 0.895 . 
344 
MEDIA 5.831 . 016 
OTHERI 0.190 . 663 
OTHER2 361 4.255 . 039 
Bold typeface indicates a statistically significant result at the 0.05 level. 
8.4.2.8.3 Industry in the Main Market (IRAS companies): 
The researcher has chosen not to present the crosstabulations between industry 
variables and the choice of IAS or USGAAP in the Main Market because they do not 
show any important differences. However, chi-square statistics produced on the 
bases of these tables are presented in Table 8.29 below. None of these statistics is 
significant at 0.05; nonetheless for two variables (TECHNO and SERVICE) the 
results were marginally significant. 
Table 8.29: Chi-square for industry binary variables in Main Market 
Variable Chi-statistic P value 
UANDT 0.058 . 
809 
MANUFI 0.118 . 
739 
PANDC 0.012 . 
914 
TECHNO 2.993 . 
084 
SFRVICE 2.820 . 
093 
Variables as defined below Table 7.4 
Presentation of contingency tables does not seem to be necessar\ . therefore the\ ww ere omitted 
from this part. 
'`' Defined in Footnote 3354 
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8.5 Student t-test for independent samples: 
As explained in Chapter 6, the t-test is run for all the variables across the two groups. 
IRAK and G GAAP (two independent samples) regardless of the violation of the 
related assumptions 362. 
8.5.1 t-test for the Neuer Markt: 
In Table 8.30, it can be seen that the mean of the employee numbers in the USGAAP 
companies is larger than that in the IAS group. The mean of total assets and turnover 
in IAS companies, on the other hand, is larger than that in USGAAP companies. 
However, the confidence intervals of the mean difference across these three variables 
indicate that one cannot be sure of the sign of the differences. 
Unlike in the Main Market, the different size variables in the Neuer Markt 
companies are not consistent with each other. Employee numbers shoe- a different 
pattern from total assets and turnover. The correlation matrix presented in Table 
shows that its correlation with the two other measures of size is not as strong as it is 
between the other two measures. This can be partially explained by differences in 
capital intensity across the different industries which seem to be clear in the Neuer 
Markt. For example, 62 % of the Media companies classified as "Large" in terms of 
assets are classified as "Small" in terms of employee numbers. This is, in turn, 
reflected in a weak correlation between these two size variables in the Media sector 
(Pearson's coefficient = 0.162). A similar observation is true for the Technology 
sector. 
The confidence interval of profitability variables. on the other hand, indicates that 
one can be 95% confident that IAS companies are more profitable than US GAAP. 
The proportions of equity held by managers on the supervisory board or the 
management board (MAN2. MAN3363) are also higher in IAS companies than in the 
ones using USGAAP, with confidence intervals supporting the direction of this 
dil-(crence. Although, Leverage in the companies using IAS seems to be significantly 
higher than that of the USGAAP companies, its confidence interval supports this 
result only when the variable is transformed into its natural log. Implications of these 
results for the hypotheses of this study are discussed later in Section 7. 
; \Ithouph the main assumptions are the normality and the equality of \ ariances, it is agreed that t- 
tcst is robust to the normalit% assumption (see Br\ man and Cramer. 2001). 
'c" Including family o\\ nership 
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8.5.2 t-test in the Main Market (IRAS subsample): 
From Table 8.31, it is seen that if the assumption about the equality of variance is 
considered, a significant difference is found in one variable only (FREFLOAT). This 
result shows that USGAAP companies have higher free float than IAS companies. 
Yet, if the assumption about the equality of variance is ignored, the difference in 
turnover and profitability (PROFIT2) are reported significant at . 
05. Furthermore. 
disregarding the assumption of the equality of variance, difference in employee 
numbers and total assets and profitability (PROFITI) are marginally significant. 
In fact in the case of the Main Market, results with the violation of the equality of 
variance assumption cannot be considered because of the large difference in the 
sample size of the two groups (IAS and USGAAP )367. 
The confidence intervals shown in Table 8.31 show that the only the difference that 
on can be confident about is that in the free float which shows that US GAAP 
companies have higher free float. 
; \s explained earlier the t-test can 
be robust to the violation of this assumption. 1-lowever, this 
assumption cannot be disregarded if the mo samples differ substantially in size 
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8.6 Mann-Whitney test: 
As previously explained Mann-Whitney is the non-parametric equivalent of the t-test. 
As indicated in Table 8.1 above, none of the variables in the Neuer Markt is 
normally distributed. Therefore, this test may theoretically be the right choice to 
analyse the Neuer Markt data. Results shown in Table 8.321 below are consistent with 
those of the parametric equivalent t-test. 
In the Main Markt IRAS subsample, LEVER and FREFLOAT are not tested usin`, 
Mann-Whitney because they are normally distributed. None of the results in this part 
was significant. 
Table 8.32: Results of Mann-Whitney in the Neuer Markt and the Main Market 
Neuer Markt Main Market subsample 
Variable Z value 1-tailed Sig Variable Z Value 1-tailed Sig 
EMPNO -0.878 . 
190 EMPNO -0.985 . 162 
TOASSET -0.284 . 
388 TOASSET -1.383 . 
084 
TURNOV -1.563 . 
059 TURNOV -1.216 . 
112 
L1: VER -2.262 . 012 
PROFITI -0.042 . 
484 
PROFITI -1.229 . 
110 PROFIT23' -0.143 . 
444 
PROFIT2 310 -1.553 . 
060 X X X 
I-REFLOAT -0.335 . 
369 X X X 
MAN 1 -0.832 . 
203 X X X 
MAN2 -2.166 . 015 X X X 
MAN3 -2.180 . 015 X 
X X 
Note: bold typeface indicates a statistically significant result at the 0.05 level 
Variables as defined below Table 8.5 
'`'`' It becomes insignificant after excluding outliers, although this procedure does not alter the results 
of the other variables significantly. 
370 lt becomes insignificant after excluding outliers, although this procedure does not alter the results 
of the other variables significantly. 
7 'These %ariables in the Main Market are not tested using Mann-\\ hitne\. because while LEVER and 1 
FREI LOAI' are normall\ distributed, management o\\nership variables are binar\ variable. 
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8.7 Multivariable Analysis for the Neuer Markt data: 
As in Chapter 7, the results of the multivariable analysis are depicted using both a 
full model and a reduced model (constructed). However. before studying these 
results, it may be useful to present the results of univariable models. Results for 
these three levels of analysis are presented and explained below: 
Fable 8.33: Results of the univariable models in the Neuer Markt 
B S. E. Wald C 372 S1g373. Exp(B) 95.0% C. A. 
SI", MPNO 0.016 0.018 0.736 0.758 
. 
196 1.016 0.980 1.052 
SASSETS -0.033 0.051 0.408 1.169 . 
262 0.968 0.876 1.070 
STURNOV -0.134 0.096 1.973 3.170 . 080 0.874 0.725 1.055 
LEVERAGE -1.215 0.658 3.415 3.487 . 033 0.297 0.082 1.076 
PROFITI -0.769 0.351 4.791 5.062 . 015 0.463 0.233 0.923 
PROFIT2 -0.256 0.125 4.218 5.282 . 020 0.774 0.607 0.988 
FREFLOAT 0.200 0.718 0.077 0.077 . 
371 1.221 0.299 4.986 
MAN I -0.490 0.579 0.718 0.724 . 
199 0.612 0.197 1.904 
MAN2 -1.233 0.580 4.526 4.613 . 017 0.291 0.094 0.908 
MAN3 -1.214 0.574 4.473 4.555 . 017 0.297 0.096 0.915 
USSUB 0.906 0.264 11.770 12.082 . 001 2.474 1.475 4.151 
AUDITOR 1.104 0.268 16.933 17.633 . 000 3.015 1.782 5.101 
USINVS2 1.767 0.654 7.290 9.463 . 004 5.852 1.623 21.100 
USMANG 1.616 0.483 11.194 13.509 . 001 5.034 1.953 12.973 
INDUS2 7.662 . 054 
PHARMA 1.656 0.605 7.490 . 006 5.238 1.600 17.147 
SOFTWARE 0.977 0.475 4.220 . 040 2.655 1.046 6.741 
OTHER 1.002 0.486 4.251 . 039 2.724 1.051 7.061 
Note: bold typeface indicates a statistically significant result at the 0.05 level. The 
dependent variable is given 0 for GGAAP and I for IRAS. 
Variables as defined below Table 8.5 
372 This Chi-square for the model with variable included whose significance level is not ver\ different 
from the significance of Wald statistic in this case, nevertheless it is lower for the first. 
''' 1 crept for the significance of industry variables, the significance of all other variables is 1-tailed. 
This does not make and difference for most of the variables except for LEVER and PROFIT?. which 
ýý ould be marginally significant if the two-tailed significance is considered. 
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('able 8.34: Results of the Full Multivariable (including all variables 
B S. E. Wald Sig. Exp (B) 95`%, C. I. for Exp(B) 
LEVER -1.879 0.850 4.894 0.027 0.153 0.029 0.807 
PROFITI -1.316 0.442 8.864 0.003 0.268 0.113 0.638 
EMPNO 0.024 0.022 1.128 0.288 1.024 0.980 1.070 
MAN 1 0.688 0.724 0.903 0.342 1.990 0.482 8. '2 l 
FREFLOAT 0.370 0.879 0.177 0.674 1.448 0.259 8.106 
AUDITOR 0.966 0.304 10.084 0.001 2.627 1.447 4.769 
US MAN 0.812 0.631 1.656 0.198 2.253 0.654 7.762 
USSUB 0.645 0.307 4.410 0.036 1.906 1.044 3.479 
USINVS 1.264 0.806 2.461 0.117 3.540 0.730 17.177 
INDUS3 6.531 0.088 
PHARMA 1.351 0.699 3.737 0.053 3.861 0.981 15.192 
SOFTWARE 0.815 0.554 2.166 0.141 2.259 0.761 6.686 
OTHER 1.332 0.570 5.465 0.019 3.788 1.240 11.572 
Constant -2.298 0.780 8.680 0.003 0.100 
Model Chi-square =57.183 (Sig :. 000) 
Note: bold typeface indicates a statistically significant result at the 0.05 level. The dependent variable 
is given 0 for GGAAP and I for IRAS. 
Variables as defined below Table 8.5 
Whereas Table 8.33 shows the results of univariable regression analysis (a model for 
each variable); Table 8.34 shows a full model which includes all the variables. 
[-however, in order to avoid high multieollinearity, a single variable is included to 
proxy for each of size, profitability and management ownership. Other full models 
which include the alternative proxies for size (total assets and turnover), profitability 
(PROFIT2) and management ownership (MAN2 and MAN3) are depicted in 
Appendix 10.7. As can be seen from the results in Table 8.33,10 variables were 
significant in the univariable models, but only 5 of these variables were significant in 
the full model shown in 8.34. The confidence interval of all the significant variables 
either does not contain the value 1 or barely does (the case of PHARMA). As 
explained in Chapter 7, this indicates the stability of the results for most of the 
variables, which in turn means that we can be more confident about the estimated 
coefficients. Furthermore, confidence intervals which clearly include the value 1 can 
be an indication of overfitting in this model and the need to a model with a smaller 
number of variables. 
\ reduced model similar to that constructed for the Main Market in Chapter 7 is 
constructed here for the Neuer Markt using 'backward elimination' as depicted in 
: -\ppendiy 
10.7 (this approach is explained in Chapter 7). As can be seen in Table 
8. ; 5, results of this model show that USINVES (US investors) is significant at . 
05. 
278 
Chapter8: Choice between L1L und US GAA P 
although it was not in the full model. Still, one should remember that this model 
gives us a better combination of variables in terms of the likelihood ratio and avoid 
the risk of overfitting. 
fable 8.35: Results of the multivariable model in the Neuer Markt 
B S. E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 95.0% C. I. for EXP(B) 
LEVER (-) -1.525 0.774 3.884 0.049 0.218 0.048 0.992 
PROFITI (+) -1.178 0.419 7.917 0.005 0.308 0.136 0.700 
USSUB (+) 0.774 0.296 6.833 0.009 2.168 1.214 3.87 3 
AUDID (+) 0.984 0.296 11.071 0.001 2.674 1.498 4.773 
USINVS (+) 1.696 0.689 6.068 0.014 5.454 1.414 21.031 
INDUS 6.795 0.079 
PHARMA 1.335 0.682 3.833 0.050 3.800 0.998 14.466 
SOFTWARE 0.844 0.534 2.493 0.114 2.325 0.816 6.627 
OTHER 1.309 0.539 5.896 0.015 3.704 1.287 10.658 
MEDIA 374 0.000 1.000 
Constant -1.954 0.596 10.749 0.001 0.142 
Model Chi-square: 50.564 (Sig:. 000) 
Note: bold typeface indicates a statistically significant result at the 0.05 level. The dependent variable 
is -iven 0 for GGAAP and 1 for IRAS. 
Variables as defined below Table 8.5 
Using the information presented in Table 8.35, the multivariable logistic model can 
be written in the following form: 
log 
P(USGAAP) 
= _1.525LEVER - 1.178PROFITI + 0.774USSUB + 0.984AUDID 1 P(JAS) 
+ 1.696USINVES + 1.335PHARMA + 0.844SOFTWARE + 1.309OTHER 
As explained earlier, there is more than one alternative for measuring profitability 
and management ownership. Therefore, only one alternative is included in the model. 
8.7.1 Model interpretation: 
For easier interpretation, this section interprets the exponentiated coefficients (Exp 
(B)) rather than the coefficients themselves. 
For all the variables in the model in Table 8.35, the confidence intervals either do not 
contain 1 or just barely do (in the case of PHARMA and SOFTWARE). As 
mentioned above, this observation means that that we can be very confident about 
the stability of the results and the effect of the variables. 
374 r\1I' DI\ is chosen as a reference category. Still the overall significance of INDUS is the same 
using a different category as reference. MEDIA is chosen because it is the only catcgor\ compared to 
which all categories are significant. 
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The model adopted above shows that a leverage (profitability) increase of one unit 
(0.01) decreases the ratio of the probability of being a [, -SGAAP company to the 
probability of being a IAS company by a factor of 0.218 (0.308) (Exp (B)). Still, the 
sign of the profitability coefficient is opposite to the expected one (discussed later at 
the end of this chapter). 
Having a subsidiary in the US, on the other hand, increases the likelihood of 
compliance with USGAAP. This is reflected in an increase in the ratio of the 
probability of being a USGAAP company to that of being an IAS company by a 
factor of 2.168. The same observation applies to having US investors and a Big-s 
auditor. 
The overall significance of the industry variable INDUS2 indicates that it is 
significant at 0.1. However, the categories PHARMA and OTHER are significant at 
higher levels (0.05). The results for the category PHARMA (which can be replaced 
by a binary variable375) indicate that being in the pharmaceuticals sector rather than 
the media sector (the reference category) increases the ratio of the probability of 
being a USGAAP company to the probability of being an lAS company by 3.8. A 
similar observation applies to the results of SOFTWARE and OTHER. On the other 
hand, having the category OTHER as a reference category shows that being in the 
MEDIA sector is a significant factor which decreases the likelihood of being a 
USGAAP company. 
Further discussion of these results is presented at the end of this chapter. 
8.7.2 Model Evaluation: 
The following are results the most important tests of goodness of fit which are 
discussed in previous sections. 
8.7.3 Model chi-square: 
The model chi-square statistic for this model as shown at the bottom of Table 8.35 is 
significant at less than 0.000. This result indicates that predictors in this model 
perform significantly as group. (Model chi-square of the füll model is 57.183 and of 
higher significance) 
'l, This ýý ill `-, i\ c an identical result. 
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8.7.4 Hosmer and Lemeshow test: 
This test resulted in chi-square statistic of 5.958 which highly insignificant (0.652). 
This level of insignificance indicates a good fit which better than that of the Main 
market (higher P value). (This statistic for the full model is 1.928 and insignificant at 
0.986 which indicates a very high fit). 
8.7.5 McFadden R; : 
The statistic for the model above was 0.15 which indicates a moderate amount of 
explained variation. 
8.7.6 Accuracy of prediction: 
Although the overall percentage of correct classification is less than that in the 
previous model constructed for the Main Market. this model seems to be better in 
predicting the event (compliance with USGAAP). Furthermore, the model performs 
better than chance by a larger margin than that of the Main Market model376. 
Indices of the predictive efficiency show the following: 
" ý, = 
0.345 (d = 4.9 with statistical significance p=0.000) 
0zI, =0.404 (d= 6.251 with statistical significance p=0.000) 
Both results indicate that, in terms of prediction, the model built for the Neuer Markt 
performs better than that built for the Main market. 
Table 8.36: Classification table of the adopted model in the Neuer Markt 
Predicted % correct 
Observed IAS USGAAP 
IAS 103 31 76.9 
USGAAP 41 69 62.7 
Overall percentage 70.5 
8.7.7 Testing for linearity: 
The model shown above contains two continuous variables which are LEVER and 
PROFITI. To check whether the logit was linear in either of these variables, Box- 
Tidvv-ell was used as well as Polynomial regression strategies. The results of these 
tests indicate that both variables are linear in the logit. 
376 The hest result can be achieved by chance as shown by SPSS' output is to get all the IAS firms 
classified correctly `, i\ ing an over all percentage of 54.9 ° 0. Hence this model improves the prediction 
hý I ý. °o (t). I% in the Main market). 
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8.7.8 Testing for multicollinearity: 
On the basis of the most conservative criteria (maximum VIF of 4 and minimum 
tolerance value of 0.1), Table 8.37 shows that there is no multicollinearity between 
the model's variables. 
Table 8.37: Multicollinearity diagnostics l 
ToleranceV VIF 
PROFITI 
. 
903 1.108 
LEVER 
. 
885 1.130 
USINVES 
. 
979 1.021 
AUDID 
. 
930 1.075 
USSUB 
. 
921 1.085 
PHARMA 
. 
561 1.781 
SOFTWARE 
. 
355 2.818 
OTHER 
. 
384 2.606 
Variables as defined below Table 8.5 
Furthermore, Table 7.38 shows both the Eigenvalues and the condition index values 
which are also used diagnose multicollinearity. A conditions index less than 15 
confirms the observation stated above that there is no multicollinearity (a discussion 
about multi-collinearity is in Chapter 7). 
Table 8.38: Multicollinearity diagnostics 2 
Dimension37 Eigenvalue Condition index 
1 4.175 1.000 
2 1.170 1.889 
3 1.039 2.005 
4 . 
951 2.095 
5 . 
627 2.582 
6 
. 
388 3.281 
7 . 
367 3.372 
8 . 
237 4.199 
9 
. 
044 9.634 
8.7.9 Residuals Diagnostics: 
To find the firms (cases) for which the model fits poorly, three types of residual were 
examined: Studentized residual, standard residual and deviance statistics. 
, T' I'hcrc is I dimension for each parameter. 
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Table 8.39: Residual diagnostics 
Residual ± 2.0 ± 2.5 ± 3.0 
Standardized (zre) 7 2.9 % 5 2.0 % 2 0.1 % 
Studentized (sre) 5 2.0 % 0 0 
Deviance (dev) 5 2.0 % 0 0 
It can be seen from Table 8.39 that less than 3% of all types of residuals outside the 
range + 2. Furthermore, only 2% of the standardized residuals are outside the range 
2.5 with only two values greater than 3. These frequencies are consistent with what 
we should expect about the distribution of the standardized residuals. It is explained 
earlier in this chapter that we would expect about 5% of the sample to have 
standardized residuals outside the ±2 bounds and 1% outside the ± 2.5 bounds. 
Overall this indicates that apart from these few cases the model is a good fit. 
However, data for these firms was checked to detect any unusual observations 78. 
Figure 8.2 below shows a histogram with the standardized residuals with a normal 
curve. This histogram shows the few observations outside the boundaries of ± 2. The 
type of histogram we have here is very common in logistic regression and should not 
be of concern (SPSS Inc, 2001). 
'78 Three of these firms complied with USGAAP despite the fact that they were in the Media sector 
and did not have either a subsidiary in the US or US investors. The\ also had non-Big5 auditors and 
had high leverage. According to the results shown for the model above, these firms are more likel\ to 
be J, \-, firms. Although the model indicates that MEDIA firms are less likel\ to comply with 
l AAP, examples from reality show that Media firms tend to use particular standards in USGAAP 
to deal \\ ith specific accounting issues in the Media. Nothing was unusual in the data for the other mo 
firms. 
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Figure 8.2: Distribution of the standardized residuals 
The second aim of diagnostics is to detect any cases (firms) which may have undue 
influence on the model. Examining DFBeta values showed that none of these values 
was greater than 1 (the maximum DFBeta value was 0.259, which is far from 1 37`'). 
8.8 Multivariable analysis for the subsample of the Main Market: 
There is not a multivariable model for the choice between IAS and USGAAP in the 
Main Market. The reason for this is that USLIST is the only one factor that proved to 
be significant in a multivariable setting. This result is consistent with that produced 
by the multinomial model presented in Chapter 7. 
Although USLIST is a good predictor, it explains only small proportion of the 
compliance with USGAAP. In other words, only six companies from the 23 using 
USGAAP are listed in the US. Therefore, Table 8.40 is designed to show some 
important facts about these firms. Although the vast majority of this information can 
he obtained from the crosstabulations presented above, Table 8.40 presents this 
information in a different way that gives a better and more complete overview. 
The following facts on USGAAP companies in the Main Market can be extracted 
from Table 8.40: 
" They do not tend to be in particular industry sectors, 
'1" Chapter 7 explains that DFBeta -greater than I causes concern. 
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" They are almost classified in quality segments (only 3 «hick are not). 
" Nearly all of them have subsidiaries abroad (except one). 
" The majority have subsidiaries in the US (18 out of ? 3.78%). 
" The majority have Big-5 auditors (19 out of 23.82.6 %). 
" They are classified in different size categories, and different levels of 
leverage and different levels of free float. 
Although having a subsidiary in the US, a Big-5 auditor and being a classified in a 
quality segment seem to be significant characteristics of companies using USGAAP, 
statistical analysis did not prove that they are significant factors in differentiating 
these companies from those using IAS. This may be related to the fact that there is a 
small number of companies using US GAAP. 
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8.9 Summary and Discussion of the results on the choice between IAS and 
USGAAP in the Neuer Markt: 
The results of this chapter are divided into two sections: results from the Neuer 
Markt and results from the Main Market; nevertheless analysis presented in this 
chapter, for both markets, is on the choice between IAS and US GAAP. The main 
hypotheses tested in this chapter are those linking companies with a US element. 
Still, most of the hypotheses tested in Chapter 7 are tested in this chapter as well on 
the grounds that US GAAP is considered to be of higher quality, more stringent and 
requiring more disclosures than IAS. In other words, the evaluation of US GAAP 
compared with IAS is similar to that of IRAS compared with GGAAP. Results on 
these particular hypotheses are found to be substantially different from those in 
Chapter 7. Yet, as it will be seen from the discussion below, this difference cannot be 
blamed on the assumption stated above (the superiority of US GAAP to IAS) being 
wrong. The results discussed in the following section are those of the Neuer Markt, 
as presented in table 8.41. 
In general, all the variables that are have a US element, namely USINVES, USSUB 
and USMAN, proved to be important determinants in choosing US GAAP rather 
than IAS in the Neuer Markt. However, USMAN is not included in the multivariable 
model. In broad terms, this part of the results is consistent with that obtained by 
Weißenberger et al (2004), where they concluded that companies using US GAAP 
are those which believe that it would be advantageous with in the US market. 
The variable USMAN, which indicates whether a firm has managers from the US 
(on the supervisory board or the management board) or not, is significant in the 
bivariable analysis (chi-square and univariable models). but omitted from the 
adopted multivariable model. Further analysis shows that the effect of this variable is 
masked by the variable USINVES (having significant investors from the US). As 
shown in the correlation matrix in Table 8.5, the correlation between these two 
variables is strong (significant Pearson coefficient of 0.556). Despite the strong 
relationship between USINVES and USMAN, the presence of US investors is not 
the reason (at least not the main reason) for the presence of US managers on the 
supervisory board or the management board (as expected in the hypothesis in 
Chapter 5). A crosstabulation between the two variables shows that while 81 % of 
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companies which have US investors have US managers. only 48 % of the companies 
with US managers have US investors. In fact, the variable which seems to explain 
the presence of US managers is USSUB, where 81.5 % of the companies with US 
managers have subsidiaries in the US. A similar observation is found in the analysis 
on the Main Market in Chapter 7 between FORSUB (having a foreign subsidiary) 
and FORMAN (having foreign managers). Therefore, FORMAN wý as considered 
then as an indication of the importance of the foreign subsidiaries and, in turn, as a 
proxy for internationality (further discussion of this is provided in Chapter 7). Based 
on this observation, it is possible to suggest that the presence of a US manager on the 
supervisory board or the management board is an indication of the importance of the 
US subsidiary. Mezias (2002) reports that European companies, including German, 
that have American top officers for their subsidiaries in the US face fewer lawsuits. 
American top officers can influence the choice of US GAAP by persuading the 
hoard of management that this will help them to avoid any probable legal disputes 
related to their business in the US. The fact that USMAN is not included in the 
adopted model should not mean that this variable is not an important predictor; 
nevertheless it is highly correlated with other factors which mask its effect. 
Having a US subsidiary USSUB is one of the highly significant factors in the 
adopted model. The acceptance of the alternative hypothesis indicates the 
importance of having a subsidiary in the US in the choice of US GAAP. This 
significance can be explained by the need of these companies to be more transparent 
with third parties in the US which include suppliers, government and strategic 
customers through using a GAAP that is familiar to these parties. Furthermore, they 
are likely to be seeking finance for their US projects from US institutions, for 
hedging reasons. Finance sought by German firms operating in the US may come 
from American banks which are likely to require or at least to prefer financial 
information prepared under their local GAAP. They may also be in interested in 
seeking finance through a future listing on a US Exchange. 
It should be mentioned that because this variable is a dichotomy (binary). it 
disregards the relative importance of the US subsidiary for the German firms. 
Further research could investigate the impact of the relative size of these subsidiaries 
on the choice of standards (although this information is not available in 
Noly)ci7. sic'(lI). as one might expect that having a small US subsidiary is less likely to 
Influence the GAAP' decision than having a large one. 
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One important finding is that USSUB is a highly significant factor in choosing IR: \S 
(rather than GGAAP) in the companies of the Main Market, but not in the choice 
between IAS and US GAAP (further discussion is presented below in section on the 
Main Market). This contrasts with the finding in the Neuer Markt, where the choice 
is only between IAS and US GAAP. 
USINVES is the second important variable in our multivariable model. The null 
hypothesis on US investors is rejected at all levels of statistical analysis. To 
understand the implication of this result, one should remember that this variable 
indicates whether US investors exist in the body of investors or not. This variable 
was initially measured on a continuous scale, but because of the large number of 
zeros it was changed into a binary variable. It is also important to recall that these 
investors are assumed to be those with a significant investment 394. Accepting the 
alternative hypotheses as stated above indicates the presence of US investors in the 
body of investors increases the probability of using US GAAP. This implies that 
managers of these companies are concerned with satisfying the need of their US 
investors with the type of information that can be directly comparable with that 
obtained in the US. Companies may also be trying to attract more US investors. 
Furthermore, US investors who have larger proportions of a company's equity would 
be able to put pressure on or to persuade management to adopt US GAAP rather than 
IAS. This may be more probable in the Neuer Markt than in the Main Market, where 
GGAAP appears to be a relatively cheap (less costly) choice. CaIPERS, the largest 
institutional investor in the US is a good example of the influence that US 
institutional investors can have on German companies to develop their corporate 
governance system and to increase their transparency (Brändle and Noll, 2004). One 
of the main arguments for the role of US investors in the choice of US GAAP is that 
it leads to high transparency, which is in turn would be appreciated by larger US 
institutional investors, who need such transparency for more for investment decision 
making purposes (see Chapter 5 for further discussion). 
As mentioned earlier listing in the US is one of the most influential factors in the 
adoption of US GAAP; nevertheless the very few Neuer Markt companies listed in 
the I. IS make it impossible to test this hypothesis statistically. Yet, the fact that all the 
'`' This because shares in Germany are largely bearer shares and then the ones reregistered in the 
annual reports or in a database like Hoppenstedt are assumed to be significant 
291 
Chapter8: Choice hem-cen LI and U'S G. J_-i? 
Neuer Markt companies listed on NASDAQ use US GAAP provides some support 
for this linkage. 
A similar case is management ownership. where variables MAN2 and MAN3 (the 
ones including family ownership) proved to be significantly different across the two 
groups, and to be significant predictors in the univariable models. However. they are 
omitted from the multivariable model. Auditor identity (AUDID) appears to be the 
most obvious factor causing the insignificance of these two variables in the 
multivariable model. The correlation matrix above (Table 8.5) shows that AUDID is 
significantly negatively correlated with both management variables. This may imply 
that companies with large proportions of management ownership tend not to have 
Big-5 auditors. One explanation for this is that when managers own a high 
percentage in the equity capital they might be reluctant to spend the high fees 
required to hire a Big-5 auditor. Furthermore, they probably would not need to hire a 
Big-5 auditor to signal to the rest of shareholders that they are acting in the best 
interests of the firm, as the agency costs are demonstrably low. It can also be said 
that shareholders would have less need to impose a Big-5 auditor as a monitoring 
device on the managers' behaviour. 
Results of the t-test and univariable models presented above show that companies 
with low proportions of management ownership are more likely to be using US 
GAAP. The fact that these companies are also likely to have Big-5 auditors, which is 
a highly significant factor, may be a good explanation as to why the management 
variables are insignificant when included with AUDID in a multivariable model. 
Unlike the choice between GGAAP and IRAS, size is not a significant factor in the 
choice between IAS and USGAAP. Although the t test proved that, in terms of 
turnover, IAS companies are significantly larger than USGAAP companies, the 
results become insignificant when extreme values are removed from the analysis. It 
is also against the expectations of the alternative hypothesis on size, which expects 
that USGAAP companies will be larger than IAS companies. Although the 
difference between the IAS group and USGAAP group in terms of employee 
numbers is insignificant, its sign is consistent with that of the alternative hypothesis. 
Leuz (2003) found that, in terms of market capitalisation, USGAAP companies in 
the Neuer Markt are significantly larger than lAS companies. However. size in 
Leuz's work is only a significant variable in the univariable analysis. but not in the 
N2 
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multivariable analysis`"`. Ashbaugh (2001). on the other hand, found that companies 
that are relatively larger, in terms of market capitalisation 396 are more likely to use 
lAS than USGAAP. Yet, it should be remembered that Ashbaugh's (ibid) sample 
comprised companies from different countries. Hence institutional differences may 
slake the comparison less relevant. Furthermore, it appears that there is no large 
difference in size between companies in the Neuer Markt. One can easily see that the 
"Range" for the Neuer Markt presented in Table 7.1 is much smaller than that for the 
Main Market shown in Table 7.2. This may be an initial indication that the size 
factor in the Neuer Markt is not as important as it is in the Main Market. 
Although the results on profitability measured by PROFITI and PROFIT2 are 
statistically significant, the null hypothesis is accepted because of the inverse nature 
ol'the relationship between profitability and using US GAAP. The results indicate 
that lAS companies are more profitable than US GAAP companies. According to the 
alternative hypothesis, profitable companies were expected to use US GAAP rather 
than IAS. One possible explanation for this finding is the expected relationship 
between profitability and internationality. The financial literature suggests that the 
profitability of multinational corporations (MNCs) increases with the degree of 
internationality (Chkir and Cosset, 2003, p511). The significantly positive 
correlation between profitability measures (PROFIT], PROFIT2) and FORMAN (as 
a proxy for internationality 387 ), is consistent with this suggestion. Given this 
relationship, one would expect profitable companies to be more international and 
more likely to comply with IAS rather than USGAAP. Although it is not self-evident 
that IAS is more international than US GAAP, a simple justification the argument is 
the fact that IAS derive from an international organization and represent an 
international view. US GAAP, on the other hand, belongs to one single country; 
nevertheless it is widely accepted internationally. 
urea (2004) found that international firms are more likely to be using IAS rather 
than USGAAP (marginal significance). This, in turn, means that profitable 
X5 In the draft of his paper (Leuz (2000)), size variables (market capitalisation and employee numbers) 
, irc significant in the multivariable model as well. However, Leuz (2003) had different results in the 
published work. 
lt is the market value of a firm's shares listed on its domestic exchange divided b\ the total 
capitalisation of its domestic equity market at the end of the sample y ear. 
' l'OR\IAN indicates Whether a firm has a foreign manager of not. In Chapter 7, it is considered as 
it better proxy for internationality than FORSUB. The same relationship proved to be existing in the 
Neuer Markt analysis. although it is not presented above. 
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companies can be expected to prefer IAS to USGAAP. Previous literature does not 
provide any results on significant profitability differences across IAS and USGAAP 
groups. Furthermore, the alternative hypothesis that profitable companies are 
expected to comply with USGAAAP is based on same arguments used to argue that 
profitable companies would choose IRAS in preference to GGAAP. Previous 
research proves that USGAAP is more restrictive and requires more disclosure than 
IAS (Leuz 2003), but differences between USGAAP and IAS cannot be as large and 
high as they are between IRAS and GGAAP. Therefore, profitable companies can 
find the advantages they need in a high quality set of accounting standards in IAS 
without incurring the additional costs of using US GAAP. 
Finally, one fact should be considered here is that profitability is a variable may not 
he totally independent of the accounting standards used. Although it is not evidenced 
in the literature, US GAAP is generally viewed to be more conservative than IAS 
and likely to produce lower profits 
Industry variables are tested in two forms: nominal variables (including different 
categories) and binary variables. The hypothesis on industry is general and does not 
assume any specific output. In other words, it does not expect companies in a 
specific sector to comply with a specific set of accounting standards. Although, 
according to the chi-square test, not all the binary variables representing industry 
sectors are significant, finding that some of them are is enough to reject the null 
hypothesis and to accept the alternative one. The multivariable analysis. on the other 
hand, shows that all the industry variables can be significant factors. Interpretation of 
the model coefficients presented above provides more discussion on these binary 
variables. In general, the results indicate that companies in the sectors PHARMA, 
SOFTWARE and OTHER388 are more likely to use USGAAP than the ones in 
MEDIA. It is mentioned above that changing the reference category provides 
different comparisons. As shown in Table 8.41, regrouping the industry sectors into 
PHARMA, SOFTWARE, MEDIA, TECHNO and OTHER 389 (as a reference 
category) shows that companies in each of these categories are less likely to be using, 
U1 SGAAP than the ones in the category OTHER. In the analysis on the choice 
bet\v cen IAS and USGAAP across the different industry sectors, one should consider 
the relationship between these industry sectors and the US market. Further analysis 
Other includes: Automobile. Retail, Transportation, Financial services, Utilities and Technolo`g\ 
'ý" The only difference is having technology companies in a separate sector. 
ý)-ý 
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shows that there is an apparent relationship between some of these industries and 
having subsidiaries in the US. The majority of companies in the sectors PI-IARMMA. 
TECHNO and Automobile have subsidiaries in the US (70.8%, 63% and 80'10 
respectively). This is also reflected in a significantly positive correlation between 
being in each of these sectors and USSUB (Table 8.5). 
This correlation can be related to the importance of the US market for these 
particular industries. However, not all these companies comply with USGAAP, and 
that is why they can be significant factors even when one controls for USSUB. 
l' urthermore, the complex relationship between the different variables in the model 
and each of the sectors makes it very difficult to explain the changes we get in the 
results by changing the reference category. As a result of this, it is not possible from 
the adopted model to find those sectors in which companies are most likely to 
choose USGAAP. Further investigation by controlling for only one industry sector at 
a time shows that software and media companies are the least likely to use USGAAP. 
On the other hand, companies in telecommunications. technology and 
pharmaceuticals tend to use USGAAP more than other companies in other sectors. 
The fact that the companies in the MEDIA sector are the least likely to use USGAAP 
is somewhat puzzling. In fact USGAAP is expected to be more advanced than IAS in 
dealing with accounting issues in the media sector 390 . 
Some German companies in the media sector prefer to use some specific options 
from USGAAP to deal with particular issues, but they do not use the whole set of 
standards. Constantin Film AG (a Neuer Markt media firm), for example, values its 
film assets in accordance with USGAAP, although it uses IAS to prepare its 
Financial statements (Constantin Film AG, 2001)'`' . 
Back and Hilbourne (from 
Grant Thornton (2002)) report similar exercises by UK media companies (as long as 
this does not contradict UKGAAP). Stromeyer, Zanker, Londoner and Northover 
(from ABN-AMRO) (2001, p. 2) explain that German film companies have often 
exploited accounting options to show high margins, in particular through the 
capitalisation of film costs and their deferral to later distribution cycles. In theory. 
this game can be played for years, but auditors are taking a closer look at film 
amortisation practices. US GAAP rules have been tightened and IAS may follo« ". 
The sheer size of this sector in the US and the advanced technolo`z\ used in it lead to this 
expectation 
'`'ý There is more than one similar example in the media companies in the Neuer Markt. 
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This explanation suggests that German film companies may prefer to use the less 
stringent set of accounting standards (that is IAS). whilst using only selected options 
from USGAAP, which is more stringent. In general, the main aim of testing industry 
variables is to prove that there is a statistically significant relationship between being 
in a specific sector and the choice of accounting standards, rather than explaining 
behaviours in each of these sectors. The significance of some categories in the 
univariable analysis and the multivariable analysis support the rejection of the null 
hypothesis and the acceptance of the alternative one. 
One of the explanations that can be given for the impact of industry on the choice of 
accounting standards is what may be called a "herding effect". One simple way to 
check whether this impact exists in the case of the Neuer Markt or not is to check the 
choice of the leader companies in each sector and to compare it with the general 
trend in that sector. Unfortunately, the researcher could not establish any statistical 
evidence on this effect. Based on the discussion above, the researcher would argue 
that the most convenient explanation for the industry impact is the importance of the 
IIS market for that industry. This means that companies are willing to adopt US 
GAAP in order to be visible and able to compete in this market. One can also think 
of it as a part of complete package that German companies should buy in order to 
operate in the US market. 
Leuz (2003) found that two of the industry binary variables were marginally 
significant factors in the choice between IAS and USGAAP in the Neuer Markt. 
However, he does not provide any explanation. Tarca (2004), on the other hand, does 
not find any significant industry factors in determining the choice between IAS and 
USGAAP either in her full sample (international sample) or her subsample of 
German firms. Weißenberger et al (ibid), on the other hand, finds that one of motives 
leading German companies towards the use of international GAAP is the aim of 
increased comparability with industry peers. 
The null hypothesis tested through the variables AUDID is rejected at both levels in 
the univariable and multivariable analysis. The alternative hypothesis that having a 
Big-s auditor is positively associated with using USGAAP is one of those based on 
the main hypothesis that USGAAP leads to a higher quality of disclosure. Kchczyk 
(2000) reports that Robert K. Elliott-KPMG and Chairman of the AICPA's Board of 
Directors states that countries like Germany are moving, towards US GAAP. as it is 
the highest standard. Furthermore. Elliott predicts that US GA: \P %\-ill \\-in because 
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he thinks that good information makes companies more profitable (means US 
GAAP). Although this may not be absolutely true (because the general tendency in 
Germany is towards IAS rather than US GAAP. see Chapter 4). it shows the point of 
view of a manager in a Big-5 firm and a leading professional body. 
As explained in Chapter 4, it is evident that US GAAP is more restrictive than LAS 
in relation to earnings management. As German companies are well-krno\\ n for 
managing earnings (see Chapter 4 for evidence), Big-5 auditors, in general, are 
expected to support the adoption of a more stringent set of accounting standards that 
reduce the opportunities for earnings management. Evidence on the important role of 
the Big-5 in preventing earnings management can be found in Becker, DeFond. 
Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam (1998); Nelson, Elliot and Tarpley (2000) and Gore. 
Pope and Singh (2001). In general, it can be said that the Big-5 are more independent 
and less likely to risk their reputation to satisfy their clients by allowing practices 
which lead to information of low quality. 
Furthermore, it is explained earlier in Chapter 2 that there have been a series of 
scandals and legal disputes in the Neuer Markt. In such an environment, one would 
expect the Big-5 to be protecting their reputation by recommending their clients to 
choose the more stringent set of accounting standards. Another explanation is that 
the Big-5 firms, which are mainly based in the US, may have more experience with 
US GAAP than IAS. Serving companies using US GAAP may be cost-saving for 
them. 
Still, one should not disregard the fact that the direction of causality between having 
a Big-5 auditor and the adoption of US GAAP may be the opposite of what is 
suggested above. It could be argued that companies that decide on using US GAAP 
seek help from Big-5 auditors, which are likely to have the required expertise for this. 
lt may be also a signal that they are contracting the best accountancy firms in 
relation to using US GAAP and hence, signalling that they are following best 
practice in financial reporting. If we assumed that companies using US GAAP are 
aiming at the US market, one would expect that using a Big-5 auditor may be a 
signal of more credibility in the application these accounting principles. 
Results of previous research on the choice between LAS and USGAAP do not 
support this hypothesis. Although Leuz (ibid) does not include this variable in his 
analysis, he footnotes that he tested this variable in an early version and found that it 
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was not significant. Tarca (ibid) and Ashbaugh (ibid). on the other hand do not 
mention this factor. 
The null hypothesis on leverage is also rejected all types of analysis. For example. 
the results of the t-test presented in Table 8.30, show that the mean leverage of IAS 
companies is significantly higher than that of US GAAP companies. All results, in 
turn, mean accepting the alternative hypotheses that compliance with USGAAP is 
negatively related to leverage. One possible explanation for this relationship is that 
German companies with low leverage may be more dependent on the equity market, 
and then have the additional need to comply with a more investor-oriented set of 
accounting standards. 
The theoretical explanations provided in Chapter 5 for the expected inverse 
relationship between leverage and the adoption of IRAS rather than GGAAP was 
also the basis for applying this hypothesis to the choice of USGAAP rather than IAS. 
However, the interesting point is that leverage does not prove to be a significant 
factor at all in the choice between GGAAP and IRAS. Comparing the descriptive 
statistics of the Neuer Markt in Table 8.1 with those of the Main Market in Table 7.1 
or 8.2, one can see that mean leverage in the Main Market is much higher than that 
in the Neuer Markt (47.4 and 31.2 respectively). This has the clear indication that 
Main Markt companies are significantly more dependent on debt finance and that the 
Neuer Markt companies are more dependent on the equity market. This, in turn, may 
be an indication that the established relationship between companies in the Main 
Market and their banks is stronger than that between the Neuer Markt companies and 
their banks. Therefore, banks (lenders) in the Main Market may be more likel-\ to 
have access to insider information than in the Neuer Markt. In other words, the 
traditional view of German firms (relying on bank than equity finance) is reflected in 
the companies of the Main Market, which are much better established in the Market. 
more than it is in the companies of the Neuer Markt, which are still new growing 
companies. Vitols (2004, p. 1) states that the foundation of Neuer Markt is viewed to 
a step taken by German policy-makers to move from a bank-based financial system 
to an equity based system. Furthermore, he also suggests that this foundation is 
partly related to the fact that "the large privately-owned banks, who find it 
increasingly difficult to make profits in traditional deposit taking and lending and 
thus shifting their focus towards fee-based activities such investment banking and 
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asset management" . 
Furthermore, one expects young companies (nc\ start ups) to 
be of higher risk and therefore have less chance to raise debt. 
1 area (ibid) finds that leverage is not a significant factor in the choice between IAS 
and USGAAP. Leuz (ibid) and Ashbaugh (ibid). on the other hand. do not test for 
this variable392. Still, Leuz (2004) find that low leverage is associated with voluntary 
segment reporting by German firms. 
Results for the Main Market: 
The most important factors in the analysis of the Main Market subsample are the free 
float (FREFLOAT) and US listing (USLIST). As mentioned earlier. listing on the 
US has proved to be the most important predictor in the previous literature. 
The significant positive relationship between choosing USGAAP and the free float 
leads to accepting the alternative hypothesis that companies with high free float are 
more likely to adopt US GAAP. One of the main explanations of the impact of free 
float on accounting choices is the increase in agency costs with the proportion of free 
float which, in turn, means more pressure for monitoring managers' behaviour. US - 
GAAP, which is more stringent and requires more disclosures than IAS, may be a 
better choice, especially as it is perceived to be more investor-oriented. Fresenius 
AG (2002) explains that it prepared its consolidated accounts for the year ending on 
December 31,2002 in accordance with US GAAP for the first time, because they 
believe that US GAAP rules are more strongly oriented to shareholders than are 
German accounting rules according to the Commercial Law (HGB), which are aimed 
at the protection of creditors. 
It might be interesting to ask why free float is important in choosing US GAAP in 
the Main Market, but not in the Neuer Market. The descriptive statistics of free float 
in both markets (Table 7.1,8.1 and 8.2) do not appear to be substantially different 
from each other. 
ý\t the level of univariable analysis, Leuz (ibid) finds that there is a significant 
difference in free float across the IAS group and the USGAAP group. Ilovyever. it 
vv as only marginally significant in his multivariable model (in only one model of 
tvv'o). Furthermore, Leuz expects free float to be positively associated with USGAAP 
'"' In an earlier version of his paper. Leuz (ibid) finds that leverage is an insignificant factor. 
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(as is the case in our results). but his results shoed a negative association. Yet. he 
also does not provide a clear explanation for his finding. 
As mentioned earlier. the limited number of US GAAP companies may have 
influenced the results in this part. Therefore. the researcher is unable to speculate as 
to whether the differences in the results between the two parts of the analysis are the 
result of institutional differences. 
Results of previous studies on the choice between USGAAP and IAS are presented 
in Chapter 5. Apart from Ashbaugh (ibid), the limited empirical studies on this 
subject failed to find many significant factors. In general, US-listing was found to be 
the most significant factor (even in the survey studies). Leuz (ibid) finds that future 
financial needs (measured by sales growth) are also an important predictor. 
Furthermore, Tarca (ibid) finds that foreign sales are a marginally significant factor 
in choosing IAS rather than USGAAP. Ashbaugh, on the other hand, finds a wider 
variety of important predictors. She finds that compliance with USGAAP is 
positively associated with the number of foreign stock exchanges the company is 
listed on, listing in the US and the degree of inferiority of domestic GAAP to the 
USGAAP. Although the current research does not test for some of the variables 
tested in the above-mentioned studies such as future financial needs and the issuing 
of seasoned equity, it tests other variables which were not examined in these studies. 
The intention to get listed in the US: the literature on the choice between IAS and 
USGAAP suggests that the intention to get listed in the US may be a significant 
factor affecting a company's decision to comply with USGAAP (Leuz, 2003; 
Weißenberger, Stahl and Vorstius, 2004). However, there is a problem in finding a 
proxy to measure this intention. This is simply because intentions are not 
quantifiable and tangible. The simplest way to measure such a variable is to Survey 
managers in the respective companies (which is not within the scope of the 
methodology of the current research). However, this can be partially explored by 
examining new listings of German companies on NYSE during the years following 
-'001 (the sample year). It was possible for the researcher to check the latest list of 
German companies quoted on NYSE (November 2004). This list showed that there 
are Only two German firms that have listed their shares on NY"Sl i since the end of 
? 001. These tvv o companies are Altana AG and BAYER AG. Both companies are in 
the Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals sector and using, LAS (for the \ car ending in 
2001). Although this verb- small number of companies does not allow us to test this 
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assumption statistically. their compliance with IAS does not support this assumption. 
Of course the period since 2001 may not provide enough time for intentions to list in 
the US to be achieved. Companies may adopt a longer time horizon. Others may be 
keen to preserve an option to list in the US, rather than having a definite intention. 
It is explained above in the Neuer Markt section that having a US subsidiary is not 
important in the choice of USGAAP in the Main Market, although it is important in 
the choice of IRAS. From 128 German companies with US subsidiaries, 62 adopt 
IRAS, of which 44 uses IAS. It is understandable that 18 out of 23 companies using 
US GAAP have subsidiaries in the US; nevertheless it is somehow puzzling that the 
44 companies decided to use IAS rather than US GAAP. Still, the multinomial 
model presented in chapter 7 shows that US SUB is important in the choice between 
G GAAP and US GAAP and between G GAAP and IAS, but not between IAS and 
US GAAP. The question is: why is USSUB a significant determinant of choosing 
US GAAP in the Neuer Markt, but not the Main Market? One possible answer is that 
the relative importance of US subsidiaries for the Main Market companies is not 
significant enough to influence the decision on choosing US GAAP. In other words, 
the cost of adopting US GAAP may be higher than the benefit when companies 
when the subsidiaries in US are small or when the company have minor interests in 
the US Market. This leads us to the need for further investigation of the relative 
significance of US subsidiaries which is suggested earlier and which is an option for 
further research. 
ý01 
Chapter 9: Summary, Conclusions and Suggestions , 
far further research 
9 Chapter 9: Summary, Conclusions and Suggestions for further 
research 
9.1 Summary: 
Since 1998, German listed companies (Main Market ') have been allowed by law to 
use internationally recognised accounting standards (IRAS - IAS or USGAAP) as a 
substitute for German GAAP (GGAAP) for the preparation of their consolidated 
financial statements. Companies in the Neuer Markt, on the other hand, were394 
required to prepare their consolidated accounts in accordance with either IAS or 
USGAAP. This flexibility in the choice of GAAP raises questions about the factors 
explaining them. 
Inspired by the literature on voluntary disclosure and on GAAP choices, the current 
research endeavours to investigate empirically the relationship between specific firm 
characteristics and the choice of one of the allowable GAAPs. 
Statistical analysis is designed at three levels: univariable, bivariable and 
multivariable analysis. Whereas significance tests are used to investigate any 
significant differences across all three established groups in terms of specific factors, 
multivariable models explore the association between these factors collectively and 
the choice of a particular set of accounting rules. 
This empirical work comprises three clusters 395 of statistical analysis. The first 
cluster of analysis is intended to examine the choice between GGAAP and IRAS, 
which only takes place in the Main Market (Chapter 7). The second cluster is 
intended to examine the choice between IAS and US GAAP. which takes place in 
both the Main Market and the Neuer Markt (Chapter 8). The third cluster of 
statistical analysis is concerned with the choice between the three groups of 
accounting standards: GGAAP, IAS and US-GAAP, which takes place in the Main 
Market. 
The hypotheses postulated to explain the choice between GGAAP and IRAS can be 
summarised in one null form as the following: the tendency to comply with IRAS by 
German listed firms is either not associated with size. being in a quality segment. 
`'' Recall that this is a name chosen by the researcher to include all segments in F\ VB (Frankfurt 
c\chaný-, c). except for the Neuer Markt. 
The Neuer Markt does not eist any more (see Chapter 2) 
Hie ww ord cluster is used here to include all the different t\ pes of statistical techniques used to 
anal\'se each choice. 
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equity capital being held by managers396. the proportion of free float. leverage. 
profitability, auditor identity. listing status, internationality of business. 
internationality of investors and industry type or is negatively related to size. being 
in a quality segment, the proportion of free float. profitability. having a Big-5 auditor. 
listing abroad, having foreign subsidiaries. having foreign investors / or positively 
related with management ownership and leverage. 
For the choice between IAS and USGAAP, on the other hand, two main types of 
hypotheses are tested. The first type is those built on a basic assumption that US 
(iAAP is more stringent and requires more disclosures than IAS. These hypotheses 
are, in general, almost similar to the ones above tested on the choice between 
GGAAP and IRAS. They can also be summarised in one null hypotheses as the 
following: the tendency of German companies to choose USGAAP is either not 
associated with size, being in a quality segment, management ownership, the 
proportion of free float, leverage, profitability, auditor identity. listing status, and 
industry type or is negatively related to size, being in a quality segment, the 
proportion of free float, profitability, having a Big-5 auditor / or positively related 
with the proportion of equity capital held by mangers397 and leverage. We notice that 
in this part there are no hypotheses on the impact of internationality398. The second 
type of hypotheses on the choice of USGAAP or IAS is based on the presence of a 
U. S. element. In short, these hypotheses can be summarised in the following null 
form: that the tendency to comply with USGAAP rather than IAS is either not 
associated with listing in the U. S., having U. S. investors, having U. S. subsidiaries 
and U. S. managers or negatively related to them. It should also be remembered that 
analysis on the choice between IAS and USGAAP is run in two separate parts: Neuer 
Markt and Main Markt. although the analysis on the Main Market in this part is 
considered somewhat informal'99 
`9' The original hypothesis was with the proportion of equity capital held by managers, but for 
statistical reasons this variable is transformed into a binar- variable. Still the result Of using this 
ariable in its continuous form gives similar results. 
In contrast with the Main Market, the management ownership variable is used in its continuous 
form. 
'"` There is not enough theoretical justification for this. It was more logical to hypothesise that 
internationality will lead to the use of IAS rather than USGAAP. This was informall\ tested and 
pro\ cd to be significant only at the univariable le\ el. 
'`'`' This is because of the limited number of companies using t! SGAAP. 
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9.2 Findings and Conclusions: 
First: German companies listed in the Main Market are statistically more likely to be 
using IRAS, if they are: 
Large in terms of total assets, employee numbers and turnover.. "'. Still, the 
relationship between size the tendency to adopt IRAS is not linear, which 
means that tendency of companies categorised as Medium to adopt IRAS is 
not statistically significantly higher than that of those categorised as Small. 
" Classified in a quality segment (DAX, MDAX or SMAX). 
" Having at least one foreign manager on either the supervisory board or the 
management board. This presence has been considered as a proxy for the 
importance of the foreign subsidiaries and, in turn, a proxy for 
internationality. Although having a subsidiary abroad is also marginally 
significant, it was excluded from the model because of its redundancy and 
because having a manager is chosen as a substitute. Hence, it can be 
concluded that the tendency of German listed firms to use IRAS increases 
with the degree of internationality (measured by having foreign managers or 
subsidiaries abroad) 
" Audited by a Big-5 auditor: Deloitte and Touche, Ernst and Young, KPMG, 
Arthur Andersen or PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
0 Having a proportion of its equity owned by members of the supervisory 
board or the management board. The conclusion in the case where the 
variable was continuous (explained in footnote 4 above) would be: `the 
tendency of German listed companies to comply with IRAS increases with 
the proportion of management ownership'. 
Furthermore, if one agrees that the final adopted multivariable model should be the 
basis for the final decision on accepting or rejecting the null hypotheses401, we 
should conclude that: 
" The tendency of German companies listed on the Main Market to comply 
with IRAS is not statistically associated with free float, leverage. profitability. 
listing abroad, foreign investors and industry type. 
400 Only one size variable included in the multivariable model, to avoid multicollinearity 
401 Recall that all decisions on rejection are taken using a significance Ieve I of . 
05. Null hypotheses 
arc rejected \v hen results are significant at levels of more than . 
05. 
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According to both univariable models and other alternative multivariable models. 
those variables underlined in the statement above are other important factors. 
However, it may not be statistically correct to draw conclusions from these results. 
The reason is because they are not in the adopted model which controls for all the 
variables that expected to be important factors402 
Second: the tendency of the Neuer Markt companies to adopt USGAAP is 
statistically associated with: 
" Low levels of leverage. Companies with low leverage are more likely to be 
using USGAAP. This conclusion is consistent with the theory provided 
earlier to support the hypothesis on leverage. 
" Low levels of profitability. It is explained in Chapter 8 that this is opposite to 
the alternative hypothesis which expects a positive relationship between 
profitability and the tendency to comply with USGAAP. This may be related 
to a weakness in the theoretical justification of this hypothesis (discussed in 
Chapter 8). This may also be related to the fact that the measure of 
profitability is not utterly independent of the GAAP used. In other words, 
profits reported under IAS may tend to be higher than those reported under 
US GAAP. However, a lack of literature in this particular area of research 
403 does not allow us to confirm this 
9 Having a subsidiary in the U. S. This means that companies having at least 
one subsidiary in the US are more likely to be using USGAAP than those 
which do not. 
" Having significant404 U. S investors among their shareholders. 
" Having a Big-5 auditor. 
Being in particular industry sectors. Informal analysis40' shows that software 
and media companies are the least likely to use USGAAP. On the other hand, 
lo" A group of statisticians advised the researcher that conclusions should be drawn on the basis on 
multivariable analysis in this type of research where the hypotheses are described to be multivariate. 
40' The researcher emailed significant researchers interested in this field: Christian Leuz (University 
of Pennsylvania, U. S. A), Holly Ashbaugh (University of Wisconsin. U. S. A) and Ann Tarca 
(University of Western Australia, Australia). They all agree on the lack of literature on this side and 
that they are not aware of any studies that may decide which one of the two GAAPs (lAS or 
l! S(IAAP) produces lower profits than the other. 
404 See Chapter 6 for explanation of significant investors. 
"5 As explained in Chapter 8, changes in the reference cats or\ (the sector to ww hich other sectors can 
he compared in the multi\ ariable model) gives different results. Further investigation b\ controlling 
I'or onl\ one industry sector at a time can help with comparing each sector with rest of sectors. 
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companies in each of telecommunications. technology and pharmaceuticals 
tend to use USGAAP more than companies in other sectors. 
While statistical analysis shows that size and free float are not associated with the 
choice between IAS and USGAAP in the Neuer Markt at all. univariable analysis 
shows that the proportion of management ownership is negatively associated with 
the choice of US GAAP. This is consistent with the alternative hypothesis explained 
and stated in Chapter 5. Yet, the results of the multivariable model do not support 
this. 
Similar to the conclusions on the Main Market, the conclusions above are based on 
the results of the multivariable analysis. Hence, it should be concluded that: 
" The tendency to comply with US GAAP by German companies in the Neuer 
Markt is not associated with size, the proportion of management ownership, 
and free float. 
Furthermore, it was not possible to test for listing in the US because of the very 
limited number of Neuer Markt companies listed in the US (or even other countries). 
However, all the Neuer Markt companies listed in the US adopt USGAAP. This 
gives some support to the alternative hypothesis, although not statistical evidence. 
Third: statistical analysis on the choice between IAS and US GAAP by the 
companies in the Main market does not provide much support to the vast majority of 
the hypotheses. It was not even possible to establish a multivariable model similar to 
that established for the Neuer Markt data. However, the factor which proved to be a 
highly significant determinant of the choice of US GAAP is U. S listing. What is 
reassuring about this limited result is that U. S. listing is the only factor on which 
there is some kind of consensus in the related literature (see Chapter 5). Furthermore. 
free float is also a significant factor in the choice of US GAAP. Yet, it is only 
marginally significant when included with USLIST in the same model. One possible 
explanation of the importance of free float in the choice of US GAAP is that 
companies with higher free float are more investor oriented and. therefore. may also 
he aiming at the US stock market which is known to have large capacity. 
Therefore. the main conclusion of this part of the analysis would be: 
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" The tendency to use US GAAP (rather than IAS) by German companies 
listed in the Main Market is highly associated with being listed in the US and 
having high free float. 
Fourth: the third part of analysis is of the choice in the Main Market between the 
three GAAPs: GGAAP, IAS or US GAAP (as three separate sets). 
Conclusions on this part are basically drawn from the multinomial model presented 
in Chapter 7: 
" The tendency of companies in the Main Market to choose IAS or US GAAP 
rather than GGAAP is positively associated with having a subsidiary in the 
Us. 
" The tendency of companies in the Main market to choose US GAAP rather 
than GGAAP is positively associated with the proportion of free float. 
9 The tendency of companies in the Main market to choose US GAAP rather 
than GGAAP is positively associated with listing in the US. 
lt can be seen from these findings that only a few variables that are statistically 
associated with the choice between US GAAP and GGAAP in the Main Markt. 
I laving a small number of US GAAP companies in the Main Market is one reason 
why there is such a small number of significant factors 406 
9.3 Suggestions for further research: 
Only a few studies have been conducted in the area of GAAP choices and more 
investigation is needed to support the results of these studies. For instance, the 
current work needs to be supported by a survey as a data resource to cover many 
points where speculations are provided on different issues. A very recent work by 
Weißenberger, Stahl, and Vorstius (2004) surveys a sample of German companies on 
the choice of IAS and USGAAP, combining that with some statistical analysis. A 
work which contains two types of data (financial statements and survey) could be 
more powerful, where the results complement each other. 
Factors examined in this study, which are based on previous literature, explain only a 
small amount of the variation of the dependent variable (accounting choice), this 
406 The multinomial model in this case was not supposed to contain more than 3 factors (see Chapter 
7). Furthermore the concentration of this analysis was to find the factors ww 11 ich are related with choice 
hct\vicen US GAAP and each of IAS or GGAAP and as not concerned finding the factors associated 
with the choice between GGAAP and LAS. 
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implies that there are still more factors to be examined. Examples of factors that 
could be considered in further research are: capital intensity. relative importance of 
foreign subsidiaries and the influence of banks. 
Another factor which may be considered in future research is the usefulness of IAS 
or US GAAP for the purposes of internal reporting. Surveys by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2002b) and Mazars (2003) indicate that a large majorit\, 
European managers (including German CFOs) believe that the use of IAS can 
benefit them for internal reporting purposes. It is difficult to measure directly the 
impact of this belief on actual adoption of IAS. However, this impact may be 
significant in companies with complex organisational structure. Singhvi and Desai 
(1971), for example, argue that in large firms, detailed information is already 
produced for internal purposes. This may mean that in the current research the 
impact of this factor may have partially been captured by the size and 
internationality variables, where the complexity of firm structure increases. However, 
it may be possible to devise a better proxy for this impact which could be used in 
future research. 
The year 2005 is a very important year in the history of accounting standards where 
listed companies in all EU member states should prepare their consolidated accounts 
according to IFRS (IAS). Many German companies have adopted IAS in the 
expectation that they will be the dominant standards in Europe. It would interesting 
to research the different dimensions of the actual implementation of IAS for the year 
2005, for instance, the observance of these standards in German companies which 
have chosen to comply with IAS prior to 2005 compared with new adopters. Such 
research would reveal what kind of benefits early voluntary compliance can have. 
For example, one would expect higher compliance with IAS by early adopters and 
more difficulties to be faced in implementing the system for new adopters. The role 
of auditors at this transitional stage is important and needs to be investigated too. 
One question is: are dominant auditors (say Big-4) more advantageous for clients 
than non-big 4 auditors in this transitional stage? 
It would be useful, too, to investigate the cost element in the preparations for the 
adoption of IAS, on which literature is scarce. It may not be easy to measure these 
costs in companies which have already adopted IAS for years. However. it would be 
easier to find such information when large numbers of firms convert to these 
308 
Chapter 9: Summary, Conclusions und Suggestions for further research 
standards at once407. Companies which are forced to use IAS may be more concerned 
with the cost argument than those who do this voluntarily. Then it is appealing to 
investigate whether they spend less on this, and whether this would affect the quality 
of their compliance. Highlighting the costs of the adoption of IRIS could be Very 
useful for policy makers and researchers in this area. 
There is some evidence in the literature that IAS does not (as much as US GAAP) 
curb income smoothing by German firms (see Chapter 4). Furthermore, a report 
published by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales (I('AEW) 
notes that aggressive earnings management in UK financial reporting is likely' to 
increase with the introduction of IFRSs (ICAEW. 2004). This implies the need to 
undertake further research to examine the truthfulness of these claims. 
The extant literature provides some empirical work on the comparisons between IAS 
and US GAAP in terms of value relevance. However, there is a clear lack of 
literature on the differences between the two GAAPs in terms of conservatism, 
reported profits and financial position (including reported leverage and total assets). 
Investigations are needed to conclude whether, for example, profits reported under 
115 GAAP are likely to be lower (or higher) than those reported under [AS. 
Information on this issue would be useful for both researchers in this particular field 
and for international committees interested in harmonising accounting standards. 
9.4 Contributions: 
To the researcher's knowledge, this is the only study in this particular area of 
research that simultaneously tests the choice of accounting standards in these two 
institutionally different German sub-markets. This research provides the opportunity 
to compare how different the factors are that influence the strategic managerial 
dlccision of choosing a particular GAAP in the two sub-markets. 
The current research tests some hypotheses that have not been tested before in 
similar research, such as the presence of foreign investors and being in a quality 
segment. Furthermore. previous studies on the choice between [AS and I 1S GAAP 
ignored any US element (apart from US listing). such as having US subsidiaries. L' 
managers and US investors, which are considered here and proved to be important 
factors. In addition to this, many proxies are also tested for the first time in this type 
o l' study, such as foreign subsidiaries, foreign managers and management ownership. 
4"' In simple \ ords, this is intended to say that more information will be a\ailable for researchers. 
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As the results of this study indicate which companies are more likely to switch to 
I RAS. they also imply which companies are more likely to continue using German 
GAAP. This may be a useful starting point for monitoring the level and the quality 
of compliance with IAS after the enforcement of IAS in 2005. Companies that tend 
to stick to GGAAP may not be in favour of using particular IAS requirements and 
have incentives to avoid using them. This, in turn, may be reflected in the adequacy 
of their compliance, when they are forced to do so. Therefore, this type of study may 
complement another stream of studies which examines the level of compliance with 
IAS, such as Street and Gray (2002). 
However, one may still wonder what the lasting contribution this study makes, once 
German listed companies are forced to comply with IAS in respect of their group 
accounts from the year 2005. In general, this work may be considered as a small 
contribution to the very limited literature on the choice of GAAP. This contribution 
is reflected in several different ways: first, the results confirm the importance of 
factors such as size, internationality and auditor type, which are consistent with the 
expectations of theory incorporated in this study's hypotheses and generally 
consistent with previous results. Although size is an important factor in the literature, 
this study shows that the relationship with size can be non-linear, where the tendency 
to comply with IRAS decreases amongst companies classified as medium-sized. 
Results on management ownership, on the other hand. were not as expected by the 
conventional theoretical explanations based on agency theory. However, the 
researcher provides an explanation for this, which is based on factual arguments such 
as the opinions of European and German CFOs about IRAS (discussed in Chapter 7). 
The inverse influence of Leverage on the choice of US GAAP is also a result which 
may be of significant interest to researchers in this particular area, simply because 
results on leverage in the literature are contradictory. Another important point which 
this research adds to the extant literature is the evidence on the influence of stock 
market classifications such as DAX, MDAX and SMAX on the quality of 
companies' reporting (voluntary compliance with IRAS). This study also provides 
reasonable evidence that having foreign managers may be a good (and possibly the 
hest) proxy for internationality and may be a good indication of the importance of 
foreign subsidiaries. Finally. one should bear in mind that most of the hypotheses 
and results of this study may be employed as sound bases for similar hypotheses in 
future studies on v'oluntarý compliance with IRAS by non-EL companies. Still. one 
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should emphasise that institutional differences and other differences between 
countries could lead to different results. In other words, the researcher does not claim 
that the models produced in this research are automatically valid for other countries 
because their relevance needs to be reviewed in the light of circumstances. 
Nevertheless they could be considered when examining the results of future studies. 
Finally, most of the factors tested here for the voluntary adoption of IRAS are widely 
used in the literature on voluntary disclosure, because of the clear parallel between 
these two managerial decisions. Therefore, the results of the current research can be 
seen as a complement to the body of literature on voluntary disclosure. In this body 
of literature there is general consistency in the results about the particular factors 
such as size, internationality, cross listing and auditor type (generally the same ones 
mentioned above in the part about GAAP choice), which are associated with higher 
disclosure Although the results of this research reinforce the existing perception of 
the impact of size, internationality and auditor type on voluntary disclosure, it casts 
doubt on the inclusion of cross-listing, as it makes it clear that this factor is not 
important when you control for size. Moreover. the influence of size is not as simple 
as it is claimed to be in the extant disclosure literature. The non-linearity that exists 
in the relationship between firm size and the choice of GAAP (as mentioned above) 
implies that the same type of relationship may exist between firm size and the extent 
of voluntary disclosure. The influence of quality segments, which have not been 
tested before in this type of literature408, may also be considered as a potential factor 
influencing companies' disclosures. Leverage is also one of the commonly tested 
factors for influencing voluntary disclosure, nevertheless, there is a lack of clear 
evidence on the influence of this factor. The current results show that leverage is 
negatively associated with choosing US GAAP over IAS which, in turn, implies that 
it may have the same impact on the levels of voluntary disclosure. 
Although the disclosure literature is built up from studies conducted in different 
countries from across the world, their results. in general, appear to be in line with 
each other and with the expectations of theory. The clear agreement between most of 
the results of this study and those in the disclosure literature. therefore, may have 
some international implications for the relationship between firm characteristics 
(wherever they are) and their decisions concerning accounting practices (such as 
4`8 At least to the best of the researcher's knowledge 
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extensive voluntary disclosures or the adoption of a more demanding (JAAP). In 
other words. results of this research may be of help is studying the impact of firm 
characteristics on voluntary accounting disclosure in other countries. 
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10.1 Appendix 1: Main Market companies included in the study (ordered 
according to their GAAP choice) 
No Company Sector GAAP Segment 
I A. Moksel AG GGAAP Unclassified Food and Beverages 
2 A. A. A. Aktiengesellschaft GGAAP Unclassified Finance 
3 a. i. s AG GGAAP Unclassified Industry 
4 AdCapital AG GGAAP SMAX Industry 
5 Adolf Ahlers AG GGAAP SMAX Consumer Cyclical 
6 Albis Leasing AG GGAAP Unclassified Finance 
7 Alcatel SEL AG GGAAP Unclassified Telecommunications 
8 Allbecon AG GGAAP SMAX Industry 
9 Andreae-Noris-Zahn AG GGAAP Unclassified Pharmaceuticals 
10 Armstrong Dw AG GGAAP Unclassified Construction 
Autania AG GGAAP Unclassified Industry 
12 AVA AG GGAAP MDAX Retail 
13 AWD AG GGAAP MDAX Finance 
14 Axel Springer Verlag AG GGAAP Unclassified Media 
15 B&L Immobilien AG GGAAP Unclassified Finance 
16 Bau-Verein zu Hamburg AG GGAAP SMAX Finance 
17 BayWa AG München GGAAP Unclassified Construction 
18 BBS Kraftfahrzeugtechnik AG GGAAP Unclassified Automobile 
19 Beate Uhse AG GGAAP MDAX Retail 
20 Berentzen-Gruppe AG GGAAP SMAX Food and Beverages 
21 BERU AG GGAAP MDAX Automobile 
22 BHS Tabletop AG GGAAP Unclassified Retail 
23 BIEN-HAUS AG GGAAP Unclassified Construction 
24 
Bijou Brigitte modische Accessoires 
AG GGAAP Unclassified Retail 
25 Biotest AG GGAAP SMAX Pharmaceuticals 
?6 BMP AG GGAAP SMAX Industry 
27 
Borussia Dortmund Gmbh & Co. 
KGaA GGAAP Unclassified Media 
28 Brilliant AG GGAAP Unclassified Technology 
19 Brüder Mannesmann AG GGAAP SMAX Industry 
30 Buderus AG GGAAP MDAX Machinary 
1 cash. medien AG GGAAP Unclassified Media 
CeWe Color Holding AG GGAAP SMAX Retail 
33 Cinemaxx AG GGAAP SMAX Media 
34 CompuGroup Holding AG GGAAP Unclassified Software 
Condomi AG GGAAP SMAX Retail 
36 Cordier, Robert AG GGAAP Unclassified Basic Resources 
37 Creaton AG GGAAP SMAX Construction 
38 Curtis 1000 Europe AG GGAAP Unclassified Retail 
"9 Custodia Holding AG GGAAP Unclassified Food and Beveraues 
40 
Deutsche Steinzeug Cremer und 
Breuer AG GGAAP SMAX Construction 
41 Deutscher Eisenhandel AG GGAAP Unclassified Basic Resources 
4-' Deutz AG GGAAP MDAX Machinar\ 
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43 Didier-Werke AG GGAAP Unclassified Basic Resources 
44 Douglas Holding AG GGAAP MDAX Retail 
45 Dr. Scheller Cosmetics AG GGAAP SMAX Pharmaceuticals 
46 Drägerwerk AG GGAAP Unclassified Telecommunications 
47 Edscha AG GGAAP SMAX Automobile 
48 effeff Fritz Fuss GmbH & Co. KGaA GGAAP Unclassified Technology 
49 Ehlebracht AG GGAAP Unclassified Construction 
50 Elexis AG GGAAP SMAX Telecommunications 
5I Elringklinger AG GGAAP Unclassified Automobile 
52 Energie Baden-Württemberg AG GGAAP Unclassified Utilities 
53 
Felten & Guilleaume Energietechnik 
AG GGAAP Unclassified Telecommunications 
54 Fielmann AG GGAAP MDAX Retail 
55 Fresenius AG GGAAP MDAX Pharmaceuticals 
56 
Friatec AG Keramik- und 
Kunstoffwerke GGAAP Unclassified Industry 
57 Fuchs Petrolub AG Oel + Chemie GGAAP SMAX Chemicals 
58 Garant Schuh AG GGAAP SMAX Consumer Cyclical 
59 Gardena AG GGAAP SMAX Consumer Cyclical 
60 GEHE AG GGAAP MDAX Pharmaceuticals 
61 GESCO AG GGAAP SMAX Industry 
62 GfK AG GGAAP MDAX Industry 
63 Gildemeister AG GGAAP MDAX Machinary 
64 GLUNZ AG GGAAP Unclassified Construction 
65 Gold-Zack AG GGAAP MDAX Finance 
66 Grammer AG GGAAP SMAX Automobile 
67 Graphitwerk Kropfmühl AG GGAAP Unclassified Basic Resources 
68 Hach AG GGAAP SMAX Retail 
69 Hamburger Hochbahn AG GGAAP Unclassified Transportation 
70 Hans Einhell AG GGAAP SMAX Retail 
71 Heinkel AG GGAAP SMAX Machinary 
72 Herlitz AG GGAAP Unclassified Retail 
73 HIT International Trading AG GGAAP Unclassified Retail 
74 Holsten-Brauerei AG GGAAP SMAX Food and Beverages 
75 Hornbach Holding AG GGAAP SMAX Retail 
76 Hucke AG GGAAP Unclassified Consumer Cyclical 
77 Hymer AG GGAAP SMAX Automobile 
78 Indus Holding AG GGAAP SMAX Industry 
79 Innotec TSS AG GGAAP SMAX Construction 
80 Interseroh AG GGAAP Unclassified Industry 
81 IVG Holding AG GGAAP MDAX Finance 
82 IWKA AG GGAAP MDAX Machinary 
833 Jean Pascale AG GGAAP Unclassified Retail 
84 Jenoptik AG GGAAP MDAX Telecommunications 
85 Jil Sander AG GGAAP Unclassified Consumer Cyclical 
86 K&M Möbel AG GGAAP SMAX Consumer Cyclical 
87 K±S AG GGAAP MDAX Basic Resources 
88 Kampa Haus AG GGAAP SMAX Construction 
89 Kamps AG GGAAP MDAX Food and Beverages 
90 Kässbohrer Geländefahrzeug AG GGAAP SMAX Machinary 
91 Koenig & Bauer-Albert AG GGAAP MMDAX Machinary 
92 Kügel Fahrzeugwerke AG GGAAP Unclassified Automobile 
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93 Köhler & Krenzer Fashion AG GGAAP SMAX Consumer Cyclical 
94 Konrad Hornschuch AG GGAAP Unclassified Retail 
95 
Krones AG Hermann Kronseder 
Maschinenfabrik GGAAP MDAX Machinary 
96 KSB AG GGAAP Unclassified Machinary 
97 Leica Camera AG GGAAP Unclassified Telecommunications 
98 Leifheit AG GGAAP SMAX Retail 
99 Leoni AG GGAAP SMAX Telecommunications 
100 Ludwig Beck AG GGAAP SMAX Retail 
101 M. A. X. Holding AG GGAAP SMAX Industry 
102 Maternus - Kliniken AG GGAAP SMAX Pharmaceuticals 
103 MCS Systeme AG GGAAP Unclassified Telecommunications 
104 MD Bau Holding AG GGAAP Unclassified Construction 
105 Mediclin AG GGAAP SMAX Pharmaceuticals 
106 Mineralbrunnen AG GGAAP Unclassified Food and Beverages 
107 Möbel Walther AG GGAAP SMAX Consumer Cyclical 
108 Mologen Holding AG GGAAP Unclassified Pharmaceuticals 
109 Neckarwerke Elektrizitätsversorgungs GGAAP Unclassified Utilities 
110 Neschen AG GGAAP SMAX Industry 
111 Norddeutsche Affinerie AG GGAAP MDAX Basic Resources 
112 PA Power Automation AG GGAAP SMAX Telecommunications 
1 13 Park & Bellheimer AG GGAAP Unclassified Food and Beverages 
114 Pegasus Beteiligungen AG GGAAP Unclassified Finance 
1 15 Pfleiderer AG GGAAP SMAX Construction 
116 Phoenix AG GGAAP MDAX Automobile 
1 17 Piper AG GGAAP Unclassified Transportation 
1 18 Pirelli Deutschland AG GGAAP Unclassified Automobile 
119 plettac AG GGAAP SMAX Construction 
120 Pongs & Zahn AG GGAAP SMAX Industry 
121 Porsche AG GGAAP Unclassified Automobile 
122 Porta Systems AG GGAAP SMAX Construction 
123 Procon GGAAP SMAX Media 
124 Progress Werk AG GGAAP SMAX Automobile 
125 ProSiebenSAT. I Media AG GGAAP MDAX Media 
126 R. Stahl AG GGAAP SMAX Telecommunications 
127 Rinol AG GGAAP SMAX Construction 
128 Rohwedder AG GGAAP SMAX Machinary 
129 Rosenthal AG GGAAP Unclassified Retail 
1 30 Rothenberger AG GGAAP Unclassified Machinary 
13 1 SAI Automotive AG GGAAP Unclassified Automobile 
1,12 Schaltbau AG GGAAP Unclassified Telecommunications 
133 Schleicher AG GGAAP Unclassified Telecommunications 
134 Schlott AG GGAAP SMAX Industry 
135 Schön & Cie. AG GGAAP Unclassified Machinary 
1 16 Schuler AG GGAAP SMAX Machinary 
1 37 Schwälbchen Molkerei Jakob Berz AG GGAAP Unclassified Food and Beverages 
1', 8 Simona AG GGAAP Unclassified Chemicals 
- I , )q Sixt AG GGAAP MDAX Transportation 
140 Software AG GGAAP MDAX Software 
141 Spar Handels AG GGAAP Unclassified Retail 
142 Stada Arzneimittel AG GGAAP MDAX Pharmaceuticals 
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143, STO AG GGAAP SMAX Construction 
144 Stollwerck AG GGAAP Unclassified Food and Beverages 
145 STRABAG AG GGAAP Unclassified Construction 
146 Stuttgarter Hofbräu AG GGAAP Unclassified Food and Beverages 
147 TAG Tegernseebahn Immobilien AG GGAAP Unclassified Finance 
148 Takkt AG GGAAP SMAX Retail 
149 tecis Holding AG GGAAP MDAX Finance 
150 TIAG Tabbert-Industrie AG GGAAP Unclassified Automobile 
151 Uzin Utz AG GGAAP SMAX Pharmaceuticals 
152 VARTA AG GGAAP Unclassified Telecommunications 
53 VBH Holding AG GGAAP Unclassified Construction 
54 VGT AG GGAAP Unclassified Industry 
155 Villeroy & Boch AG GGAAP SMAX Construction 
156 VK Mühlen AG GGAAP Unclassified Food and Beverages 
57 Vogt electronic AG GGAAP SMAX Telecommunications 
158 Wanderer-Werke AG GGAAP Unclassified Industry 
159 WCM Beteiligungs- und Grundbesitz GGAAP MDAX Finance 
160 Webac Holding AG GGAAP Unclassified Finance 
161 WERU AG GGAAP Unclassified Construction 
162 Westag & Getalit AG GGAAP Unclassified Construction 
163 Winkler + Dünnebier AG GGAAP SMAX Machinary 
164 WMF AG GGAAP SMAX Retail 
165 ABB GGAAP Unclassified Machinary 
166 Actris GGAAP Unclassified Food and Beverages 
167 Adler Real Estate AG GGAAP Unclassified Finance 
168 Allweiler GGAAP Unclassified Machinary 
169 ALNO AG GGAAP Unclassified Consumer Cyclical 
170 B. A. U. M GGAAP Unclassified Media 
171 B. U. S GGAAP SMAX Technology 
172 BASF AG GGAAP DAX Chemicals 
173 BilTrain AG GGAAP Unclassified Industry 
74 Brau und Brunnen AG GGAAP SMAX Food and Beverages 
175 CBB Holding AG GGAAP Unclassified Finance 
176 Curanum Bonifatius AG GGAAP SMAX Pharmaceuticals 
77 Deutsche Euroshop AG GGAAP Unclassified Finance 
178 Deutsche Real Estate AG GGAAP Unclassified Finance 
179 Deutsche Telekom AG GGAAP DAX Technology 
180 Eichborn AG GGAAP SMAX Media 
181 Gelsenwasser AG GGAAP Unclassified Utilities 
182 Gerry Weber International AG GGAAP SMAX Consumer Cyclical 
183 H&R Wasag GGAAP Unclassified Chemicals 
84 Hugo Boss AG GGAAP MDAX Consumer Cyclical 
185 IFA Hotel & Touristik AG GGAAP Unclassified Transportation 
186 Inter-las Technologies GGAAP Unclassified Telecommunications 
187 Kap Beteiligungs AG GGAAP Unclassified Industry 
188 Kulmbacher Brauerei AG GGAAP Unclassified Food and Beverages 
189 Linde AG GGAAP DAX Machinary 
190 Lindner Holding KGAA GGAAP Unclassified Construction 
191 Marschollek, Laut. U. P GGAAP DAX Finance 
192 Maschinenfabrik Berthold Hermle AG GGAAP Unclassified Machinar, 
19', M-Tech Technologie und Beteiligungs GGAAP Unclassified Telecommunications 
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194 Ott Stumpf AG GGAAP Unclassified Finance 
195 Radeberger AG GGAAP Unclassified Food and Beverages 
196 Ruetgers AG GGAAP Unclassified Chemicals 
197 SCA Hygiene Products AG GGAAP Unclassified Basic Resources 
198 Sektkellerei Schloss AG GGAAP Unclassified Food and Beverages 
199 Solar Fabrik GGAAP Unclassified Utilities 
200 Surteco AG GGAAP SMAX Consumer Cyclical 
201 Vattenfall Europe AG GGAAP Unclassified Utilities 
202 VDN e AG GGAAP Unclassified Basic Resources 
203 Walter AG GGAAP SMAX Machinary 
204 Walter Bau GGAAP Unclassified Construction 
205 Wasgau Produktions & Handels AG GGAAP Unclassified Retail 
206 ALTANA AG IAS MDAX Pharmaceuticals 
207 Amadeus AG IAS SMAX Industry 
208 Beiersdorf AG IAS MDAX Pharmaceuticals 
209 Bilfinger Berger AG IAS MDAX Construction 
210 Burgbad AG IAS SMAX Construction 
211 Deutsche Börse AG IAS MDAX Finance 
212 DIS Deutscher Industrie Service AG IAS SMAX Industry 
213 Eurobike AG IAS SMAX Retail 
214 Geratherm Medical AG IAS SMAX Pharmaceuticals 
215 Gerresheimer Glas AG IAS Unclassified Consumer Cyclical 
216 Hawesko Holding AG IAS SMAX Food and Beverages 
217 Heidelberger Zement AG IAS MDAX Construction 
218 HOCHTIEF AG IAS MDAX Construction 
219 Karstadt AG IAS MDAX Retail 
220 Kraftübertragungswerke Rheinfelden IAS Unclassified Utilities 
221 Loewe AG IAS MDAX Telecommunications 
222 Masterflex AG IAS SMAX Industry 
? 23 Medisana AG IAS SMAX Pharmaceuticals 
224 Merck KGaA IAS MDAX Pharmaceuticals 
225 MPC Capital AG IAS SMAX Finance 
226 MVV Energie AG IAS SMAX Utilities 
? 27 Puma AG IAS MDAX Consumer Cyclical 
? 28 Rational AG IAS SMAX Telecommunications 
229 Rhön Klinikum AG lAS MDAX Pharmaceuticals 
230 Salzgitter AG IAS MDAX Machinary 
23) 1 Sanacorp Pharmahandel AG IAS SMAX Pharmaceuticals 
- I? Sartorius AG IAS Unclassified Telecommunications 
?>; Schmalbach-Lubeca AG IAS Unclassified Industry 
34 Südzucker AG IAS MDAX Food and Beverages 
235 TA Triumph-Adler AG IAS SMAX Industry 
2 36 Turbon AG IAS SMAX Industry 
237 Vivanco Gruppe AG IAS SMAX Telecommunications 
38 WashTec AG IAS SMAX Machinary 
2319 WEDECO AG Water Technology IAS MDAX Pharmaceuticals 
'140 Wella AG IAS MDAX Pharmaceuticals 
141 \V ige Media AG IAS SMAX Media 
242 A. S. Creation Tapeten IAS SMAX Consumer Cyclical 
Adidas-Salonion AG IAS DAX Consumer Cyclical 
244 ADVorga IAS Unclassified Industry 
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245 AG Kuehnle, Kopp & Kausch IAS Unclassified Machinary 
246 Barmag AG IAS Unclassified Machinary 
247 Bay. Motoren Werke AG (BMW AG) IAS DAX Automobile 
248 Bayer AG IAS DAX Chemicals 
249 Bertelmann AG IAS Unclassified Media 
250 Bremer Woll-Kammerei AG IAS Unclassified Consumer Cyclical 
251 Ceag AG IAS SMAX Technology 
252 Deutsche Post AG IAS DAX Transportation 
253 Dyckerhoff AG IAS MDAX Construction 
254 Escada AG IAS MDAX Consumer Cyclical 
255 Essanelle Hair Group AG IAS SMAX Retail 
256 Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport SW IAS MDAX Transportation 
257 GCI management AG IAS Unclassified Industry 
258 Henkel KGAA IAS DAX Retail 
259 Lufthansa AG IAS DAX TransDortation 
260 MAN AG IAS DAX Machinary 
261 Metro AG IAS DAX Retail 
262 PREUSSAG AG IAS DAX Transportation 
263 Rheinmetall AG IAS MDAX Machinary 
264 RWE AG IAS DAX Utilities 
265 Schering AG IAS DAX Pharmaceuticals 
266 SCHOLZ & FRIENDS AG LAS Unclassified Media 
267 SGL Carbon AG IAS MDAX Basic Resources 
268 Softship AG LAS Unclassified Software 
269 Tarkett Sommer AG IAS SMAX Construction 
270 TRIPLAN AG IAS SMAX Industry 
271 Uniprof Real Estate AG IAS Unclassified Finance 
272 VOLKSWAGEN AG ST IAS DAX Automobile 
273 Cargolifter AG US GAAP MDAX Transportation 
274 Celanese AG US GAAP MDAX Chemicals 
275 Continental AG US GAAP MDAX Automobile 
276 Data Modul AG US GAAP SMAX Telecommunications 
277 Debitel AG US GAAP Unclassified Telecommunications 
278 Dürr AG US GAAP MDAX Machinary 
279 FAG Kugelfischer Georg Schäfer AG US GAAP Unclassified Machinary 
? 80 Jungheinrich AG US GAAP MDAX Machinary 
281 Knorr Capital Partner AG US GAAP SMAX Finance 
282 Marseille-Kliniken AG US GAAP SMAX Pharmaceuticals 
283 mg technologies AG US GAAP MDAX Industry 
284 Schwarz Pharma AG US GAAP MDAX Pharmaceuticals 
285 Techem AG US GAAP MDAX Industry 
286 VCL Medien US GAAP Unclassified Media 
287 Vossloh AG US GAAP MDAX Telecommunications 
288 Zapf Creation AG US GAAP MDAX Consumer Cyclical 
289 Daimler Chrysler AG US GAAP DAX Automobile 
? 90 E. ON AG US GAAP DAX Utilities 
-191 EPCOS AG US GAAP DAX Telecommunications 
292 Hoechst US GAAP Unclassified Pharmaceuticals 
29, SAP AG US GAAP DAX Software 
294 Siemens AG US GAAP DAX I elecommunications 
295 lihv ssenKrupp AG US GAAP DAX Basic Resources 
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10.2 Appendix 2: Neuer Markt companies included in the study 
No Company GAAP Sector 
1 aap-Implantate AG IAS Pharmaceuticals 
2 Abit AG IAS Software 
3 AC-Service AG IAS Software 
4 Advanced photonics 25 IAS Technology 
5 Advanced Medien AG IAS Media 
6 Allgeier Computer AG IAS Software 
7 AmaTech AG IAS Technology 
8 Antwerpes AG IAS Software 
9 Articon Information Systems AG IAS Software 
10 Arxes Information Design AG IAS Software 
I Balda AG IAS Technology 
12 Bertrandt AG IAS Automobile 
13 Bintec CommunicationAG IAS Technolo<-v 
14 Biotissue Technologies AG IAS Pharmaceuticals 
15 BOV AG IAS Software 
16 Broadnet AG IAS Software 
17 BRAIN International AG IAS Software 
18 Cancom IT Systeme AG IAS Software 
19 CDV Software Entertainment AG IAS Media 
20 ce Conusmer IAS Technology 
21 Cenit AG Systemhaus IAS Software 
22 Centrotec Hochleistungskunststoffe AG IAS Pharmaceuticals 
23 CineMedia Film AG IAS Media 
24 Comtrade AG IAS Software 
25 Constantin Film AG IAS Media 
26 Cor Insurance Techn. AG IAS Software 
27 Curasan AG IAS Pharmaceuticals 
28 Ceyoniq AG IAS Software 
29 Das Werk AG IAS Media 
30 Datasave AG IAS Software 
,1 DEAG Deutsche Entertainment AG IAS Media 
32 Drillisch AG IAS Telecommunication 
33 Dr. Honle AG IAS Technology 
34 D+s online AG IAS Software 
35 E-M-S New Media AG IAS Media 
36 Easy Software AG IAS Software 
37 EMPRISE AG IAS Software 
38 EM. TV & Merchandising AG IAS Media 
ý9 Energiekontor AG IAS Technology 
40 Euromed AG IAS Pharmaceuticals 
41 e. multi Digitale Dienste AG IAS Software 
42 FJA AG IAS Software 
43 tluxx. com 1 AS Software 
44 Fortec AG IAS Technology 
-I5 Freenet. 
de IAS Sott\\ are 
40 Funkwerk AG IAS Telecommunication 
47 F. A. M. E. Film Music Entertainment AG IAS Media 
-IS Gedvs 
Internet Products AG IAS tioftware 
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49 GFT Technologies AG IAS Software 
>ýl Grenke Leasing AG IAS Industry 
51 GFN AG lAS Software 
52 Haitec AG IAS Software 
53 Helcon Media AG IAS Media 
54 Höft und Wessel IAS Technology 
55 Hunzinger Information AG IAS Industr\ 
56 l. M internationalmedia AG IAS Media 
57 Infor AG IAS Software 
58 Intertainment AG IAS Media 
59 IntraWare AG IAS Software 
60 ISRA Vision Systems AG IAS Technology 
61 IVU Traffic IAS Software 
62 I: FAO AG IAS Software 
63 fetter AG IAS Technology 
64 Linos AG IAS Technology 
65 Lintec Computer AG IAS Technology 
66 LPKF Laser & Electronics AG IAS Technology 
67 Mania Technologie AG IAS Technology 
68 Maxdata AG IAS Technology 
69 Media! AG IAS Media 
70 media[netCom] AG IAS Media 
71 Medion AG IAS Technology 
72 Mensch und Maschine Software AG IAS Software 
73 Microlog Logistics AG IAS Transportation 
74 MIS AG IAS Software 
75 MME Me, Myself & Eye Entertainment AG IAS Media 
76 MobilCom AG IAS Telecommunication 
77 Mosaic Software AG IAS Software 
78 MWG Biotech AG IAS Pharmaceuticals 
79 m+s Elektronik IAS Software 
80 4MBO International Electronic AG IAS Technology 
81 Nemetschek AG IAS Software 
82 Nexus AG IAS Software 
83 Norcom Information Technology AG IAS Software 
84 Novasoft AG IAS Software 
85 November AG IAS Pharmaceuticals 
86 NSE Software AG IAS Software 
87 Nordex AG IAS Technology 
88 Odeon Film AG IAS Media 
89 ORBIS AG IAS Software 
90 OHB Technology AG IAS Transportation 
91 Paragon AG IAS Technology 
92 PC-Spezialist IAS Technology 
93 PC-Ware Information Technologies AG IAS Software 
94 pgam advanced technologies AG IAS Automobile 
95 Pixelnet AG IAS Software 
96 Plambeck Neue Energien AG IAS Technology 
97 Pro DV Software AG IAS Software 
98 Prout AG IAS Software 
99 P&l Personal & Informatik AG IAS Software 
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100 P&T Technology AG IAS Technology 
101 Repower 834 IAS Utilities 
102 Rösch AG IAS Pharmaceuticals 
103 RTV AG IAS Media 
104 Sachsenring Automobiltechnik AG IAS Automobile 
105 Saltus Technology AG [AS lndustrý 
106 Senator Film AG IAS Media 
107 SHS IAS Software 
108 Silicon Sensor [AS Technolo, -, \ 
109 Softing AG IAS Technology 
1 10 SoftM AG IAS Software 
111 Splendid Medien IAS Media 
112 SZ Testsysteme AG IAS Technology 
113 Sunways AG [AS Technology 
114 Technotrans AG IAS Technology 
1 15 Tiptel AG IAS Telecommunication 
116 Tomorrow Focus AG IAS Software 
117 Transtec AG IAS Technology 
1 18 Tria Software AG IAS Software 
119 Trius AG IAS Telecommunication 
120 TTL Information Technology AG IAS Software 
121 TV-Loonland AG IAS Media 
122 UMS United Medical Systems 
International AG 
LAS Pharmaceuticals 
123 United Labels AG IAS Media 
124 Umweltkontor AG IAS Technology 
125 Utimaco AG IAS Software 
126 Vectron IAS Software 
127 Viva Media AG IAS Media 
128 Wapme Systems AG IAS Software 
129 WWL Internet IAS Software 
130 Winter AG IAS Technology 
131 Computerlinks AG IAS Software 
132 Secunet Security Networks AG IAS Software 
133 Adori AG IAS Software 
134 Jumptic IAS Software 
5 ACG advanced Component US GAAP Technology 
136 adva AG US GAAP Technology 
l')7 AIXTRON AG US GAAP Technology 
138 Alphaform AG US GAAP Industry 
139 Analytik Jena AG US GAAP Technology 
140 ARBO media. net US GAAP Media 
141 Artnet. com US GAAP Software 
14-1 Atoss Software AG US GAAP Software 
143 Augusta Technologie AG US GAAP Technolo`gv 
144 ABACHO US GAAP Software 
145 Bäurer AG US GAAP Software 
140 Basler 116 US GAAP Technology 
147 Bechtle AG US GAAP Software 
148 Beta Systems AG US GAAP Sottvv arc 
149 BKN International AG US GAAP Software 
"1 
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150 buch AG US GAAP Retail 
151 Caatoosee AG US GAAP Software 
152 Ceotronics AG US GAAP Technolo<`\ 
153 Computec Media AG US GAAP Media 
154 CPU Softwarehouse AG US GAAP Software 
155 CTS Eventim AG US GAAP Media 
156 co. don AG US GAAP Pharmaceuticals 
57 CyBio AG US GAAP Pharmaceuticals 
58 Cycos AG US GAAP Telecommunication 
159 DataDesign AG US GAAP Software 
160 DCI Database US GAAP Software 
161 Digital Advertising AG US GAAP Software 
162 D. Logistics AG US GAAP Transportation 
163 Eckert und Ziegler AG US GAAP Pharmaceuticals 
164 Eli-nos Semiconductor AG US GAAP Technology 
165 EVOTEC BioSystems AG US GAAP Pharmaceuticals 
166 Foris AG US GAAP Financial Services 
167 Farmatic biotech energy ag US GAAP Technology 
168 GAP AG US GAAP Technology 
169 Gauss Interprise AG US GAAP Software 
170 GeneScan Europe AG US GAAP Pharmaceuticals 
171 Girindus AG US GAAP Pharmaceuticals 
172 GPC-Biotech AG US GAAP Pharmaceuticals 
173 Heiler Software AG US GAAP Software 
174 IBS AG US GAAP Software 
175 ID-Media AG US GAAP Software 
176 IDS Scheer AG US GAAP Software 
177 In-Motion AG US GAAP Media 
178 Infogenie Europe AG US GAAP Telecommunication 
179 finit innovation AG US GAAP Technology 
180 Internolix AG US GAAP Software 
181 Intershop AG US GAAP Software 
182 IPC Archtec AG US GAAP Technology 
183 itelligence AG US GAAP Software 
184 IXOS Software AG US GAAP Software 
185 Jack White Productions AG US GAAP Media 
186 Kleindienst AG US GAAP Software 
187 Kontron Embedded Computers AG US GAAP Technology 
188 LION Bioscience AG US GAAP Pharmaceuticals 
189 Lipro Holding AG US GAAP Software 
190 Lobster Technology Holding AG US GAAP Technolo`gyy 
191 Micrologica AG US GAAP Software 
I 9)2 Morphosys AG US GAAP Pharmaceuticals 
193 Mühlbauer Holding AG & Co US GAAP Technology 
94 Muller-Die lila Logistik AG US GAAP Transportation 
195 Net AG US GAAP Technolouv 
196 Netlife AG US GAAP Software 
197 Neue Sentimental AG US GAAP Media 
198 OnVista AG USGAAP Software 
199 lkirs\ ttc AG US G, AAP Software 
200 Pfeiffer- Vacuum Technology AG US G, A, aP Industry 
iýl"1 
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201 Pironet AG US GAAP Software 
202 Pixelpark AG US GAAP Software 
203 PlasmaSelect AG US GAAP Pharmaceuticals 
204 Plenum AG US GAAP Soft\\ are 
205 Primacour AG US GAAP Telecommunication 
206 PSB AG US GAAP Software 
207 PSI AG US GAAP Software 
208 Pulsion Medical Systems AG US GAAP Pharmaceuticals 
209 QS Communications AG US GAAP Software 
210 Realtech AG US GAAP Software 
211 Rucker AG US GAAP Automobile 
212 Singulus Technologies AG US GAAP Technology 
213 SinnerSchrader AG US GAAP Software 
214 Softline AG US GAAP Software 
215 Softmatic US GAAP Software 
216 Steag-Hamatech AG US GAAP Technology 
217 Süss MicroTec US GAAP Technology 
218 Swing 978 US GAAP Media 
219 Syskoplan AG US GAAP Software 
220 Syzygy AG US GAAP Software 
221 TDS AG US GAAP Software 
222 Teles AG US GAAP Software 
223 Travel24. com AG US GAAP Software 
224 UBAG Unternehmer Beteilig.... US GAAP Industry 
225 United Internet AG US GAAP Software 
226 USU-Openshop AG US GAAP Software 
227 3U Telecom US GAAP Telecommunication 
228 Varetis AG US GAAP Telecommunication 
229 Wavelight Laser Technologie AG US GAAP Pharmaceuticals 
230 Web. de AG US GAAP Software 
231 W. E. T. Automotive AG US GAAP Automobile 
232 W. O. M World of Medicine AG US GAAP Pharmaceuticals 
233 Carl Zeiss AG US GAAP Technology 
234 Camelot tele. communication. online AG US GAAP Telecommunication 
235 Lambda Physik AG US GAAP Technology 
236 PVA TePla US GAAP Technology 
237 Texas Instruments Berlin AG US GAAP Software 
238 Telegate AG US GAAP Telecommunication 
239 Biolitec AG US GAAP Pharmaceuticals 
240 b. i. s. Börsen-Informations-Systeme AG US GAAP Software 
241 MediGene AG US GAAP Pharmaceuticals 
242 USU AG US GAAP Software 
-14' SAP systems US GAAP Software 
244 EuroMicron AG US GAAP Technology 
, ý, 
Appendices 
10.3 Appendix 3: German companies listed abroad as on December 31,2001 
Firm Listings Segment 
B. U. S NYSE (OTC) SMAX 
BASF SwX 
, London, Paris, NYSE and DAX Tokyo 
Bayer SwX, London, Paris, NYSE, Tokyo, DAX 
Luxembourg, Madrid, Amsterdam, 
Antwerp, Barcelona, Brussels and Milan. 
BMW SwX DAX 
Bewag Amsterdam Unclassified 
Celanese NYSE MDAX 
Continental SwX, London, NYSE (OTC) MDAX 
Daimler Chrysler SwX, Paris, NYSE, Tokyo, Toronto, 
San- Francisco and Philadelphia 
DAX 
Deutsche Telekom NYSE, Tokyo, Amsterdam and Toronto DAX 
Dyckerhoff Luxemburg MDAX 
E. ON SwX and NYSE DAX 
EPCOS NYSE DAX 
Fresenius Medical care NYSE MDAX 
Fuchs Petrolub AG SwX SMAX 
Heidelberger Zement Brussels MDAX 
Henkel AG SwX and Vienna DAX 
Innneon Technologies NYSE Unclassified 
IW KA SwX MDAX 
iXOS NASDAQ Neuer Markt 
Kraft.. 
. 
Rheinfeiden 410 SwX Unclassified 
Linde SwX DAX 
Lion Bioscience NASDAQ Neuer Markt 
MAN AG SwX and Vienna DAX 
Merck KGaA SwX MDAX 
Metro AG SwX DAX 
Pfeiffer Vacum NYSE Neuer Markt 
Primacom NASDAQ Neuer Markt 
QsC NASDAQ Neuer Markt 
RWE SwX DAX 
SAP AG SwX DAX 
Schering SwX, London and NYSE DAX 
SGL Carbon NYSE MDAX 
Siemens SwX, London, Paris, NYSE, 
Amsterdam, Brussels and Vienna 
DAX 
ThyssenKrupp London DAX 
Volkswagen London, Paris. Tokyo, Luxemburg. 
Madrid, Amsterdam, Brussels. Milan and 
Vienna. 
DAX 
")" Schweitzer Börse 
"`' K ftuebertragunýgti\V, erke Rheinfeiden 
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10.4 Appendix 4: German companies listed in the US as on December 31,2001 
Company GAAP Market 
Companies listed on NYSE 
Allianz AG IAS Main 
Altana AG IAS Main 
BASF AG GGAAP Main 
Bayer AG IAS Main 
Celanese AG US GAAP Main 
Daimler Chrysler AG US GAAP Main 
Deutsche Bank AG G GAAP Main 
Deutsch Telecom AG G GAAP Main 
E. ON AG US GAAP Main 
EPCOS AG US GAAP Main 
Fresenius AG G GAAP Main 
Infineon Technologies AG US GAAP Main 
Pfeiffer Vacuum Technology AG US GAAP Neuer 
SAP AG US GAAP Main 
Schering AG IAS Main 
SGL Carbon IAS Main 
Siemens AG US GAAP Main 
Companies listed on NASDAQ: 
Digital Telekabel AG No information 
Incam AG Freiverkehr (OTC) 
INTERSHOP Communications AG US GAAP Neuer 
iXOS Software AG US GAAP Neuer 
LION bioscience Aktiengesellschaft US GAAP Neuer 
1ýi 
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10.5 Appendix 5: A sample of multivariable models for the Main `larket 
(other than the adopted one): 
The following are only a sample of alternative multivariable models that show 
different combinations of variables other than that in the adopted model in Chapter 7. 
These models contain some of the variables excluded from the Main model, such as 
other size variables (in their continuous form). having foreign subsidiaries (FORSUB) 
and listing status (LIST). 
Model 10.5.1: 
A model including total assets (ASSETS) and management ownership (MAN 1) as 
continuous variable 
B S. E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 95.0% C. I. for EXP(B) 
SEGMENT 1.422 0.326 19.054 0.000 4.147 2.190 7.855 
AUDID 0.842 0.303 7.714 0.005 2.321 1.281 4.205 
FORMAN 0.679 0.307 4.910 0.027 1.972 1.082 3.597 
ASSETS 0.019 0.012 2.808 0.094 1.020 0.997 1.043 
MAN 1 1.011 0.722 1.961 0.161 2.749 0.668 11.315 
FORSUB 0.610 0.420 2.109 0.146 1.841 0.808 4.197 
Constant -3.241 0.506 41.061 0.000 0.039 
Model 10.5.2: 
Including turnover (TURNOV) as a continuous variable (instead of ASSETS) and 
USSUB (having a subsidiary in the US) 
B S. E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 95.0% C. I. for EXP(B) 
SEGMENT 1.153 0.337 11.692 0.001 3.169 1.636 6.138 
AUDITOR 0.626 0.316 3.933 0.047 1.871 1.007 3.474 
FORMANG 0.499 0.321 2.412 0.120 1.646 0.878 3.089 
MAN I 1.564 0.747 4.385 0.036 4.776 1.105 20.639 
FORSUB 0.006 0.467 0.000 0.990 1.006 0.402 2.513 
TURNOV 0.063 0.027 5.430 0.020 1.065 1.010 1.123 
USSUB 1.041 0.349 8.911 0.003 2.833 1.430 5.613 
Constant -3.043 0.504 36.393 0.000 0.048 
Model 10.5.3: 
Including listing status (LIST) and excluding size variables 
B S. E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 95.0% C. I. for EXP(B) 
SEGMENT 1.305 0.331 15.518 0.000 3.689 1.927 7.062 
AUDID 0.819 0.306 7.141 0.008 2.268 1.244 4.134 
FORMAN 0.630 0.310 4.117 0.042 1.877 1.022 3.450 
MAN I 1.119 0.723 2.399 0.121 3.063 0.743 12.630 
FORSUB 0.551 0.421 1.710 0.191 1.7 34 0.760 3.958 
LIST 1.392 0.491 8.029 0.005 4.025 1.536 10.545 
Constant -3.155 0.505 38.993 0.000 0.04 3 
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Model 10.5.4: 
Including a size variable (EMPNO) as a continuous variable with listing status (LIST 
in the same model) 
B S. E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 95.0% C. I. for EXP(B) 
SEGMENT 1.225 0.333 13.532 0.000 3.406 1.773 6.543 
AUDITOR 0.782 0.309 6.392 0.011 2.186 1.192 4.007 
FORMAN 0.543 0.316 2.939 0.086 1.720 0.925 3.199 
MAN 1 1.286 0.722 3.173 0.075 3.617 0.879 14.884 
FORSUB 0.501 0.422 1.410 0.235 1.650 0.722 3.770 
LIST 0.702 0.563 1.556 0.212 2.018 0.670 6.081 
EMPNO 0.014 0.007 3.924 0.048 1.014 1.000 1.028 
Constant -3.130 0.504 38.532 0.000 0.044 
Model 10.5.5: 
Including foreign investors (FORINVES) with segmentation (SEGMENT) in one 
model. 
B S. E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 95.0% C. I. EXP(B) 
SEGMENT 1.638 0.316 26.795 0.000 5.144 2.767 9.563 
FORINVS 0.590 0.307 3.703 0.054 1.804 0.989 3.289 
Constant -2.078 0.302 47.230 0.000 0.125 
Model 10.5.6: 
Including the industry variable (INDUS 1), which consists of 5 categories: Utilities 
and Transportation (U&T), Manufacturing (MANUF), Pharmaceuticals and 
Chemicals (P & C), Technology (TECHNO), and Trading (TRADE- as a reference 
category) 
B S. E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 95.0% C. I. for EXP(B) 
SEGMENT 1.515 0.331 20.944 0.000 4.548 2.377 8.701 
AUDID 0.831 0.304 7.457 0.006 2.296 1.264 4.170 
FORMAN 0.834 0.308 7.337 0.007 2.302 1.259 4.209 
MAN I 0.911 0.730 1.555 0.212 2.487 0.594 10.409 
ASSETS 0.016 0.011 2.024 0.155 1.016 0.994 1.038 
INDUSI 6.275 0.180 
U&T 0.966 0.643 2.254 0.133 2.626 0.745 9.264 
MANUF -0.024 0.353 0.005 0.946 
0.977 0.489 1.951 
P&C 0.828 0.483 2.941 0.086 2.289 0.888 5.895 
TECHNO 0.484 0.493 0.960 0.327 1.622 0.617 4.266 
Constant -3.026 0.461 43.063 0.000 0.049 
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Model 10.5.7: 
Including the industry variable (INDUS2). which consists of thee categories: 
Services (SERVICE), Manufacturing (MANUF) and Trading (TRADE- as a 
reference category) 
B S. E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 95.0% C. I. for EXP(B) 
SEGMENT 1.578 0.329 23.065 0.000 4.848 2.545 9. '32 
AUDID 0.863 0.303 8.086 0.004 2.369 1.307 4.293 
FORMAN 0.785 0.305 6.636 0.010 2.192 1.206 3.982 
MAN 1 0.873 0.720 1.470 0.225 2.394 0.584 9.818 
ASSETS 0.017 0.011 2.204 0.138 1.017 0.995 1.040 
INDUS2 4.083 0.130 
SERVICE 0.845 0.446 3.592 0.058 2.328 0.972 5.579 
MANUF 0.124 0.334 0.138 0.710 1.132 0.588 2.181 
Constant -3.074 0.463 44.153 0.000 0.046 
Model 10.5.8: 
A model with 
rather than a 
category. 
a different variable of segments (nominal one with four 
binary variable), where Unclassified firms are set as 
categories, 
a reference 
B S. E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 95.0% C. I. EXP(B) 
AUDITOR 0.904 0.314 8.254 0.004 2.468 1.333 4.572 
FORMANG 0.705 0.312 5.093 0.024 2.024 1.097 3.7 35 
MAN] 1.366 0.737 3.438 0.064 3.920 0.925 16.608 
SASSETS 0.002 0.011 0.030 0.862 1.002 0.981 1.02'3 
SEGMENTS 3E+01 I E-07 
DAX 3.048 0.773 15.564 0.000 21.070 4.635 95.782 
MDAX 2.017 0.387 27.129 0.000 7.512 3.517 16.044 
SMAX 0.899 0.369 5.941 0.015 2.458 1.193 5.065 
Constant -2.833 0.400 50.248 0.000 0.059 
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10.6 APPENDIX 10.6: Steps of backward elimination that result in the adopted 
model for the Main Market: 
B S. E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95.0% C. 1. for 
EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Step I LEVERAGE -. 469 . 840 . 312 1 . 576 . 625 . 121 3. -40 PROFIT I . 295 1.066 . 077 1 . 782 1.344 . 166 10.847 FREFLOAT -. 535 . 693 . 597 1 . 440 . 585 . 151 2276 FORSUB . 569 . 444 1.638 1 . 201 1.766 . 739 4.218 AUDITOR . 674 . 322 4.370 1 . 037 1.962 1.043 3.692 
LIST . 545 . 620 . 772 1 . 380 1.724 . 512 5.81 FORINVES . 196 . 397 . 243 1 . 622 1.216 . 558 2.650 FORMANG . 449 . 370 1.477 1 . 224 1.567 . 759 3.234 INDUS2 411 2.877 2 . 237 INDUS2(1) 
. 
653 
. 
491 1.767 1 
. 
184 1.921 
. 
734 5.031 
INDUS2(2) -. 073 . 364 . 040 1 . 841 . 930 . 45 5 1.899 
BIMANI 1.063 . 586 3.294 1 . 070 2.895 . 919 9.126 
BIMAN2 -. 308 . 849 . 131 1 . 717 . 735 . 139 3.885 
BIMAN3 . 285 . 782 . 133 1 . 715 1.330 . 287 6.157 
OREMPNO412 
. 
608 2 
. 
738 
OREMPNO(1) 
. 
797 1.025 
. 
604 1 
. 
437 2.219 
. 
297 16.5 55 
OREMPNO(2) 
. 
199 
. 
467 
. 
182 1 
. 
670 1.220 
. 
489 3.046 
ORASSET 2.360 2 . 307 
ORASSET(1) 1.455 . 967 2.264 1 . 132 4.285 . 
644 28.518 
ORASSET(2) . 570 . 567 1.012 
1 . 314 1.769 . 582 5.375 
ORTURN . 
173 2 . 
917 
ORTURN(1) -. 047 1.226 . 001 1 . 
969 . 954 . 086 10.546 
ORTURN(2) -. 253 . 658 . 148 1 . 700 . 
776 . 214 2.820 
PROFIT2 . 016 . 076 . 
042 1 . 837 1.016 . 876 1.178 
SEGMENT 1.248 . 409 9.300 
1 . 002 3.483 1.562 7.767 
Constant -3.359 . 
747 20.214 1 . 
000 
. 
035 
Step 2 LEVERAGE -. 488 . 838 . 
339 1 . 560 . 614 . 
119 3.170 
PROFITI . 273 1.060 . 
066 1 . 797 
1.314 . 165 10.501 
FREFLOAT -. 520 . 690 . 
567 1 . 451 . 
595 . 154 2.301 
FORSUB . 556 . 
443 1.578 1 . 209 1.744 . 
732 4.154 
AUDITOR . 
668 
. 
321 4.341 1 . 
037 1.950 1.040 3.655 
LIST . 556 . 
619 . 808 
1 . 369 
1.744 . 519 5.863 
FORINVES . 199 . 
397 . 250 
1 . 617 
1.220 . 560 2.656 
FORMANG . 453 . 
369 1.511 1 . 219 
1.573 . 764 3.240 
INDUS2 2.842 2 . 241 
INDUS2(1) . 635 . 
488 1.693 1 . 193 
1.888 . 725 4.915 
INDUS2(2) -. 082 . 363 . 
051 1 . 821 . 
921 . 453 
1.875 
BIMANI 1.091 . 582 
3.521 1 . 061 
2.979 . 953 
9.314 
BIMAN2 -. 309 . 849 . 
132 1 . 716 . 
734 . 139 
3.881 
BIMAN3 . 284 . 
782 . 132 
1 . 716 
1.329 . 287 
6.157 
OREMPNO 1.023 2 . 600 
OREMPNO(1) . 813 . 815 . 
994 1 . 319 
2.255 . 456 11.147 
OREMPNO(2) . 129 . 416 . 096 
1 . 757 
1.138 . 503 
2.572 
4' 1 Recall that this the industry variable which includes three categories of which I is SERVICES, ? is 
MIANUF, while 1 is TRADE the reference category. 
41 This variable and the following tww o are the categorised size variables (OREMPNO, ORASSET 
and ORTUNOV). The category I 
is High, whereas 2 is Medium (la\\ is the reference category) 
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ORASSET 3.797 2 . 150 ORASSET(1) 1.420 . 730 3.782 1 . 052 4.136 . 989 17.21)4 ORASSET(2) 
. 426 . 423 1.015 1 . 314 1.531 . 668 3.506 PROFIT2 
. 
016 
. 
076 
. 
046 1 
. 
830 1.016 
. 
876 1.1-9 
SEGMENT 1.221 . 402 9.231 1 . 002 3.389 1.542 7.448 Constant -3.338 . 743 20.190 1 . 000 . 036 Step 3 LEVERAGE -. 471 . 835 . 318 1 . 573 . 624 . 122 3.207 PROFITI . 405 . 894 . 205 1 . 650 1.499 . 260 8.64) F REF LOA T -. 513 . 690 . 552 1 . 457 . 599 . 15 5 2.315 FORSUB 
. 
552 
. 
443 1.553 1 
. 
213 1.736 
. 
729 4.132 
AUDITOR . 672 . 320 4.407 1 . 036 1.958 1.046 3.665 
LIST . 556 . 619 . 807 1 . 369 1.713 . 518 5.864 FORINVES . 201 . 397 . 257 1 . 612 1.223 . 562 2.662 FORMANG . 456 . 369 1.529 1 . 216 1.577 . 766 3.248 
INDUS2 2.909 2 . 234 
INDUS2(1) . 646 . 486 1.767 1 . 184 1.909 . 736 4.950 
INDUS2(2) -. 077 . 362 . 045 1 . 832 . 926 . 455 1.883 
BIMANI 1.088 
. 
582 3.502 1 
. 
061 2.969 
. 
950 9.281 
BIMAN2 -. 307 . 849 . 130 1 . 718 . 736 . 139 
3.887 
BIMAN3 . 284 . 782 . 132 1 . 717 1.328 . 287 6.152 
OREMPNO 1.027 2 . 598 
OREMPNO(1) 
. 
815 
. 
816 
. 
998 1 
. 
318 2.259 
. 
457 11.172 
OREMPNO(2) 
. 
129 
. 
416 
. 
097 1 
. 
756 1.138 
. 
503 2.574 
ORASSET 3.778 2 . 
151 
ORASSET(1) 1.416 . 
730 3.764 1 
. 
052 4.119 
. 
986 17.216 
ORASSET(2) . 423 . 423 1.002 
1 . 317 1.527 . 
667 3.41)5 
SEGMENT 1.216 . 
401 9.173 1 
. 
002 3.37 3 1.536 7.408 
Constant -3.354 . 
741 20.487 1 . 
000 
. 
035 
Step 4 LEVERAGE -. 477 . 835 . 
327 1 . 568 . 621 . 121 
3.188 
PROFIT I . 406 . 
894 . 207 1 . 
649 1.501 . 260 8.654 
FREFLOAT -. 517 . 
689 . 564 
1 . 453 . 
596 . 155 2.300 
FORSUB . 
557 
. 
442 1.587 1 . 
208 1.745 . 
734 4.152 
AUDITOR . 679 . 
319 4.530 1 . 033 1.973 
1.055 3.689 
LIST . 555 . 
618 . 808 1 . 
369 1.743 . 519 5.847 
FORINVES . 202 . 397 . 
259 1 . 611 
1.224 . 563 2.662 
FORMANG . 448 . 
368 1.488 1 . 222 
1.566 . 762 3.219 
INDUS2 3.102 2 . 212 
INDUS2(1) . 671 . 
481 1.946 1 . 163 
1.957 . 762 5.027 
INDUS2(2) -. 069 . 361 . 
036 1 . 849 . 
933 . 460 1.893 
BIMANI 1.007 . 532 
3.589 1 . 058 
2.738 . 966 7.763 
BIMAN3 . 060 . 
485 . 016 
1 . 901 
1.062 . 411 
2.747 
OREMPNO 1.095 2 . 578 
OREMPNO(1) . 842 . 
812 1.074 1 . 300 
2.320 . 472 
11.392 
OREMPNO(2) . 143 . 
415 . 119 
1 . 730 
1.154 . 512 
2.600 
ORASSET 3.673 2 . 159 
ORASSET(l) 1.386 . 725 
3.660 1 . 056 
4.001 . 967 
16.558 
ORASSET(2) . 415 . 422 . 
967 1 . 326 
1.5 15 . 662 
3.466 
SEGMENT 1.222 . 402 
9.251 1 . 002 
3.393 1.544 7.456 
Constant -3.369 . 740 20.716 
1 . 000 . 
034 
Step 5 LEVERAGE -. 472 . 834 . 320 
1 . 572 . 
624 . 122 
3.198 
PROFIT 1 . 410 . 893 . 
211 1 . 646 
1.507 . 262 
8.684 
FREFLOAT -. 536 . 672 . 637 
1 . 425 . 
585 . 157 
2.183 
FORSUB . 559 . 442 1.507 1 . 
206 1.748 . 735 
4.157 
AUDITOR . 677 . 319 4.513 1 . 03 4 
1.968 1.054 3.676 
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LIST . 556 . 618 . 809 1 . 368 1.743 19 5.850 
FORINVES . 192 . 388 . 
244 1 
. 6211 1.211 . 567 2.589 
FORMANG . 450 . 367 1.502 1 220 1.569 . 764 3. '23 
INDUS2 3.143 2 . 208 
INDUS2(1) . 674 . 481 1.964 1 . 161 1.962 . 764 5.037 
INDUS2(2) -. 070 . 361 . 038 1 . 846 . 932 . 460 1.890 
BIMANI 1.052 . 391 7.249 1 . 007 2.864 1.331 6.16 
OREMPNO 1.088 2 . 580 
OREMPNO(1) 
. 
839 
. 
811 1.069 1 
. 
301 2.314 
. 
472 1 1.3 54 
OREMPNO(2) . 146 . 414 . 124 1 . 724 1.157 . 514 2.602' 
ORASSET 3.658 2 . 161 
ORASSET(1) 1.381 . 723 3.645 1 . 056 3.978 . 964 16.413 
ORASSET(2) . 413 . 421 . 958 1 . 328 1.511 . 661 3.451 
SEGMENT 1.228 . 399 9.488 1 . 002 3.414 1.563 7.457 
Constant -3.351 . 726 21.323 1 . 000 . 035 
Step 6 LEVERAGE -. 600 . 
787 
. 
581 1 
. 
446 
. 
549 
. 
117 2.567 
FREFLOAT -. 552 . 672 . 675 1 . 
411 . 576 . 154 2.148 
FORSUB 
. 
546 
. 
441 1.535 1 
. 
215 1.726 
. 
728 4.095 
AUDITOR 
. 
669 
. 
318 4.419 1 
. 
036 1.951 1.046 3.639 
LIST . 546 . 617 . 782 
1 . 377 1.726 . 515 5.783 
FORINVES . 192 . 388 . 245 
1 . 621 1.211 . 567 
2.590 
FORMANG . 456 . 367 1.539 
1 . 215 1.577 . 
768 3.239 
INDUS2 3.021 2 . 
221 
INDUS2(1) . 
663 
. 
480 1.912 1 . 
167 1.941 . 
758 4.970 
INDUS2(2) -. 061 . 360 . 
028 1 . 866 . 941 . 
465 1.905 
BIMANI 1.034 . 389 7.051 
1 . 008 2.812 1.311 
6.032 
OREMPNO 1.117 2 . 572 
OREMPNO(1) . 
852 
. 
811 1.104 1 . 
293 2.344 . 
478 11.483 
OREMPNO(2) . 
157 . 
413 
. 
145 1 . 
704 1.170 . 
521 2.631 
ORASSET 3.706 2 . 157 
ORASSET(1) 1.388 . 723 
3.683 1 . 055 
4.009 . 971 16.551 
ORASSET(2) . 428 . 
421 1.034 1 . 309 
1.535 . 672 3.503 
SEGMENT 1.241 . 398 
9.718 1 . 002 
3.458 1.585 7.542 
Constant -3.282 . 707 
21.565 1 . 000 . 
038 
Step 7 LEVERAGE -. 596 . 786 . 
575 1 . 448 . 
551 . 118 
2.573 
FREFLOAT -. 561 . 670 . 
701 1 . 402 . 
571 . 154 2.121 
FORSUB . 515 . 
436 1.397 1 . 237 
1.674 . 713 3.931 
AUDITOR . 677 . 
317 4.563 1 . 033 
1.969 1.057 3.666 
LIST . 559 . 
616 . 825 
1 . 364 
1.750 . 523 
5.851 
FORMANG . 537 . 
328 2.671 1 . 102 
1.711 . 899 
3.256 
INDUS2 2.949 2 . 229 
INDUS2(1) . 648 . 
479 1.828 1 . 176 
1.911 . 747 
4.889 
INDUS2(2) -. 070 . 359 . 
038 1 . 846 . 
933 . 461 
1.885 
BIMANI 1.040 . 389 
7.138 1 . 008 
2.830 1.319 6.069 
OREMPNO 1.206 2 . 547 
OREMPNO(1) . 883 . 
810 1.189 1 . 276 
2.419 . 494 
11.840 
OREMPNO(2) . 159 . 
414 . 147 
1 . 701 
1.172 . 521 
2.637 
ORASSET 3.619 2 . 164 
ORASSET(1) 1.369 . 723 3.591 
1 . 058 
3.933 . 954 
16.213 
ORASSET(2) . 430 . 421 1.046 
1 . 306 
1.538 . 674 
3.510 
SEGMENT 1.205 . 390 9.568 
1 . 002 3.337 
1.555 7.160 
Constant -3.207 . 689 21.691 
1 . 000 . 
040 
Step 8 LEVERAGE 
FREFLOAT 
-. 486 
-. 566 
. 776 
. 665 
. 392 
. 724 
1 
1 
. 531 
. 395 
. 615 
. 568 
. 134 
. 154 
2.817 
2.091 
ýý 
4ppendices 
FORSUB . 545 . 435 1.573 1 . 210 1.725 . 736 4.042 AUDITOR . 670 . 316 4.482 1 . 034 1.954 1.051 3.634 
LIST . 684 . 597 1.314 1 . 252 1.982 . 615 6.381 FORMANG . 545 . 326 2.799 1 . 094 1.725 . 
911 3.269 
INDUS2 2.840 2 . 242 INDUS2(1) . 645 . 478 1.824 1 . 177 1.907 . 747 4.863 INDUS2(2) -. 052 . 356 . 021 1 . 884 . 949 . 472 1.909 BIMAN I 1.020 . 386 6.983 1 . 008 2.772 1.301 5.906 ORASSET 14.152 2 . 001 ORASSET(1) 1.918 
. 512 14.045 1 . 000 6.806 2.496 18.555 ORASSET(2) . 507 . 377 1.812 1 . 178 1.661 . 793 3.476 SEGMENT 1.240 
. 384 10.402 1 . 001 3.456 1.627 7.342 Constant -3.279 . 688 22.740 1 . 000 . 038 Step 9 FREFLOAT -. 601 . 662 . 822 1 . 365 . 548 . 150 2.009 FORSUB . 537 . 433 1.540 1 . 215 1.712 . 732 4.001 AUDITOR 
. 665 . 316 4.435 1 . 035 1.945 1.047 3.613 
LIST . 707 . 596 1.410 1 . 235 2.028 . 631 6.518 FORMANG . 529 . 325 2.652 1 . 103 1.697 . 898 3.208 
INDUS2 3.028 2 . 220 
INDUS2(1) . 690 . 473 2.128 1 . 145 1.993 . 789 5.036 
INDUS2(2) -. 021 . 
353 
. 
003 1 
. 
954 
. 
980 
. 
491 1.957 
BIMANI . 998 . 384 6.773 1 . 009 2.714 1.280 5.757 
ORASSET 14.258 2 
. 
001 
ORASSET(1) 1.925 . 512 14.135 1 . 000 6.858 2.513 18.711 
ORASSET(2) . 501 . 376 1.774 1 . 183 
1.650 . 790 3.447 
SEGMENT 1.231 
. 
383 10.339 1 . 
001 3.426 1.617 7.256 
Constant -3.491 . 601 33.708 1 . 000 . 
030 
Step 10 FORSUB . 
525 
. 
433 1.471 1 . 
225 1.690 
. 
724 3.948 
AUDITOR . 666 . 315 4.466 
1 . 035 1.947 1.049 3.611 
LIST . 568 . 576 . 
973 1 . 324 1.764 . 571 5.452 
FORMANG . 528 . 324 
2.662 1 . 103 1.696 . 
899 3.200 
INDUS2 2.652 2 . 266 
INDUS2(1) . 625 . 466 
1.798 1 . 180 1.868 . 749 
4.658 
INDUS2(2) -. 038 . 351 . 
012 1 . 914 . 963 . 484 1.916 
BIMAN I . 944 . 
377 6.291 1 . 012 2.572 
1.229 5.379 
ORASSET 14.298 2 . 
001 
ORASSET(1) 1.930 . 512 
14.213 1 . 000 6.891 
2.526 18.799 
ORASSET(2) . 516 . 
374 1.900 1 . 168 1.675 . 
804 3.490 
SEGMENT 1.112 . 357 
9.691 1 . 002 3.041 
1.510 6.125 
Constant -3.562 . 592 
36.242 1 . 000 . 
028 
Step 11 FORSUB . 540 . 
434 1.550 1 . 213 
1.716 . 734 4.014 
AUDITOR . 686 . 
314 4.771 1 . 029 
1.986 1.073 3.675 
FORMANG . 567 . 
321 3.129 1 . 077 
1.763 . 941 3.305 
INDUS2 2.657 2 . 265 
INDUS2(1) . 647 . 
466 1.932 1 . 165 
1.911 . 767 4.760 
INDUS2(2) -. 008 . 349 . 
001 1 . 982 . 
992 . 500 1.967 
BIMANI . 920 . 375 
6.011 1 . 014 
'. 510 1.203 5.240 
ORASSET 20.888 2 . 000 
ORASSET(1) 2.132 . 471 
20.449 1 . 000 
8.428 3.346 21.229_ 
ORASSET(2) . 538 . 374 2.071 
1 . 150 
1.712 . 823 
3.560 
SEGMENT 1.179 . 353 11.145 1 . 
001 3.250 1.627 6.494 
Constant -3.643 . 590 38.164 1 . 000 . 
026 
step 12 FORSUB 
AUDITOR 
. 571 
. 685 
. 429 
. 314 
1.772 
4.766 
1 
1 
. 183 
. 029 
1.769 
1.984 
. 764 
1.073 
4.099 
3.669 
ý ýý 
-l1)j)c 11 Iic'c'X 
FORMANG 
. 544 . 319 2.908 1 . 088 1.7'3 . 
922 ;. 221 
BIMANI 
. 909 . 372 5.971 1 . 015 2.482' 1.197 5.146 ORASSET 22.226 2 . 000 ORASSET(1) 2.186 
. 467 21.889 1 . 000 8.898 3.561 22.23' ORASSET(2) 
. 567 . 369 2.358 1 . 125 1.763 . 855 3.636 SEGMENT 1.102 
. 346 10.133 1 . 001 3.01 1 1.527 5.9 36 Constant -3.520 . 550 40.903 1 . 000 . 030 Step 13 AUDITOR . 696 . 312 4.963 1 . 026 2.006 1.087 3.700 FORMANG . 618 . 314 3.855 1 . 050 1.854 1.001 3.435 
BIMANI . 819 . 364 5.054 1 . 025 2.268 1.111 4.632 
ORASSET 22.727 2 . 000 
ORASSET(1) 2.196 . 465 22.308 1 . 000 8.987 3.613 22.354 
ORASSET(2) . 557 . 368 2.287 1 . 130 1.745 . 848 3.59 3 
SEGMENT 1.201 . 339 12.518 1 . 000 3.323 1.708 6.40.1 
Constant -3.117 . 
445 49.083 1 
. 
000 
. 
044 
Variable(s) entered on step 1: LEVERAGE, PROFITI, FREFLOAT, F_SUB, AUDITOR, LS. 
FORINVS2, FORMANG, INDUS2, BIMANI, BIMAN2, BIMAN3, OR3EMPNO, OR3ASSET, 
OR3TURN, PROFIT2, and SEGMENT. 
-,,, Vii. 
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10.7 Appendix 10.7: Steps of backward elimination that result in the adopted 
model for the Neuer Markt. 
B S. E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95.0% C. Lfor 
EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Step I SEMPNO 
. 022 . 022 1.039 1 . 308 1.023 . 980 1.067 
LEVERAGE -1.688 . 848 3.958 1 . 047 . 185 . 035 . 975 PROFIT I -1.214 . 438 7.678 1 . 006 . 297 . 126 . 701 
MAN3 -. 334 . 
721 
. 
214 1 
. 
644 
. 
716 
. 
174 2.943 
FREFLOAT -. 055 . 890 . 004 1 . 951 . 947 . 166 5.414 
AUDITOR . 906 . 304 8.898 1 . 003 2.474 1.364 4.487 
US MAN . 779 . 636 1.501 1 . 220 2.179 . 627 7.576 
USSUB . 659 . 307 4.622 1 . 032 1.934 1.060 3.527 
USINVS2 1.189 . 816 2.120 1 . 145 3.283 . 663 16.260 
INDUS3 5.732 3 . 125 
INDUS3(1) 1.280 . 690 3.445 1 . 063 3.597 . 931 13.899 
INDUS3(2) . 815 . 547 2.220 1 . 136 2.258 . 773 6.593 
INDUS3(3) 1.238 . 556 4.955 1 . 026 3.448 1.159 10.254 
Constant -1.795 . 778 5.327 1 . 021 . 166 
Step 2 SEMPNO . 022 . 022 1.067 1 . 302 1.023 . 980 1.067 
LEVERAGE -1.691 . 846 3.996 1 . 046 . 
184 . 035 . 967 
PROFIT I -1.214 . 438 7.672 1 . 006 . 297 . 126 . 701 
MAN3 -. 318 . 
672 
. 
223 1 
. 
637 
. 
728 
. 
195 2.718 
AUDITOR . 908 . 303 8.989 1 . 
003 2.478 1.369 4.485 
US MAN . 779 . 636 1.503 1 . 
220 2.180 . 627 7.576 
USSUB . 658 . 306 4.627 1 . 
031 1.931 1.060 3.518 
USINVS2 1.194 . 812 2.162 1 . 
141 3.300 . 672 16.205 
INDUS3 
413 5.733 3 . 125 
INDUS3(1) 1.279 . 690 3.440 
1 . 064 3.593 . 
930 13.878 
INDUS3(2) . 813 . 546 
2.215 1 . 137 2.255 . 
773 6.581 
INDUS3(3) 1.236 . 555 4.956 
1 . 026 3.441 
1.159 10.211 
Constant -1.822 . 648 7.909 
1 . 005 . 162 
Step 3 SEMPNO . 022 . 
022 1.039 1 . 308 1.022 . 
980 1.067 
LEVERAGE -1.745 . 837 
4.350 1 . 037 . 175 . 
034 . 900 
PROFIT I -1.253 . 432 
8.425 1 . 004 . 
286 . 123 . 666 
AUDITOR . 928 . 
300 9.563 1 . 002 2.528 
1.404 4.552 
US MAN . 768 . 
630 1.485 1 . 223 
2.156 . 627 7.415 
USSUB . 
660 . 306 
4.663 1 . 031 
1.935 1.063 3.523 
USINVS2 1.228 . 
805 2.324 1 . 127 
3.414 . 704 
16.552 
INDUS3 6.154 3 . 104 
INDUS3(1) 1.291 . 689 
3.510 1 . 061 
3.637 . 942 14.039 
INDUS3(2) . 803 . 
548 2.147 1 . 143 
2.231 . 763 
6.527 
INDUS3(3) 1.262 . 554 
5.182 1 . 023 
3.532 1.192 10.469 
Constant -1.930 . 608 
10.065 1 . 
002 . 145 
Step 4 LEVERAGE -1.446 . 778 
3.453 1 . 063 . 
236 . 051 1.082 
PROF ITI -1.176 . 423 7.727 
1 . 005 . 
309 . 135 . 
707 
AUDITOR . 972 . 297 10.748 
1 . 001 
2.645 1.479 4.730 
US MAN . 735 . 626 1.377 
1 . 241 
2.086 . 611 
7.120 
USSUB . 703 . 303 5.393 1 . 
020 2.019 1.116 3.653 
4'' Categories are= INDUS (1)=SOFTWARE, INDUS(2)=PHARMA, INUS(3)=OTHER, and 
INDI IS(4)=MEDIA (reference categorv) 
1lý 
-iJ)J endiC(LS' 
USINVS2 
INDUS3 
1.205 . 804 2.247 
6.813 
1 . 134 
3 . 078 
3.336 . 690 16.118 
INDUS3(1) 1.317 . 688 3.663 
1 . 056 3.733 . 969 14.382 
INDUS3(2) 
. 892 . 542 
2.705 1 . 100 2.439 . 843 7.058 
INDUS3(3) 1.355 . 548 
6.107 1 . 013 3.875 1.323 11.345 
Constant -2.013 . 605 11.055 1 . 001 . 134 Step 5 LEVERAGE -1.525 . 774 3.884 1 . 049 . 218 . 048 . 992 
PROFIT] -1.178 . 419 7.917 1 . 005 . 308 . 136 . 700 
AUDITOR . 984 . 296 11.071 1 . 001 2.674 1.498 4.773 
USSUB . 774 . 296 6.833 1 . 009 2.168 1.214 3.873 
USINVS2 1.696 . 689 6.068 1 . 014 5.454 1.414 21.031 
INDUS3 6.795 3 . 079 
INDUS3(1) 1.335 . 682 3.833 1 . 050 3.800 . 998 14.466 
INDUS3(2) . 844 . 534 2.493 1 . 114 2.325 . 816 6.627 
INDUS3(3) 1.309 . 539 5.896 1 . 015 3.704 1.287 10.658 
Constant -1.954 . 596 10.749 1 . 001 . 142 
a Variable(s) entered on step 1: SEMPNO, LEVERAGE, PROFIT], MANS, FREFLOAT, 
AUDITOR, US MAN, USSUB, USINVS2, INDUS3. 
n - - 
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